Popular Android Anti-Virus Software Fooled By Trivial Techniques
wiredmikey writes "A group of researchers from Northwestern University and North Carolina State University tested ten of the most popular AV products on Android, and discovered that they were easily fooled by common obfuscation techniques. In a paper (PDF), the researchers said they tested AV software from several well-know security vendors. In order to evaluate the mobile security software, the researchers developed a tool called DroidChameleon, which applies transformation techniques to Android applications. Known malware samples were transformed to generate new variants that contain the exact malicious functions as before. These new variants were then passed to the AV products, and much to the surprise of the paper's authors, they were rarely flagged — if at all. According to the research, 43% of the signatures used by the AV products are based on file names, checksums or information obtained by the PackageManager API. This means that, as mentioned, common transformations will render their protection useless for the most part. For example, the researchers transformed the Android rootkit Droid Dream for their test. DroidDream is a widely-known and highly dangerous application. Yet, when it was transformed, every AV program failed to catch at least two variants."
AV products suck!
The whole premise of trying to match a virus 'signature' is simply stupid and useless.
"Ma'am, is this your son?"
"Well, my son was wearing a hat, so no."
Chances are it does. Just because you're too stupid to believe there's no possible way a virus can get onto your phone, doesn't mean that there's someone out there with the know-how and the skill to do just that. There is (and has never been) anything that is 100% secure.
...that AV apps not tested (such as avast!) are immune from this problem, and the authors only chose to report on those AV programs that failed their tests?
Citation please.
As I recall... the initial 'exploit' used by the ChevronWP7 folks involved running a local web server on your PC... then tricking your phone into developer unlocking against it... rather than the official Microsoft servers.
I wouldn't exactly call this a vector for virus infiltration.
Ditto when it comes to homebrew apps (which could only run on developer unlocked device (legit or not unlocked))... and required manual side-loading of the app.
Claiming malware was possible on WP7 is like claiming it's possible to infect the Pentagon with your super-l33t virus... provided you can trick someone into going into one of the secure server rooms, logging in as a local administrator, accessing your hax0red website... then clicking "Yes, I want to run configure; make; make install".
Help Brendan pay off his student loans
How'd that work out? Oh right... Android (Linux based) is the most easily hackable mobile phone OS out there!
You say that like it's a bad thing.
-- Alastair
Tell the guys writing the smartphone virus cleaning software that our world is in danger of obliteration by a large asteroid, and we're building a series of Ark ships to get everybody off the planet to safety. The smartphone virus cleaning software writers will depart on the "B" Ark, along with hairdressers and middle-managers.
Then the rest of us will laugh our asses off.
I'm not repeating myself
I'm an X window user; I'm an ex-Windows user
Not talking about ChevronWP7 or anything like it. The actual homebrew stuff for WP7 wasn't well publicized, partially because a lot of it was flying under the MS radar so far as possible, but it existed. The best-know "root" program is called WP7 Root Tools (http://www.wp7roottools.com) and exploits various firmware bugs in HTC, LG, and Samsung firmware (and possibly others) for WP7 to gain near-complete control over the OS, disable many of the "security" restrictions (such as the prohibitions on third-party non-"app" executables), give full access to the filesystem, registry, and certificate store, and allow running any other app as TCB (WP7's equivalent of "root" or "Admin"). Other apps before it, including things like TouchXplorer and Advanced Config, took less complete control but nonetheless had permission to do any number of nasty things had that been the intention of the developers. Additionally, once the later versions of Root Tools (with the "elevate other apps" feature) came out, a considerable number of homebrew apps that needed such permissions immediately sprung up, providing a perfectly good avenue for somebody to slip in a Trojan app. Indeed, it was a considerable concern.
The point about requiring manual sideloading is valid (in fact, installing WP7 Root Tools would have been a lot easier if Microsoft would have signed it and put it in the store, since otherwise it could be difficult to install on some devices after Mango introduced the interop-lock). However, I fail to see the important difference between installing an app you think is safe because it's on the store, and an app you think is safe because it comes out of the developer community that has been adding such cool features to your phone. Either way, it's a manual action on your part to install the app, and most people aren't going to decompile it and examine it for malicious code even if they had the know-how to do so. As for whether Trojans in general constitute "real" malware, that's all that the Android apps in question are, or the malicious iOS apps for jailbroken phones, or similar.
To address your little analogy, social engineering is one of the best ways to bypass security there is; the weakest link in computer security usually sits between the user's ears. Also, your analogy seriously falls flat on its face when you consider that it wasn't supposed to be *possible* to "[log] in as a local administrator" on WP7. A seriously locked-down system wouldn't allow your scenario either.
Then there's the minor, but really easy, attacks which were possible against WP7 without requiring firmware access or bypassing interop-lock or any such thing. For example, the XAP files that would let you access other device or operator marketplaces could just have easily crippled your phone's marketplace functionality, overwritten your personal documents, broken your installed apps, and other things. Those were just carefully crafted ZIP archives with a .XAP extension and some XML files to make the installer recognize them; the same attack was actually possible using .ZIP files as well and wouldn't have been that hard to socially engineer somebody to try, or could have been bundled into an otherwise-legit XAP on the store.
There's no place I could be, since I've found Serenity...
This doesn't surprise me at all. The so-called virus scanners can't actually scan for viruses (i.e. examine the code of third-party apps) because that would break the copy protection. The paper mentions this at the beginning.
Do you have WP7 Root Tools installed on your Trophy? If so, at least three different exploits were used: the ZIP path traversal that made the interop-unlock "app" work (all the work was actually done by the installer), the Connection Setup hack that achieved interop-unlock by hijacking the network database using some debug code to inject a script that modified the registry, and the exploit that Root Tools itself used in the HTC drivers to gain arbitrary code execution in the kernel.
Just because Heathclif74 was not, so far as anybody knows, embedding any malware in his software doesn't mean he couldn't have been, or one of the many other authors posting their work on XDA-Devs and WPCentral.
There's no place I could be, since I've found Serenity...
Modifications of the binaries creates a new variant of a virus, which may go undetected. I'm shocked! If you'd like an AV solution that performs a deep inspection on every binary, each time they are executed on your device, it's going to be a sloooooow ride.
yet quite often we hear about a bug in the Linux kernel, or Bind, or some other major component that has been undiscovered for years and years
i seem to recall that as an excuse around these parts for a decade (continuing today) regarding linux... and yet those bugs aren't exploited, even when the potential target is driving much of the consumer embedded world, servers (including probably majority of web servers and many large corporate intranets), and now smartphones.
Android (Linux based) is the most easily hackable mobile phone OS out there!
calm down a bit there sunshine... android is really a userland running on a virtual machine (dalvik). if you find an android vulnerability that affects the underlying linux kernel, then you'll have a major story. yes android is probably pathetically insecure (it would be nice if it were as secure as linux), but the linux kernel underneath dalvik is as tight and tested as the numerous datacenters around the world require it to be.
some slashdotters like to pick on how linux fans claim android = linux when it suits and not when it doesn't. android is an application layer running inside a virtual machine (so it is separated from the linux kernel), but there is still linux underneath (so every android deployment is also a linux deployment). linux and android are usually lumped together when arguing about market share, and separated when arguing about security, but there's nothing contradictory if you take the context of the argument into account.
I don't practice particularly careful practices with my phone AT ALL, installing and uninstalling things all the time, etc etc and at most, at the absolute most, I've seen one chunk of malware. The real problem is not malware it's the permissions you grant the legitimate stuff you put on. WHY, does such and such game or widget need my phone book, email address book, call log browser history and location db? That's the problem right there.