IEEE Standards For Voting Machines

kgeiger writes "Voting machine designs and data formats are a free-for-all. The result is poor validation and hence opportunity for fraud. An IEEE standards group wants all election computer systems to speak the same language. From the article: 'IEEE Standards Project 1622 is working on electronic data interchange for voting systems. The plan is to create a common format, based on the Election Markup Language (EML) already recommended for use in Europe. This is a subset of the popular XML (eXtensible Markup Language) that specifies particular fields and data structures for use in voting.'"

Comments

There is a more immediate problem

[betterunixthanunix]

I understand how a hand count works. I have no idea how most voting machines work, because their designs are secret. We can talk about standards after we get access to source code and design documents.

Re:There is a more immediate problem

[hutsell]

Even at the likely risk of being considered a tin foil luddite, this is the one technology I wish would never be made, even if there is a "100% assuredness" in both accountability and transparency people can feel comfortable about, even when it is something done in autonomous isolation.

The political system of representative government is about people interacting with one another; voting should reflect that process. Regrettably, since the time and energy to write a compelling argument here is way beyond my present capabilities, I've resigned myself to being on the losing end on a personal viewpoint about the philosophy of politics.

Re:There is a more immediate problem

[Anonymous Coward]

No. Just no.

How do we know that the hardware on the floor is the exact same hardware as that which has been audited by experts?

How do we know that the software running on that hardware is the exact same software as that which has been audited by experts?

How do we know that there isn't some obscure hole that the experts failed to detect?

How do we know that the experts aren't in fact in on the nefarious scheme (or schemes!) to steal the elections?

How do we know that the data that is being tabulated at the main data centre is in fact the data that was collected at the polling booths?

Sure, hand counted paper ballots have similar issues. But you can overcome those issues with paper ballots, in a transparent and obvious manner, by letting anybody who wants to watch the whole process from start to finish. You can't do that with electronics; it's just too complex, and there are too many ways to be sneaky about it to be certain that there are no problems.

I remember scrutineering ballots in the state of Victoria (Australia) some years ago. Anybody could rock up and do it. I picked up on a few mistakes, too. The fact that anybody can do this gives me much more assurance about the results that are published. Of course, you could have the issue of citizen apathy, but if that's an issue, well, the elections are moot anyway.

Shortest Standard Ever

[Anonymous Coward]

Proposal for New IEEE 1622 Standard:

1.1 DON'T

1.1.1 Voting should be done on paper.

1.2 WTF IS WRONG WITH YOU

1.2.1 See 1.1 and appropriate sub-sections.

Oblig XKCD

[Anonymous Coward]

xkcd.com/463/

Re:Yeah... no.

[Samantha Wright]

It doesn't matter whether or not it happens. They're creating a fucking file format. That hardly protects against (a) fraudulent data input or (b) fraudulent reporting of results. Time to upgrade to dead trees, guys.