John Nash's Declassified 1955 Letter To the NSA
An anonymous reader writes "In 1955, John Nash sent an amazing letter (PDF) to the NSA in order to support an encryption design that he suggested. In it, he anticipates computational complexity theory as well as modern cryptography. He also proposes that the security of encryption can be based on computational hardness and makes the distinction between polynomial time and exponential time: 'So a logical way to classify enciphering processes is by the way in which the computation length for the computation of the key increases with increasing length of the key. This is at best exponential and at worst probably at most a relatively small power of r, ar^2 or ar^3, as in substitution ciphers.'"
Hereâ(TM)s some linkys to the actual NSA website pages that talk about this:
http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2012/nash_exhibit.shtml
http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/nash_letters/nash_letters1.pdf
If you want news from today, you have to come back tomorrow.
So you mean that he was probably tired that day and he wanted to send the letter to the NaSA instead?
Slashdot, fix the reply notifications... You won't get away with it...
I think overtly creative people get to be that way partly because they are not "normal". It is their gift or mindset to be able to see, conjecture and analyze what others can not fathom.
Yet we tend to shy away from anyone who is "not normal". I am glad Mr. Nash has been able to proceed in his career in spite of his problems. I hope his story gives others with problems some inspiration.
Reading Nash's letters makes me realize how much better presentation medium powerpoint is.
And also how much junk is made to sound nice, just with a nice presentation.
After Nash invents modern cryptography, explains it quite eloquently in a few pages of hand written notes, and designs and builds an electronic machine that automatically encrypts / decrypts the messages. He is then sent form letter rejection by the government: "It has been found that cryptographic principles involved in your system, although ingenous, do not meet the necessary requirements for official application."
They hint that they have found a weakness in it, but for some reason they don't disclose it. It might be the case that the NSA wanted to keep it secret, just like the British did.
maybe that 1950s IC post was by another anti-space nutter AC, you all look alike you know.
Those early mainframes didn't use integrated circuits, it took the space program's Apollo Guidance System (1963 - ) to push that.
Amusing you brought up SAGE, as ICBM are of course part of and intertwined with the story of the space age and space age technology. In fact, I'd say it was downright stupid of your and hurts your arguments terribly.
We all reap the many benefits of the space program, GPS and weather and geoscience and comm satellites to name a few.
Or, they simply wanted to butter him up and keep him quiet because the presiding industrial defence complex entities at the time (Westinghouse, GE, Hughes, Bell Telephone (or later, AT&T), etc.) already had inferior, but completed cryptographic solutions ready to go. How many times has the Fed been handed elegant solutions to problems only to pass them by for fixes given to them by men from the old boy's network?
Python: 'And then suddenly you have a language which says "we're all stuck with whatever the whiniest coder wants".'
Well trolled! For those playing along at home, SAGE was for spotting and intercepting bombers.
Mind the Gap
As I read the correspondence I tried to put myself in the position of Dr. Campaigne, and tried to figure out whether what Nash was saying made any sense. I confess that Nash's presentational style made me feel as though I was reading what Nash himself referred to as "a crank or circle-squarer". The core of Nash's invention is a squiggly, messy node graph of colored lines demonstrating a manually obfuscated binary function. But the importance of his communication is the importance of P vs. NP functions, which Nash communicated very very obliquely. Nash's Unabomber handwritten font didn't help him either.
I feel bad that I would have made the same mistake that Campaigne did. But I think nearly anyone would have.
Actually I was surprised by how much interest the NSA showed. Here was a young (~27) assistant professor of math writing to the government largely out of the blue. Nash himself was relatively insecure in his reputation, at least to this audience:
"I hope my handwriting, etc. do not give the impression I am just a crank or circle-squarer. My position here is Assist. Prof. of math. My best known work is in game theory (reprint sent separately)."
Even though he's insecure, he still chose to hand-write his letters sloppily with relatively poor penmanship and words crossed out. Still, the NSA dutifully corresponded with him and analyzed his machine, concluding
"[it] has many of the desirable features of a good auto-key system; but it affords only limited security, and requires a comparatively large amount of equipment. The principle would not be used alone in its present form and suitable modification or extension is considered unlikely, unless it could be used in conjunction with other good auto-key principles."
The letters certainly don't give me the impression of someone who is serious about making a working cypher machine. He's pretty clearly just dabbling in cryptography because it's a nice mental game for him to play. That doesn't necessarily mean his ideas should be ignored, and (somewhat surprisingly) the NSA didn't ignore them.
What Nash seems to be describing is a feedback shift register. This has potential as a cryptosystem, but isn't a very good one. As the NSA pointed out, it "affords only limited security".
When Nash wrote this, Friedman had already developed the theory that allowed general cryptanalysis of rotor-type machines. But that was still highly classified. Friedman, of course, was responsible for breaking the Japanese "Purple" cypher, plus many others. Before Friedman, cryptanalysis was about guessing. After Friedman, it was about number crunching.
Friedman was the head cryptanalyst at NSA at the time. Within NSA, it would have been known that a linear feedback shift register was a weak key generator. So this idea was, properly, rejected. At least NSA looked at it. Friedman's hard line on that subject was "No new encryption system is worth looking at unless it comes from someone who has already broken a very hard one."
The fact that a problem is NP-hard isn't enough to make it a good key generator. The Merkle-Hellman knapsack cryptosystem, the first public-key cryptosystem published, is based on an NP-hard problem. But, like many NP-hard problems, it's only NP-hard in the worst case. The average case is only P-hard. (Linear programming problems, and problems which can be converted to a linear programming problem, are like that.) So that public-key system was cracked.
We still don't have cryptosystems which are provably NP-hard for all cases. Factoring and elliptic curves are as good as it gets, and there's still the possibility that a breakthrough could make factoring easy.