Slashdot Mirror
Launch Command Preserved In Power Failure, But Nuclear Designs Still Risky
With a follow-up to Tuesday's story, Martin Hellman writes "Slashdot reported that a system failure at Warren AFB in Wyoming affected 50 ICBMs and that 'various security protocols built into the missile delivery system, like intrusion alarms and warhead separation alarms, were offline.' Assuaging fears that America's nuclear deterrent might have been compromised during this failure, the source article notes that the missiles still could be launched from airborne command centers. Other reports cite an administration official offering assurances that 'at no time did the president's ability [to launch] decrease.' Given the difficulty of debugging software and hardware that is probably not a good thing. The history of nuclear command and control systems has too many examples of risky designs that favor the ability to launch over the danger of an accidental one."
"risky designs that favor the ability to launch"
There are multiple safeguards built into the system that have to be released in order to launch even one missile. None of the safeguards are coupled, meaning that there is no cascading effect. Each one has different inputs and a different means to activate it.
One of the simplest is that it takes the near-simultaneous activation of two mechanical, key-locked switches to send the fire command to the missile, and these are separated by enough distance that one person can't do it alone. And it only gets to that point after a number of other manual steps have been taken to prep the launch.
Even the President's order is not sufficient to start everything rolling. The people in charge of monitoring the threat systems go to him to ask for authorization. He doesn't go to them - they'd never believe him if he did, since there's no way he'd know there was a threat. And they don't make their decision lightly.
At the point where it's necessary to launch a nuke, it will be blindingly clear to everyone that we should have made the process simpler, not that it is too simple.
They were never intended for the purpose of dealing with smaller scale outbreaks of violence even ones as large as the Iraq war.
Actually they were. It was later decided that this class of weapon countered MAD politics and may actually encourage wide spread use of larger nuclear devices. In turn, these weapons provided limited tactical value, not to mention a long list of logistical and security issues. As such, such weapon programs ceased to be.
Nukes would definitely still be used for tactical purposes in any large-scale military conflict (which hasn't happened for quite a long time). NATO vs Russia, Russia vs China, China vs USA, India vs Pakistan, China vs India - if any of these pairs got into full-scale conflict, then definitely any tight grouping of 100.000+ soldiers+armor should fear a nuclear warhead, and such groupings would be inevitable.
then definitely any tight grouping of 100.000+ soldiers+armor should fear a nuclear warhead, and such groupings would be inevitable.
Wrong answer. No military is going to group 100k soldiers in an area that can taken out by a single warhead, and never would have. Ever. Even in WWII we were only able to kill 100k people by striking civilians. This is the whole reason you have multiple military bases, to distribute you capabilities and make it impossible for an enemy to take out a significant portion with a single strike. With the exception of training bases, military posts generally have less than 10k people, and often less than 5k people stationed there, for this exact reason. The remainder of the work force on a base are civilians.
And you won't see tactical nuclear weapons being used in the field likely ever, as that is the invisible line in the sand that would justify the enemy using nukes, perhaps on civilian targets. And there is no justification for using them against an enemy without nuclear capability. If an enemy used tactical nukes on us, we would still use them as a strategic weapon in retaliation, against fixed targets, not mobile troops. Even though we have them, tactical nuclear weapons make no sense, as they are solely a deterrent, a strategic weapon. Perhaps this is why they were all under SAC (Strategic Air Command) and not TAC (Tactical Air Command) during the Cold War, including all ICBMs (obviously excepting navel based warheads under the Nuclear Triad philosophy: Bombers, ICBMs, Submarines)
So, such groupings are not only NOT inevitable, they are highly unlikely as there is no tactical or strategic advantage to such a grouping, and tremendous risks.
Tequila: It's not just for breakfast anymore!
From the summary: The history of nuclear command and control systems has too many examples of risky designs that favor the ability to launch over the danger of an accidental one.
[[Citation Needed]]
Seriously - because the claim quoted above is not supported in either of the linked articles. In fact, the citations show precisely the *opposite* - as the PALs were specifically intended to reduce the ability to launch in favor of reducing the risk of accidental launch. That they were improperly used is an operational flaw, not a design flaw. (A difference roughly as subtle as a baseball bat upside the head - and that the writers are unaware of this is a sure and certain sign they aren't qualified to write on the topic.)
The writer of the article cited above further compounds his error by using a situation from over three decades ago as 'proof' that a problem exists today - a situation which his own quote shows to no longer exist.
Not willingly, but massed formations can be funneled into areas where nukes can be used on them more effectively; the 1980's version of the Hot Gates. Take a close look at the topography and forested areas of West Germany during the latest part cold war.
Yes, I have seen the big board.
You don't need the code to launch the missiles. You need to codes to tell the people that launch the missiles you are who you say you are.
Have you noticed how much more of a shithole eastern europe and russia is compared to western europe? It isn't a coincidence. The soviets pulled off stunts comparably evil to the Nazis. I am thankful the west and particularly the USA drove them into the ground.
So, have you never read this, or were you being ironic with your signature?
IANYL, IANAL, TINLA, IANAMD, IANAP,