10 Years After SQL Slammer

Trailrunner7 writes "Ten years ago today, on Jan. 25, 2003, a new worm took the Internet by storm, infecting thousands of servers running Microsoft's SQL Server software every minute. The worm, which became known as SQL Slammer, eventually became the fastest-spreading worm ever and helped change the way Microsoft approached security and reshaped the way many researchers handled advisories and exploit code. This is the inside story of SQL Slammer, told by David Litchfield, the researcher who found the bug and wrote the exploit code that was later taken by Slammer's authors and used as part of the worm."

Comments

Also decided in favor of restrictive firewalls

[xxxJonBoyxxx]

Kind of hard to believe that ten years ago it was quite common for people to still have their SQL Servers hooked up the Internet with no firewall or firewall rules that permitted direct connections to the control port. Good luck finding that configuration today...

Re:Also decided in favor of restrictive firewalls

[h4rr4r]

There are still tons of them.

I have heard such a setup suggesting in the past 12 months by a customer to make life easier for them. We did not do that.

Re:Also decided in favor of restrictive firewalls

[gstoddart]

My guess is it's far more common than you'd think. A lot of software is really awful when it comes to security, and a lot of places don't do much better.

I ran into a piece of software about 3-4 years back which lived in the DMZ to provide access to internal servers. The software in question stored passwords in plain text in the registry -- we're talking the admin password for the production database. I screamed bloody murder at how big of a risk that was, but eventually got told to STFU. Thankfully, it was a short contract and I wasn't around much longer.

You might be shocked to find out how often security is secondary to cost and convenience. I'm betting loads of people here on Slashdot have encountered things like this.

Look at all the stories we've seen about SCADA devices being on the internet -- people are regularly putting mission critical stuff directly onto the internet with no good security.

Re:Also decided in favor of restrictive firewalls

[khasim]

I'd love to implement great security for every customer we have but it's always up to them and how much "trouble" they want to get through using their network (even if it isn't really).

That's the real problem. It will always be easier to NOT do something than it will be to do something.

And NOT doing something will, 99%+ of the time, will be less expensive than doing something.

It is only when that less-than-1%-of-the-time event hits that "something" gets done. And even then the 'something" is usually a panic reaction and NOT real security.

HTTP Slammer

[rastakid]

Slashdot does it again.

Google Cache Version

[Anonymous Coward]

http://goo.gl/PCkGM

Security priorities have changed

[Cid Highwind]

So this guy "wrote the exploit code that was later taken by Slammer's authors and used as part of the worm", and he's not dead or serving an eleventy hojillion year federal prison sentence?

Times change indeed...

Re:Security priorities have changed

[eap]

So this guy "wrote the exploit code that was later taken by Slammer's authors and used as part of the worm", and he's not dead or serving an eleventy hojillion year federal prison sentence?

Times change indeed...

The article mentions he was paid by a company in Germany to penetrate their heavily-fortified SQL Server installations. This is when he developed the exploit code. Presumably it's not illegal for a company to pay you to security test its systems.

He also took the steps of communicating the exploit to Microsoft before releasing the code. He even asked their permission before divulging the code, and didn't do so until MS had released a fully corrective patch.

You're right, however, he'd be in jail if it happened today.

Our article on the subject:

[nweaver]

We (David Moore, Vern Paxson, Stefan Savage, Colleen Shannon, Stuart Staniford, and myself) did the analysis of how it spread, including showing how it infected all the vulnerable systems in 10 minutes, and detailing flaws in the random number generator.

Our article eventually appeared in IEEE Security & Privacy.

You can't beat clueless

[A Friendly Troll]

Letting a DB server out on the internet is moronic by itself, but not having installed a patch that was available 6 months before the worm started spreading, well, that's even worse.

The worst thing of all, however, is that Microsoft *itself* had unpatched instances of SQL Server out on the net and they themselves got pwned.