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Science Panel Recommends Censoring Bird Flu Papers

Morty writes "The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) has recommended that details of two research papers involving Avian Flu not be published because of security concerns. At least one of the research groups says that their work should be logically reproducible. The NSABB's censorship recommendations do not (currently) have the force of law, but Science and Nature voluntarily delayed publication."

23 of 126 comments (clear)

  1. FYI by elsurexiste · · Score: 3, Informative

    These people are an official panel of the US Department of Health. From Wikipedia:

    It is tasked with recommending policies on such questions as how to prevent published research in biotechnology from aiding terrorism, without slowing scientific progress.

    Just in case you've never heard of them (I know I haven't).

    --
    I rarely respond to comments. Also, don't ask for clarifications: a brain and Google are faster, believe me!
    1. Re:FYI by sirlark · · Score: 3, Informative

      The US Department of Health is concerned mainly with management of public health, maintianing the public health care system, and responding to widespread health emergencies. The NIH is a research body primarily involved with research in the health and biosciences, and with distributing funding to other organisations doing research in those fields.

    2. Re:FYI by dkf · · Score: 3, Informative

      What's the difference between the US Department of Health and National Institute of Health (NIH)? I know the latter is part of the executive branch, but that'sit.

      They're both executive branch. The NIH are formally a part of the DoH, and have responsibility for doing (and coordinating) research for the department. There are similar arrangements in other departments (the DoD has DARPA, the DoE fund a number of national labs, etc.) and it's not very remarkable. In general, it's useful for the departments to have research arms in order to both provide solid scientifically-based advice on policy, and to gently encourage everyone else to do research that benefits the nation as well as themselves.

      --
      "Little does he know, but there is no 'I' in 'Idiot'!"
  2. Wrong way around by gtch · · Score: 5, Funny

    If they don't want anyone to read the papers, they should print off millions of copies with an official-looking government cover, then send them out all over the country with big letters on the envelope: "Important Information from Your Government".

    That guarantees no-one will read it.

    1. Re:Wrong way around by chromas · · Score: 5, Funny

      Or staple together said millions of copies and submit them to the House/Senate as a bill.

    2. Re:Wrong way around by sakdoctor · · Score: 5, Funny

      Nobody would read it, and it would pass.

  3. Interesting parallel to I.T. by Kinky+Bass+Junk · · Score: 4, Interesting

    When security vulnerabilities are discovered in a piece of software (that is not open source), the release of that information may be delayed to allow sufficient time for the developers to patch the vulnerability. This organisation is basically asking that the release of this information be delayed until such a time as it is irrelevant. The problem we see with this is that people will always find the unreleased vulnerabilities, and it is entirely possible that this will happen in this case, but it would be a bit more catastrophic than a 0-day IIS vulnerability.

    --
    Anonymous Coward
  4. Re:Quick by RDW · · Score: 4, Funny

    Call Dustin Hoffman and tell him Gary Sinese is immune

    It's the supporting cast you have to worry about. From the Washington Post article:

    "Fears of bad actors spreading a mutant, highly transmissible virus suffuse the three-page note published by the board."

  5. I think it's no coincidence by erroneus · · Score: 4, Funny

    Just look at the fact that the bird flu story is directly after then Angry Birds story. Maybe it's just the fact that I'm waking up at 3am and later about 5-something AM, but I think there's more than just a casual connection here. Look at the facts:

    1. Both about birds.
    2. Both about people unable to control themselves.
    3. One is about a bird virus, the other about birds going viral.

    There is something at play here... not sure what it is just yet...

    1. Re:I think it's no coincidence by a_hanso · · Score: 4, Funny

      Late stage angry bird flu will cause the sufferer to repeatedly fling himself at any loose assemblage of bricks, wood or stone in the vicinity.

    2. Re:I think it's no coincidence by goldaryn · · Score: 4, Funny

      The green sickly pigs in Angry Birds were inspired by the Swine Flu epidemic

      I like to imagine that the back-story is: the birds are angry because they are in biological warfare with their piggy enemies. Avian flu... swine flu...

  6. Re:lol ... why international law? NIH in the US! by equex · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Afaik, this research is also locked down and kept secret in Europe for the same reasons as in the US. These strains of flu viruses are well understood and is probably one of the easiest to modify given the knowledge and research already done. I know little of the subject, but let's say the Stuxnet code was published and all that was needed to make it take down 70% of the nuclear plants in the world at the same time by simply uncommenting a ''Fuxx0rThemAllSimultaneously()' function call. Even a novice programmer would figure that out. Maybe that flu virus is analogous, and requires not much else than a novice fucking around with it to make it uber-deadly. I'd prefer they kept it hidden.

    --
    Can I light a sig ?
  7. Re:And so it starts ... by siddesu · · Score: 3, Insightful

    What "starts"? Withholding scientific publications because of various "national security" concerns is most definitely not a new practice.

  8. Incorrect. by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 5, Informative

    What they actually did was create a NEW strain of the virus, which was physically transmissible. Before they bred this transmissible virus via ferrets, it was not easily transmitted to humans.

    So what they did was actually create a superflu... one with a high mortality rate in humans and is easily transmissible. Whereas before these experiments, it already had a high mortality rate, but was not easy to transmit.

    These were extrememly dangerous experiments that should never have been carried out. The labs where they did this work do make mistakes... we know because they have suffered loss of containment in the past!

    If you want to read more about it, just google "H5N1" and "ferret".

    1. Re:Incorrect. by emilper · · Score: 5, Informative

      there was another thread about this same subject a few weeks ago, and there was no "new strain of the virus", just a virus sharing one of the proteins that help the virii attach to cells

      while we have lots of resistant bacterias living in our hospitals (and by our mean "all the hospitals in the world"), we're getting hype over this ... not sure any more it's hysterics or histrionics ... maybe Netherlands needs pretexts to wipe out chicken farms somewhere ...

      here you go, mandatory link to non-brain-damaged content ... http://www.virology.ws/2011/12/06/ferreting-out-influenza-h5n1/

      Scientists appear to be responsible for the hype surrounding this experiment. Fouchier called it ‘one of the most dangerous viruses you can make’. Paul Keim, chair of NSABB, ‘can’t think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one’, and Richard Ebright, a molecular biologist at Rutgers University says the experiment should not have been done. Martin Enserink writing in ScienceInsider says that the virus could change world history, and similar proclamations of doom can be found in the popular press.

      Passage of viruses in a different host is one strategy for reducing the virulence in humans. This concept is explained in this passage from Principles of Virology:

      Less virulent (attenuated) viruses can be selected by growth in cells other than those of the normal host, or by propagation at nonphysiological temperatures. Mutants able to propagate better under these selective conditions arise during viral replication. When such mutants are isolated, purified, and subsequently tested for pathogenicity in appropriate models, some may be less pathogenic than their parent.

      The possibility that passage of the H5N1 virus in ferrets will attenuate its virulence in humans has been ignored.

      getting tired of this ...

    2. Re:Incorrect. by GauteL · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Actually, I was to quick about it and I apologise. Please mod down my parent post as it is nonsense.

    3. Re:Incorrect. by chrb · · Score: 3, Insightful

      there was no "new strain of the virus", .... here you go, mandatory link to non-brain-damaged content ... http://www.virology.ws/2011/12/06/ferreting-out-influenza-h5n1/

      From your link: "A laboratory in the Netherlands has identified a lethal influenza H5N1 virus strain that is transmitted among ferrets."

      The whole argument from your link about it not being as lethal as H5N1 is pure speculation - as he admits, we don't know transmissibility of the strain in humans, because we won't do that experiment. His basic argument is the virulence of the virus in humans is reduced by having the virus be transmitted through non-human hosts. This is not necessarily true - it depends on what species the virus is moving between. If a virus makes the leap from something further from humans (eg fish) to something closer to humans (eg pigs) then it becomes more dangerous to us. His argument may be correct in the case where you have an organism adapted very well to humans and you expose it to non-human transmission selective pressures, then it will probably evolve and become less adapted to humans. But this is not always the situation.

      He also says:

      Nature is far better at producing viruses that can kill – to think that we can duplicate the enormous diversity and selection pressures that occur in the wild is a severe case of scientific hubris.

      Maybe he is right (at the moment) about manually targetted changes - but we are only going to get better at this over time. He has also ignored the practice of laboratory evolution (or synthetic evolution), where nature is used in the lab to evolve or enhance certain characteristics of organisms. For a far-out plan, some rogue biologists could expose humans, see which ones are infected and die first, and then infect others with flu samples taken from those bodies. After repeating for some generations, this selective pressure may well produce a highly lethal and highly transmissible variant.

    4. Re:Incorrect. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Insightful

      I applaud your ability to admit to being potentially or clearly incorrect. Even if you end up being correct, I see far too many ill-informed people that are quick to take a popular view, without questioning sources AND their own judgement. I believe the deepest levels of learning come from questioning everything and evryone, especially yourself, when considering what one accepts to be fact.

      That low ID looks to be a bit well-deserved.

  9. Oh Great. by headkase · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Anyone who has half-a-background in virology would have had this stroke of inspiration by now. So what has been accomplished with this ban? Well, lot's of attention has now been brought on the matter to alert the quarter-brained ones.

    --
    Shh.
  10. Re:lol ... why international law? NIH in the US! by oreaq · · Score: 4, Insightful

    [...] but let's say the Stuxnet code was published [...]

    Most of it was decompiled and published here. You can find all the binaries online if you're really interested. Hiding the results is just security by obscurity. The Dutch scientist didn't perform some magic trick that nobody else can do. Doesn't make it any less scary though.

  11. Even terrorists wouldn't release this by Viol8 · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Since they'd kill their own people and snuff out their cause.

    However that still leaves the deranged , which unfortunately there are a lot of on the planet. Though whether they could be deranged enough AND smart enough at the same time to do it is another matter.

  12. do you know what's as dangerous as false alarmism? by circletimessquare · · Score: 3, Insightful

    false complacency

    are you telling us it is impossible for someone to create something lethal and easily transmissible and release it, by mistake or on purpose?

    if you are going to grant it is impossible but unlikely, do you not grant that the consequences are huge?

    and giant tsunamis will never strike nuclear plants

    and religious fundamentalists will never fly planes into office towers

    there's many kinds of ignorant folly in this world

    read, and educate yourself as to how your psychology and cognition fails you, and us:

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_swan_theory

    --
    intellectual property law is philosophically incoherent. it is your moral duty to ignore it or sabotage it
  13. The important secret is already out. by dpbsmith · · Score: 4, Interesting

    The important atomic bomb secret was that it could be done.

    The important secret here is that "university-based scientists in the Netherlands and Wisconsin created a version of the so-called H5N1 influenza virus that is highly lethal and easily transmissible between ferrets."

    Assume that there are terrorists out there who wish to develop a virological weapon, and have the smarts and the wherewithal to do so. They now know that the H5N1 virus is a good place to start and that there's a winning combination to be found. Holding back the precise blueprint isn't going to delay things much. You have to assume the terrorists are capable of doing research-quality work. It sounds rather as if researchers in the Netherlands and Wisconsin both found answers indepedently. It's quite possible that the terrorists, working on their own, will find something original and better than either of them.

    What suppressing the research might do is make it difficult for other researchers to experiment with protective measures against them.