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NSA Foils Much Internet Encryption

An anonymous reader writes "The New York Times is reporting that the NSA has 'has circumvented or cracked much of the encryption, or digital scrambling, that guards global commerce and banking systems, protects sensitive data like trade secrets and medical records, and automatically secures the e-mails, Web searches, Internet chats and phone calls of Americans and others around the world, the documents show. ... The agency, according to the documents and interviews with industry officials, deployed custom-built, superfast computers to break codes, and began collaborating with technology companies in the United States and abroad to build entry points into their products. The documents do not identify which companies have participated.'" You may prefer Pro Publica's non-paywalled version, instead, or The Guardian's.

141 of 607 comments (clear)

  1. Let us endeavour to create better encription by ackthpt · · Score: 4, Funny
    --

    A feeling of having made the same mistake before: Deja Foobar
    1. Re:Let us endeavour to create better encription by The+Grim+Reefer · · Score: 5, Funny

      For awesome powa

      Hasn't the majority of the internet already applied that twice?

    2. Re:Let us endeavour to create better encription by NettiWelho · · Score: 4, Funny

      Hmm... I have a creeping feeling the NSA has already introduced a vulnerability into the rot13! If you click on encrypt twice the original contents are revealed!

    3. Re:Let us endeavour to create better encription by ackthpt · · Score: 2

      Hmm... I have a creeping feeling the NSA has already introduced a vulnerability into the rot13! If you click on encrypt twice the original contents are revealed!

      Insidious!

      Hit it a third time and we're all secure again! Quick!

      --

      A feeling of having made the same mistake before: Deja Foobar
    4. Re:Let us endeavour to create better encription by snowraver1 · · Score: 4, Funny

      You actually have to do it three times to be secure - like 3DES

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    5. Re:Let us endeavour to create better encription by slashmydots · · Score: 4, Funny

      Yes, rot13 is huuuuge lol. But for one way encryption similar to hashes, they just run it through Google translate to 5 different languages, at least one of which is asian-based and one of which is latin-based. Studies have shown that whole letters encrypted with 5-layer google translate method are impossible to return to its original form, making it vastly superior to MD5 and SHA256.

    6. Re:Let us endeavour to create better encription by Beardydog · · Score: 2

      You're right. I've only managed to strip off three levels, and it's left your comment completely unreadable!

    7. Re:Let us endeavour to create better encription by Austerity+Empowers · · Score: 3, Interesting

      We can all participate in this research!

      http://translationparty.com/

    8. Re: Let us endeavour to create better encription by flyingfsck · · Score: 4, Funny

      You jest, but I have been wondering about adding a large block of urandom data at the bottom of each of my email messages, just to give the NSA grief.
      ***255DES*** =-w%(:RvO R-*_fTM)[=vz?"{|T***EOT***

      --
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  2. SSH? by Phibz · · Score: 3, Insightful

    I wonder if their list includes SSH

    1. Re:SSH? by Yaur · · Score: 4, Informative

      The claim is VPNs and SSL... so either a break in RSA or AES, either way SSH would be covered. But there are so few details in the story its hard to know how technically competent the staff who reviewed the documents and therefore how serious the threat is.

    2. Re:SSH? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

      I wonder if their list includes SSH

      OpenSSL came from SSLeay, which was created outside of the US specifically for this reason.

      Its not a technical attack in the first round;

          The long, strong arm of the NSA
          July 27, 1998
          Web posted at: 4:15 PM EDT
          http://edition.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9807/27/security.idg/

          [..]

          It's gotten to the point where no vendor hip to the NSA's power will
          even start building products without checking in with Fort Meade first.
          This includes even that supposed ruler of the software universe,
          Microsoft Corp. "It's inevitable that you design products with specific
          [encryption] algorithms and key lengths in mind," said Ira Rubenstein,
          Microsoft attorney and a top lieutenant to Bill Gates. By his own
          account, Rubenstein acts as a "filter" between the NSA and
          Microsoft's design teams in Redmond, Wash. "Any time that you're
          developing a new product, you will be working closely with the NSA,"
          he noted.

          [..]

          Clearly wary of granting the government supervision over its products,
          Microsoft has stubbornly refused to submit a data-recovery plan, even
          though the Redmond giant already includes a data-recovery feature in
          its Exchange Server.

          "The Exchange Server can only be used when this feature is present,"
          Rubenstein said. "Because we haven't filed a product plan, it's harder
          for us to export this than for companies that have filed plans."

          [..]

    3. Re:SSH? by lgw · · Score: 5, Insightful

      I'd wager that the fundamental flaw in HTTPS is that the government has the private keys direct from the CAs. The protocol is flawed in the key management (as most are).

      --
      Socialism: a lie told by totalitarians and believed by fools.
    4. Re:SSH? by jasno · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Yeah, I figured they can always classify the private keys as business records and request them via subpeona. Nothing in the law prevents it.

      --

      http://www.masturbateforpeace.com/
    5. Re:SSH? by MightyMartian · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Yes, it goes without saying that the supreme weakness of key-based encryption is that you're only as secure as the security of the signing keys themselves.

      The proper way to do it is to have your CAs sitting on a non-network connected computer sitting in a secure location, with as few individuals having access as possible. Obviously that's not 100%, as the NSA could still show up with a warrant, but you're going to know when you've been compromised, which is, really, the whole point behind proper key management.

      --
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    6. Re:SSH? by lister+king+of+smeg · · Score: 4, Informative

      Unless you exchange private keys offline, manually, preferably not using any temporary electronic storage means, the NSA has your keys.

      um you never exchange privet key's you only share public keys.

      --
      ---Saying gnome 3 is better than windows 8 not so much a compliment as it is damning with light praise.
    7. Re:SSH? by SolitaryMan · · Score: 2, Informative

      Sounds like a pile of steaming bullshit to me, to be honest.

      --
      May Peace Prevail On Earth
    8. Re:SSH? by amorsen · · Score: 5, Informative

      The claim is VPNs and SSL... so either a break in RSA or AES, either way SSH would be covered.

      You do not need to break RSA or AES to break a lot of VPNs. I.e. if you use aggressive mode IKEv1 PSK (typically plus XAUTH, but that does not actually help), the shared private key can be recovered by offline attacks. NSA supercomputers should have no problem handling most keys. Alternatively, if certificates are used, many organizations buy premade certificates including secret keys instead of going through the trouble of generating their own secret keys. That means the NSA only has to compromise the few certificate vendors.

      And this is just the passive attacks the NSA can do. If they actively interfere, they can use downgrade attacks or (for HTTPS) the various TLS vulnerabilities or use proper fake vendor certificates or all sorts of other mischief. That is harder to pull off unnoticed of course.

      Very little equipment supports IKEv1 with "raw" RSA keys (no certificates), even though that takes the whole PKI problem away and avoids aggressive mode. I'm only aware of (free|open|libre|strong)SWAN and RouterOS. IKEv2 is almost non-existent, and what little equipment supports it tends to only support the equivalent of IKEv1 main mode with PSK or certificates -- precisely the areas where IKEv1 is already good enough.

      For those of us who use proprietary encryption acceleration: how do we know that the session keys are chosen securely and not divulged with steganography somehow? I know that products have existed which did exactly that, revealing part of the encryption key in the encrypted data stream (and I know that because the vendor was fairly open about the practice).

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    9. Re:SSH? by bloodhawk · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Why would anyone ever exchange private Keys???? The system does not work that way.

    10. Re:SSH? by IamTheRealMike · · Score: 5, Informative

      Certificate authorities never see private keys so you are dead wrong about that. What's more, even if a rogue CA was minting bad certs on the fly to attest that the NSA was really foobar.com, that would have been noticed. Remember that secrecy is something they value insanely highly. They wouldn't ever do something so easily noticed and the articles do not imply any kind of CA compromise.

      In fact if you read all the stories (they overlap largely but not entirely) you can get a vague picture of what's going on. Firstly, they record all encrypted traffic in case they can decrypt it later. Secondly, they have a database of public to private keys, populated via any means they can. Thirdly, they obtain keys in lots of ways (hacking, subversion, bogus court orders, brute forcing old/weak keys etc) but they don't seem to have a magical solution to all strong crypto. The closest that the leaks come to this is discussion of some amazing cryptoanalytic breakthrough, which could possibly mean they're able to break some kinds of RSA? Perhaps they're ahead of Joux et al by some years?

      Regardless, what it is, it can't be a solution to all crypto, because these governments apparently asked the newspapers not to publish on the grounds that people might switch to stronger systems that worked.

    11. Re:SSH? by Score+Whore · · Score: 4, Insightful

      A) The NSA probably directly runs half of the CAs and thus own the root keys that come configured in your browser.
      B) Absent some fancy crypto skills, having the CA root key only allows them to MITM connections. Doesn't help with decrypting a captured stream.

    12. Re: SSH? by MightyMartian · · Score: 4, Insightful

      To fully secure our VPN, I've now built a CA on a non-Internet connected machine which sits behind lock and key. I use it to create SSL certificates for our VPN routers. I'm not building these Certs for Joe Average to connect to my servers, I'm building them so I can be sure that communications between my VPN endpoints is secure, and by securing the CA I can be certain that the likelihood of anyone, including the NSA, can break into my VPN tunnels with any kind of non-local exploit is low to nil.

      --
      The world's burning. Moped Jesus spotted on I50. Details at 11.
    13. Re:SSH? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

      Bruce Schneier should be technically competent enough for you, see his articles today at the Guardian.

      http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/05/government-betrayed-internet-nsa-spying

      http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-remain-secure-surveillance

    14. Re:SSH? by sneakyimp · · Score: 3, Interesting

      I'm more inclined to trust Bruce Schneier who says "I trust the mathematics," than the authors of this sensationalist NYTimes article. To me, it seems like they completely lack any nuanced understanding of the information flow and its vulnerabilities and are merely depending on whatever third-hand analysis they might have gleaned from reading other amateur blogs.

      I agree that going to the service providers (e.g., google, yahoo, apple, phone companies, etc.) or building a backdoor into the software is a good way to go about it, but I hardly think that means that the NSA is "winning the war on encryption."

    15. Re: SSH? by mspohr · · Score: 4, Informative

      From the article it sounds like the NSA has compromised most commercial VPN software (and is working on the rest) with backdoors, etc.
      Do you use commercial (non open source) VPN software? If so, it doesn't matter that your keys are secure.

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    16. Re:SSH? by sneakyimp · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Mod parent up. Nobody talking about this even seems to have the vaguest understanding of encryption.

    17. Re: SSH? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Funny

      Welcome to the do not fly list.

    18. Re:SSH? by mspohr · · Score: 4, Insightful

      The article states that they are working with commercial software vendors to insert back doors, vulnerabilities, etc. into their software. This is much easier than trying to break RSA or AES by brute force.
      I think we have to assume that all commercial software has been compromised and is vulnerable.
      Only trust open source software where the code has been audited carefully.

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    19. Re:SSH? by sneakyimp · · Score: 2

      HTTPS doesn't strictly require that you use any authority at all. You can use a self-signed certificate. Verification of the cert is hard, but not impossible. Also, the process of obtaining a cert from a CA doesn't require you to give up your private key.

    20. Re: SSH? by vux984 · · Score: 3, Insightful

      This case self signed certs would be safer.

      Self signed certs have always been safer when used properly.

      In a closed controlled enterprise environment self-signed certs are fine, and reasonably easy to do well.

      Using them properly on the public internet however is pretty much impossible. Keys with a chain of trust to a 3rd party certificate authority (e.g. verisign, comodo, et al) are exactly that ... chains of trust. Can I trust that verisign hasn't be compromised by your average hacker? Probably, for the most part yes. Can I trust that verisign hasn't rolled over and opened its legs for the NSA? No. I can't.

      But having the average https site switch over to self-signed certs to avoid using NSA-compromised-verisign isn't a solution as I have no convenient way to verify when i enter their web address that I haven't been presented with a MITM site (hosted by a hacker... or even by the NSA which is the whole reason we dumped Verisign certs for self-signed in the first place...)

    21. Re:SSH? by vux984 · · Score: 2

      Or it could be an MITM proxy page for the NSA, and they just forgot to sign it. The trouble with self signed certs is you don't know who you are talking to at all.

    22. Re:SSH? by gutnor · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Certificate authorities never see private keys

      Theoretically, in practice average Joe buy their certificate and private keys from a third party. And obviously if you use any type of hosted environment, you must provide the private key.

      Even big companies do not run their own datacenter nowadays, hell even Banks do not run everything onsite so I wouldn't be surprise me if the NSA did not already have the majority of the SSL private keys.

    23. Re:SSH? by niftymitch · · Score: 2

      Perhaps one way pads have been exchanged already.

      Some of the leakers have posted large files of clearly
      random data. By using that data in interesting ways
      key exchange or data exchange could move forward for
      many destinations.

      It is interesting that private communications once were safe
      inside a common gummed envelope and protected by
      a few penny seal in the upper right corner.

      The thoughts and prayers of many are now laid open to the whims
      of unknown agencies, companies and bureaucrats. The issue
      to me is that they are unknown... The journal or diary of anyone
      is no longer as safe as it once was under a mattress. Once exposed,
      once disclosed it cannot be undone without astounding expense
      and perverse effort. The commerce in "stolen words" by media
      boggles the mind. Should a friend of yours be implicated in a crime
      the media seems happy to steal you images and words without
      compensation and without liable for truth regarding you or your
      acquaintances.

      --
      Truth is stranger than fiction, but it is because Fiction is obliged to stick to possibilities; Truth isn't. Mark Twain.
    24. Re:SSH? by Cramer · · Score: 5, Informative

      To be 1000% clear... all a CA does is sign keys generated by others. They never see the private server key(s). Having the CA signing certificates doesn't give you the magic ability to decode a site's traffic; it only allows you to pretend to be that site. (assuming you can get the users traffic to come to, or through, you. and that other steps (fingerprint validation, serial number checking, etc.) aren't being used.)

    25. Re:SSH? by knarf · · Score: 2

      I wonder if their list includes SSH

      In the linked BULLRUN document, in section 6 ('BULLRUN sensitivity and coverage') it clearly mentions SSH as one of the covered protocols so the answer is yes. As to whether this coverage is due to some publicly-unknown (but NSA-available) weakness in the SSH protocol, in common implementations, in the used cyphers or enacted case-by-case through man-in-the-middle attacks is of course unknown.

      --
      --frank[at]unternet.org
    26. Re:SSH? by gweihir · · Score: 2

      Vulnerabilities in AES are very, very unlike. Vulnerabilities in RSA can only be introduced by changing the universe. What is far more likely is back-doors or intentionally weak key generation in commercial SSL and VPN products. I already have seen commercial encryption that was incompetently done. Now I am wondering whether that was intentional. However it was grossly obvious, so I guess not, even though it was a well-known US company.

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    27. Re:SSH? by Frobnicator · · Score: 5, Insightful

      I'm more inclined to trust Bruce Schneier who says "I trust the mathematics," than the authors of this sensationalist NYTimes article

      I trust the math, even though I don't understand it.

      I don't necessarily trust the people who coded the math into a program.

      I don't necessarily trust the computer that is running the program.

      --
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    28. Re:SSH? by Cramer · · Score: 2

      Correction: SSLeay was developed outside the USA because of US export restrictions -- if a US citizen wrote even a single line of code, the project would not be exportable ("published", i.e. "downloadable", 'tho actual print publication was legal.) It had f*** all to do with any government attempts or agenda to weaken or subvert it.

    29. Re:SSH? by mi · · Score: 4, Interesting

      My old boss was employee 7 at Verisign and he says he was there the day they came for the keys.

      The silver lining in this sad story is that the algorithm used by SSL itself is still unbreakable to the NSA. They wouldn't have needed the keys otherwise. So asymmetric crypto is still sound — if used properly — and privacy-minded people can still use it to communicate...

      --
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    30. Re: SSH? by 0111+1110 · · Score: 5, Interesting

      I think at this point it is safe to assume that all US or US ally based commercial software of any kind that is of some value to the NSA/GCHQ has been compromised. I would imagine that this will present a huge advantage to open source software in relevant fields. IMO any software company that allowed such backdoors deserves to go out of business. It also means that commercial anti-virus, firewall, and other security software has to be assumed to be backdoored for the NSA/GCHQ. This also gives Linux a huge advantage because it is not so dependent on high quality security software.

      --
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    31. Re: SSH? by mspohr · · Score: 5, Insightful

      With closed source, you don't know if it's secure and you can't verify that it's secure and now we have these NSA documents which state that they have already compromised the most popular commercial security software and they are working on compromising the rest of it.
      With open source, you don't have a guarantee that it's secure but you do have lots of knowledgeable people looking at the code (especially now) and you yourself can audit the code. It has a much higher chance of being secure.
      You're right, "a security solution with a destroyed reputation is no solution at all"... and the NSA just destroyed the reputation of all commercial security software.

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    32. Re:SSH? by swillden · · Score: 3, Informative

      Certificate authorities never see private keys

      Theoretically, in practice average Joe buy their certificate and private keys from a third party.

      Um, no, Joe average does not. Joe doesn't understand where his keys come from, but the CA doesn't provide them.

      The public/private key pair is generated on Joe's computer. Most CA's issue certificates through a web-based form, and that form triggers the browser to generate the key pair locally. Then the public key is placed in a certificate request and uploaded to the CA. Some time later the CA signs the public key and produces the resulting public key certificate, which is downloaded.

      The private key never leaves the user's computer until they move it somewhere else (e.g. to install it in their web server).

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    33. Re:SSH? by Marillion · · Score: 4, Insightful

      My suspicion is that they can monitor the AES key negotiation during SSL handshake. I've heard enough experts say they still trust AES. But if you as a government agency can compel a company to disclose their private RSA/DSA key then snooping SSL is easy. SSL uses the RSA/DSA public to encrypt the session symmetric encryption key. If you know the RSA/DSA private key, then you can easily decrypt that session key and then snoop the communication.

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    34. Re:SSH? by gweihir · · Score: 2

      And what would that have to do with SSH? SSH does not support user-specified symmetric keys.

      --
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    35. Re: SSH? by skids · · Score: 3, Insightful

      That is assuming the NSA doesn't send developers into OSS environments to insert cleverly obfuscated and plausibly deniable vulnerabilities. OSS is spread pretty thin in many areas. Some products you would think would have a team of tens of developers have more like 4, and there is a good probability there will be a deficiency in either expertise or time.

    36. Re:SSH? by flyingfsck · · Score: 2

      They are referring to the Carter era Clipper Chip, which everyone said a polite No Thank You to.

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    37. Re:SSH? by FireFury03 · · Score: 2

      I'd wager that the fundamental flaw in HTTPS is that the government has the private keys direct from the CAs. The protocol is flawed in the key management (as most are).

      It's not that simple. When you get your certificate signed, you never give the CA your private key - you give them a certificate signing request instead. So by compromising a CA, the NSA can't get access to the key required to do offline decryption of an SSL session.

      They *can* get the CA's own key, of course. And that would allow them to forge a new certificate that claims to be yours. They can use that certificate to perform an online man in the middle attack of your SSL sessions, and anyone validating the certificate by checking it is signed by the CA wouldn't be able to tell the difference. However, the real cert and the forged cert would be different, which means there's a reasonable chance that someone's going to spot this if its done on a large scale. For example, as far as I know, Chrome checks that the certificates Google's websites are presenting it with are actually Google's certificates, even if they appear to be correctly signed by the CA - if it sees a fake cert it reports back to Google. (This is how Google has caught compromised CAs before)

      As we've seen before, if a CA is caught handing out forged certificates, their life is pretty much over - all the browser vendors immediately revoke their CA certificates. So given how easy it is to spot the forged certificate when this kind of attack is pulled on a large scale, and how bad things would go for the CA when someone spotted it, it seems unlikly that a CA would help the NSA in this way unless they were put under immense pressure.

    38. Re: SSH? by the_olo · · Score: 2

      To fully secure our VPN, I've now built a CA on a non-Internet connected machine which sits behind lock and key. I use it to create SSL certificates for our VPN routers. I'm not building these Certs for Joe Average to connect to my servers, I'm building them so I can be sure that communications between my VPN endpoints is secure, and by securing the CA I can be certain that the likelihood of anyone, including the NSA, can break into my VPN tunnels with any kind of non-local exploit is low to nil.

      Did you secure the machine against passive electromagnetic emissions eavesdropping when it is powered on? That would require making a full faraday cage out of your CA machine's server room, with a fully self-contained power source (possibly a fossil-fueled powered generator?) within and no communication wires whatsoever crossing the cage's boundary.

      Are the private keys of your VPN nodes stored in secure, physically tamper-proof hardware security module devices both resitant to electromagnetic eavesdropping and trusted to not have NSA backdoors, or are they on disks or other non protected memory?

      Depending on answers to those questions, your precautions against NSA spying may not be effective at all.

  3. Uh... okay by cryptizard · · Score: 5, Insightful

    I believe the "working with industries to install backdoors" part, but the cracking internet standards encryption? Nope. The report doesn't even say what they are supposed to have cracked, only some nebulous "widely used internet encryption". Do they have a ton of computation power? Yes. Do they have some magical break on AES that no one in academia knows about or can even fathom? No. Just some FUD.

    1. Re:Uh... okay by Hatta · · Score: 5, Interesting

      Cracking doesn't mean brute force. If you compromise the key, the encryption is just as surely cracked. Chances are what they really mean here is that they've compromised the certificate authorities that are trusted by default by most web browsers. Turns out self signed certificates really are more secure.

      GPG and SSH are probably safe as you generate your own keys on the local machine.

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    2. Re:Uh... okay by cryptizard · · Score: 5, Insightful

      I don't know that it is necessarily true, but I wouldn't bet my life that they don't have a backdoor on at least one root CA. Remember, you don't need all of them, just one can do a lot of damage.

    3. Re:Uh... okay by cryptizard · · Score: 3, Insightful

      No, no and no. It would take a SIGNIFICANT theoretical break on encryptions to bring them within the realm of brute force capability. Even 80 bits of security is considered well outside of the reach of existing machines, and AES has at least 128 bits. Remember, every bit doubles the amount of time it takes to brute force. It would take all the computers in the world billions of years to brute force one key.

    4. Re:Uh... okay by Yaur · · Score: 2

      Even if the CA were in your back pocket how would you go about generating a rogue certificate with the same fingerprint as the real one?

    5. Re:Uh... okay by Hatta · · Score: 2

      What reason do you have to believe that they haven't compromised the CAs? All it would take is one NSL, which the CAs could never appeal, or tell anyone about. Why would they not do that? Do you know of an alternative method that would be more effective?

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    6. Re:Uh... okay by dgatwood · · Score: 5, Informative

      No need to compromise anything. They just need a single CA to be complicit with a court order to produce a certificate that signs an NSA-provided key for a specific site. Then, they can freely MITM that site. SSL is swiss cheese as security goes, because certs are automatically trusted if signed by a CA, are never stored, and their designated requirements are never checked when determining whether a new key should be trusted or not. In short, SSL is a train wreck.

      Self-signed keys are not more secure. If a site goes from a self-signed cert to a signed cert with a different key, most browsers do not display any warning. Although you can install anti-MITM tools that produce a warning when the key changes, those tools would detect such a government MITM whether you're using a CA-signed cert or a self-signed cert. By contrast, a CA-signed cert makes it much harder to perform a MITM attack the first time a user goes to your site, effectively limiting such attacks to those who can convince a CA to give them a cert for your site. Guess which is more likely.

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    7. Re:Uh... okay by thoromyr · · Score: 2

      Cracking encryption isn't a crap shoot -- its not like they get a single roll of the dice and say "damn, we didn't crack that one" -- it is just a matter of time. The question, really, is "how much time would it take to crack this encrypted communication" and the answer depends on a lot of factors. It rarely, if ever, is the theoretical limit to difficulty. A trivial example is the debian fiasco where nearly all entropy was removed from key generation. That is a bit extreme, but the point stands that the difficulty is, due to implementation issues and side channel attacks, very likely less than the theoretical.

      It is popular to express the difficulty of decryption in time-to-decrypt. Even if the difficulty were always the theoretical this would still be wrong. There are orders of magnitude difference in computing power that can be applied. Just switching from a fast CPU to a good GPU will give you a very nice speed up -- and that is before clustering. Periodically I have to update a "time to crack a password based on complexity rules" table and its sad. Anyone using that kind of guidance is being misled: it isn't even useful for doing relative comparisons. "But these complexity rules mean that my password is 1000x harder to crack" is meaningless if it can still be done in less than five minutes.

      Yes, breaking SSL is not the same as cracking passwords. But the same principles apply: a guided attack will usually perform far better. Periodically there is news in the security field about a vulnerability that made communications/stored files/SSL encryption much less strong than it should have been. And some people still don't see why the NSA maintains recordings of encrypted sessions. Can't crack it within a year? Better luck next month.

      But regardless of any of that, it isn't going to do you much good to generate your own certificates when you connect to Amazon, Facebook, Google, etc., etc., etc.

    8. Re:Uh... okay by Hatta · · Score: 5, Interesting

      No need to compromise anything. They just need a single CA to be complicit with a court order to produce a certificate that signs an NSA-provided key for a specific site.

      That's what's meant by "compromise".

      Self-signed keys are not more secure. If a site goes from a self-signed cert to a signed cert with a different key, most browsers do not display any warning.

      If you remove the CAs from your list of trusted certificates, it would display a warning.

      Although you can install anti-MITM tools that produce a warning when the key changes, those tools would detect such a government MITM whether you're using a CA-signed cert or a self-signed cert

      Unless the NSA is forcing the CAs to compromise every single certificate they offer. They may not be, but it would be foolish to assume that they aren't.

      --
      Give me Classic Slashdot or give me death!
    9. Re:Uh... okay by IamTheRealMike · · Score: 3, Informative

      There's nothing in the articles that implies this. Backdooring a CA only helps if several things hold:

      1) They can not only intercept but also rewrite traffic on the fly. Possible, but if so, not yet mentioned in any leaks.

      2) They're willing to take the chance that someone might notice.

      So an operation against a single site, definitely possible. But they are clearly desperate to grab everything, all the time! Their whole MO is not targeted investigations but to spy on everyone simultaneously. You can't use a rogue CA to do that. They'd be detected immediately, if only by geeks setting up SSL for their new personal VPS and suddenly noticing the CA their browser gets isn't the one they installed.

      The problems with SSL are not that CAs exist. The model holds against the global adversary who wants to decrypt everything. The problems with SSL are almost certainly more prosaic - many websites can be automatically hacked and their keys stolen without the owners ever knowing. In the default config that allows you to then decrypt all past traffic as well. Some implementations will use old, weak keys that were strong once upon a time but have since become obsolete. Some implementations will have bad random number generators. Some implementations will run on VPS providers and are subject to side channel attacks by colocated VMs. Some keys can be subpoenad and others can be obtained by covert agents. And of course you still leak traffic metadata even when SSL works perfectly.

      There are lots of ways to attack SSL that will work some of the time, and that's exactly what the leaks imply - they can beat encryption sometimes but they don't have a magic skeleton key to everything.

    10. Re:Uh... okay by cryptizard · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Note that no-one has been able to prove there are no efficient solutions to integer factorisation or discrete logs - maybe the reason those proofs is so elusive is because it doesn't exist.

      That's because it's impossible to prove such a statement without also proving that P != NP. There is very little hope in constructively showing the difficulty of these problems, we just say "smart people have been working on integer factorization for thousands of years and they haven't figured out a way to do it, so we can trust it for now." It's not foolproof, but it's the best we can do.

    11. Re:Uh... okay by epine · · Score: 3, Insightful

      It's kind of like the "eye of sauron" thing. They may not be omnipotent and able to target everyone at once, but once their eye turns your way there's little you can do about it short of jumping into a volcano.

      Did you sleep through the end of the movie? You can't watch everybody all of the time. It ends up becoming a resources issue, and the NSA has finite resources after all (despite spending their secret funds at 100x typical levels of government efficiency).

      A central prong in this campaign is to discourage the vast majority of people from even trying to make their communications secure so that they do have enough resources to watch everyone who poses any threat at any level pretty much all the time.

    12. Re:Uh... okay by mspohr · · Score: 3, Informative

      I think you can assume that most "popular" commercial encryption software has been compromised.
      Bruce Schenier has a good article in The Guardian on how to protect your computer:
      http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-remain-secure-surveillance
      From the article:
      With all this in mind, I have five pieces of advice:

      1) Hide in the network. Implement hidden services. Use Tor to anonymize yourself. Yes, the NSA targets Tor users, but it's work for them. The less obvious you are, the safer you are.

      2) Encrypt your communications. Use TLS. Use IPsec. Again, while it's true that the NSA targets encrypted connections – and it may have explicit exploits against these protocols – you're much better protected than if you communicate in the clear.

      3) Assume that while your computer can be compromised, it would take work and risk on the part of the NSA – so it probably isn't. If you have something really important, use an air gap. Since I started working with the Snowden documents, I bought a new computer that has never been connected to the internet. If I want to transfer a file, I encrypt the file on the secure computer and walk it over to my internet computer, using a USB stick. To decrypt something, I reverse the process. This might not be bulletproof, but it's pretty good.

      4) Be suspicious of commercial encryption software, especially from large vendors. My guess is that most encryption products from large US companies have NSA-friendly back doors, and many foreign ones probably do as well. It's prudent to assume that foreign products also have foreign-installed backdoors. Closed-source software is easier for the NSA to backdoor than open-source software. Systems relying on master secrets are vulnerable to the NSA, through either legal or more clandestine means.

      5) Try to use public-domain encryption that has to be compatible with other implementations. For example, it's harder for the NSA to backdoor TLS than BitLocker, because any vendor's TLS has to be compatible with every other vendor's TLS, while BitLocker only has to be compatible with itself, giving the NSA a lot more freedom to make changes. And because BitLocker is proprietary, it's far less likely those changes will be discovered. Prefer symmetric cryptography over public-key cryptography. Prefer conventional discrete-log-based systems over elliptic-curve systems; the latter have constants that the NSA influences when they can.

      --
      I don't read your sig. Why are you reading mine?
    13. Re:Uh... okay by Em+Adespoton · · Score: 2

      Do they have some magical break on AES that no one in academia knows about or can even fathom? No. Just some FUD.

      That might be because NSA may have forward-engineered some tricks/backdoors into AES. Doing the reverse-engineering may be much harder.

      No, not with AES. AES was not developed in the US, and has been thoroughly reviewed. However, the NSA may have forward-engineered some tricks into common implementations that use AES -- most likely in the form of reducing the actual-used keyspace.

      No, you're more likely to find the NSA when dealing with public key-based cryptography, where they can just insert their own master key and not have to worry about the encryption method/implementation at all. It's easier to break a web of trust than a mathematical algorithm.

    14. Re:Uh... okay by shentino · · Score: 3, Informative

      I'm sure part of the NSA's task isn't just compromising root CA's, but shutting down those who refuse to cooperate.

      You may recall that even though lavabit shut down voluntarily the feds are still after them trying to get them busted on contempt charges for pulling the plug on themselves.

    15. Re:Uh... okay by pegacat · · Score: 2

      Schneier suggests elliptic key may be compromised and should be avoided... as with other public key systems it is based on a computationally hard one way problem, it's not beyond the realms of possibility that our TLA friends may have some special insight here.

      http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-remain-secure-surveillance

      As a side issue, I've been to vendor presentations where they've boasted about the ability of their advanced firewalls/edge devices to do real time MITM attacks using valid signing certs obtained from (at least one) top level CA, to enable companies to monitor gmail etc for 'IP protection'. Given the NSA's liking for compromising network devices I wouldn't be surprised if that method was also used.

      --
      Wer mit Ungeheuern kämpft, mag zusehn, dass er nicht dabei zum Ungeheuer wird.
  4. More technical discussion by veg_all · · Score: 5, Informative

    From Bruce Schneier Here and here.

    Also a nice call to arms here.
    "I have resisted saying this up to now, and I am saddened to say it, but the US has proved to be an unethical steward of the internet. The UK is no better."

    --
    grammar-lesson free since 1999. (rescinded - 2005)
    1. Re:More technical discussion by stenvar · · Score: 5, Insightful

      but the US has proved to be an unethical steward of the internet. The UK is no better

      Any nation would prove to be an unethical steward of the Internet: power tempts and corrupts, whether it's the power to control the Internet, the power to wage war and kill people, the power to mess with the economy, or the power to hand out "benefits" to people.

      The only solution to any of these problems is to rely on decentralized mechanisms that can't be controlled and corrupted by central authorities, and to limit the power of governments as much as possible and to the absolute minimum.

    2. Re:More technical discussion by stenvar · · Score: 3, Insightful

      (1) We need to adopt technologies that are secure no matter what the government wants.

      (2) We need to reduce and devolve the power of government in general in all areas: defense, federal police, welfare, health care, monetary policy, economic policy, etc. And that needs to happen in both the US and Europe.

    3. Re:More technical discussion by stenvar · · Score: 2

      "Countries" don't neglect things. "Secrecy culture" doesn't cause anything.

      In democracies, all the faults ultimately come down to who we choose as our representatives. Bush should have been kicked out after his first term. Obama should have been kicked out after his first term. Anybody who voted for the "Patriot' act should have been kicked out after the first term.

      And to make that happen, voters need to be educated better. They need to stop falling for b.s. like blaming evil corporations or evil bankers when it is our elected representatives that are selling us to them. Voters need to understand that there are no "benefits" or free lunches, that government can't create jobs or fix the economy.

    4. Re:More technical discussion by Opportunist · · Score: 2

      There should be a change in mentalities, but it has to start with the people. We have to realize and accept that life is simply dangerous and that there is no guarantee, no matter how much we'd wish it or how much we'd be willing to pay and sacrifice for it, that nothing "bad" can happen to us. Life is dangerous. Usually it ends deadly. Face it.

      Then, and only then, there is a chance that governments will be forced to release the power we grant to them. No matter how you twist and turn it, any power some group has over any other one is granted, not taken. You cannot have power over me if I do not allow it, as Kirk put it, the last command on this ship is given by me. Yes, that price is high. And the only reason governments can take power over its subjects is because the subjects are not willing to pay it.

      Now, this is kinda drastic, but what I wanted to convey is that there IS ALWAYS an option. Always. There is never a situation where we do not have any choice but to do X. We might not like the other options present, but they exist.

      And if we want our governments to stop spying on us, we'd have to accept that, and WE will have to change our view on events first of all. We will have to give up security, security that is more likely than not only imagined anyway, but we can get our liberty back.

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
  5. The lede leaves out two important points by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Interesting

    1. The NSA actively worked to gain control of standards processes and subvert them.

    2. The NSA covertly employs people in telcos without the knowledge of the telcos.

    The sound you hear is the sound of the last 20 years of work in academic and industry, on standards
    and code, on processes and procedures, quietly disintegrating.

  6. And the crucial details.. missing by hydrofix · · Score: 4, Insightful
    All articles are missing the crucial details; namely which cryptographic algorithms have been successfully cracked and under which parameters. Guardian writes:

    The three organisations removed some specific facts but decided to publish the story because of the value of a public debate about government actions [...] .

    Yet, the article does claim this:

    "Project Bullrun deals with NSA's abilities to defeat the encryption used in specific network communication technologies. Bullrun involves multiple sources, all of which are extremely sensitive." The document reveals that the agency has capabilities against widely used online protocols, such as HTTPS, voice-over-IP and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), used to protect online shopping and banking.

    But they also quote Snowden that:

    "Encryption works. Properly implemented strong crypto systems are one of the few things that you can rely on," he said before warning that NSA can frequently find ways around it as a result of weak security on the computers at either end of the communication.

    Maybe we still have some hope?

    1. Re:And the crucial details.. missing by Laxori666 · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Could they have just Man-in-the-Middle'd a whole ton of HTTPS connections? If they get certificates signed by the right authorities and have access to backbone routers, can't they just read HTTPS as if it were not even encrypted?

    2. Re:And the crucial details.. missing by hydrofix · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Yes, but this could show up with tools like SSL Observatory, which has recorded millions of certificates from different web sites as seen by hundreds of thousands of Chrome and Firefox users globally. They would risk eventually exposing themselves, and the CAs who signed those bogus certificates for NSA would get nuked from all browsers, which is the absolute worst thing that can happen to a CA. If they use fake certs and MITM, it would have to be very elusive, and carry a calculated risk of exposure.

    3. Re:And the crucial details.. missing by DMJC · · Score: 2

      I think it's pretty safe to assume that all Cisco products have been cracked and the NSA has backdoors into all the infrastructure gear.

    4. Re:And the crucial details.. missing by steelfood · · Score: 4, Insightful

      There are literally hundreds of places to attack encrypted communications. The encryption algorithm itself is just one component in a chain that must be and remain secure. The NSA only needs to compromise one part of that chain to compromise the entire system.

      It can be a mathematical breakthrough. It can be an implementation flaw. It can be an implementation flaw of any related--however loosely--system. It can be an embedded individual on one end. It can be a specific external device. It can be a component--however marginal--of a device. It can be a (secret) court order. It can be a xkcd-style baseball bat to the knee to one or both parties. It can be negotiated with one or both parties.

      The founders knew this. They understood that an individual with limited resources had no chance against the government who would have relatively unlimited resources (the government's resources is the country itself, so it really is Person vs. United States), and the only way to prevent, stop, or avoid such a scenario is for the government to check and balance itself. Those checks and balances have (mostly) failed. We as individuals have no recourse.

      There's always hope, but you'd be deluding yourself if you think there's any chance.

      --
      "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be."
    5. Re:And the crucial details.. missing by hairyfish · · Score: 2

      I was with you all along but I was waiting for the line at the end where you kick off the revolution and we all join in. The biggest problem I see these days is that we're all too slack to do anything about it. The Internet has given us a way to blow off steam without going outside and getting angry and burning shit down. We've forgotten how to revolt. Man, even as I type this I can feel the hate waning. It's all too hard... I might just waste the rest of the day reading Reddit and wanking to porn...

  7. Trojan by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Funny

    So I'm left with the impression that the NSA will add features in return for improved access.

    SELinux comes to mind as a gift from the NSA to the Linux community. A gift with a hidden payload.

    Hmm.... We can call it Trojan Linux. Ribbed for your pleasure. The ultimate in back door penetration.

    1. Re:Trojan by gweihir · · Score: 2

      Very , very unlikely. SELinux is not complicated enough to guard against such back-doors being found. And then they would have lost a lot of trust, making it useless and decreasing their chances of doing something like it again. Also, while for example weakening key generation in commercial SSL or VPN products can be done in very subtle ways and requires extensive experience and knowledge to recognize, SELinux has no "analog" or "complex mathematical" components. It is simply a permission system for capabilities and can be understood by any reasonably competent engineer or hacker.

      Of course, nobody will trust them now, so trusting anything they produce in the future would be a really, really bad idea.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
  8. perspective by geekoid · · Score: 3, Interesting

    the NSA has done over a 100,000,000 million legal searches.
    From all the leaked records, 22,000 are questionable. Those 22,000 lie everywhere between needing a judicial interpretation, to blatant breech.
    The leaks also show NSA's number one whistle blower to the courts is the NSA. They report them and correct them.

    Not to excuse there blatantly illegal searches, but to thing the whole system is some corrupt entity that s out to get everyone is simply wrong.
    No evidences supports that at all.we have a lot of hope becasue none of the evidences shows it to be nearly as bad as the media claims. And certainly nowhere near where the chicken littles on /. claim.

    --
    The Kruger Dunning explains most post on /. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
    1. Re:perspective by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative

      It needs to be kept in mind that the definition of "legal search" in this day and age doesn't exactly translate into what a normal thinking person would think it does. Plenty of things are "legal" in this country that are in fact rather blatantly unconstitutional.

      Remember, we've had a "conservative" Supreme Court for a long time now and they're doing what every consertative court has done before them: making it harder for people to hold big business and law enforcement accountable for anything. The only rule of law they're interested in is ruling over you and other actual people. They're not interested in the rule of law as it applies to restrain those in power. That's how you create a dictatorship. We may not have a single dictator, but make no mistake, in every way that actually matters, that's what we have now.

    2. Re:perspective by JanneM · · Score: 4, Insightful

      That's like saying almost all sex they've ever had was consensual and legal, so we really shouldn't blame them for the few cases of rape they committed.

      --
      Trust the Computer. The Computer is your friend.
    3. Re:perspective by AlphaWoIf_HK · · Score: 2

      the NSA has done over a 100,000,000 million legal searches.

      Legal? Maybe. Constitutional? No. Rubberstamped warrants don't count.

      --
      Da derp dee derp da teedly derpee derpee dum. Rated PG-13.
  9. Suprising why? by The+Grim+Reefer · · Score: 2

    Does anyone really find this surprising? Wasn't it a few years back that the NSA told the banks that 128-bit encryption was perfectly safe, but mandated that the military switch to 256?

  10. eveBot intercepts aliceCopter! by Thud457 · · Score: 4, Funny

    surely there should be a ripe market niche for some smart geek to 3D print arduino-controlled quadcopters to facilitate key exchange. hmmmm... hold on, still a few bugs to be worked out...

    --

    the preceding comment is my own and in no way reflects the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

    1. Re:eveBot intercepts aliceCopter! by the_B0fh · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Just don't use paypal to get funding...

  11. I call bullshit by JoeyRox · · Score: 4, Insightful

    The NSA can crack 4096-bit PGP keys? I doubt it. Seems like FUD to dissuade people from even attempting to use encryption

    1. Re:I call bullshit by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Informative

      You can make keys longer than that too.... google on how to patch gpg for large keys.

      I personally use a 16384 key for weaker stuff, and a 32768 bit key for more serious things.

      The 4096 bit ceiling was purely for computational speed. Any higher back in the day would take over a day to generate the key. Took my machine 4 hours to make the 16384 key with modern hardware but this is significantly more secure than 4096.

      Protip, you can still work with unpatched clients as long as your key is 16384 or less. You can go higher but only then with everyone you communicate with having the patched client. That's why I stick to 16384 for compatibility but go larger when serious.

    2. Re:I call bullshit by Rich0 · · Score: 4, Interesting

      The NSA can crack 4096-bit PGP keys? I doubt it. Seems like FUD to dissuade people from even attempting to use encryption

      There is no mathematical proof that 4096-bit PGP keys are secure. You can only say that known algorithms cannot find a key in a practical amount of time on known computational hardware.

      You don't know if an algorithm exists that would allow the keys to be factored in a short period of time. You also don't know if somebody has developed a practical quantum computer - it is already known that one would allow certain encryption systems to be trivially broken.

      For every mathematician publishing articles about cryptography in the public space, there are probably 100 much-better-paid ones publishing articles in internal NSA publications. The NSA is by far the largest employer of mathematicians on earth - and they hire the best and the brightest they can find.

    3. Re:I call bullshit by bingoUV · · Score: 2

      You haven't thought about it much. Unknown languages are deciphered all the time. Those with weird grammar and scripts.

      The statement of Sherlock Holmes - "What one man can invent, another can discover" - applies to invented language.

      So we need cryptography, where the statement doesn't apply.

      --
      Bingo Dictionary - Pragmatist, n. A myopic idealist.
  12. Lenovo? by steelfood · · Score: 5, Interesting

    From ProPublica:

    In one case, after the government learned that a foreign intelligence target had ordered new computer hardware, the American manufacturer agreed to insert a back door into the product before it was shipped, someone familiar with the request told The Times.

    Who else remembers the debacle about the government no longer purchasing Lenovo computers? I remember some people saying that if the U.S. government is making all this fuss about it, they're probably the ones doing it.

    This seems to indicate those people are correct.

    --
    "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be."
  13. Why is that organization still legal? by Opportunist · · Score: 2

    By any stretch of the definition it fits the pattern as an organization that has a harmful, if not outright destructive, impact on the stability of the country and its relationships to other countries.

    But probably they already have more than enough dirt on any politician to keep them in line. It's kinda scary if you think about it.

    --
    We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
  14. Raw document by Rytis · · Score: 4, Informative

    The raw document provides some more details but remains not especially explicit.

    "The fact that NSA/CSS has some capabilities against the encryption in TLS/SSL, HTTPS, SSH, VPNs, VoIP, WEBMAIL, and other network communication technologies".

    Capabilities are defined here as NSA/CSS ability to exploit a specific technology. This may encompass acquiring and processing plaintext data and/or acquiring, decrypting and processing encrypted data.

  15. Re:Works for me by kilfarsnar · · Score: 4, Insightful

    So do you want the NSA to break Syria's encryption about their chemical weapons attacks?

    Or do you prefer we not know that the Syrian government uses chemical weapons to kill civilian populations, affecting public policy?

    Which social contract would you prefer government to break? the "Government shouldn't know private activities of foreign governments" or "Government shouldn't allow foreign governments to kill civilians"?

    If your privacy is important, then you think that means your government shouldn't monitor foreign communications, correct? And that means you think it's ok for foreign governments to kill civilians as they please? And if you think foreign governments should be allowed to kill civilians, then I guess you don't donate to charity either? Why would you want to help other people, after all?

    You can pick either charity or privacy, but you can't have both. Sorry. That's because bad guys have power, and you need more power to overcome those bad guys for the purposes of charity.

    So charity or privacy? What's it going to be?

    Won't somebody please think of the civilians!

    All else aside, if you think the NSA breaks codes in order to prevent civilian casualties, or for "charity", you have another thing coming. They do it to provide intelligence to the US government to facilitate furthering its national interest, in whatever form that may take. And if you think civilian casualties or chemical weapons are the actual reason we are considering whether or not to attack Syria, you have yet another thing coming.

    --
    "What the American public doesn't know is what makes them the American public." -Ray Zalinsky (Tommy Boy)
  16. Re:Works for me by aaaaaaargh! · · Score: 4, Insightful

    "Government shouldn't allow foreign governments to kill civilians"?

    Incidentally, that policy also applies to the Syrian government versus the US. Cos', you know, the US is a foreign government and airstrikes would surely also kill civilians.

    Also, your entire post is a false dichotomy.

  17. Information leakage attacks most likely vector by m.dillon · · Score: 2

    I don't think the NSA has to break actual keys brute-force, but with information leakage it has been shown that data can be sussed-out of an encrypted stream (particularly an interactive one). Given sufficient leakage of known quantities, keys can be broken in much less time.

    As we've seen just recently, even something as innocuous as HTTP compression over a SSL link can result in serious information leakage by anyone monitoring the size of the payloads.

    Encryption streams, in general, require additional random data to be inserted into the stream and for the salt to be continuously modified (i.e. feedback) to remain strong. If one does neither of those things than the information leakage increases to the point where the keys can be broken without spending years of cpu cycles.

    -Matt

  18. Where random number gen "flaws" come from. by Animats · · Score: 5, Insightful

    There are a surprisingly large number of public key generators with weak random number generators:

    And those are the ones we know about.

    For open source systems, the person or persons who inserted the weak code should be identified and kicked off the project. It may just be incompetence, but that's a good reason to keep them out of security-critical areas.

    Weak keys don't just let the NSA in. They let the People's Liberation Army of China in, too.

  19. Expectation of privacy? by whoever57 · · Score: 3, Interesting

    The agencyâ(TM)s success in defeating many of the privacy protections offered by encryption does not change the rules that prohibit the deliberate targeting of Americansâ(TM) e-mails or phone calls without a warrant.

    I can see (although I don't necessarily agree with) the argument that we have no expectation of privacy on metadata, but surely there is an expectation of pricacy on encrypted data. Surely the fact that the user has encrypted his data (or knows that it will be) provides an expecation of privacy that would invoke a 4th amendment protection.

    --
    The real "Libtards" are the Libertarians!
  20. Re:Works for me by XanC · · Score: 2, Informative

    The phrase is "you have another think coming".

  21. Re:Works for me by xevioso · · Score: 2, Insightful

    I do. I do give a fuck about people who nerve gas to kill civilians in large amounts. If you don't, you are a sociopath.

  22. Re: Works for me by tolkienfan · · Score: 5, Insightful

    How did the NSAs ability to decrypt most of the encrypted communications of the world prevent Syria's chemical attack on its own people?
    Or even help after the fact, for that matter?
    How is helping Syria's people even part of the NSAs charter?

  23. Deniability has been improved by jacobsm · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Now that we know the NSA can intercept and decrypt any message, doesn't it also mean that they can change the message to whatever they want, re-encrypt it, and pull it out in a court of law as evidence?

    If they do, or even if they don't, I can now say they did, and they can't prove they didn't.

  24. Re:Works for me by Dishevel · · Score: 5, Insightful
    How about the NSA do its fucking job.

    Spy on foreign governments and foreign citizens. They need to stay the fuck away from Citizens of the United States of America. Spying on Americans is what other governments are for.

    The NSA is operating far outside of its charter. Put them straight.

    --
    Why is it so hard to only have politicians for a few years, then have them go away?
  25. Re:Works for me by mendax · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Actually, you will get neither if the NSA is able to read all encrypted communication. Simply put, if the government has the ability to penetrate all encrypted communications, there will be no privacy. If there is no privacy the government will eventually degenerate to a tyranny. Given a choice between a tyranny and dead Syrians, I choose the dead Syrians. I don't like the idea of people being killed by their government but I'd rather have the Syrian government killing Syrians than the American government killing Americans, something which will eventually happen if we lose our civil rights.

    Don't doubt for a minute that there are forces in the government that are working toward that. They're mostly not evil people and most don't really understand what the ramifications of what they are doing, but history does repeat itself and there is plenty of history that demonstrates what happens when a government can do whatever it wants. Orwell's "1984" is fiction, not history, but it is based upon history and basic psychology. If we want to retain our civil rights, we need to fight and struggle for them, both in the courts and in civil disobedience if necessary.

    --
    It's really quite a simple choice: Life, Death, or Los Angeles.
  26. Stallman warned... by fredprado · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Richard Stallman warned us about this decades ago. It is incredible how people are still able to dismiss his warnings as more and more of his predictions come into reality.

  27. Re:Works for me by mi · · Score: 4, Informative

    So do you want the NSA to break Syria's encryption about their chemical weapons attacks?

    I'd like us to continue treating encryption as weapons and regulate its export accordingly. Unfortunately, it is not really possibly — any enemy worth the designation would be able to get it anyway, because moving an algorithm is much easier than a gun. And, unlike guns, you only need to move an algorithm once.

    So charity or privacy? What's it going to be?

    I wish I had sufficient confidence in my own government to be able to sincerely pick charity... Unfortunately, I do not. If the President can already ask the IRS to hurt opposition's finances, what's to prevent him from asking the NSA to look into the opposition's e-mails? The sort of thing, that got Nixon to resign is barely an issue with today's Americans...

    However, according to an earlier article about Snowden's interaction with journalist(s), PGP (with sufficiently large keys) is still unbreakable even to the NSA — at least, as far Snowden was aware:

    This past January, Laura Poitras received a curious e-mail from an anonymous stranger requesting her public encryption key. For almost two years, Poitras had been working on a documentary about surveillance, and she occasionally received queries from strangers. She replied to this one and sent her public key — allowing him or her to send an encrypted e-mail that only Poitras could open, with her private key — but she didn’t think much would come of it.

    So that's, what a particularly private person should be using for all of his communications...

    --
    In Soviet Washington the swamp drains you.
  28. Re:THIS... by mspohr · · Score: 5, Insightful

    This has nothing to do with liberal or conservative and everything to do with the power of government.
    From Bruce Schneier:
    Dismantling the surveillance state won't be easy. Has any country that engaged in mass surveillance of its own citizens voluntarily given up that capability? Has any mass surveillance country avoided becoming totalitarian? Whatever happens, we're going to be breaking new ground.
    http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/05/government-betrayed-internet-nsa-spying

    --
    I don't read your sig. Why are you reading mine?
  29. Re: Works for me by dataspel · · Score: 2, Informative

    Yes, it is. Citation: http://grammarist.com/usage/another-think-coming/

  30. Re:Works for me by mi · · Score: 2
    Though I sympathize with the gist of your position, I must question this particular argument:

    If there is no privacy the government will eventually degenerate to a tyranny.

    Why exactly is this so? Of course, it would be rather uncomfortable to have no privacy, but would it necessarily lead to tyranny? Why not the opposite, for example — if no one's dealings are private and all information (from banking transactions, to kissing, to bowel movements) about everyone is readily available to whoever cares, wouldn't it be harder to subdue the electoral process, for example?

    --
    In Soviet Washington the swamp drains you.
  31. Re:Works for me by TheSeatOfMyPants · · Score: 2

    Plenty of people like me cared. Just because you (or even most people you noticed) didn't care doesn't mean " we " didn't.

    --
    Now mostly at Usenet:comp.misc & SoylentNews.org (it's made of people!)
  32. Re:Works for me by chihowa · · Score: 2

    Because that world would never come to be. What we'd have is certain people being completely transparent and other, more privileged, people having privacy. All of the shady stuff that happens today would continue to happen in private, but everyone would also know about every BM you made.

    --
    If you want a vision of the future, imagine a youtube comments section scrolling - forever.
  33. Re:Works for me by mcl630 · · Score: 4, Informative

    Though I sympathize with the gist of your position, I must question this particular argument:

    If there is no privacy the government will eventually degenerate to a tyranny.

    Why exactly is this so? Of course, it would be rather uncomfortable to have no privacy, but would it necessarily lead to tyranny? Why not the opposite, for example — if no one's dealings are private and all information (from banking transactions, to kissing, to bowel movements) about everyone is readily available to whoever cares, wouldn't it be harder to subdue the electoral process, for example?

    You would make it much, much easier to "subdue the electoral process". If you're currently the party in power and facing re-election, you first kill everyone who donates money to the opposition--everybody stops giving them money, hampering their campaign. Then you kill anyone who's given any hint that they might vote for the opposition. You and your cohorts get re-elected. Rinse and repeat, and eventually nobody dares form an opposition party, much less support one. If anybody says or does anything that remotely sounds like rebellion, you kill them too. Your party stays in power indefinately, the only things that might end your reign are a split in your party, or killing off so many people that there not enough people left to work and your economy collapses.

  34. Re:Works for me by mirix · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Yeah, 'accidental' civilian deaths, or deaths from 'necessary collateral damage' are so very noble and just.

    In Serbia the US/NATO 'accidentally' bombed a farmers market, two hospitals, the Chinese embassy, civilian radio/TV stations, bridges on the wrong side of the country with civilians on them, etc. Also random factories that weren't military-related industry (eg. tobacco) - Interestingly the tobacco factory got bought by Phillip Morris a couple years later...

    Chemical weapons are abhorrent, absolutely. But unless use is widespread, picking winners and causing more death and destruction isn't ideal, neither.

    --
    Sent from my PDP-11
  35. Re:Works for me by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Insightful

    > I'd like us to continue treating encryption as weapons and regulate its export accordingly.

    Except that:
    - encryption is not a weapon so treating it as such makes no sense.
    - the rest of the world is able to invent encryption algorithms too. While creating good encryption requires very specialized knowledge and skill, these things are not exclusive to the US.
    - strong encryption is a requirement for electronic commerce, when the rest of the world does not have access to encryption this hurts the US financially.

  36. HTTPS forward secrecy to the rescue by wytcld · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Your can configure your HTTPS server to use forward secrecy. Forward secrecy uses one-time keys, generated by between the website and the browser for the single session. Most modern browsers support it. But it generally requires compiling the latest version of OpenSSL and the compiling Apache 2.4.x against that, not using the Apache 2.2.x versions that are standard in most of the Linux distros. More detail also here.

    If you set up your webserver this way, and your visitors use the right browsers, they NSA's having good copies of the site's certificates won't gain them much. At least that's what Ivan Risti's saying. On TLS/SSL stuff, there may be no one better.

    --
    "with their freedom lost all virtue lose" - Milton
    1. Re:HTTPS forward secrecy to the rescue by heypete · · Score: 3, Informative

      Forward secrecy is supported in Apache 2.2.x in the form of ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange ("DHE"). This works out-of-the-box on Debian and Ubuntu servers (I run a few Debian/Ubuntu servers, and have those options enabled) without needing to recompile anything.

      Apache 2.4.x is require for use of elliptic curve ephemeral Diffie Hellman ("ECDHE"), which provides greater protection with shorter key lengths (e.g. a 256-bit EC key is equivalent to a 3072-bit discrete log key, but Apache 2.2.x uses a baked-in set of DH parameters that's only 1024-bits long). EC is also a lot faster than discrete log DH which is useful in certain environments.

  37. Re:NIST 2006 by letsief · · Score: 3, Informative

    No, the article wasn't referring to AES. AES was developed by a pair of Belgian cryptographers as part of an open competition. The NSA approves the use of AES to protect Top Secret information. They didn't put a back door in AES.

    The article was referring to the Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generator (Dual EC DRBG), published as part of SP800-90. The DRBG uses a set of constants, like many crypto algorithms. The NSA, as the designer of the DRBG, selected the constants. Microsoft researchers noted that if the constants were carefully chosen, the NSA could predict future outputs of the DRBG. Despite what the New York Time article says, the NSA probably didn't do that. No one was going to use this DRBG anyway, except for the NSA and their partners, so they would have very little reason to sneak in a backdoor. Still, it's a bad property to have in a crypto algorithm. You should really explain the provenance of any constants used in a crypto algorithm, and there was no explanation of how the Dual EC DRBG constants were selected.

  38. The NSA must serve us, not attack us. by dweller_below · · Score: 3, Interesting
    As a security professional, one of my greatest threats is the Exploit Marketplace. You can fight mistakes. You can fight attackers. But it is almost impossible to fight economics. The exploit market is creating an economy that creates and enables exploit. It is the greatest driving force optimizing the Internet for Attack, instead of Defense. Now, it looks like the Exploit Marketplace was justified, founded and sustained by the NSA. We have learned that the NSA has enormous budgets devoted to purchasing exploits. Today we learn:

    "The NSA spends $250m a year on a program which, among other goals, works with technology companies to 'covertly influence' their product designs."

    So, the NSA creates exploit in everything they can influence. And they can influence almost everything. The NSA purchases exploit. Many times, they must be purchasing info on the exploits that they created. They preserve exploit. They mask everything in secrecy. And it all enhances the exploit marketplace.

    If we could just get the NSA out of the exploit market, the whole thing would probably collapse like a real-estate broker's wet dream.

    The other chilling revelation is the names of these programs:

    "The NSA's codeword for its decryption program, Bullrun, is taken from a major battle of the American civil war. Its British counterpart, Edgehill, is named after the first major engagement of the English civil war, more than 200 years earlier."

    The NSA has crappy internal discipline. Instead of using meaningless codewords for project names, their codewords frequently describe the project. PRISM described how the NSA collects info. These project names shout that the NSA is fomenting civil war. They are at war with the rest of the country.

    • * The NSA must be stripped of it's ability to create exploit.
    • * The NSA must be stripped of it's ability to purchase exploit.

    If we survive as a nation of liberty, the NSA must serve us, not attack us.

  39. Re:Works for me by Zak3056 · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Perhaps we shouldn't have provided the Syrians with the precursor chemicals to make weapons in the first place.

    Your position is laughable. You have the precursor chemicals to make weapons under your kitchen sink. It's basically impossible to have any kind of modern industrial base without them.

    People like you are why I can't buy fucking cold medicine anymore.

    --
    What part of "shall not be infringed" is so hard to understand?
  40. Re:I'm stunned. by currently_awake · · Score: 2

    We do have such people in domestic economy, hence the wall street collapse. The total collapse of the reputation of the USA just takes longer to hit the ground is all.

  41. Re:Works for me by Pseudonym+Authority · · Score: 2

    Except it's nothing even close to that. The voyeurs with badges are absolutely shitting themselves over the face that someone had the nerve to expose their secrets. They sit in their tower, safe from any public scrutiny at all. They have so much privacy that you can't even tell others that you got a `warrant' served to force you to put in a backdoor apparently.

  42. Re:FREEEEEEEDOM! by cluedweasel · · Score: 3, Informative

    The Guardian article refers to it as a "10 year program" which would put it's inception in the Bush Jr. years. As for the EU is better argument, it looks like my own country's government was a prime mover in this. Way to go guys.

  43. expanding on this post. by Wycliffe · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Expanding on the above post, if the US is installing and/or exploiting bug related backdoors in
    commercial software it would take relatively few to reach 99+% coverage.
    If you can get the OS's you're set as you can hit 99% with less than a half dozen.
    Likewise with cellular providers, handset makers, virus scanners, printer (driver) manufacturers,
    cpu manufacturers, router manufacturers, email clients, web browsers, office suites, etc....
    Take any category of software or hardware most of which are dominated by only a few major players
    and if you can get your foot in the door with any of them then you have control of the computer or
    device. I'm not sure that linux even has that much advantage as there are few if any people who
    compile everything from scratch and even if they do, how hard would it really be to get an
    undocumented bug inserted into one of several hundred programs that run on a typical computer.
    If they're willing to throw enough time, money, and power behind it, there is no way someone can
    avoid being eavesdropped on.

  44. Re:Works for me by marcosdumay · · Score: 4, Insightful

    You can't do much with the knowledge that a government wants you dead.

    But a government can do a lot with the knowledge that you want it replaced.

  45. Re:Works for me by Kazoo+the+Clown · · Score: 2

    I don't care what discussions Syria has internally about chemical weapons. I do care when they actually USE them, though I doubt that cruise missiles are an effective or moral response. The fact Syria HAD such weapons seemed to be known already, we're only now getting into a tiff over it since they may have actually been used. But If you think you need to decrypt someone's communications to figure that out if WMD has been used, you've got bigger problems, because Syria or the next Syria could end up using sneakernet for that communications, or a form of encryption you can't decrypt. This whole reliance on knowing everyone's electronic thoughtcrimes about WMD or whatever is simply laziness. There's this idea that you don't need spies on the ground who risk detection anymore and that it can all be done from an office chair in Langley, and frankly, that's dangerous thinking that puts us all at risk. Similar the idea that you don't need boots on the ground and can wage an effective pushbutton war. You can certainly kill a lot of people with a pushbutton, but that's not the same thing. However, it's easy to sell these ideas to get big budgets for cool equipment and the ability to violate privacy just like the Stasi and you don't even have to get out if your office chair to earn your paycheck. I'm sorry but it's a really lousy long-term solution for the rest of us.

  46. Re:Works for me by marauder · · Score: 2

    Why are you lot the only people in the world entitled to privacy?

  47. Re:Works for me by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative

    Spy on foreign governments and foreign citizens. They need to stay the fuck away from Citizens of the United States of America. Spying on Americans is what other governments are for.

    The NSA isn't actually spying on US CItizens, they're just storing the data in easy-to-interpret databases so that other governments can do the spying for the NSA. Oh, and probably also providing those governments with the tools they need to better spy on US Citizens.

    Skirting the law is easy with the right thinkers. New Zealand was doing a similar thing with the GCSB by sending their contractors off to work for other government agencies. The contractors, being employed by the other agencies and hidden from the GCSB by a really secure "please don't let us know if you use our computers while working for them" policy, weren't part of the GCSB, so didn't have to play by their rules (which basically said "no spying on NZ citizens", recently changed to "only spy on NZ citizens if the government-selected overseer decides there's good reason for it").

  48. Re:Works for me by Zontar+The+Mindless · · Score: 2

    I also give a fuck about the Syrian civilians who've been gassed.

    I also realise that bombing Syrian won't bring them back to life.

    It also occurs to me that the Assad régime's reaction to strikes against their country might well employ some "Now see what you made me do" logic to justify gassing some more.

    --
    Il n'y a pas de Planet B.
  49. NIST 2006 IT security related documentation by bytesex · · Score: 2

    The following documents were published in 2006 by NIST that relate to IT security:

    SP 800-96 PIV Card to Reader Interoperability Guidelines

    SP 800-103 DRAFT An Ontology of Identity Credentials, Part I: Background and Formulation

    SP 800-92 Guide to Computer Security Log Management

    SP 800-89 Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature Applications

    SP 800-88 Guidelines for Media Sanitization

    SP 800-69 Guidance for Securing Microsoft Windows XP Home Edition: A NIST Security Configuration Checklist

    SP 800-18 Rev.1 Guide for Developing Security Plans for Federal Information Systems

    --
    Religion is what happens when nature strikes and groupthink goes wrong.
  50. Do the numbers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Insightful

    the NSA has done over a 100,000,000 million legal searches.

    That means there is a court order for each of the searches. Assuming that every of the 300 million inhabitants of the U.S. is a certified judge, that still means that every of those judges is responsible for about 330000 court orders. Assuming that it takes about half an hour to evaluate and fill such an order and that an average month has about 165 working hours, it means that the average U.S. citizen has spent about 1000 months or 80 years of signing court orders for legal searches so far.

    Of course assuming that all of those searches were legal.

    Sounds legit to me.

  51. Always assume it is broken by Darinbob · · Score: 2

    First off, assume encryption is broken.
    Second, if you're relying on a third party to encrypt for you, then assume that they read your stuff before they even encrypted it.
    Third, if you're at all concerned about this stuff, then don't do anything on the internet that you don't want the entire world to know about.

    None of this news story should be a surprise to anyone. Everyone should already have assumed that the NSA cracked it all, and everyone should already have assume that the handy third party web sites are busily sending all your data to the NSA or someone else.

    This doesn't mean it's hopeless. It means don't be naive and trust third parties if you want security. Security does not coexist with convenience. Encrypt your sensitive data before you hand it off to someone else for transport (even then it may be broken, but it's vastly more secure than handing plain text to third party site and asking them to encrypt it on your behalf).

  52. Re:Works for me by DocHoncho · · Score: 4, Insightful

    So because there are scary bad men out there the government should be able to do whatever the fuck it wants to be able to catch them? Even if that includes massively violating the privacy of every citizen (never know who's a scary bad man!!) in the country? Even if it includes building a massive database filled with who the fuck knows what that never, ever, gets erased? You know how they say the internet forgets nothing? This is even worse, since random fruit loops on the internet don't have access to your phone records, your banking records, your phone calls, your location and every niggling little detail of your entire life! If you think it's bad that /b/ can access something stupid you said on your blog and troll you even if you delete it, just wait until some scary bad men, I mean trusted public servants, get ahold of all that juicy personal information that those stalwart do-gooders of the NSA put together for them, they'll have a field day! Accidently piss off some bureaucrat at the DMV? He'll just call his cousin at the Ministry of Love and they'll whip up some charges doubleplusquick then off to the Re-education centers (actually, that's too expensive, off to the work camps, more than likely).

    If you really think it's just "metadata" you're deluded. All this stuff that's coming out used to sound like the fever dreams of the loony fringe, and god damn does it suck having to listen to them smugly say "We told you so."

    --
    Celebrity worship is a poor substitute for Deity worship and costs more to boot.
  53. Re:Works for me by DocHoncho · · Score: 2

    I interpreted that the GP as meaning that as it is the government eliminating privacy there would be an implicit asymmetry in the access of such information. That is, the government, or more properly its agents, would have unprecedented access into the personal lives of, well, everybody. The statement "If there is no privacy the government will eventually degenerate to a tyranny" does not imply that absolutely all privacy is removed, rather, the privacy of ordinary citizens is removed and those who can pay or otherwise maintain control of their own privacy, i.e. by brute force, have a grossly unbalanced amount of power and tyranny results from the malicious use of that power.

    I mean really, if the NSA can break all encryption what exactly leads to the conclusion that everyone can do it? Even in the event that some clever crackers find and exploit whatever backdoors the NSA had placed in some encryption method most people would not have the resources or skills to intercept enough of other peoples traffic to make any real use of that ability. We've been hearing about how the NSA basically stores all, or nearly all, internet traffic. Do you have a tap at ATT&T as well?

    --
    Celebrity worship is a poor substitute for Deity worship and costs more to boot.
  54. Re: Works for me by dataspel · · Score: 2

    lol ok not gonna argue with Judas Priest

  55. you seriously need to back up that claim by SuperBanana · · Score: 2

    how do we know that the session keys are chosen securely and not divulged with steganography somehow? I know that products have existed which did exactly that, revealing part of the encryption key in the encrypted data stream (and I know that because the vendor was fairly open about the practice).

    If you're going to make such a massive claim, you need to back it up. Name the vendor/manufacturer and equipment, or I, and every other slashdot reader, will consider this bullshit.

  56. Re: Works for me by naranek · · Score: 2

    You guys have a good think going!

    --
    Only dumb birds land downwind.
  57. Re:Works for me by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Interesting

    So it's okay if you're spied on by Australians, and Australians are spied on by the USA, and any intelligence is shared?

  58. The real concern by Taco+Cowboy · · Score: 5, Insightful

    While you guys are cracking jokes on ROT13, a letter to NYT ( http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html?_r=0 ) caught my attention

    - - - B Missouri Reader
            Missouri

    On the one hand, âoeIn the future, superpowers will be made or broken based on the strength of their cryptanalytic programs,â but on the other hand the liberties of Americans are at risk by such programs.

    In other words, we face a situation where the strongest, most secure nation can no longer be a nation that guarantees the rights of its citizens.

    Privacy is not simply a convenience, but it is intimately linked to free speech and to the future prospects for democracy in America. Key elements of the Constitution provide a framework where incumbents can be challenged in free elections, ensuring that better ideas and better leaders will become available to guide the nation. But nobody can win an election against an incumbent with unlimited access to the communications of its rivals. We're not there yet, but the trend is in that direction.

    It is high time that members of both parties in Congress get off of their high horses and address this growing threat to our democracy. Technical and legal hurdles must be cleared, and it may even be necessary to make significant changes in the way the internet works. But time passes very quickly in the technology world, and the clock has already been ticking for quite a long time."

    --
    Muchas Gracias, Señor Edward Snowden !
  59. Re:Encryption is a joke by Alioth · · Score: 2

    Being able to write in shorthand is good and all... but how is that going to help?

    (Or did you mean steganography?)

  60. Re:Works for me by captjc · · Score: 2

    Your whole post is fucking retarded:

    1. Encryption isn't a weapon. Period. Comparing the two is fucking stupid.

    You do realize that up until around 1992 cryptography was considered a munition in the US and the export of which was heavily regulated.

    --
    Slow Down Cowboy! It's been 1 hour, 47 minutes since you last successfully posted a comment
  61. Re:MISINFORMATION by TCM · · Score: 2

    Stop writing. Just stop.

    Private keys are not sent anywhere, ever. If someone is generating your private key for you, in a browser nonetheless, you are doing PKI wrong. Period.

    --
    Of course it runs NetBSD. BTC: 1NT7QvbetmANwaMzhpVL6