For 18 Minutes, 15% of the Internet Routed Through China
olsmeister writes "For 18 minutes this past April, 15% of the world's internet traffic was routed through servers in China. This includes traffic from both .gov and .mil US TLDs." The crazy thing is that this happened months ago, and nobody noticed. Hope you're encrypting your super-secret stuff.
Isn't that what the Internet was designed to do; route as need to get bits to their destination?
UNIX/Linux Consulting
when that 18mins is over and all their stuff goes through American servers
did you forget to take your meds?
There are plenty of reasons to use encryption but the Chinese government just isn't one of them for me. If I view something they don't like, what exactly are they going to do? I suppose they could block my access but it's not like I would get thrown in a Chinese prison.
I have a lot more to worry about from identity thieves, scams and heck, my own government.
The Anti-Blog
Chinese Headlines claim for a period of nearly 21,018,240 minutes...nearly 100% of Internet traffic has been routed through the United States....wonder if they're worried about the balance of power?
My God can beat up your God. Just kidding...don't take offense. I know there's no God.
2) Can China record or alter any traffic that passes through its network? If the data is sufficiently well encrypted, it can not read that data, although it can record the cyphertext. The fact that China can issue a certificate does not mean that it can read *your* data. It only means that encrypted data sent to Chinese servers can be read by the holder(s) of the encryption keys used by those servers.
I don't think you understand MITM attacks.
Take a moment to look at the list of trusted root certificate authorities in your web browser right now.
FF Preferences > Advanced > Encryption > View Certificates
Notice the Chinese ones? The Chinese government can compel any of those root CAs to produce a certificate for any domain they choose. For example, let's say CNNIC creates rogue certs for Google.com.
1) You request a secure page "https://mail.google.com"
2) MITM intercepts the request and makes their own connection to mail.google.com using the real cert.
3) MITM uses the fake cert to encrypt it's connection to you, and pass you the mail.google.com data.
4) Firefox validates the cert chain and gives you a big "look it's secure" bar, and you just got pwned.
The real problem is with the retarded cert system. Any CA can create certs for any domain without the domain's permission; If the CA is trusted your browser won't complain at all.
This is why it's important to view the certs that you are using (in Firefox, click or hover over the "secure" bar).
Note: If you had a cookie that kept you signed in to gmail, its too late to check the cert after the MITM is logged into your account.