Kodak Failing, But Camera Phones Not To Blame
An anonymous reader writes with this snippet from The Conversation: "According to the Wall Street Journal, camera manufacturer Kodak is preparing to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, following a long struggle to maintain any sort of viable business. The announcement has prompted some commentators to claim that Kodak's near-demise has been brought on by: a failure to innovate, or a failure to anticipate the shift from analogue to digital cameras, or a failure to compete with the rise of cameras in mobile phones. Actually, none of these claims are true. Where Kodak did fail is in not understanding what people take photographs for, and what they do with photos once they have taken them."
Continues the reader: "Looking at camera data from Flickr, of images uploaded in 2011, camera phones only make up 3% of the total. Dedicated cameras from Canon, Nikon and yes, Kodak were used to take 97% of the images. What Kodak failed to understand is that people have switched from taking photos for remembering and commemorative reasons to using photos for identity and communication. The shift changes the emphasis away from print to social media platforms and dedicated apps."
Dedicated cameras from Canon, Nikon and yes, Kodak were used to take 97% of the images
Kodak makes its money (or used to) from film, not the camera hardware itself. All those 'dedicated cameras' are busy taking shots without a single bit of negative being exposed.
flickr is a horrible source to do a study like this, it is going to bias towards 'real' cameras because it's more of a photography sharing site then it is a "drunken pics at the bar last night" site. mobile phones can upload photos straight to facebook and twitter
Snowden and Manning are heroes.
If business was slowing down a lot, why weren't they sacking workers and reducing expenditure? I think this is more of a failure on management to restructure the company in a way that identifies that they can't really compete in the digital age how they once used to. I think that sometimes the management just have to realise that the company can't exist like it once did, and in order for the company to remain and still employ some people, they'll have to downsize a lot more than management might be comfortable about.
Let's pretend the data is accurate and reliable. Kodak's core problem would remain the same: if you're business model is built on selling photographic film and paper, and people don't need that anymore, the company is going to fail.
It first tried to rebuke the claims of Kodak being not able to innovate, etc, and then discussed "how people today use photos" in the examples of Flickr, Facebook, and such. It concluded with the weak argument of essentially one sentence, that "[It] is hard to see a role for Kodak in all of this." The problem with this reasoning is that exactly the same thing can be said about many of Kodak's competitors. I'm not aware whether Nikon or Canon is doing significantly better in this regard, which is to ease the "sharing and distribution" of photos through the Internet and social networking.
Colorless green Cthulhu waits dreaming furiously.
Kodak has lost money each year but one since Mr. Perez, who previously headed the printer business at Hewlett-Packard Co., took over in 2005. The company's problems came to a head in 2011, as Mr. Perez's strategy of using patent lawsuits and licensing deals to raise cash ran dry.
Perez chose litigation over innovation; failure was inevitable and deserved.
Even though Kodak saw digital photography coming, the problem was Kodak's whole financial structure was tied to film, and digital technology was disruptive technology. They might have been able to sustain the brand by merging with or buying the right company at the right time (e.g. Canon), but most companies have a hard time dealing with technology shifts that vaporize their main profit center. It's not as simple as just knowing what the next trend is; it's figuring out how to gracefully wind down the existing cash cow while giving the new technology the management attention and resources it needs to thrive. Even then, there still ends up being a lot of pain because you can just put all of the same people you had producing film to work in a digital camera business.
Someone I knew uploaded their photos to the Kodak site for printing, and had deleted them from her camera.
Rather than making it easy to get a copy of these photos, it was impossible. I think you basically had to order a PhotoCD or something, which I wasn't going to do.
They could have made a proper website to allow people to share their photos and print them. But they made it annoying.
at this: "It would be interesting to repeat this analysis using Facebook data, but there is no reason to believe the results would be substantially different."
Yes, because the millions of smartphones out there with a camera and a Facebook app (as opposed to a flickr app) aren't going to skew the results at all.
Flickr is for people who like photography; ergo, the data is going to be skewed heavily towards actual cameras.
Facebook is for people sharing themselves with their friends and the world. One only has to peruse a random person's Facebook profile picture page to find hundreds of self-snaps taken in the bathroom, or at the pub, or on a train, or whatever.
Kodak, in my opinion, failed because they neglected to make quality products in their particular niche (easy to use, inexpensive, easy to share). They offshored their production, so Kodak cameras were notoriously hit-or-miss in regards to actually working right. They missed the highend market (then again Kodak was never known for that anyway), letting Sony, Pentax, Canon, and Nikon beat them there. They failed to leverage their gigantic photo paper experience into anything worthwhile (I own a Kodak printer that, as I type this, refuses to print due to some bizarre error I don't have time to diagnose).
In short, Kodak failed because Kodak fucked up. Photography isn't going anywhere. Hell, film photography isn't going anywhere. Kodak just stood still and let the world pass them by.
They took our Kodachrome away, and nobody cared.
hookers and grits.
I just bought my girlfriend a dedicated Samsung camera that will connect to Facebook/Twitter/Email/Whatever via WiFi and upload directly from the camera. It is honestly a pretty sweet feature.
As far as I understand, film still has its use - in very low temperatures (say, -30C), CCDs do not work as well as film. I am sure that there are special cameras with heated CCDs, but they would cost a lot, where film can be used with a (relatively) cheap camera.
Actually, that's backwards. At low temperatures, photographic film becomes brittle and must be heated. On the other hand, CCDs have less noise at lower temperatures. Astronomers use cooled CCDs extensively. IR cameras often have cooled CCDs; if you want to image heat, you want as little extraneous heat as possible at the imager.
I think you mean a Steve Jobs, whereas I mean a more boring hum-drum one like Mark Hurd.
Basic competent leadership is enough to turn Kodak around, it doesn't need a superstar CEO, or a major new innovation. That graphics software they killed, it was doing well in the marketplace before the credit crunch hit them. Credit crunch hits, idiot CEO sacks all the programmers and outsources it to China to cut costs. Competitors Agfa/Heidleberg etc. hire all the programmers while they're cheap and come out with major upgrades in the next cycle, customers switch from Kodak and Kodak product dies. Why? Some idiot CEO read an outsourcing article and like a gullible idiot believed it???
Cameras still sell, and sell well, and Kodak are still a respected camera maker, but they make slightly overpriced, ugly looking cameras. Just basic CEO cost cutting, and trying out new designers, and adjusting teams, boring CEO 101 stuff would be enough to bring Kodak back.
Kodaks problems are just bad CEO problems.
Someone I knew uploaded their photos to the Kodak site for printing, and had deleted them from her camera.
Rather than making it easy to get a copy of these photos, it was impossible. I think you basically had to order a PhotoCD or something, which I wasn't going to do.
They could have made a proper website to allow people to share their photos and print them. But they made it annoying.
Ofoto.com was the premiere photography web upstart at the millennium. At that time, Ofoto was the largest buyer of KODAK paper. In fact, since they were clearly in a position of market dominance, Ofoto's brand looked very appealing to Kodak. Kodak greedily gobbled up that magnificent Berkeley dot com upstart, and made it Dow Jones blue chips. From that moment forward, it was all down hill for Ofoto. It went from being the technological and artistic leader to falling into stagnation and total alienation of Ofoto's loyal customer base. They tragically proceeded to delete the customer archives, to save on cost. For most people, this cloud was the ONLY back up of their precious data. Kodak refused to allow customers to download their data:or transfer it to other servers. ONLY the purchase of measly 700mb/ $20 CDs was offered as a means of accessing gigabytes of sacred customer data. I recall doing the math and finding that it was more expensive than all of my camera equipment. Kodak MURDERED Ofoto like they self destructed themselves when they realized that Corporate America is no place for a retired labor force. So just die, rob the shareholders, and let go of all those ballooning pension and health care commitments.
Around 2003, I used to work in a small photo store, and we had a Noritsu optical photo printer hooked up to a WinNT4 workstation running Kodak DLS MiniLab software. From the ground up, it was designed for totally digital workflow, so processing orders from floppy disks and CDs was common, as was saving orders to NAS.
It was buggy as hell, the GUI frequently drew garbage and tears, it wouldn't run on Win2K so we couldn't use a lot of card readers or USB anything, it crashed several times a day, and the database would just stop working for no reason which required frequent restarts and losing orders. The system was supposed to be all digital, but any orders we loaded from customer media always printed yellow and washed out, and any color adjustments resulted in horrible banding and color shifts. It was a total black box system, and I couldn't even tell what colorspace the machine was using to process images. JPEG files with embedded color profiles either showed up totally black, or in some cases would cause the system to crash. I eventually developed a system of filtering all customer orders through Irfanview to weed out color profiles the DLS software couldn't handle, to make sure we could actually print on a 1-hour schedule without fear the system would collapse. Just about everything crashed that software, and the CD burner would frequently make coasters -- a big deal when Kodak was charging several dollars for their PhotoCDs (the system would write to blank CDs, thankfully).
Photos scanned on the Kodak PictureMaker kiosk (running a SparcStation III which took over 15 minutes just to boot up), would take about 10 minutes just to network the final images to the DLS software, even though it took half as long for the Noritsu printer to spit them out. Don't even get me started about the greeting card templates, where more than 150K of XML was required just to define a canvas and a transparency mask to make bordered cards.
Naturally, proprietary file formats were used for everything, so it was impossible to access customer orders directly through the NAS. You had to use special client software to connect to the DLS system, search for the order strictly by customer number (not order number), retrieve thumbnails of the orders one at a time until you haphazardly discovered the actual order you wanted, retrieve the high-resolution image for the whole order, and then you could actually save the images to a disk. This procedure could take 3-4 minutes if you were lucky, more than 15 if you weren't. The Image Extractor client was about the only thing in the whole setup that ran on Win2K, so that was what we used to write orders to USB thumb drives. The DLS system itself required a horrifically expensive multi card reader connected via SCSI.
If there was anything that shattered my impression of Kodak, it was their "high-end" software. Kodak did a horrible job adapting to the digital market.