Dell Ships Infected Motherboards
An anonymous reader writes "Computer maker Dell is warning that some of its server motherboards have been delivered to customers carrying an unwanted extra: computer malware. It could be confirmation that the 'hardware trojans' long posited by some security experts are indeed a real threat."
The Pentagon is spending millions on research designed to ensure it can trust the microchips in critical systems, especially those made outside the US.
- I think the only true way to be sure is to manufacture the microchips yourself, of-course this costs much more than millions.
This comes down to the old question raised by Ken Thompson of Trusting Trust.
You can't handle the truth.
It's firmware, meaning software in a ROM. It's only slightly unconventional.
And they say it's only on motherboards sent out as replacements. Interesting, you would think this would make it fairly easy to identify the source.
Basically the entire computer's assembled in a sweatshop by barely literate people who are being paid jack-shit to assemble a "rich-boy toy" for some perceived fat cat in the US who sleeps on piles of money.
How the hell would they know if someone decided to pull a dick move like this?
And for what they're being *COUGH*paid*COUGH*, why the hell would they even care?
Chas - The one, the only.
THANK GOD!!!
Arguably the IPMI is one step easier than just the motheboard firmware. Those suckers are basically little embedded computers, typically running linux or vxworks, with their own processor and everything. They happen to be physically coupled to the motherboards of larger devices; but, architecturally, they are basically the same as any of the "little bitty plastic box" style embedded network appliances.
Given the fact that embedded appliances frequently have security made of pure shit, and servers are rather high value targets, the only real surprise is that they aren't targeted more often. Especially, if you are super lucky, the IPMI card will be connected to the oh-so-special-and-physically-separate-for-security "management network", which is where all the juicy; but often vulnerable, management interfaces live. Nice place to have an attack platform silently embedded...
Unfortunately you cannot QA 100% of everything you ship without significantly affecting costs - as the article states, Dell is saying that this affects a small number of motherboards sent out in a particular manner, so its quite possible that this slipped through a random item QA testing net out into the open without there being any real QA procedure issue.
Why is this modded flamebait? It seems like a legitimate question for someone unfamiliar with why this is interesting.
"If you see a man on a horse, he is likely an enemy. Kill the man and eat the horse."