Federal Magistrate Rules That Fifth Amendment Applies To Encryption Keys
Virtucon writes "U.S. Magistrate William Callahan Jr. of Wisconsin has ruled in favor of the accused in that he should not have to decrypt his storage device. The U.S. Government had sought to compel Feldman to provide his password to obtain access to the data. Presumably the FBI has had no success in getting the data and had sought to have the judge compel Feldman to provide the decrypted contents of what they had seized. The Judge ruled (PDF): 'This is a close call, but I conclude that Feldman's act of production, which would necessarily require his using a password of some type to decrypt the storage device, would be
tantamount to telling the government something it does not already know with "reasonably particularity" — namely, that Feldman has personal access to and control over the encrypted storage devices. Accordingly, in my opinion, Fifth Amendment protection is available to Feldman. Stated another way, ordering Feldman to decrypt the storage devices would be in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination.'"
If the government has reasonable suspicion that you have illicit data, they can still compel you to decrypt it.
V qba'g xabj, guvf ybbxf yvxr n ernfbanoyl fhfcvpvbhf cbfg gb zr...
Where did the last sentence in this summary come from? It seems to be completely contradictory to the main content. Elaborate?
XKCD 538: A crypto nerd's imagination vs. what would actually happen
Does the 5th amendment right to avoid self-incrimination apply only to the particular charges being brough in a given case, or does it cover any statement that could be incriminating, even if it were in a different proceeding, or if the record from Case A were to be used as evidence in Case B?
Say, in the case of an encrypted HDD, it's reasonably plausible that a broad spectrum of the suspect's electronic activities will be there. Common software tends to be a bit 'leaky' in terms of recording what it does(temp files, caches, search indexes, etc.) and most people don't have entirely separate computers for each flavor of crime they are engaged in.
If somebody were being charged for one crime that probably left evidence on the HDD(kiddie porn, say); would the fact that they know that there is evidence of CC-skimming(but, unlike the kiddie porn, the feds have no circumstantial evidence or other grounds for belief) justify a 5th-amendment refusal to decrypt the volume? Would the other potentially-incriminating stuff be irrelevant because it isn't among the charges(even if the court record could be used as evidence to bring future charges)? Would the suspect be compelled to divulge the key; but the prosecution only have access to material relevant to the charges being filed, with some 3rd party forensics person 'firewalling' to exclude all irrelevant material?
Yeah sometimes we pass silly laws in the UK and other times they do in the States. Its like trying to figure out which pile of shit has the least offensive smell.
I am a free slashdotter. I will not be modded, blogged, DRM'd, patented, podcasted or RFID'd. My life is my own.
Encryption keys? It's arguing about the wrong topic. These silly arguments about the Fifth Amendment will soon be about as relevant to our lives as the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Shutting down free speech with violence isn't fighting fascism. It IS fascism!
It's a subtle point described in the judges decision.
If the government has knowledge of particular documents, they can force you to present them. This includes forcing you to open your safe or decrypting your hard drive.
If the government has no knowledge of the contents of the hard drive, no information from other sources that indicate that you have specific documents it wants, then it can't force you to decrypt your hard drive.
The judge's position was that since the government had no indication of whatever documents are on the hard drive, producing them tied the defendant to the documents - providing evidence of control and ownership. Since that evidence (control and ownership) was not available to the government beforehand, it would be compelled testimony.
I think this is also reasonable in light of the fourth amendment. If the government doesn't have knowledge of specific documents, it can't go "rummaging around" on your disk looking for things.
What encryption algorithm did he use that's FBI-proof?
Bzzt. In this real life example, when the guys with the $5 wrench came along, the victim called his lawyer who brought in a judge who wields a $100 wrench.
And it all happened (he beat the $5 wrench guys) because he encrypted. If he hadn't encrypted, he might not have ever known he was under attack (well, ok, in this particular example he actually did; most of the time you don't), wouldn't have been confronted with the $5 wrench, and wouldn't have have had the recourse of getting the judge to come in with his $100 wrench.
Encrypt. More of than not, it results in you defeating your adversary. That's true whether the adversary is your government, someone else's government, a common thief, Google, whoever bought your refurbished drive after you RMAed it, or whoever.
You're stupid and knowingly negligently careless if you don't encrypt anything important. We're all going to point and you and laugh at the non-random misfortune that you consciously chose to experience.
Examples of what's important are: your shopping list, where you're having dinner tonight, mundane thoughts such as "yes, I'll have another beer" and nearly anything else. Anything you say can be used against you, and I'm not quoting Miranda; I'm quoting reality itself.
Truecrypt.
The FBI has admitted defeat in attempts to break the open source encryption used to secure hard drives seized by Brazilian police during a 2008 investigation. <URL:http://news.techworld.com/security/3228701/>
I really shouldn't have used someone else's email address for this account.
So, it's rather like if the police found a special car with very strong windows and combination locks. They have strong evidence that it's got a lot of heroin in it and want to get inside it to search it and have a warrant to do so but can't get it open.
They think, but don't have much evidence to support that belief, that you had unrestricted access to the car interior and therefore have the combination and can open the door for them.
What this ruling says is that they can't compel you to product the combination because then you would be being forced to reveal that you did, in fact, have the combination and, hence, access to the inside of the vehicle which would be incriminating given the contents of the car.
If, however, they found a surveillance video that showed you opening the door of the car using the combination you could then be compelled to provide the combination as that would not reveal, for the first time, that you actually had access to the interior of the car.
Is that correct?
Why is there an "insightful" mod and why isn't it "-1"? If I wanted insight, I wouldn't be reading
Things I learned from reading the ruling:
1. As usual, keep your mouth shut. The guy merely admitted that he lived alone in his current residence for 15 years before he got smart and lawyer-ed up, and that fact makes an appearance in the ruling. It doesn't hurt much and they would have figured it out anyway, but it definitely didn't help.
2. Use whole-disk encryption and encrypt everything. All evidence against him mentioned in the ruling was obtained from unencrypted drives and were what should have been private bits and metadata that leaked or never making it to the encrypted drive, especially log files. They have highly incriminating file-names, drive letters, peer-to-peer download logs, basically a ton of metadata. While this ruling almost certainly doesn't cover all the evidence against him, it's not clear the FBI would have anything at all if it weren't for the two drives that they found unencrypted. Although they must have had something else to go after him in the first place.
3. IMO he really dodged a bullet at least in this narrow instance. Crudely speaking, Judge says it isn't reasonable to conclude that both the files in question necessarily exist and that the defendant had access to them (it sounds like the real problem is the latter). This when they have file-names, log files, and the disks in question were taken from his residence where he has lived alone for 15 years, and while he certainly hasn't admitted the disks were his, I don't see an active claim to the contrary either (which I'd likely support but he needs to say it). I'm very pro-encryption and am generally not happy with the court compelling encryption keys, but this is one of the weakest cases for not doing so that I could think of, and is probably why the FBI decided to go for it and now potentially lost big if this it the burden or proof they are stuck with to prove ownership or control of data on a disk.