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US Ability To Identify Source of Nuclear Weapons Decays
Hugh Pickens writes "The NY Times covers a report released by the National Research Council, which says the ability of the US to identify the source of a nuclear weapon used in a terrorist attack is fragile and eroding. The goals of the highly specialized detective work, known as nuclear attribution, is to clarify options for retaliation and to deter terrorists by letting them know that nuclear devices have fingerprints that atomic specialists can find and trace. 'Although US nuclear forensics capabilities are substantial and can be improved, right now they are fragile, under-resourced and, in some respects, deteriorating,' the report warns. 'Without strong leadership, careful planning and additional funds, these capabilities will decline.' The report calls on the federal government to take steps to strengthen its forensic capabilities and argues for the necessity of better planning, more robust budgets, clearer lines of authority and more realistic exercises."
If a nuke goes off in a US city, we have an excuse for stalling on identifying who's responsible while politicians have a knee-jerk reaction and send US soldiers (or missiles, or UAV's) off on another enormously profitable foreign adventure. And if it turns out they're wrong, we can blame it on anonymous technicians with "decaying skills".
I wonder if you realize how right you are about the way the USA does things. From the summary:
You know what else is fragile, under-resourced, and in many respects deteriorating? Our willingness to examine the connection between meddling in the affairs of soverign nations and their more radical factions' desire to go to extremes in order to attack us.
For those who feel inclined to speak about this without having done any research (like that stops anyone these days), I'll sum it up briefly. The USA has a habit of using its intelligence services to overthrow democratically elected officials in foreign countries and usually replaces them with dictators more favorable to its economic interests. Iran during the 1950s is a good example, though only one of many. Do a little research and it is easy enough to come up with several examples of this behavior.
Does anyone plan to argue that this does not constitute provocation in the eyes of those who suffer because of this practice? Yes, the way they retaliate is inhuman and reprehensible, particularly when they go after civilians. I fully agree with that. What I reject is the notion that "they hate us because of our freedoms". I think it's more like, they hate us because they want to be left alone. If that's the case, and if our goal is to end this sort of terrorism, our first responsibility is to end the practices of ours that encourage it. Then we are in a better position to go after the people who persist and come up with better ways to deter them.
If anyone wants a list that they can start researching, I found a decent one here. It's just a list to help you get started. If you want to be informed on this subject you will have to do your own research. If you take the time to do that, however, what will amaze you is how little retaliation there has been.
It is a miracle that curiosity survives formal education. - Einstein
Also, Sandia is not the design lab you are looking for. You are confusing them with Los Alamos and Livermore.
I respect the fact that you have a four digit UID, but the problem is not as trivial as you make it out to be.
I'm no physicist, but the first thing that came to mind--without having any idea how they actually track this stuff--is doping.
One would think that the places that produced this stuff would automatically fingerprint it by doping the material with rare elements, stuff that can only be produced in expensive labs or the nuclear plants themselves--such as Neptunium and Protactinium. Just enough of the elements, and in proportions specific to the place of origin, to ID the source of the product.
Whether or not this stuff would be intact and usable for identification purposes after a detonation, no idea, but it would at least allow for confirmation-of-source on materials before they are actually incorporated into a device. And, lets face it, this is the time we want to be identifying sources--not when we are taking ground-zero samples.
They would be able to tell that a given sample was from a fast-breeder reactor, they'd also be able to tell that it was not one they'd got data for and they'd probably be able to tell which uranium mine the ore was from (there aren't many and no more are likely to be discovered at any depth we have the technology to operate at at this time). Since the fingerprint is unique, and since radioactive waste is awfully hard to get rid of subtly, it would be extremely quick and easy to find where the reactor was.
An example of just how hard it is to hide these kinds of signatures -- the Russian who was poisoned by Polonium in London some years back. They can identify not only which reactor but which reactor vessel that Polonium came from. And that was with a very very trace sample. (As I recall, it was identified within a few hours of it being established Polonium was used.) Polonium has a half-life of 138.376 days. Since Britain closed Daresbury's 20MeV tandem accelerator, the options for doing a high-resolution run would have been limited, but they would certainly have been able to tell to within a day or two when the Polonium had been produced.
THAT is the kind of fingerprinting that can be done. Hell, even with my A-Level project software, I was able to isolate almost every radioisotope in the Chernobyl fallout from just the gamma signatures and no AMS at all. (Every radioisotope not only has a unique mass, it also has a unique energy signature.)
What would it take to get a sample for analyzing? Well, you get a bucket that you can open and close at both ends. You lower it into the water and take a sample. There won't be much plutonium or uranium floating near the surface, but there'll be enough even a few feet below to analyze. Back in 1978, that's how most of the research on the nuclear waste in the Irish Sea was done - with buckets, string, a dinghy and someone to keep look-out. Nothing fancier was needed and the results were staggeringly good. An actual core sample from the radioactive sludge would not have given you better results.
The thing is, it's almost impossible for a reactor to not release enough waste for it to be (a) identified as a nuclear reactor, and (b) listed alongside its radioisotope signature. No country - USA and Russia included - has ever successfully hidden a reactor. At least, not for more than about a week. And the kit needed by a radiochemist to do any serious work is virtually nothing. At the time of Chernobyl, it was possible to take a mobile lab up to any farm in the Cumbrian hills and do studies of soil, lichen and sheep. If the US Navy can't fit such a lab into a small manned submersible or even an ROV, it's their own damn fault.
It's a small world and it smells funny; I'd buy another if it wasn't for the money; Take back what I paid (SoM)