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Photo Kiosks Infecting Customers' USB Devices
The Risky Biz blog brings news that Big W, a subsidiary of Woolworths, has Windows-based Fuji photo kiosks in at least some of its stores that don't run antivirus software, and are therefore spreading infections, such as Trojan-Poison-36, via customers' USB storage devices. Here is the account of the original reporter. "It's not just the lack of AV that's the problem... it appears there's been zero thought put into the problem of malware spreading via these kiosks. Why not just treat customers' USB devices as read-only? Why allow the kiosks to write to them at all? It would be interesting to find out which company — Fuji, Big W, or even some other third party — is responsible for the maintenance of the machines. It would also be interesting to find out if there are any liability issues here for Big W in light of its boneheaded lack of security planning."
Did they not learn this in programming school? Does not every programming tutorial and system administrator handbook start with this?
The first thing I learned (fortunately not the hard way) was, that, nevermind the specs, input is allways malformed, user input doubly so...
System Administration 101
Windows autorun viruses: Annoying if you use Windows, easy to ignore if you don't.
Vuvuzelas: Annoying if you watch soccer, easy to ignore if you don't.
I've seen them, but that's not the point - the point is that the kiosk itself should be mounting the stick as read-only regardless of how the stick itself is configured. There should be absolutely no way for the kiosk to write to the stick; otherwise you risk an error (or something malicious, as in this case) wiping out the customer's data or (again, as in this case) potentially infecting their machine.
It's official. Most of you are morons.
I would guess Fuji is responsible for these machines. I work for Target, and ALL equipment, kiosks included, in our Kodak labs are serviced by Kodak field techs.
Incidentally, we are allowed to connect guests' media to the kiosks ONLY, never directly to any other lab workstation, because the kiosks are (or at least are supposed to be) far better locked down, including treating all media as read-only.
virus.code
line 1: remount USB write enabled
Just burn a CD and give it to them. Blank CDs cost like 10 cents each if you buy a spindle, and you don't have to worry about them losing your USB drive or infecting it.
More people need to know about this: /FS:NTFS /X
You can make your usb stick immune to all autorun viruses. Simply make an empty autorun.inf file on the usb stick, set file permissions for username " everyone " to Full control: Deny all.
Now noone can delete, write, rename that file and viruses aren't smart enough yet to take over control or delete permissions on the file. The file system on the stick would have to be ntfs. If the file system on it is fat32 you'll need to run from cmd
convert Z:
Where Z is the partition letter of your usb stick. You can also disable autorun on all partitions using TweakUI
"Customers USB Devices Infecting Photo Kiosks".
Wow, it took me all of 30 seconds to find evidence that you're a lazy raging retard who shouldn't be trusted with a calculator, let alone a general purpose computing device. I know that's a long name for the link, but I really felt it needed to be said.
If you were blocking sigs, you wouldn't have to read this.
Must... resist... "yo momma" joke.
How much storage space do you mind losing to viruses though? Windows viruses. Come on, unleash your anger!
If you were blocking sigs, you wouldn't have to read this.
I used to work on similar kiosks a few years back, those also had no AV, but usually that wasn't a problem.
They ran a hardened win2k, no network services, autorun disabled, afair execution for all drives but C: disabled.
So how the f* would they get infected in the first place?
Lazy techs, at least that was the #1 cause for troubles for back then, everything from re-enabling services to installing 3rd party RA software with no/weak passwords...
The kiosk situation is generally lousy.
Do they keep a copy of all my pics?
They make a copy (they have to, to display thumbnails), but is it temporary or permanent ("To improve the quality of our service...").
There should be a law prohibiting the keeping of copies without express permission, and they shouldn't be allowed to make unrelated functionality dependent on the user agreeing to let them keep a copy.
Copyright law might work here, but I imagine the kiosk companies have found a way around that. Maybe there's a "Terms of user" stick on the back of the machine mentioning that they keep copies, etc.
Expert in software patents or patent law? Contribute to the ESP wiki!
Why run windows on these kiosks? An embedded OS would be more suitable and cheaper...
Why execute anything thats stored on the usb sticks? That's just colossally stupid, i could understand if some malware was getting onto the devices by exploiting a bug in the jpeg parser or similar, but executing any code on an inserted device is just ridiculous.
Why is the inserted media not mounted read only? These kiosks only need to print photos, they don't need to write to the media.
Why is the system drive writable?
Why is the kiosk software running as a privileged user?
The idea of installing antivirus on them is a stupid one, it will increase the cost, require the kiosks to be updated somehow (either necessitating frequent engineer visits or require a network connection), and no antivirus detects everything (i often do incident response when a customer system has been compromised, in every single case there has been some kind of av product installed and it failed to detect the compromise even tho in most cases the malware installed is well known to other av products).
Also an av product may detect a false positive on a customer's media device and delete their data which could open the kiosk vendor up to potential liability.
Instead, run an embedded linux on these systems...
the frontend software is custom written anyway so could just be written for linux instead without too much difficulty..
less to go wrong since such an os could be stripped to its bare minimum
less cost - there would be no per unit licensing costs..
mount any customer supplied media readonly and noexec.
boot the os from readonly flash so the os cannot be tampered with and any problems a reboot will restore it to default/clean settings
use ram for temporary storage (or a small disk which is reformatted at boot if more storage is required) so after a power cycle, anything left on there is gone
if any persistent storage is required (eg for logs) use a remote syslog server, a receipt printer, or a small disk mounted noexec
use something like an internal readonly compact flash card for the os, when an engineer has to upgrade all he needs to is swap the card out.
http://spamdecoy.net - free throwaway anonymous email - avoid spam!
I did own an Agfa Photo Kiosk. It didn't have an AV by default and it ran "Windows XP embedded edition" that prevented me from installing an AV (installers didn't allow me to do an install.). I saved a raw image of the hard disk for safety and allowed it to infect customers. It was a security nightmare. Viruses had their way into the machine, but AV software didn't. Autorun was a requirement for the kiosk software to process photos and could not be disabled.
1. download random pic from Internet. ...
2. put it on stick, along with Virus
3. infect kiosk
4. from now on, kiosks substitutes customers photos with "random internet pic" from step 1 somewhere between the time the order has been validated, and when it will be printed.
5.
6. Sit back and watch the fun as customer comes back to pick up his photos...