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Researcher Discloses New Batch of MySQL Vulnerabilities

wiredmikey writes "Over the weekend, a security researcher disclosed seven security vulnerabilities related to MySQL. Of the flaws disclosed, CVE assignments have been issued for five of them. The Red Hat Security Team has opened tracking reports, and according to comments on the Full Disclosure mailing list, Oracle is aware of the zero-days, but has not yet commented on them directly. Researchers who have tested the vulnerabilities themselves state that all of them require that the system administrator failed to properly setup the MySQL server, or the firewall installed in front of it. Yet, they admit that the disclosures are legitimate, and they need to be fixed. One disclosure included details of a user privilege elevation vulnerability, which if exploited could allow an attacker with file permissions the ability to elevate its permissions to that of the MySQL admin user."

42 of 76 comments (clear)

  1. You deserve it! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Insightful

    When you leave 3306 open on the internet.

    1. Re:You deserve it! by Dwonis · · Score: 1

      Indeed. Firewalls break end-to-end connectivity, and incentivise a protocol-encapsulation arms race that is bad for the Internet. It's 2012; You have no business writing more code that speaks the Internet Protocol unless it can actually handle being on the Internet.

    2. Re:You deserve it! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Car analogy time! Ever get stuck behind a tractor driving 5 mph, carrying a fully loaded manure spreader dripping all over? Then you try to pass him but all the fumes have made you high and you crash your car. You wake up and find yourself chained up in a farmer's sex dungeon and he proceeds to sodomize you for 3 months until you finally die of an impaled rectum.

      Well, maybe your car shouldn't be on the road either!

    3. Re:You deserve it! by ls671 · · Score: 1

      You do not need a firewall, just listen to local IP addresses, not the public Internet one ;-)

      --
      Everything I write is lies, read between the lines.
  2. Re:At the risk of getting modded down... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    Agreed. If it weren't for 'researchers' like Slouches-With-Pizza, here, we wouldn't have to worry about computer crime at all.

  3. Re:At the risk of getting modded down... by mcgrew · · Score: 2

    You don't need a lab coat or even a lab to research.

  4. Re:At the risk of getting modded down... by K.+S.+Kyosuke · · Score: 5, Insightful

    is someone who spends their working day just trying to poke holes and find vulnerabilities in software a "researcher"?

    Yes. Much like people trying to poke holes in other people's scientific research are scientists.

    --
    Ezekiel 23:20
  5. Re:At the risk of getting modded down... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

    If it's so easy, why aren't you doing it and making money turning in chrome flaws to google? or firefox flaws to mozilla? Or Ie flags to microsoft? They all pay for real vulnerabilities.

    The answer: It's not easy. There is no magic "penetration program". It requires detailed knowledge of processors, compilers, and software architecture. It requires skills that you won't learn in most colleges (R/E). It requires patience. It requires methodical documentation to be good at it. And at the end of the day, there is absolutely zero guarantee that you will find any vulnerabilities or that a vulnerability even exists.

  6. Re:At the risk of getting modded down... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    ... is someone who spends their working day just trying to poke holes and find vulnerabilities in software a "researcher"? Glorified tester maybe but thats about it. I somehow don't think these people hang around in white labcoats in clean rooms with clipboards looking at the latest results. More like some fat guy slouching with a pizza running yet another penetration program that someone else wrote.

    So you are unwilling to qualify a fat guy slouching with pizza dripping down his face who finds 7 vulnerabilities in MySQL during the weekend as a "researcher", and give the title to a Monday-Friday 9:00AM-5:00PM labcoat wearer who (probably hates his job and) believes MySQL is secure? Why?

    FWIW the fat guy also found 4 other vulnerabilities in other software.

    If running some other person's software to find these vulnerabilities is so damn easy, how come the guys with the fancy labcoats didn't find them sooner?

  7. Researchers use responsible disclosure by raymorris · · Score: 1

    "Researcher", insomuch as it implies a level of professionalism, should be reserved for those with a modicum of professionalism, such as responsible disclosure. I could have had my 15 minutes of fame with a vulnerability I discovered that could have been used to take fown wikipedia and many other sites, but instead I reported it through the proper channels so it was fixed, not exploited. Perhaps "security attention-seeker" would be a better term.

    1. Re:Researchers use responsible disclosure by greg1104 · · Score: 1

      A look at the twitter feed of the submitter and his associated web site--"Farlight Elite Hackers Legacy"--does not give the impression of responsible disclosure. But this is the same guy who released the 2010 “Apache Killer”; calling attention to problems with exploit code is this guy's method. I'd rather see that than no disclosure at all. He does appear to be a professional penetration tester at work, who does things like speak at conferences on his methods too.

    2. Re:Researchers use responsible disclosure by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2

      As someone who he released a vulnerability for this weekend, and the person responsible for security of the product in question...

      I WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE IF HE WOULD NOTIFY US (the affected vendor) AT LEAST AT THE SAME TIME HE PUBLICLY RELEASES IT!!!

      We found out via support cases coming in from clients who were reading FullDisclosure before I got into the office to check my morning emails. NOT COOL!

    3. Re:Researchers use responsible disclosure by Cid+Highwind · · Score: 1, Insightful

      We found out via support cases coming in from clients who were reading FullDisclosure before I got into the office to check my morning email

      ...and you think it's somehow reasonable for a "person responsible for security" to sit back and wait for vulnerability reports to find their way through product support channels, instead of monitoring FullDisclosure?

      --
      0 1 - just my two bits
    4. Re:Researchers use responsible disclosure by greg1104 · · Score: 3, Insightful

      If Oracle doesn't have someone reading FullDisclosure every day, including the weekends, you deserve to be embarrassed and shamed by your customers. Hint: someone from the MariaDB team was adding to the discussion already by Sunday.

    5. Re:Researchers use responsible disclosure by Cid+Highwind · · Score: 1, Insightful

      Well, it was after 11PM local time, I'm sorry if I sleep.

      Now you want advance notice based on your timezone... this is called "moving the goalpost".

      Originally you said: "I WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE IF HE WOULD NOTIFY US (the affected vendor) AT LEAST AT THE SAME TIME HE PUBLICLY RELEASES IT!!!"

      There's an easy solution to that:
      1: Subscribe to FD.
      2: There, now you're being notified at the same time as the public.

      --
      0 1 - just my two bits
    6. Re:Researchers use responsible disclosure by Hizonner · · Score: 1

      I used to handle ALL of these issues for a very large vendor. Yes, people did wake me up over things, until I wised up that my employer's problems during my off hours were in fact my employer's problems, not mine, and that my employer as an institution didn't give a fuck about anything but saving face.

      I quit about the time vendors started trying to dodge responsibility by talking about other people's "responsible disclosure".

      You are not entitled to know about a problem before those who are actually affected (hint: that's the users, not you). Your company's unwillingness to staff 24-hour incident response does not entitle it to special consideration. Maybe early disclosure to you would help the customers you've already failed... if you could turn a patch around in, say, a week. So few companies do that that it's not really worth the discoverer's time to think about the possibility. The usual "responsible disclosure" demand for weeks or months to accommodate internal laziness, bureaucracy, incompetence, and spin control is ridiculous and helps nobody but the vendors themselves.

      Any vulnerability could very well already be known to some bad guys somewhere... and most vendors leak the information like crazy once they have it, long before they get their patches out. So waiting around for vendors just creates more risk. It's end user self-help or nothing.

      Your company really lost all right to act wronged the minute it released the buggy code. If somebody wants to give you a few extra hours, I won't fault that person, but I won't say it's good, either.

      Toughen up. Maybe you should try to release fewer bugs.

    7. Re:Researchers use responsible disclosure by Hizonner · · Score: 1

      Nope, but I didn't whine about it.

    8. Re:Researchers use responsible disclosure by lennier · · Score: 1

      As someone who he released a vulnerability for this weekend, and the person responsible for security of the product in question...

      ... shouldn't you be apologising for not finding the vulnerability in your own product yourself?

      You've got the source code, all the architecture notes, the people who wrote it, the comprehensive testing suites... and yet you still let a critical security error get through that some random guy on the street with a $10 fuzzer found by accident.

      There's a problem here, and it's not with the security researcher. Sorry.

      --
      You are not a brain: http://books.google.com/books?id=2oV61CeDx-YC
    9. Re:Researchers use responsible disclosure by Cid+Highwind · · Score: 1

      THREE MONTHS?!?

      That's insane. Maybe it was appropriate in the 1980s when "security researchers" and "black-hat hackers" were sets of bored grad students with slightly different moral compasses, but now with various governments and criminal enterprises buying up exploits, one should probably just assume that anything disclosed publicly is also for sale from another "vendor" or already packaged into as-yet-undetected malware.

      As for sleep, it sounds like somebody has created an expectation of 24x7 on-call security support, without funding positions for more security people. Don't let the company make that your problem!

      --
      0 1 - just my two bits
    10. Re:Researchers use responsible disclosure by lennier · · Score: 1

      There's an easy solution to that:
      1: Subscribe to FD.
      2: There, now you're being notified at the same time as the public.

      There's an even easier solution:

      0. Don't introduce security vulnerabilities into your own product to start with.

      We have compilers and testing suites for a reason. Use them. And if your language and testing toolchain are insufficient to the job of making sure your product does not endanger the entire Internet, then use a better one. If your architecture doesn't allow you to write provably secure code, write a better one.

      It's 2012. There's no excuse for this anymore. Do it right, or don't put your code on the Internet.

      --
      You are not a brain: http://books.google.com/books?id=2oV61CeDx-YC
    11. Re:Researchers use responsible disclosure by philip.paradis · · Score: 1

      The first rule of software is that all software beyond the barest of trivial examples will have bugs. Compilers are software, and have the same long and sordid history of bugs. Since compilers have been mentioned specifically, you might be interested in the classic work Reflections on Trusting Trust (it was apparently written by a guy who knows a thing or two about the topic, some Ken Thompson fellow).The same goes for test suites. In many cases, bugs translate to security vulnerabilities. In some cases, perfectly rational behavior demonstrated by entities known as programs results in unexpected behavior when they are made to exchange data. This phenomenon is referred to as "novel outcomes" in some circles, and "wow, that's some fucked up shit" in others. There is a reason the field of information security is as broad as it always has been, is, and always will be.

      Your post proves you have never worked as a professional developer, or for an organization where your role was deeply connected to systems or development work. Heck, it proves you've never worked on any major open source project either, for that matter. I suppose we should all stop using anything resembling software immediately to prevent the planet from caving in under the weight of its own failure. Or perhaps you should take your obviously extremely advanced software engineering skills and produce the one true invulnerable platform for everyone, one layer and application at a time.

      As Bruce Schneier famously said, "security is a process, not a product." That process never ends, and involves complexities I believe could be delicately framed as things that aren't exactly your area of expertise. That's okay, though; you can always start educating yourself immediately. We're all looking forward to your next batch of brilliant revelations on infosec strategy.

      --
      Write failed: Broken pipe
    12. Re:Researchers use responsible disclosure by idontgno · · Score: 1

      Hold it. You don't monitor full disclosure security websites yourself?

      It's called "Intel". It's worth the effort.

      Full disclosure is only a problem if you don't take advantage of it yourself. Otherwise, it's embarrasing when your customers do your job for you, or when the blackhats do a little personal disclosure on your assets.

      Yeah, yeah, I know. There aren't enough hours in the day, you don't have enough staff, etc., etc. That just means management isn't prioritizing and allocating correctly. That still means "you" are doing it wrong, in the collective organizational sense of "you".

      You're proactive, or you're a victim. This is reality. You're just lucky your customers feel invested in helping you, even if out of self-defense.

      --
      Welcome to the Panopticon. Used to be a prison, now it's your home.
  8. Re:At the risk of getting modded down... by ducomputergeek · · Score: 5, Funny

    No, but you need a bow tie to be the doctor...because bow ties are cool.

    --
    "The problem with socialism is eventually you run out of other people's money" - Thatcher.
  9. Om nom nom by Cid+Highwind · · Score: 2

    The troll eats well today...

    --
    0 1 - just my two bits
  10. Privilege Elevation bug not much of a bug by detain · · Score: 2

    from what I'm reading the privilege elevation bug requires that you as a non root user be able to write files to a /var/lib/mysql// directory. I dont remember ever seeing a setup where those directories are world writable or where normal non-root users would be added to the mysql group.

    --
    http://interserver.net/
    1. Re:Privilege Elevation bug not much of a bug by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      C:\>dir /var/lib/mysql//
      Invalid switch - "var".

      What is going on here? Is my system vulnerable or not?

    2. Re:Privilege Elevation bug not much of a bug by TheSpoom · · Score: 5, Funny

      If you're running Windows, you can default to "yes".

      --
      It's better to vote for what you want and not get it than to vote for what you don't want and get it.
      - E. Debs
    3. Re:Privilege Elevation bug not much of a bug by greg1104 · · Score: 4, Interesting

      Right, suggestions like the Zenoss commentor who says "f you dont want to frack around, just chmod those puppies 777" are the reason why this is a problem. It's sadly common advice in the "I want setup to be easy" land of MySQL priorities.

      Note that if you change the directory a PostgreSQL server writes to so that other users are allowed to write there, too, the server will refuse to start until you fix the permissions so that isn't the case. New database installations made with initdb have the right permissions, but the code checks against people "fracking" themselves by making them less secure later. The only way around this is to modify the source code to disable the check!

    4. Re:Privilege Elevation bug not much of a bug by Gothmolly · · Score: 1

      Just like the world is full of "developers" who write everything to c:\temp, the world is full of Unix hacks who chmod 777 everything "because then it works".

      --
      I want to delete my account but Slashdot doesn't allow it.
    5. Re:Privilege Elevation bug not much of a bug by defcon-11 · · Score: 1

      I haven't done much windows development, are the semantics of C:\temp different from /tmp? Why is writing to it a bad idea?

    6. Re:Privilege Elevation bug not much of a bug by WuphonsReach · · Score: 1

      Just like the world is full of "developers" who write everything to c:\temp, the world is full of Unix hacks who chmod 777 everything "because then it works".

      Or the Linux hacks who disable SELinux because they can't figure out how to create exceptions or fix the file system labeling problems.

      --
      Wolde you bothe eate your cake, and have your cake?
    7. Re:Privilege Elevation bug not much of a bug by turbidostato · · Score: 1

      "I haven't done much windows development, are the semantics of C:\temp different from /tmp? Why is writing to it a bad idea?"

      It's bad idea for at least two reasons:
      1) You should never write to C:\temp, or /tmp for that matter. You should write to %TEMP% or $TMP instead.
      2) Even if you write to %TEMP%, please think twice what you write there and where exactly within: i.e. to a non-predictable file name.

    8. Re:Privilege Elevation bug not much of a bug by drkstr1 · · Score: 1

      Writing to tmp breaks encapsulation, and so it is considered more "dangerous" than setting up your own internal temporary storage mechanism. File name collisions are the most obvious issue to arise from this. In worse cases, you can leak sensitive information (I remember one of the GUI terminals in Gnome was dumping the buffer as plain text to tmp, even when using SSL).

      --
      Fanboy Status: Apache Flex, C#, Eclipse, KDE, Pirate Party, Ron Paul, Slackware, Windows 7
    9. Re:Privilege Elevation bug not much of a bug by lennier · · Score: 1

      Writing to tmp breaks encapsulation, and so it is considered more "dangerous" than setting up your own internal temporary storage mechanism.

      Race conditions like c:\temp and /tmp are an example of why the current 40-year-old operating system model we have, with lots of secure processes but all using a big shared filesystem, needs a long overdue rethink. And we're missing the chance to do it with the best opportunity we have - tablets - because they're inheriting the same fundamentally broken OS design.

      Another big other example of why our OSes need a rethink is virtualisation. It shouldn't have to take simulating an entire CPU, motherboard and OS just to get provable separation of shared processes. That sort of thing is exactly what an OS was invented to do in the first place - but our shared-filesystem model simply doesn't allow it, so we have to virtualise the hard and slow way, creating entire virtual machines when all we'd need in a well-designed system was processes. That's nuts.

      Yet another example is installation. We write software at the process level that's neatly encapsulated into objects which don't overwrite each other's memory space, and we learned since the 1980s that "global variables" are bad. But those objects only exist in process RAM, we implement them with subtly different semantics for each language, and don't persist them to long term OS storage in any kind of consistent manner. And when it comes to write the installer, we just throw out everything we learned in software development school, and shove a bunch of files and directories and registry keys into that big ol' global variable we call "the filesystem" (plus databases, net-attached services, and on Windows, the COM object state). Then we put a thin layer of access permissions over the top to cover up the shared-everything fail underneath. And so every worm that comes along that once gets access to the filesystem or worse, our network credentials, can do whatever it wants. So no matter how pretty and clean our high-level security abstractions, underneath we're pretty much still right back in 1960s-era shared-memory COBOL mainframes with GOTO statements and global shared databases. /facepalm.

      How about we take those functional and OO design principles we love so dearly and build an OS on them? I seem to recall that was the promise of the entire 90s generation of OSes, from OS/2 to Taligent/Pink to Windows NT/Cairo. Did any of it eventuate? Nope. At least not for security. We added secure object capabilities on top of an insecure substrate which is still there - but security is about removing capabilities, and then proving that you removed them. That's why we can't do security.

      --
      You are not a brain: http://books.google.com/books?id=2oV61CeDx-YC
    10. Re:Privilege Elevation bug not much of a bug by defcon-11 · · Score: 1

      I guess most of the tempfile stuff I've worked with has been in Python and Ruby, where the std lib has functions to create tempfiles, and you don't have to worry much about file paths or name collisions or having to set the correct file permissions. Presumably there are similar third party libs for languages lacking these features in the std lib.

  11. Re:At the risk of getting modded down... by NotBorg · · Score: 1

    If they would have said "hacker" there would have been another debate about if that word were used correctly. Neither debate matters because everyone but the stupid pendant gallery understood what was meant and that language is a mailable medium that relies heavily on context.

    Also, the stereotyping certainly doesn't make your argument stronger. It simply makes you look like a clueless outsider that gets his bearings from Hollywood and Internet memes.

    --
    I want this account deleted.
  12. My God by Safety+Cap · · Score: 1

    You wake up and find yourself chained up in a farmer's sex dungeon and he proceeds to sodomize you for 3 months until you finally die of an impaled rectum.

    You describe perfectly what a seasoned, experienced developer feels like when he (or she) has to wade through a typical *MP "application" in order to fix and extend it.

    Proof Cthulhu is real: *MP kiddies believe view logic is Best Logic.

    --
    Yeah, right.
  13. Only improperly configured installations? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Insightful

    I don't quite agree that this only effects improperly configured installs. If you leave 3306 open to the Internet, yes, that would be an improper configuration and you kind of get what you deserve there.

    However, imagine the case of having a webserver open to the world hosting $RANDOM_PHP_APP_OF_THE_DAY, with a MySQL server backend on a separate private network it must talk to. Everything is properly firewalled, only the webapp can access MySQL on 3306, and only has access to it's own database(s) it needs to, and nothing more. Now random exploit for PHP app happens, which gives the attacker access to run their own SQL commands, gain user shell access, whatever. These exploits are common.

    This instead of limiting the attacker to the database credentials within the app itself, now gave the attacker full access to the entire MySQL infrastructure bypassing any local ACL's you have in place. Instead of just being able to access your application database, now they can access any other databases setup on the same server.

    Most exploits these days are fairly innocuous by themselves - it's when you string them together is where they get to be important. Any attacker worth their salt has lists of thousands of exploitable webapps they are saving for just such days, when a new backend zero day hits. Then they fire up their tools to take advantage first of the known hole in the web application they already scanned for months ago, to then exploit the more severe underlying exploit which is "behind the firewall so we don't care".

    Security is a multi-layered thing. You cannot be secure in a bubble, and you cannot say something doesn't effect you just because an attacker can't directly exploit the problem from a random wireless access point in a coffee shop somewhere. Very few exploits I see these days are that "easy" to pull off - they all require multiple exploits used at once, to gain the access needed to the target.

    1. Re:Only improperly configured installations? by jhol13 · · Score: 1

      If you leave 3306 open to the Internet, yes, that would be an improper configuration and you kind of get what you deserve there.

      Why? Why do you "deserve" that the database is not safe to use that way? Shouldn't it be? If not, why it should not be safe?

      I think this is the main reason why every fucking application from browsers to document viewers to databases to webapps to firewalls to php's are buggy: developers assume "it will be protected by other means, I don't need to check my code or sanitize input. They'll use apparmor. it is not that serious a hole".

  14. Re:At the risk of getting modded down... by lennier · · Score: 1

    If running some other person's software to find these vulnerabilities is so damn easy, how come the guys with the fancy labcoats didn't find them sooner?

    That's the question that the survivors picking their way through the rubble of the Internet will be asking in a few years.

    It's not like these vulnerabilities are hard to find, as evidenced by the constant flood of discoveries by tiny private research groups. Yet our current best-of-breed million-dollar industrial-strength software development industry swears it's absolutely impossible / impractical to do it at any cost. And the academic software engineering community apparently agrees.

    Something does not add up here. It should not be possible for these low-budget hackers to beat the entire world's programming experts at their own game. And yet, here we are.

    What's the explanation?

    --
    You are not a brain: http://books.google.com/books?id=2oV61CeDx-YC
  15. Perhaps because its boring? by Viol8 · · Score: 1

    Creating something is a lot more fun than picking it apart.

  16. Re:At the risk of getting modded down... by GameboyRMH · · Score: 1

    Hey you know what's under a labcoat? A pizza-stained shirt. From slouching and eating it while running an experiment with someone else's discoveries.

    --
    "When information is power, privacy is freedom" - Jah-Wren Ryel