True Tales of (Mostly) White Hat Hacking
snydeq writes "Stings, penetration pwns, spy games — it's all in a day's work along the thin gray line of IT security, writes Roger A. Grimes, introducing his five true tales of (mostly) white hat hacking. 'Three guys sitting in a room, hacking away, watching porn, and getting paid to do it — life was good,' Grimes writes of a gig probing for vulnerabilities in a set-top box for a large cable company hoping to prevent hackers from posting porn to the Disney Channel feed. Spamming porn spammers, Web beacon stings with the FBI, luring a spy to a honeypot — 'I can't say I'm proud of all the things I did, but the stories speak for themselves.'"
I thought Frank Grimes elecfrocuted himself years ago. Poor Grimey.
much worse has happened and it has been someone at the cable head end messing up.
Like porn on the OTA channel showing the super bowl on cable systems or porn showing up on the EAS / public access channels.
'Three guys sitting in a room, hacking away, watching porn, and getting paid to do it — life was good,'
It's not gay if we don't make eye contact with each other... Why are you staring at m-- Ohh, my bad. Carry On!
i-Guide
Now did that hack let you get FREE HBO and PPV movies or just local remap channels?
Over the years there have been stores of getting big pron PPV / VOD bills for shows they did not see how likely was it that some hacked the box so they where able to get free pron?
http://consumerist.com/2008/06/21/listen-time-warner-the-60-year-old-english-teacher-didnt-order-1400-of-porn/
One of the sillier things that the culture of individualism has brought is heroism: the idea that one person or a very small group of people are supermen, able to challenge all perceived evil and win the day. But it's bullshit. There are only two ways to make a system secure: 1) Have everyone on your side; 2) Have no one use it. 2 is approached by an awful lot of firms: why release an exploit for system X, when you get 100x the exposure with an exploit on system Y? 1 is approached another way: many eyes. Three guys in a room aren't going to find shit, no matter how much porn they watch (well, unless it's *that* sort of porn). There will always be hundreds among the 7 billion odd people who will spot something you've missed. So, a security team comprising only three people is merely there for show, and the only reason you haven't been broken into is because you've approached close enough to 1 or 2.
If you need a hat to show what side you're on, you're not a hacker. You may be a cowboy. There's lots of them in the IT security industry. But you're no hacker.
'I can't say I'm proud of all the things I did, but the stories speak for themselves.'"
Not proud? I assume that means that you were not proud of watching porn with three other guys. I don't even want to know what you did that might make you feel not proud.
But good going with the techniques you used to catch the bad guys,
Spamming porn spammers, Web beacon stings with the FBI, luring a spy to a honeypot
...watching porn...probing for vulnerabilities...
...of an idiot who was teaching people how to hack into certain types of setups in an open IRC channel of mine.
And he was using his employer's servers to do it!
Now this guy was, at the time, causing ALL sorts of grief for me and several of my colleagues. He kept trying to hack our message boards, hack our e-mails, break onsite computers, tried DDOS'ing us numerous times, was sniffing wifi traffic for all he was worth, etc. All while claiming he was "twice the hacker of all of us put together".
Anyhow, I was basically logged into my channel 24x7. So I'd logged the whole thing. Including the part where the guy promised to "eventually" get around to cleaning up the hack job they'd used to get in.
Well, he probably WOULD have.
Had a copy of the complete IRC log, including the mention of live customer financial data being on that server, NOT found its way directly to the company's owner.
The next time the guy came in, he was detained, his system was imaged for evidence, and he was let go.
And it took him nearly 3 months before anyone got around to actually telling him who'd dropped the dime on him.
And all without doing a single illegal thing.
I later wound up helping the FBI give him a vacation at Club Fed.
And it looks like he's going back to stay for a while.
Chas - The one, the only.
THANK GOD!!!
If a low level of effort can take care of 80% of your problems, then it is worth the effort
Suppose that most (guessing 90%+) hostile attacks on servers are using a commonly known technique, and that there is either vendor or SANS guidance on dealing with it, then three people can certainly perform the penetration test, test the solution and set it up to be rolled out by existing operations staff
Sure, the first day and closely held techniques (imho small %) could play hell with you, but the people who actually have access to them are more likely to be targeting vast sums of wealth than playing pranks on Disney
And yes, I researched, developed and deployed a security solution for a mid-sized data center in less than two months. There was no heroism, just a long grind, lots of documentation and getting rif-ed at the end of the lock-down
Did your underpants get sticky while you were typing that?
..
--
ref: big sloppy kiss, bitch-slap, circle-jerks, girlfriend, hetero man, jerk off, jerk to, just pissing, pages stuck together, porn vid, really squirting, scantily-clad female, sucked my dick, sucking his dick, whackin
Wow, I guess you really are just typing with one hand.
Sorry about that! This guy was selling "Digital Cable Descramblers" which I knew was bullshit because the device was literally just the male end of a cable...however...
THE FUCKIN THING WORKED!
I guess it was just a MAC address spoofer and someone else got charged for what everyone was ordering.
Nothing will ever be proven 100% secure because it's easier to break things than make them. However, typical software is akin to a car door that's not only unlocked, but swung wide open. 95% of developers have less than two weeks of security training, often less than 8 hours. They put approximately zero effort into security. It doesn't take a huge team of security experts to close the door and lock it.
When I started my current job, it took me maybe 40 hours to reduce our attack surface by 90% because my predecessor either knew nothing about security, or just didn't care.
Same source as this fairy tale.. http://www.infoworld.com/d/security/in-his-own-words-confessions-of-cyber-warrior-222266
A browser based xss attack that can traverse the file system and return a passwd file? Sorry, but I'm calling bs. Even if the javascript code exploited a vulnerability in the browser's sandbox, i highly doubt many phone jockey call center pcs are running a posix os with a passwd file. This whole article stinks of bs and loosely related security buzz words sequenced together to form something halfway inteligable for someone who knows little about security.
Oh, for the love of %DEITY....
Here's a link to the one page version of the story:
http://www.infoworld.com/print/222831
I hope nobody takes this article even remotely serious.
It's obvious the author has no idea what he's talking about, and didn't perform any of the attacks that he's mentioned - his example of dot-dot-slash directory traversal, and XSS itself are entirely incorrect - not in a technical nitpick way, but as-in, someone who knew how to utilize such attacks most certainly wouldn't describe them as he has.
Charlatan.
Sorry about that! This guy was selling "Digital Cable Descramblers" which I knew was bullshit because the device was literally just the male end of a cable...however...
THE FUCKIN THING WORKED!
I guess it was just a MAC address spoofer and someone else got charged for what everyone was ordering.
I doubt it was a MAC spoofer, you'd still run into purchase limits and eventually the cable company would start digging into why they were getting sued by a shitload of people in a single town for large amounts of bogus purchases.
More likely scenario is that it had a small in-band signalling chip that sets the box to what is called "Tech" or "Factory" status. It's a special operational mode where the box assumes it's authorized for everything and that you've already paid for everything, so it never even sends a purchase request up to the head-end equipment. The programming sent down the coax is usually encrypted these days, but the signalling which controls the box status and does stuff like removing PIN locks, resetting, forcing code downloads, etc. is usually signalled "in the clear".