Data Breach Reveals 100k IEEE.org Members' Plaintext Passwords
First time accepted submitter radudragusin writes "IEEE suffered a data breach which I discovered on September 18. For a few days I was uncertain what to do with the information and the data. Yesterday I let them know, and they fixed (at least partially) the problem. The usernames and passwords kept in plaintext were publicly available on their FTP server for at least one month prior to my discovery. Among the almost 100.000 compromised users are Apple, Google, IBM, Oracle and Samsung employees, as well as researchers from NASA, Stanford and many other places. I did not and will not make the raw data available, but I took the liberty to analyse it briefly."
Some actual news for nerds, and from the horse's mouth. And graphs and everything. Love it.
systemd is Roko's Basilisk.
Does this make plaintext password storage an IEEE standard now?
That could save an, er, friend of mine, a lot of work...
Why do we need to learn this from the newspaper?
I mean, PLAINTEXT passwords AND publicly available on their FTP.
Does he/still have the job?
You'd think that people involved with the IEEE are a group that should know better, and yet the most common passwords according to the analysis reads like the usual suspects list from other breaches. They're still common, easily guessable passwords. Hashing wouldn't have protected them very long, as these are on the short list for any cracking program to test.
It should be a wake up call that our current methods of trying to get users to pick secure passwords are a total failure. We need to go back to the drawing board and figure out a better way to get the message across, including tools to make it easy for people to get it right.
-- "So they told me that using the download page to download something was not something they anticipated." - Bill Gates
>> when are we going to all start hashing and salting passwords?
Please RTFA. The exposure wasn't in password STORAGE, it was in password LOGGING. (The stored passwords may already have been hashed and salted for all we know, but the FTP server was writing them to log files out in clear text!)
Well they are normally transmitted plain text so why shouldn't they be logged in plain text too?
It is like having super duper security behind the passcode access panel. But leaving a security camera looking at the people using the panel recorded and making it public.
sed -e 's/Chuck Norris/Rajnikant/g' joke > fact
Well with the exception of "SUNIV358", which is something of an outlier, the rest are all pretty standard passwords that you'd expect to see in any dataset like this
As a member of the IEEE I have to admit we have the worst web site you can imagine. It constantly asks for login information as you try to browse and it is hard to find most information online.
Are we reading the same article here? ;-)
One has an uppercase 5. The other is all lowercase.
Password hashing doesn't matter when the login password is conveyed in a URL and the URLs fetched are logged.
From the article, its clear that this is what happened: the login process creates a URL with the username & password in it, and since the URLs were logged and accessible, the login passwords could be obtained in the clear.
Test your net with Netalyzr
The exposure wasn't in password STORAGE, it was in password LOGGING.
This case shows that in the context of security, that is a distinction without a difference.
You could, you know... look in the logs to find out?
Ah, arrogance and stupidity, all in the same package. How efficient of you. -- Londo Mollari
Breach gives the connotation, some one or something broke into something that was protected. Here it looks like IEEE, quite stupidly, left valuable data unguarded.
sed -e 's/Chuck Norris/Rajnikant/g' joke > fact
It always upsets me when I see logins used for plain FTP.
SFTP people! It's not hard!
For large sets, this will be our guide even unto death, for the LORD will work for each type of data it is applied to...
Do you understand why Chrome doesn't allow a master password that actually obscures the stored passwords? I can't figure it out. I can't use a browser that doesn't do that. That's the only thing holding me back from Chrome.
I'm a scientist. I write papers that are published in academic journals and I review such papers for journals. Journals use editorial managers to, well, manage, the entire process and you'd be surprised how often those send out automated e-mails that, helpfully, contain my login and password IN PLAINTEXT, just in case I might have forgotten (even if I did not request the password).
In general terms, if you use a website that is able to remind you of your password if you forgot, consider that password known to the world and all other accounts that use the same or a similar password at high risk of being compromised.
Oh and I have an Obligatory XKCD too.
Group password for authorized users at a particular company?
On Windows, Chrome protects its password database with Windows' Data Protection API. The DPAPI has several layers, but at the end its security rests entirely on the Windows account password. So .... you do have a master password in a way, but we all know how easy it is to recover Windows passwords.
If the geiger counter does not click, the coffee, she is not thick.
The exposure wasn't in password STORAGE, it was in password LOGGING.
This case shows that in the context of security, that is a distinction without a difference.
There is a difference since, in the context of security, one would have to prescribe a corrective/preventative measure (that will be different wrt storage or logging.) Yeah, we can say "no passwords in plain text" in general terms, and then yes, there is no difference.
But that is the same mentality that drive people who think the problem was in storage and not logging. Everybody thinks ZOMG the former, but completely ignore the later. So, then, that supposedly insignificant difference becomes very relevant in the context of security.
Chances are the same people - had they not RTFA - will pretty much commit the same mistake (securing the storage and "yay we are done", forgetting completely the rest of the attack surface/leaky areas/whatever.)
This is the same as saying that flash is required, yet how many ipod/ipads could not access flash content ? I do run tons of js, but I can at least acknowledge the choice of those who won't.
If a website is able to send you your actual password, it is time to stop using that website. They are storing your credentials in the clear.