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BP Knew of Deepwater Horizon Problems 11 Months Ago
jkinney3 was one of several readers to send in news of recently discovered internal documents from BP which indicate the company knew "there were serious problems and safety concerns with the Deepwater Horizon rig far earlier than those the company described to Congress last week." According to the New York Times, "The documents show that in March, after several weeks of problems on the rig, BP was struggling with a loss of 'well control.' And as far back as 11 months ago, it was concerned about the well casing and the blowout preventer." Reader bezenek points out this troubling quote about BP's inconsistent risk assessments: "In April of this year, BP engineers concluded that the casing was 'unlikely to be a successful cement job,' according to a document, referring to how the casing would be sealed to prevent gases from escaping up the well. The document also says that the plan for casing the well is 'unable to fulfill M.M.S. regulations,' referring to the Minerals Management Service. A second version of the same document says 'It is possible to obtain a successful cement job' and 'It is possible to fulfill M.M.S. regulations.'"
How does this come as a surprise since the government limits BP's liability to just a drop in the bucket for them? Yeah, they are thinking about retroactively removing it, but seriously, anytime you reduce the liability to an artificially low number, you are just asking for trouble.
Taxation is legalized theft, no more, no less.
Did they not honestly believe that a disaster could occur? Did the right people not talk to each other? Or was the urge to cut corners simply so great that people ignored the risk?
From the ABC interview with one of the survivors, the BP people were arguing with the Transocean people, insisting that it would be ok to skip some phases of sealing the well because they wanted to move the schedule up. I wonder what that BP manager was thinking.
For every problem, there is at least one solution that is simple, neat, and wrong.
From here:
Was anyone else reminded of that little gem?
"Live as if you'll die tomorrow." Ridiculous. You could die later today.
If you do want to "own" this disaster and take responsibility then here is a challenge for you. Take this memo and every other smoking gun a decent investigation will reveal and seize BP and all its assets. Take the assets of ALL the top level execs and board, use that to pay for the clean up. Hold those same people criminally responsible for ALL of this and imprison them. Have BP continue to run and use all of its future profits and assets to fund some proper alternative fuel projects, or just pay off the national debt.
This is something the people would gladly see happen. It may restore some faith in us, letting us know the gov't is not completely corrupt and run by these bastards. And it would go a long way to prove you are not just a puppet who provides lip service on the news. It could show you actually give a damn.
So, are you willing to be the change you spoke about?
20% bonus if I come in ahead of schedule. etc etc etc.
Deleted
That's right, it's not the engineers who run those companies and when I point this obvious fact out it gets a 'flamebait' score.
If it's a flamebait, then I am going for it again. ... BP, Transocean, Halliburton have not rationally considered the options and have not rationally analyzed the feasibility. They are doing exactly the same thing they have been doing for the past 30 years at least. The current oil spill is a mirror image of the Ixtoc disaster, the difference is just how deep they are drilling. They couldn't stop the spill in 50 meters of water with the blow out preventer, it did not work then, didn't work now; with the 'sombrero' = 'top hat', with the 'junk shot'= some metal balls they were throwing into the well then, they couldn't stop the leak with pumping the mud='top kill' etc.
Engineers can take all the offense they like, but this is simply the truth. Engineers are not running BP or Transocean or Halliburton. Engineers matter only to the question 'how much more money can we dig out of the earth' and not 'how do we deal with a disaster we may cause'.
You can't handle the truth.
Like 9/11 and terrorism have anything to do with oil... err wait.
Fines don't amount to much, even if they're huge -- shareholders get hurt, but the decisionmakers don't get hurt enough.
The solution: long jail sentences, from the CEO on down to middle management. If you knew about this and were anything but a prole, you need to go to jail. A policy like this and management will consider safety far more important than they do now.
P.S. Same goes for Massey up in West Virginia, etc.
Support a few technologists in Washington.
No.
What I would really like to see is the risk analysis report. How cautionary were the warnings of the engineers and how did the pencil pushers at the top translate this as an acceptable risk?
"No doubt one may quote history to support any cause, as the devil quotes scripture." - Learned Hand
While the top guys are often not engineers, what you're saying isn't entirely true. They have very rationally considered the options. Here's a nice link to a technical briefing from last week where they outline their options and the current situation.
In addition Tony Hayward is a geologist with a PhD.
Read what I mean, not what I wrote.
Oh, like this.
First of all, the sections of pipe are joined mechanically, and sealed with O-rings. The O-rings are specified for shallow water pressures (and temperatures), and rather than use adequate deep water parts, the shallow water parts were continued to avoid mandatory Federal oversight and testing.
On top of that, deadlines for completion were already tight, as no schedule variability was provided for unforeseen events, such as severe weather, that might hamper drilling and well conversion efforts. The conversion from an exploratory/research structure into a production well was a hard deadline, and pressure was on internally from the otherwise stagnant middle managers clamoring for achievement. There was no room for failure with a project named Deepwater Horizon.
As engineers' warnings flowed up the chain of command, the wording changed from "grave concern" to "concern" to "noted comment" to eventually "thumbs up!". Inter-hierarchical presentations followed a strict time schedule, so power point mentality and "no bad news up" reigned.
That reminds me of this old classic:
In the beginning was the Plan.
And then came the Assumptions.
And the Assumptions were without form.
And the Plan was without substance.
And darkness was upon the face of the workers.
And they spoke among themselves, saying, "It is a crock of shit, and it stinks."
And the workers went unto their Supervisors and said, "It is a pail of dung, and we can't live with the smell."
And the Supervisors went unto their Managers, saying "It is a container of excrement, and it is very strong, such that none may abide by it."
And the Managers went unto their Directors, saying "It is a vessel of fertilizer and none may abide its strength."
And the Directors spoke among themselves, saying to one another, "It contains that which aids plant growth, and it is very strong."
And the Directors went to the Vice Presidents, saying unto them, "It promotes growth, and it is very powerful."
And the Vice Presidents went to the President, saying unto him, "This new plan will actively promote the growth and vigor of the company with powerful effects."
And the President looked upon the Plan and saw that it was good.
And the Plan became Policy.
And that is how shit happens.
Momentarily, the need for the construction of new light will no longer exist.
Well since BP's unconscionable business practices are being thoroughly exposed, you don't necessarily have to give them a second chance. There's a point where their organization is so flawed that it would be an unacceptable danger to have these people continue to drill when millions of lives can be affected. The best solution may be to dismantle BP's US operations entirely and let it serve as a warning to the rest.
FWIW, I believe that under law the top level executives and the board of directors ARE personally liable. But somehow the prosecutors don't find those targets appealing, and they get to choose which cases they prosecute.
It doesn't *have* to be corruption. That's only one possibility. Personally, I think it is, but only if you give corruption a very wide interpretation. If a DA prosecutes someone powerful, whether they win or lose their career is probably over. Same for the Attorney Generals, but with a tougher criterion for powerful. And judges also, for whatever reason, tend to give favorable treatment beyond the bounds of law or reason to the more powerful.
They *laws* are fair (in the sense recognized by François Villon: simplified"The law forbids both the rich and the poor from sleeping under the bridge."), but the enforcement isn't even fair in that sense.
I think we've pushed this "anyone can grow up to be president" thing too far.
Like Nigeria. From that article,
.
"When I first heard Daydream Nation it quite frankly scared the living shit out of me." -- Matthew Stearns
Does this really surprise anyone?
Yes, I am surprised. In one really important regard:
That NYT piece is an excellent piece of reporting. It gets to the facts - some of which are decidedly uncomfortable for both the government & BP and many of which required considerable research and effort - it ties everything nicely together and, without commentary, innuendo or logical fallacy, manages to paint a compelling picture of corporate and bureaucratic laxity.
Congratulations to Brown and Lehren for an excellent and important piece of work. This kind of journalism is exactly what we need.
Crumb's Corollary: Never bring a knife to a bun fight.
Anyone who has had any experience with drilling opreations in the gulf will know that loss of drilling fluids, kicks and other well control events are common, expected and routine. Dressing them up to be problems with the well design is pure horsepuckey. If you don't know what you're talking about then STFU. Even so-called "underground blowouts" are common and can be insured by lloyds. Furthermore the phrase 'casing was unlikely to be a successful cement job' makes no sense. The article is poorly written by people who do not have a grasp of oilfield equipment and procedures and obviously could not be bothered consulting with someone who was in the rush to attempt to smear Pulitzer all over themselves. Now, this statement has nothing whatsoever to do with the actual issues which were: failure on BP and Transoceans part to identify excessive fluid flows following the cementation of the production liner AND failure (or so it seems from public information) to maintain the BOP- quite a difficult task given its located at the sea floor but any indication that it has problems should call for immediate halt and repair work. When drilling any well, your BOP is all that stands between you, catastrophe and death. /rant