Stuxnet Struck Five Targets In Iran
Batblue writes "Researchers at Symantec said that the notorious Stuxnet worm targeted five separate organizations, and attacks against those objectives — all with a presence in Iran — started in June 2009, more than a year before independent experts raised the alarm."
That makes me feel sooo much better about the value of antivirus software.
Does slashdot's new interface support posting from a Babbage engine running OpenBSD?
Iranians aren't arabs, so whether something "makes arabs more or less inclined" is irrelevant to them.
> That makes me feel sooo much better about the value of antivirus software. Does slashdot's new interface support posting from a Babbage engine running OpenBSD?
1992 is calling, it wants its Windows virus back ...
"Researchers at Symantec said that the notorious Stuxnet worm targeted five separate organizations, and attacks against those objectives — all with a presence in Iran — started in June 2009, more than a year before independent experts raised the alarm."
What experts, none of these peopel have been able to produce an Operating System that is immune to "computer viruses" ..
"Cyberwar" is just a propaganda term, and doesn't really exist.
Right?
Best Slashdot Co
Did Iran suddenly become an Arab country or something?
Tic-Tac-Toe, Global Thermonuclear War, and relationships all have the same winning move.
RTFA. Stuxnet was able to report back when if found a controller that matched it's target.
Those idiots didn't even have their systems air gaped.
Further, 5 targets? Iran has only acknowledged and allowed inspections of 1 ultra-centrifuge plant.
5 targets means any air strike just got more complicated. But we are still better off then before.
John McAfee 'It was like that time I hired that Bangkok prostitute; to do my taxes, while I fucked my accountant'
ATTN: Systems Integrators.
Guys, we can’t ignore this one. Stuxnet has taught the whole world what can be done. So it is now orders of magnitude more likely that an attacker could develop a modified version of it or design something similar to it in nature with the potential of doing much more damage than Stuxnet actually caused.
Here’s a worst-case scenario:
We’re now in a situation (unlikely, but potential) where an American systems integrator could connect his laptop to a plant in India, pick up something like this, and then bring it back to our in-house systems, where it would then spread to every system they ship. The control systems then start failing, accidents occur, etc.
I don’t think Systems Integrators are at risk to this particular threat (the original Stuxnet) for the following reasons:
The antivirus vendors are all over this one. Its probably in every signature scanner, and its behavioral tricks are probably being watched by all of the behavior-based malware products.
Microsoft issued a fix for the Windows exploit Stuxnet uses in early August (or sooner). So if you’ve done Windows Update since then you’re protected regardless of antivirus status.
The quick policy change I think we need to make is this:
1. Control systems products and Internet surfing must be 100% separated. So if you run Step7 or RSLogix on your native boot laptop, then you need to surf inside a VM. OR, If you surf on your main machine, all your controls programs must run inside VMs.
2. Develop a good firewall procedure for when we connect laptops to foreign plant networks (especially International). We need to block the laptop from accepting inbound IP traffic from any addresses other than the ones in our own panel. This won’t be a big deal to implement and maintain as we travel to different networks.
3. Keep all hosts and VM’s current on Critical updates from Microsoft.
4. Keep current updates on whichever antivirus or antimalware program you’re using. I actually think we’re safer overall if we keep a mix of security products in use (different ones on different machines) rather than picking one single vendor’s solution, because we’re more likely to learn we’ve been infected, even if its just 1 of the products we’re using that detected it. Then we can use appropriate measures to remove it from any systems that didn’t detect it.
Is this good enough for now? Too extreme? Other ideas?
There's no place like 127.0.0.1
Doing this kind of shit (and plain terrorist assassinations of physicists) only re-enforces Ahmadinejaad's power in Iran. It is not too difficult for state media there to display US, CIA and Israel as evil entities. So, this stupid "solution" to Iranian A-bomb problem actually made problem almost impossible to solve now.
839*929
The first rule of cyber-warfare is:
You do not talk about cyber-warfare.
The second rule of cyber-warfare is:
You do NOT talk about cyber-warfare!
(also, that was GP's point.)
It didn't actually target SCADA systems (though Siemens does make them) - it targetted their STEP 7 PLC systems. This is worse, it's a lower level control system. Google for Bruce Schneier's writing about Stuxnet for more good info.
They tried to charge me 30 bucks for toilet paper, if that don't scream stuxnet worm I don't know what does!
My God, it's Full of Source!
OUTSIDE_IP=$(dig +short my.ip @outsideip.net)