7,000 Irish e-Voting Machines To Be Scrapped

lampsie writes "You may recall from back in January 2012 that the Irish government had deemed their stock of 7,000 e-voting machines 'worthless.' Turns out they are not — after spending upwards of €54 million purchasing them almost a decade ago, all 7,000 will now be scrapped for €70,000 (just over nine Euros each). The machines were scrapped because 'they could not be guaranteed to be safe from tampering [...] and they could not produce a printout so that votes/results could be double-checked.'"

Comments

chéad phost

[Anonymous Coward]

chéad phost

use the same system for slot machines

[Joe_Dragon]

use the same system for slot machines
they go under lots of testing to make them hard to cheat them even to the point of shocking them.

Re:use the same system for slot machines

[rtfa-troll]

Nobody actually knows how hard this is since nobody has ever actually succeeded in doing it, despite the fact that many people have tried. Here is another example:

use the same system for slot machines they go under lots of testing to make them hard to cheat them even to the point of shocking them.

This is one of the standard examples, the other given is bank machines. The average engineer/computer scientest will tell you this every time up to the stage of actually starting voting machine companies and spending millions on delivering machines which fail to be sufficiently secure. Just think about how much more hostile the voting machine environment

• if you cheat a slot machine you can get a few hundred dollars - if you beat a voting machine you can controll F22 contracts worth US$66.7 billion
• slot machines are run in an environemnt where you can watch the users - watching voters is illegal
• you can see who wins on your slot machine and almost nobody cares - voters are supposed to be anonymous
• slot machines are essentially static; the money is put in and taken out in the bar - voting machines have to be distributed to many locations
• your slot machine will still earn money even if it is completely emptied several times a year - a voting machine only needs to lose once

It's true that the slot Las Vegas slot machine program is much better than any current voting machine goes through. That is outrageous. However, don't think that if you did follow the Las Vegas system that would be enough.

Re:use the same system for slot machines

[khendron]

I pay my bills online.
I do my banking online.
I order my shopping online...

And all those activities are the target of a significant amount of fraud. It is tolerated, though, because the savings outweigh the costs. You can't say the same for an election.

Re:How Difficult Is It Really?

[Confusedent]

Here's what Schneier said about it in 2004:

"Computer security experts are unanimous on what to do. (Some voting experts disagree, but I think we’re all much better off listening to the computer security experts. The problems here are with the computer, not with the fact that the computer is being used in a voting application.) And they have two recommendations:

DRE machines must have a voter-verifiable paper audit trails (sometimes called a voter-verified paper ballot). This is a paper ballot printed out by the voting machine, which the voter is allowed to look at and verify. He doesn’t take it home with him. Either he looks at it on the machine behind a glass screen, or he takes the paper and puts it into a ballot box. The point of this is twofold. One, it allows the voter to confirm that his vote was recorded in the manner he intended. And two, it provides the mechanism for a recount if there are problems with the machine.

Software used on DRE machines must be open to public scrutiny. This also has two functions. One, it allows any interested party to examine the software and find bugs, which can then be corrected. This public analysis improves security. And two, it increases public confidence in the voting process. If the software is public, no one can insinuate that the voting system has unfairness built into the code. (Companies that make these machines regularly argue that they need to keep their software secret for security reasons. Don’t believe them. In this instance, secrecy has nothing to do with security.)

Computerized systems with these characteristics won’t be perfect -- no piece of software is -- but they’ll be much better than what we have now. We need to start treating voting software like we treat any other high-reliability system. The auditing that is conducted on slot machine software in the U.S. is significantly more meticulous than what is done to voting software. The development process for mission-critical airplane software makes voting software look like a slapdash affair. If we care about the integrity of our elections, this has to change."

Source.