Slashdot Mirror
Modeling Software Showed BP Cement As Unstable
DMandPenfold writes "Advanced modeling software analyzed the cementing conditions for BP's Deepwater Horizon oil well as unstable, days before the blast that killed 11 oil rig workers and let millions of barrels of oil spill into the Gulf of Mexico. Halliburton, the company that carried out the cement job, used its own modeling software called OptiCem, to support arguments that more stability was needed for the piping and cement. ... An OptiCem test on 15 April, five days before the blast, stipulated that from Halliburton’s point of view, 21 ‘centralizers’ needed to be added to the well bore. The centralizers are used to provide space around the oil pipe casing within the well, as cement is poured around it, and are a vital part of safe drilling. BP initially adhered to the OptiCem software test and ordered 15 extra centralizers. But when technicians on the rig received the extra centralizers they mistakenly decided the new centralizers were the incorrect type. At this point BP proceeded with the drilling anyway, with the six centralizers, deciding another known technique of injecting cement in other places would work."
So what? BP has massive amounts of money, as well as political connections out the ass. Nothing is going to happen to them, even if half of the Gulf Coast population winds up with cancer. Complain away, Slashdot. If it makes you feel better to post on the intertubes, excellent. Meanwhile, nothing gets done.
Actually I do believe
"Thank you Captain Hindsight", is more appropriate of a comment here.
Translation:
"We have concrete evidence that bp not only dropped the ball, but insisted on risking screwing themselves over. However we're not going to say it was their fault, as they're a big oil company that pays us alot of money."
so much for biting the hand that feeds you.
The issue isn't "omg they ignored the modeling - those bastards!"
The issues are:
1) Was their mistaken belief that the stabilizers were the wrong size reasonable under the circumstances, was it due to an understandable human error, or was it due to gross incompetence?
2) Was the backup plan based on sound engineering and sound industry practices, or was it a "we think this will be okay, let's cross our fingers and drill?"
If the mistake on the stabilizers was reasonable under the circumstances and the backup plan was based on sound engineering and sound industry practices, I don't see any blame as it relates to this particular decision.
On the other hand, if either decision was based on incompetence, then it's easy to pin blame. If the mistake was based on something less than incompetence - say, a competent person demonstrating the reality that good human beings occasionally make mistakes and making a bad or careless decision at what would turn out to be the worst possible time - then there is blame but the punishment for that person should not be as severe as that of incompetence.
Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
I have yet to see a single posting on Slashdot that appears to come from a real source that would even come close to being a whistleblower.
I have seen a lot of big egos who think they're in the know but never anyone who really was in any inner circle with the real goods.
How about we go right back to the source of the problem and track down the bastard who issued the licence to drill in such deep water to begin with? Surely it's obvious to even the most dim-witted American politician that drilling in 5,000 feet of water is going to entail some risks?
Halliburton did the cementing, then said hey it's wrong, then BP proceeded with drilling anyway, rather than redoing the cement. Halliburton didn't do the drilling so I don't see how you can blame them.
According to the Oil Spill Commission’s findings this week, Brian Morel, drilling engineer at BP, wrote an email to Brett Cocales, another BP engineer, as the drilling proceeded, saying: “Who cares, it’s done, end of story, we’ll probably be fine”. ...I put very, very little faith in the model because it’s wrong a lot.”
[...]
At a hearing in July, BP’s well team leader, John Guide, explained the decision not to go with the software’s recommendations. “The model is – first of all, it’s not accurate all the time.
BP still drilled with “no direct indicators of cement success” and no cement evaluation log, the Oil Spill commission said. The company conducted a separate negative pressure test, an oil engineering test designed to show whether the casing and cement would hold against significant pressure, and isolate potentially dangerous hydrocarbons.
The test was failed, but was – for an unexplained reason – deemed a “complete success” by both BP and rig owner Transocean at the time, a presentation on Monday said.
That's pretty blatant. Halliburton warned them, BP did their own separate test, which failed. Then they're like, oh well let's do it anyway! And you find a way to blame Halliburton in that?