Launch Command Preserved In Power Failure, But Nuclear Designs Still Risky
With a follow-up to Tuesday's story, Martin Hellman writes "Slashdot reported that a system failure at Warren AFB in Wyoming affected 50 ICBMs and that 'various security protocols built into the missile delivery system, like intrusion alarms and warhead separation alarms, were offline.' Assuaging fears that America's nuclear deterrent might have been compromised during this failure, the source article notes that the missiles still could be launched from airborne command centers. Other reports cite an administration official offering assurances that 'at no time did the president's ability [to launch] decrease.' Given the difficulty of debugging software and hardware that is probably not a good thing. The history of nuclear command and control systems has too many examples of risky designs that favor the ability to launch over the danger of an accidental one."
Exaggerated threats from relatively weak entities. Questionable need in 1950 never mind 2010.
RGdot.com
So a previous president lost the biscuit for months at a time. That is the president would have been unable to authenticate to military command that he was giving a launch order. Why was that not considered a problem? When 50 missiles going into a still usable but wacky state is?
It's "Risky." You need to know it's STILL RISKY. Risk we say!
Be worried. Because their is risk. Don't think about the security those nooks have provided since WW2; there was and is absolutely no "risk" that another world wide conflagration might have or will happen without those risky missiles. But those nooks! The nooks are RiSkY you fool. RISKY. Don't worry about the risk to medical capabilities in the US as we legislate someones' idea of justice into medicine, either. No risk there at all. Running up 10% of our GDP as debt every year is also clearly risk free. So you just keep worrying about the nooks! They are Risky!
Clinton never lost the biscuit. Did you see his waistline? ;-)
Seriously though, Clinton didn't lose anything, his aide lost the codes but not the football itself (guess I'm assuming there's more to the football than just a folder of codes). The aide then covered that fact up for months before anyone checking on him bothered to do more than take his word for it.
But Clinton was in no way involved in the loss or cover up of the situation.
People in cars cause accidents....accidents in cars cause people
"In fact, the citations show precisely the *opposite* - as the PALs were specifically intended to reduce the ability to launch in favor of reducing the risk of accidental launch. That they were improperly used is an operational flaw, not a design flaw."
If so, then the distinction between an operational flaw and a design flaw is a distinction without a difference. Or at least one without significance. If a system designed to prevent something from happening can be easily subverted when implemented as designed then it has a huge design flaw. It assumed (and required) that basic security practices would be followed (unique combinations). If this was not followed, it was worthless. This was by design.