RSA: Phish Me If You Can (Video)
Spearphishing. The deluxe (but easy) way to get unwary employees to put malware on your network. It's basically the same as phishing, except more targeted. That is, a plain phishing scam might offer an unwary web-browsing employee a chance to see a famous starlet naked, while a spearphishing attack might purport to be an urgent request from your Bizzaro County office for 200 Kg of Unobtainium Oxide. Open that email, and... ZAP! So this is social hacking (cracking for the old-timers), and cannot necessarily be fought entirely by technical means. So how about setting up fake spearphishing attempts and immediately sending employees who fall for them to an IT security class with an emphasis on how to avoid phishing scams? You can do this yourself, possibly with help from a bright person or two from a nearby University. Or you can contact PhishMe or another anti-phish training company and have them help you teach spearphishing awareness to your people. Either way, every computer-using person in your company should know about phishing -- and should know how to avoid getting hooked by phishers.
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The problem is 100% technical. How could viewing an email ever result in malware being installed? Somebody failed -- they're called the IT department.
It's the fact that they treat us like eager morons, who won't recognize it. I mean the signs are dead simple.
1. Mentions a particular company by name.
2. Includes at least one buzz-word.
3. Entirely positive language.
Regular Slashdot stories pretty clearly have signs of concern or raise questions about their subject matter. These bare-naked slashvertisements are insulting. If you're going to be blatant, please fucking acknowledge that it's sponsored in the summary.
In network security, just the same as physical security, the main problem is not the hardware or the software, it's the wetware.
"Think about how stupid the average person is. Now, realise that half of them are dumber than that." - George Carlin
When setting up a test like this, first look at the legitimate e-mails sent around your company. If your business routinely circulates e-mails containing attachments employees are expected to open or links they're expected to click on, then ask yourself why you've got an overlap between what you expect employees to do and what you want them to not do. If you expect employees to check addresses but your e-mail client hides addresses, ask yourself why you're hiding what you want recipients to check. If you're having to ask those kinds of questions then the first problem you need to address isn't employees being vulnerable to spearphishing attacks, it's your internal e-mail culture and standards that make those vulnerabilities normal and expected.
Expect a lot of resistance to fixing these things. Not from your regular workers, from the upper layers of management who like these things because they make life easy and look "Oooh, shiny!".
It's a lot like physical security. You can emphasize it all you want, but when managers get angry at employees who closed the door in the manager's face forcing them to use their own key you will not get employees to stop letting people tailgate through doors.
It's not about being dumb, it's about not being aware. If the first phishing email you come across is one that's technically advanced and well written enough to slip through the technological filter: then you as a corporate employee are probably going to fall for it. Especially if it's a true spear-phishing email that's targeting *you*. It'll look like an email from your boss with yet another emailed PDF or DOCX report to review. Bam.
The solution that PhishMe proposes is to safely expose employees to phishing emails on a regular basis and teach everyone to recognize actual phishing emails from those demonstrations. The human reading the email and about to click the link or open the attachment is your last line of defense and shouldn't be neglected as such.