IEEE Standards For Voting Machines

kgeiger writes "Voting machine designs and data formats are a free-for-all. The result is poor validation and hence opportunity for fraud. An IEEE standards group wants all election computer systems to speak the same language. From the article: 'IEEE Standards Project 1622 is working on electronic data interchange for voting systems. The plan is to create a common format, based on the Election Markup Language (EML) already recommended for use in Europe. This is a subset of the popular XML (eXtensible Markup Language) that specifies particular fields and data structures for use in voting.'"

Comments

There is a more immediate problem

[betterunixthanunix]

I understand how a hand count works. I have no idea how most voting machines work, because their designs are secret. We can talk about standards after we get access to source code and design documents.

Re:There is a more immediate problem

[hutsell]

Even at the likely risk of being considered a tin foil luddite, this is the one technology I wish would never be made, even if there is a "100% assuredness" in both accountability and transparency people can feel comfortable about, even when it is something done in autonomous isolation.

The political system of representative government is about people interacting with one another; voting should reflect that process. Regrettably, since the time and energy to write a compelling argument here is way beyond my present capabilities, I've resigned myself to being on the losing end on a personal viewpoint about the philosophy of politics.

Re:There is a more immediate problem

[WillAdams]

Given that some polling locations are likely to not have power on election day:

http://www.salon.com/2012/11/01/power_loss_threatens_vote_in_6_plus_states/

the problems w/ unnecessarily using machines is obvious.

Use a paper ballot. Use machines to count them. Have standards for how said machines communicate the totals.

Above all, have a physical paper trail for the inevitable recounts.

Re:There is a more immediate problem

[DNS-and-BIND]

Everyone says this. It gets old. The PRI in Mexico rigged elections for 80 years using nothing but paper ballots.

Re:There is a more immediate problem

[Anonymous Coward]

No. Just no.

How do we know that the hardware on the floor is the exact same hardware as that which has been audited by experts?

How do we know that the software running on that hardware is the exact same software as that which has been audited by experts?

How do we know that there isn't some obscure hole that the experts failed to detect?

How do we know that the experts aren't in fact in on the nefarious scheme (or schemes!) to steal the elections?

How do we know that the data that is being tabulated at the main data centre is in fact the data that was collected at the polling booths?

Sure, hand counted paper ballots have similar issues. But you can overcome those issues with paper ballots, in a transparent and obvious manner, by letting anybody who wants to watch the whole process from start to finish. You can't do that with electronics; it's just too complex, and there are too many ways to be sneaky about it to be certain that there are no problems.

I remember scrutineering ballots in the state of Victoria (Australia) some years ago. Anybody could rock up and do it. I picked up on a few mistakes, too. The fact that anybody can do this gives me much more assurance about the results that are published. Of course, you could have the issue of citizen apathy, but if that's an issue, well, the elections are moot anyway.

Re:There is a more immediate problem

[kenorland]

The secret ballot where a ballot cannot be attached to a specific person after it has been cast is a fundamental part of our electoral system

Only since around the late 19th century, a little after the UK, and even today, many people vote by mail.

Secret ballots are a good idea, but I think people attach way too much importance to them. Once you get fraud down to within a few percentage points, it makes little difference, and the US is way below that.

Re:There is a more immediate problem

[amorsen]

It is fine to have machines counting the hand-marked slips of paper, so you can announce a preliminary result on election night -- although many places manage that perfectly well by hand.

The vote counters bring accountability to the table. You can never be truly sure that a machine is not compromised. If humans are compromised, we catch them and prosecute them, and a conspiracy needs to involve at least hundreds of people. With machines, a few people can compromise an entire election.

If you allow the machines into the voting booth, anonymous voting is in danger and voter mistakes become impossible to detect. If you allow them to actually record votes, the whole process becomes a joke.

Re:There is a more immediate problem

[gatzke]

I do know how printers work. I don't understand why they can't have a hard copy paper trail.

You use the machine to cast your vote, you get a hard copy to review and put in a pile.

Audit a given number of sites to see that the machine count and paper count match.

You get the benefits of the automated system that can be reviewed by a human.

Re:There is a more immediate problem

[readin]

They also bring transparency.

The fact that we CAN audit people after the fact and at least in theory burn anyone for cheating is itself a deterrent.

Voting machine tampering is harder to detect.

Which is why so many people recommend that the voting machine spit out a piece of paper that the voter can verify has his vote recorded correctly, and drop that piece of paper into a separate box. In most cases the voting can be tallied efficiently electronically, but in a disputed election the paper ballots can be counted by hand.

Shortest Standard Ever

[Anonymous Coward]

Proposal for New IEEE 1622 Standard:

1.1 DON'T

1.1.1 Voting should be done on paper.

1.2 WTF IS WRONG WITH YOU

1.2.1 See 1.1 and appropriate sub-sections.

Re:Shortest Standard Ever

[MightyMartian]

You forgot 1.1.1.1 "Format like Word 97"

Why bother?

[Kenja]

When Texas and Iowa are threatening to arrest election monitors, standards are not the issue.

Re:Why bother?

[DeadCatX2]

Not because they're international, but because they're election monitors. Not generally the types of people that we would expect to attempt to influence elections. After all, if you heard that Syria was barring international election monitors within 100 feet of polling places, would you give them the same benefit of the doubt?

Re:Why bother?

[slacka]

"It's not the people who vote that count. It's the people who count the votes."
-Josef Stalin
With the election this close, I really hope it's the voters, not fraud, that decides the next president..

Re:Any stats experts want to weigh in on this

[Jon_S]

Actually, this was the paper I was looking for:

http://www.themoneyparty.org/main/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Republican-Primary-Election-Results-Amazing-Statistical-Anomalies_V2.0.pdf

Same authors and analysis. But much more in depth treatment of the data and analysis of alternate explanations.

Just say no ...

[riverat1]

Just say no to all electronic voting. I don't care if it's open source or not, how can you ever be sure about the software loaded on a voting machine unless you do it personally. And then how can anyone else who uses the machine trust you. I don't have a problem with machine counting of paper ballots because you always have a hand count to fall back on if necessary but I'll never trust pure electronic voting.

International monitors - a non-issue

[Anonymous Coward]

When Texas and Iowa are threatening to arrest election monitors, standards are not the issue.

No, what Texas has said is that international election monitors have to follow the same laws as everyone else and stay 100 feet away from the polling place. They are perfectly free to speak to any voter beyond that 100ft radius.

Also I believe the treaty the US signed regarding election monitoring note that monitors must obey local laws.

Did I miss something? This seems to be a non-issue.

Oblig XKCD

[Anonymous Coward]

xkcd.com/463/

Re:Yeah... no.

[Samantha Wright]

It doesn't matter whether or not it happens. They're creating a fucking file format. That hardly protects against (a) fraudulent data input or (b) fraudulent reporting of results. Time to upgrade to dead trees, guys.

Re:Oblig XKCD

[margeman2k3]

Also, http://xkcd.com/927/

Not all, only some types of vote counting machines

[Anonymous Coward]

Not all machines or all districts. That is how the anomaly becomes so clear. If you look at the vote flipping and ballot stuffing statistical test for example, these 'dodgy' districts that show clear vote flipping all to Romney:

http://www.themoneyparty.org/main/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Republican-Primary-Election-Results-Amazing-Statistical-Anomalies_V2.0.pdf

Tabulators seem to be easier to rig with tabulators showing a clear rigging for Romney:
http://www.themoneyparty.org/main/stolen-election-2004-plus-the-voter-fraud-scam-series/wisconsin-no-tabulator-versus-tabulator-counties/

Presumably because a room full of people counting in front of witness needs a lot of conspirators, but the tabulator only needs the single engineer who sets up the tabulator to rig it and he can do hundreds of machines across many districts.

If you read the stats test, there was vote flipping (i.e. fraud) from Santorum to Romney in Ohio, and you can see the same thing on the Tabulators test. I don't like Santorum myself, but the numbers don't lie.

I'll copy the conclusion of the stats paper in full here, the numbers are quite damning. The data is there at the bottom, I've played with the Maine data myself to check.

VII. Conclusions
Slopes on cumulative vote tally charts, which should settle to horizontal lines,
are an amazing statistical anomaly. The hypergeometric distribution chart,
normally produces after a minor initial oscillation, a smooth horizontal line for
the rest of the chart. By applying this distribution to the 2012 Republican
primary election data, we exposed a serious election anomaly, which can be
seen as obvious slopes favoring one candidate. It is an extraordinary
observation and indicates overwhelming evidence of election manipulation. A
massive set of detailed data and analysis for all 50 states, beyond the scope of
this paper, also confirmed these unlikely results. These highly anomalous
election results indicate a widespread, systematic exchange of votes favoring
one candidate.
Statistical analysis of the Republican Primaries results from 2012 in Iowa, New
Hampshire, Arizona, Ohio, Oklahoma, Alabama, Louisiana, Wisconsin, West
Virginia, and Kentucky show strong statistical evidence of election
manipulation15. The anomaly subsides somewhat towards the end of the
election cycle, when completion is weakened by the earlier election results.
Historically, an early vote gain effect snowballs through the various primary
states as it benefits the candidate with momentum as well as additional votes.
Mitt Romney, based on our analysis, should have (statistically) gotten third
rank in Iowa’s election (as opposed to second); second rank in New Hampshire
(as opposed to the first rank), and so on, resulting most likely to a brokered
convention at the Republican National Convention in Tampa, FL.
Some rather large statistical anomalies in states such Ohio have negatively
affected opposing candidates by reducing their momentum and fundraising
power. Ohio’s election (statistically) should have been earned by candidate Rick
Santorum. Rank switching in Oklahoma’s election also affected candidates.
The statistical analysis clearly shows that other candidates were supposed to
get more votes than the official count. Tests were performed on random
samples as well as the entire statistical populations represented by the whole
state in each case. These facts assure us that the tests have high statistical
power, as well as lack of selection bias. Many individual counties (600+) have
been analyzed as well, indicating that this type of election fraud is pervasive.
We urge readers of this paper to reproduce our results and publish their
findings.