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NSA Foils Much Internet Encryption

An anonymous reader writes "The New York Times is reporting that the NSA has 'has circumvented or cracked much of the encryption, or digital scrambling, that guards global commerce and banking systems, protects sensitive data like trade secrets and medical records, and automatically secures the e-mails, Web searches, Internet chats and phone calls of Americans and others around the world, the documents show. ... The agency, according to the documents and interviews with industry officials, deployed custom-built, superfast computers to break codes, and began collaborating with technology companies in the United States and abroad to build entry points into their products. The documents do not identify which companies have participated.'" You may prefer Pro Publica's non-paywalled version, instead, or The Guardian's.

432 of 607 comments (clear)

  1. Let us endeavour to create better encription by ackthpt · · Score: 4, Funny
    --

    A feeling of having made the same mistake before: Deja Foobar
    1. Re:Let us endeavour to create better encription by The+Grim+Reefer · · Score: 5, Funny

      For awesome powa

      Hasn't the majority of the internet already applied that twice?

    2. Re:Let us endeavour to create better encription by NettiWelho · · Score: 4, Funny

      Hmm... I have a creeping feeling the NSA has already introduced a vulnerability into the rot13! If you click on encrypt twice the original contents are revealed!

    3. Re:Let us endeavour to create better encription by ackthpt · · Score: 2

      Hmm... I have a creeping feeling the NSA has already introduced a vulnerability into the rot13! If you click on encrypt twice the original contents are revealed!

      Insidious!

      Hit it a third time and we're all secure again! Quick!

      --

      A feeling of having made the same mistake before: Deja Foobar
    4. Re:Let us endeavour to create better encription by snowraver1 · · Score: 4, Funny

      You actually have to do it three times to be secure - like 3DES

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    5. Re:Let us endeavour to create better encription by slashmydots · · Score: 4, Funny

      Yes, rot13 is huuuuge lol. But for one way encryption similar to hashes, they just run it through Google translate to 5 different languages, at least one of which is asian-based and one of which is latin-based. Studies have shown that whole letters encrypted with 5-layer google translate method are impossible to return to its original form, making it vastly superior to MD5 and SHA256.

    6. Re:Let us endeavour to create better encription by Em+Adespoton · · Score: 1

      Hmm... I have a creeping feeling the NSA has already introduced a vulnerability into the rot13! If you click on encrypt twice the original contents are revealed!

      Insidious!

      Hit it a third time and we're all secure again! Quick!

      ROT-13 has been cracked for years... I'd never use anything smaller than ROT-273 these days.

    7. Re:Let us endeavour to create better encription by Dishevel · · Score: 1

      Hmm... I have a creeping feeling the NSA has already introduced a vulnerability into the rot13! If you click on encrypt twice the original contents are revealed!

      Insidious!

      Hit it a third time and we're all secure again! Quick!

      ROT-13 has been cracked for years... I'd never use anything smaller than ROT-273 these days.

      I use ROT-273 X2!

      --
      Why is it so hard to only have politicians for a few years, then have them go away?
    8. Re:Let us endeavour to create better encription by Beardydog · · Score: 2

      You're right. I've only managed to strip off three levels, and it's left your comment completely unreadable!

    9. Re:Let us endeavour to create better encription by Austerity+Empowers · · Score: 3, Interesting

      We can all participate in this research!

      http://translationparty.com/

    10. Re: Let us endeavour to create better encription by jd2112 · · Score: 1

      I just pipe in to /dev/null snd pipe out from /dev/random.

      --
      Any insufficiently advanced magic is indistinguishable from technology.
    11. Re:Let us endeavour to create better encription by __aaltlg1547 · · Score: 1
      Above message after English -> Finnish -> Korean -> Irish -> Mandarin -> Russian -> English

      Yes, ROT13 huuuuge availability. However, as a one-way hash, they are just two of at least Latin-based Asia-based, one run in five languages using Google Translate. Research encryption far Google translation layer 5 characters to return to its original shape, it is impossible, therefore, MD5 and SHA256 wells.

      Yep, for now GT-5 (Google Translate 5) is unbreakable. There's no way to recover the original text from that hash. However, I had to type plaintext into my browser. That seems more than a little insecure against the Puzzle Palace. Also my intended recipient is not going to know what I meant.

    12. Re: Let us endeavour to create better encription by flyingfsck · · Score: 4, Funny

      You jest, but I have been wondering about adding a large block of urandom data at the bottom of each of my email messages, just to give the NSA grief.
      ***255DES*** =-w%(:RvO R-*_fTM)[=vz?"{|T***EOT***

      --
      Excuse me, but please get off my Pennisetum Clandestinum, eh!
    13. Re:Let us endeavour to create better encription by Chrisq · · Score: 1

      Hmm... I have a creeping feeling the NSA has already introduced a vulnerability into the rot13! If you click on encrypt twice the original contents are revealed!

      Does anyone know where I can get the original version of rot13, before NSA introduced this backdoor?

    14. Re:Let us endeavour to create better encription by chris.alex.thomas · · Score: 1

      to be honest, I think most of the internet tried to apply it twice, got bored and just stopped half way.....cause a lot of what I read is unintelligible gibberish....although sometimes that proves an effective encryption layer....

    15. Re: Let us endeavour to create better encription by Si · · Score: 1

      Good luck proving your random text doesn't decrypt to "Kill all America! Durka Durka Allah!" ;)

      --


      Why is it that many people who claim to support standards have such atrocious spelling and grammar?
  2. SSH? by Phibz · · Score: 3, Insightful

    I wonder if their list includes SSH

    1. Re:SSH? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      I wonder if their list includes SSH

      It certainly includes threats to HTTPS, so that seems likely.

      The document reveals that the agency has capabilities against widely used online protocols, such as HTTPS, voice-over-IP and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), used to protect online shopping and banking.

    2. Re:SSH? by Yaur · · Score: 4, Informative

      The claim is VPNs and SSL... so either a break in RSA or AES, either way SSH would be covered. But there are so few details in the story its hard to know how technically competent the staff who reviewed the documents and therefore how serious the threat is.

    3. Re:SSH? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

      I wonder if their list includes SSH

      OpenSSL came from SSLeay, which was created outside of the US specifically for this reason.

      Its not a technical attack in the first round;

          The long, strong arm of the NSA
          July 27, 1998
          Web posted at: 4:15 PM EDT
          http://edition.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9807/27/security.idg/

          [..]

          It's gotten to the point where no vendor hip to the NSA's power will
          even start building products without checking in with Fort Meade first.
          This includes even that supposed ruler of the software universe,
          Microsoft Corp. "It's inevitable that you design products with specific
          [encryption] algorithms and key lengths in mind," said Ira Rubenstein,
          Microsoft attorney and a top lieutenant to Bill Gates. By his own
          account, Rubenstein acts as a "filter" between the NSA and
          Microsoft's design teams in Redmond, Wash. "Any time that you're
          developing a new product, you will be working closely with the NSA,"
          he noted.

          [..]

          Clearly wary of granting the government supervision over its products,
          Microsoft has stubbornly refused to submit a data-recovery plan, even
          though the Redmond giant already includes a data-recovery feature in
          its Exchange Server.

          "The Exchange Server can only be used when this feature is present,"
          Rubenstein said. "Because we haven't filed a product plan, it's harder
          for us to export this than for companies that have filed plans."

          [..]

    4. Re:SSH? by lgw · · Score: 5, Insightful

      I'd wager that the fundamental flaw in HTTPS is that the government has the private keys direct from the CAs. The protocol is flawed in the key management (as most are).

      --
      Socialism: a lie told by totalitarians and believed by fools.
    5. Re:SSH? by jasno · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Yeah, I figured they can always classify the private keys as business records and request them via subpeona. Nothing in the law prevents it.

      --

      http://www.masturbateforpeace.com/
    6. Re:SSH? by the+eric+conspiracy · · Score: 1

      The key generation process seems to me to be susceptible to corruption.

      https://www.eff.org/rng-bug

      Not so much when it's done locally like in SSH.

    7. Re:SSH? by MightyMartian · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Yes, it goes without saying that the supreme weakness of key-based encryption is that you're only as secure as the security of the signing keys themselves.

      The proper way to do it is to have your CAs sitting on a non-network connected computer sitting in a secure location, with as few individuals having access as possible. Obviously that's not 100%, as the NSA could still show up with a warrant, but you're going to know when you've been compromised, which is, really, the whole point behind proper key management.

      --
      The world's burning. Moped Jesus spotted on I50. Details at 11.
    8. Re:SSH? by lister+king+of+smeg · · Score: 4, Informative

      Unless you exchange private keys offline, manually, preferably not using any temporary electronic storage means, the NSA has your keys.

      um you never exchange privet key's you only share public keys.

      --
      ---Saying gnome 3 is better than windows 8 not so much a compliment as it is damning with light praise.
    9. Re:SSH? by SolitaryMan · · Score: 2, Informative

      Sounds like a pile of steaming bullshit to me, to be honest.

      --
      May Peace Prevail On Earth
    10. Re:SSH? by amorsen · · Score: 5, Informative

      The claim is VPNs and SSL... so either a break in RSA or AES, either way SSH would be covered.

      You do not need to break RSA or AES to break a lot of VPNs. I.e. if you use aggressive mode IKEv1 PSK (typically plus XAUTH, but that does not actually help), the shared private key can be recovered by offline attacks. NSA supercomputers should have no problem handling most keys. Alternatively, if certificates are used, many organizations buy premade certificates including secret keys instead of going through the trouble of generating their own secret keys. That means the NSA only has to compromise the few certificate vendors.

      And this is just the passive attacks the NSA can do. If they actively interfere, they can use downgrade attacks or (for HTTPS) the various TLS vulnerabilities or use proper fake vendor certificates or all sorts of other mischief. That is harder to pull off unnoticed of course.

      Very little equipment supports IKEv1 with "raw" RSA keys (no certificates), even though that takes the whole PKI problem away and avoids aggressive mode. I'm only aware of (free|open|libre|strong)SWAN and RouterOS. IKEv2 is almost non-existent, and what little equipment supports it tends to only support the equivalent of IKEv1 main mode with PSK or certificates -- precisely the areas where IKEv1 is already good enough.

      For those of us who use proprietary encryption acceleration: how do we know that the session keys are chosen securely and not divulged with steganography somehow? I know that products have existed which did exactly that, revealing part of the encryption key in the encrypted data stream (and I know that because the vendor was fairly open about the practice).

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    11. Re:SSH? by bloodhawk · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Why would anyone ever exchange private Keys???? The system does not work that way.

    12. Re:SSH? by MetricT · · Score: 1

      AES was standardized in 2001, so it just barely makes it under the wire. 3DES and Diffie-Hellman are also good targets. Or it may be referring to a popular foreign/military cipher, like GOST, IDEA, etc.

    13. Re:SSH? by IamTheRealMike · · Score: 5, Informative

      Certificate authorities never see private keys so you are dead wrong about that. What's more, even if a rogue CA was minting bad certs on the fly to attest that the NSA was really foobar.com, that would have been noticed. Remember that secrecy is something they value insanely highly. They wouldn't ever do something so easily noticed and the articles do not imply any kind of CA compromise.

      In fact if you read all the stories (they overlap largely but not entirely) you can get a vague picture of what's going on. Firstly, they record all encrypted traffic in case they can decrypt it later. Secondly, they have a database of public to private keys, populated via any means they can. Thirdly, they obtain keys in lots of ways (hacking, subversion, bogus court orders, brute forcing old/weak keys etc) but they don't seem to have a magical solution to all strong crypto. The closest that the leaks come to this is discussion of some amazing cryptoanalytic breakthrough, which could possibly mean they're able to break some kinds of RSA? Perhaps they're ahead of Joux et al by some years?

      Regardless, what it is, it can't be a solution to all crypto, because these governments apparently asked the newspapers not to publish on the grounds that people might switch to stronger systems that worked.

    14. Re:SSH? by IamTheRealMike · · Score: 1

      The New York Times has an infographic that claims they have some capabilities against SSH.

    15. Re:SSH? by Score+Whore · · Score: 4, Insightful

      A) The NSA probably directly runs half of the CAs and thus own the root keys that come configured in your browser.
      B) Absent some fancy crypto skills, having the CA root key only allows them to MITM connections. Doesn't help with decrypting a captured stream.

    16. Re: SSH? by MightyMartian · · Score: 4, Insightful

      To fully secure our VPN, I've now built a CA on a non-Internet connected machine which sits behind lock and key. I use it to create SSL certificates for our VPN routers. I'm not building these Certs for Joe Average to connect to my servers, I'm building them so I can be sure that communications between my VPN endpoints is secure, and by securing the CA I can be certain that the likelihood of anyone, including the NSA, can break into my VPN tunnels with any kind of non-local exploit is low to nil.

      --
      The world's burning. Moped Jesus spotted on I50. Details at 11.
    17. Re:SSH? by FuzzNugget · · Score: 1

      Heh ... there's a thought: that the occasional HTTPS site you visit without a signed cert -- y'know, when your browser gives you a big, nasty security warning -- could actually be *more* secure.

    18. Re:SSH? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

      Bruce Schneier should be technically competent enough for you, see his articles today at the Guardian.

      http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/05/government-betrayed-internet-nsa-spying

      http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-remain-secure-surveillance

    19. Re:SSH? by sneakyimp · · Score: 3, Interesting

      I'm more inclined to trust Bruce Schneier who says "I trust the mathematics," than the authors of this sensationalist NYTimes article. To me, it seems like they completely lack any nuanced understanding of the information flow and its vulnerabilities and are merely depending on whatever third-hand analysis they might have gleaned from reading other amateur blogs.

      I agree that going to the service providers (e.g., google, yahoo, apple, phone companies, etc.) or building a backdoor into the software is a good way to go about it, but I hardly think that means that the NSA is "winning the war on encryption."

    20. Re: SSH? by mspohr · · Score: 4, Informative

      From the article it sounds like the NSA has compromised most commercial VPN software (and is working on the rest) with backdoors, etc.
      Do you use commercial (non open source) VPN software? If so, it doesn't matter that your keys are secure.

      --
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    21. Re:SSH? by Dahamma · · Score: 1

      Why even bother with loopholes when they can just seize everything you have with a subpoena...

    22. Re:SSH? by sneakyimp · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Mod parent up. Nobody talking about this even seems to have the vaguest understanding of encryption.

    23. Re: SSH? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Funny

      Welcome to the do not fly list.

    24. Re:SSH? by mspohr · · Score: 4, Insightful

      The article states that they are working with commercial software vendors to insert back doors, vulnerabilities, etc. into their software. This is much easier than trying to break RSA or AES by brute force.
      I think we have to assume that all commercial software has been compromised and is vulnerable.
      Only trust open source software where the code has been audited carefully.

      --
      I don't read your sig. Why are you reading mine?
    25. Re:SSH? by sneakyimp · · Score: 2

      HTTPS doesn't strictly require that you use any authority at all. You can use a self-signed certificate. Verification of the cert is hard, but not impossible. Also, the process of obtaining a cert from a CA doesn't require you to give up your private key.

    26. Re: SSH? by vux984 · · Score: 3, Insightful

      This case self signed certs would be safer.

      Self signed certs have always been safer when used properly.

      In a closed controlled enterprise environment self-signed certs are fine, and reasonably easy to do well.

      Using them properly on the public internet however is pretty much impossible. Keys with a chain of trust to a 3rd party certificate authority (e.g. verisign, comodo, et al) are exactly that ... chains of trust. Can I trust that verisign hasn't be compromised by your average hacker? Probably, for the most part yes. Can I trust that verisign hasn't rolled over and opened its legs for the NSA? No. I can't.

      But having the average https site switch over to self-signed certs to avoid using NSA-compromised-verisign isn't a solution as I have no convenient way to verify when i enter their web address that I haven't been presented with a MITM site (hosted by a hacker... or even by the NSA which is the whole reason we dumped Verisign certs for self-signed in the first place...)

    27. Re:SSH? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

      My old boss was employee 7 at Verisign and he says he was there the day they came for the keys. No he was not in the room. Dudes in suits show up in black SUV's and all the key holders were taken in back with the boss. I think they have had this for a very long time. Good thing that stuff you guys call money only represents debt and has no real value.

    28. Re:SSH? by vux984 · · Score: 2

      Or it could be an MITM proxy page for the NSA, and they just forgot to sign it. The trouble with self signed certs is you don't know who you are talking to at all.

    29. Re:SSH? by gutnor · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Certificate authorities never see private keys

      Theoretically, in practice average Joe buy their certificate and private keys from a third party. And obviously if you use any type of hosted environment, you must provide the private key.

      Even big companies do not run their own datacenter nowadays, hell even Banks do not run everything onsite so I wouldn't be surprise me if the NSA did not already have the majority of the SSL private keys.

    30. Re:SSH? by niftymitch · · Score: 2

      Perhaps one way pads have been exchanged already.

      Some of the leakers have posted large files of clearly
      random data. By using that data in interesting ways
      key exchange or data exchange could move forward for
      many destinations.

      It is interesting that private communications once were safe
      inside a common gummed envelope and protected by
      a few penny seal in the upper right corner.

      The thoughts and prayers of many are now laid open to the whims
      of unknown agencies, companies and bureaucrats. The issue
      to me is that they are unknown... The journal or diary of anyone
      is no longer as safe as it once was under a mattress. Once exposed,
      once disclosed it cannot be undone without astounding expense
      and perverse effort. The commerce in "stolen words" by media
      boggles the mind. Should a friend of yours be implicated in a crime
      the media seems happy to steal you images and words without
      compensation and without liable for truth regarding you or your
      acquaintances.

      --
      Truth is stranger than fiction, but it is because Fiction is obliged to stick to possibilities; Truth isn't. Mark Twain.
    31. Re:SSH? by Cramer · · Score: 5, Informative

      To be 1000% clear... all a CA does is sign keys generated by others. They never see the private server key(s). Having the CA signing certificates doesn't give you the magic ability to decode a site's traffic; it only allows you to pretend to be that site. (assuming you can get the users traffic to come to, or through, you. and that other steps (fingerprint validation, serial number checking, etc.) aren't being used.)

    32. Re:SSH? by knarf · · Score: 2

      I wonder if their list includes SSH

      In the linked BULLRUN document, in section 6 ('BULLRUN sensitivity and coverage') it clearly mentions SSH as one of the covered protocols so the answer is yes. As to whether this coverage is due to some publicly-unknown (but NSA-available) weakness in the SSH protocol, in common implementations, in the used cyphers or enacted case-by-case through man-in-the-middle attacks is of course unknown.

      --
      --frank[at]unternet.org
    33. Re:SSH? by gweihir · · Score: 1

      That is complete BS. Public Key Crypto does not work that way, you _never_ exchange private keys.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    34. Re:SSH? by gweihir · · Score: 2

      Vulnerabilities in AES are very, very unlike. Vulnerabilities in RSA can only be introduced by changing the universe. What is far more likely is back-doors or intentionally weak key generation in commercial SSL and VPN products. I already have seen commercial encryption that was incompetently done. Now I am wondering whether that was intentional. However it was grossly obvious, so I guess not, even though it was a well-known US company.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    35. Re:SSH? by gweihir · · Score: 1

      I have no idea where you see that. The only one I see is at the Guardian and that is about SSL (a bit subtle, but SSL has had numerous protocol weaknesses and similar graphics are pretty well known in the community).

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    36. Re:SSH? by gweihir · · Score: 1

      You are confusing OpenSSL and OpenSSH. They are completely different things.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    37. Re:SSH? by Frobnicator · · Score: 5, Insightful

      I'm more inclined to trust Bruce Schneier who says "I trust the mathematics," than the authors of this sensationalist NYTimes article

      I trust the math, even though I don't understand it.

      I don't necessarily trust the people who coded the math into a program.

      I don't necessarily trust the computer that is running the program.

      --
      //TODO: Think of witty sig statement
    38. Re:SSH? by Cramer · · Score: 2

      Correction: SSLeay was developed outside the USA because of US export restrictions -- if a US citizen wrote even a single line of code, the project would not be exportable ("published", i.e. "downloadable", 'tho actual print publication was legal.) It had f*** all to do with any government attempts or agenda to weaken or subvert it.

    39. Re:SSH? by mi · · Score: 4, Interesting

      My old boss was employee 7 at Verisign and he says he was there the day they came for the keys.

      The silver lining in this sad story is that the algorithm used by SSL itself is still unbreakable to the NSA. They wouldn't have needed the keys otherwise. So asymmetric crypto is still sound — if used properly — and privacy-minded people can still use it to communicate...

      --
      In Soviet Washington the swamp drains you.
    40. Re:SSH? by cheater512 · · Score: 1

      You will know when the NSA has raped you, but the gag order they give you prevents anyone else from knowing.
      And they'd probably cover all their bases and imply that if you close down then that is telling people that something is wrong.

    41. Re:SSH? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Baby, it doesn't feel as good with encryption.

    42. Re:SSH? by AHuxley · · Score: 1

      My view is the NSA is fine with SSH - a security letter to a US provider if it the plain text is 'safe' on the US owned/hosted server.
      If the encrypted message is passed on the hope is that a deep understanding of Apple or MS at an OS level will still allow for plain text to be recovered after tracking.
      http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx/nsa-br-mx.htm hints at the fun tracking part if your nation is in good with most telcos ~ Mainway, Association, Dishfire, Goal...
      Would the average create an air gap for encryption and decryption on average using another computer for networking only?

      --
      Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
    43. Re: SSH? by 0111+1110 · · Score: 5, Interesting

      I think at this point it is safe to assume that all US or US ally based commercial software of any kind that is of some value to the NSA/GCHQ has been compromised. I would imagine that this will present a huge advantage to open source software in relevant fields. IMO any software company that allowed such backdoors deserves to go out of business. It also means that commercial anti-virus, firewall, and other security software has to be assumed to be backdoored for the NSA/GCHQ. This also gives Linux a huge advantage because it is not so dependent on high quality security software.

      --
      Quite an experience to live in fear, isn't it? That's what it is to be a slave.
    44. Re:SSH? by TheSeatOfMyPants · · Score: 1

      privet key[ i]s you

      I deny those allegations -- I've never seen that privet before in my life, and certainly wouldn't agree to be its key!

      --
      Now mostly at Usenet:comp.misc & SoylentNews.org (it's made of people!)
    45. Re: SSH? by mspohr · · Score: 5, Insightful

      With closed source, you don't know if it's secure and you can't verify that it's secure and now we have these NSA documents which state that they have already compromised the most popular commercial security software and they are working on compromising the rest of it.
      With open source, you don't have a guarantee that it's secure but you do have lots of knowledgeable people looking at the code (especially now) and you yourself can audit the code. It has a much higher chance of being secure.
      You're right, "a security solution with a destroyed reputation is no solution at all"... and the NSA just destroyed the reputation of all commercial security software.

      --
      I don't read your sig. Why are you reading mine?
    46. Re:SSH? by swillden · · Score: 3, Informative

      Certificate authorities never see private keys

      Theoretically, in practice average Joe buy their certificate and private keys from a third party.

      Um, no, Joe average does not. Joe doesn't understand where his keys come from, but the CA doesn't provide them.

      The public/private key pair is generated on Joe's computer. Most CA's issue certificates through a web-based form, and that form triggers the browser to generate the key pair locally. Then the public key is placed in a certificate request and uploaded to the CA. Some time later the CA signs the public key and produces the resulting public key certificate, which is downloaded.

      The private key never leaves the user's computer until they move it somewhere else (e.g. to install it in their web server).

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    47. Re:SSH? by swillden · · Score: 1

      Heh ... there's a thought: that the occasional HTTPS site you visit without a signed cert -- y'know, when your browser gives you a big, nasty security warning -- could actually be *more* secure.

      No, it couldn't. MITM attacks are trivial with self-signed certs.

      --
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    48. Re:SSH? by gweihir · · Score: 1

      I see. Well, it may not really mean anything. Maybe it is in there because you can run ssh with commercial SSL certificates and many commercial implementations do so. Different from SSL, both protocol and implementations, at least OpenSSH has a stellar security record. I would not trust any commercial SSH implementation though, maybe that is the angle.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    49. Re:SSH? by Marillion · · Score: 4, Insightful

      My suspicion is that they can monitor the AES key negotiation during SSL handshake. I've heard enough experts say they still trust AES. But if you as a government agency can compel a company to disclose their private RSA/DSA key then snooping SSL is easy. SSL uses the RSA/DSA public to encrypt the session symmetric encryption key. If you know the RSA/DSA private key, then you can easily decrypt that session key and then snoop the communication.

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    50. Re: SSH? by MightyMartian · · Score: 1

      I use OpenVPN and OpenSSH for building tunnels.

      --
      The world's burning. Moped Jesus spotted on I50. Details at 11.
    51. Re:SSH? by gweihir · · Score: 2

      And what would that have to do with SSH? SSH does not support user-specified symmetric keys.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    52. Re:SSH? by jonwil · · Score: 1

      ECC may not be as strong as everyone believes if the "magic numbers" used in the particular ECC implementation may have been chosen by someone (NSA or otherwise) with an interest in making the algorithm weaker than it otherwise would have been.

    53. Re: SSH? by skids · · Score: 3, Insightful

      That is assuming the NSA doesn't send developers into OSS environments to insert cleverly obfuscated and plausibly deniable vulnerabilities. OSS is spread pretty thin in many areas. Some products you would think would have a team of tens of developers have more like 4, and there is a good probability there will be a deficiency in either expertise or time.

    54. Re:SSH? by noh8rz10 · · Score: 1

      why even bother with a subpoena when they can insert backdoors into OS's, server equipment, and encryption standards?

    55. Re:SSH? by noh8rz10 · · Score: 1

      Absent some fancy crypto skills, having the CA root key only allows them to MITM connections. Doesn't help with decrypting a captured stream.

      no worries, they have mad crazy crypto skills. rtfa, it's really impressive. I'm gobsmacked!

    56. Re:SSH? by udippel · · Score: 1

      The proper way to do it is to have your CAs sitting on a non-network connected computer sitting in a secure location, with as few individuals having access as possible. Obviously that's not 100%, as the NSA could still show up with a warrant, but you're going to know when you've been compromised, which is, really, the whole point behind proper key management.

      Come on, mods, how can this be "insightful"?? Are you not aware that the keys are needed to set up any communication; and that it is exactly the requirement for a CA to be online? If you want to mod up, the best could have been "funny"

    57. Re:SSH? by rtb61 · · Score: 1

      It's amusing thought, the NSA just keeps on giving to FOSS by it's actions, M$ and their ilk must be sorely vexed by the practices of the NSA.

      --
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    58. Re:SSH? by LordLimecat · · Score: 1

      I wonder where the article is getting its info. What the heck does this even mean:

      Having lost a public battle in the 1990s to insert its own “back door” in all encryption,

      In "all" encryption? What public battle?

      Theyre also claiming the snowden documents indicate that the NSA has cracked most encryption? Did I miss something, or are reporters as usual ill equipped for actual reporting?

    59. Re:SSH? by SuricouRaven · · Score: 1

      That also only works if you have the hardware yourself. Only large organisations host things like external websites in their own building - most just pay for hosting, or colocate a server. In which case a government agency can easily turn up with a warrant and a gag order. If you've done something to draw attention of the NSA, I'm sure their experts have devised something like a device that can be hotplugged into a PCI(-e) slot and use DMA to dump the contents of RAM, then spoof comments to the storage controller to get the hard drive contents too without needing to disrupt operations.

    60. Re:SSH? by SuricouRaven · · Score: 1

      That Joe isn't very average.

      This is what the average Joe sees:

      'The internet has a little picture of a padlock in the corner. That means I can put my credit card number in.'

    61. Re:SSH? by multi+io · · Score: 1

      I'd wager that the fundamental flaw in HTTPS is that the government has the private keys direct from the CAs. The protocol is flawed in the key management (as most are).

      That would only allow for "targeted" (MITM) attacks, rather than opportunistic (untargeted) decryption. And modern browsers perform certificate pinning for some well-known domain certificates, which means MITM against those servers would be detected. Unless the government has the keys for those domain certs as well...

    62. Re:SSH? by flyingfsck · · Score: 1

      Yup, there is a movement back to Diffie Hellman key exchange with forward security, instead of the default, but to activate that, sysadmins the world over actually need to read the man pages, which they will never do.

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    63. Re:SSH? by flyingfsck · · Score: 1

      I read somewhere that the default RSA key exchange of SSH is not forward secure, but using DSA keys is. Does anyone know?

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    64. Re:SSH? by Shuntros · · Score: 1

      The proper way to do it is to have a 100% offline CA with its key material split over a number of smart cards so the CA can only be brought up periodically for signing purposes when a certain number of cards are present (say 3 of 5) and even then you use an HSM which performs all activities hence the private key is never accessible even if you wanted it to be. You store the cards in fireproof safes in geographically dispersed secure physical locations, cardholders travel by different modes of transport, at different times of day, stay at different hotels etc. For day-to-day certificate issuance and signing you have a subordinate CA sat in a networked HSM. That way there can only ever be a minuscule (I'd never use the word impossible) risk that the root CA can be compromised and you maintain the ability to revoke the day-to-day CA.

      90% of a good PKI is process and governance, not the technology itself.

      I suspect what's going on here is that the NSA has the ability to cut certs for things like *.google.com, *.facebook.com etc from a trusted commercial CA whose root is already installed in everybody's browser, hence they can man-in-the-middle the traffic without raising alarm. A few sneaky BGP advertisements and this would be surprisingly easy to do.

      It's pretty shocking to read most of the comments on here and realise that very few people actually know how PKI works even at the most basic level.

    65. Re:SSH? by flyingfsck · · Score: 2

      They are referring to the Carter era Clipper Chip, which everyone said a polite No Thank You to.

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    66. Re:SSH? by sFurbo · · Score: 1

      Vulnerabilities in RSA can only be introduced by changing the universe.

      Isn't it enough to find a quick way to factor large numbers? Or even to find a quick way to calculate Euler's totient function? And aren't the NSA advocating for government agencies to move towards elliptic curve based cryptography, which wouldn't be vulnerable to this?

      Anyway, I still think your conclusion is correct, so it really is just a technicality.

    67. Re:SSH? by FireFury03 · · Score: 2

      I'd wager that the fundamental flaw in HTTPS is that the government has the private keys direct from the CAs. The protocol is flawed in the key management (as most are).

      It's not that simple. When you get your certificate signed, you never give the CA your private key - you give them a certificate signing request instead. So by compromising a CA, the NSA can't get access to the key required to do offline decryption of an SSL session.

      They *can* get the CA's own key, of course. And that would allow them to forge a new certificate that claims to be yours. They can use that certificate to perform an online man in the middle attack of your SSL sessions, and anyone validating the certificate by checking it is signed by the CA wouldn't be able to tell the difference. However, the real cert and the forged cert would be different, which means there's a reasonable chance that someone's going to spot this if its done on a large scale. For example, as far as I know, Chrome checks that the certificates Google's websites are presenting it with are actually Google's certificates, even if they appear to be correctly signed by the CA - if it sees a fake cert it reports back to Google. (This is how Google has caught compromised CAs before)

      As we've seen before, if a CA is caught handing out forged certificates, their life is pretty much over - all the browser vendors immediately revoke their CA certificates. So given how easy it is to spot the forged certificate when this kind of attack is pulled on a large scale, and how bad things would go for the CA when someone spotted it, it seems unlikly that a CA would help the NSA in this way unless they were put under immense pressure.

    68. Re:SSH? by flyingfsck · · Score: 1

      I assume the private key only leaves the user's PC as a steganographic copy sent to the NSA...

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    69. Re:SSH? by kerrbear · · Score: 1

      Regardless, what it is, it can't be a solution to all crypto, because these governments apparently asked the newspapers not to publish on the grounds that people might switch to stronger systems that worked.

      Or that's what they want us to think...

    70. Re: SSH? by lorinc · · Score: 1

      I've always thought of Verisign&co as a very reliable evidence that I'm paying something over the real paypal and not to some Russian based thugs. I would never trust them for my privacy.

      Wasn't it the same situation 2 years ago in Libya with the gov certificate being trusted by default by some OS?

    71. Re: SSH? by rastos1 · · Score: 1

      With open source, you don't have a guarantee that it's secure but you do have lots of knowledgeable people looking at the code

      While I'd love to agree with you I challenge anybody who looked on OpenSSL source code enough to understand more than 10 lines to raise a hand.

    72. Re:SSH? by jcdr · · Score: 1

      Open source code can be audited by any expert. This is certainly an advantage over closed source project.

    73. Re:SSH? by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 1

      See my post in this thread.. I don't understand how Bruce Schneier can recommend Silent Circle right after saying "the NSA also works with security product vendors to ensure that commercial encryption products are broken in secret ways that only it knows about. "

      Silent circle - a US and UK connected commercial company - propriety closed source, and in a sneaky "no we are open, really trust us" sort of way. W T F!???

    74. Re: SSH? by Lennie · · Score: 1

      If you trust DNSSEC and operating systems and browsers supported it DANE could solve that problem.

      --
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    75. Re: SSH? by the_olo · · Score: 2

      To fully secure our VPN, I've now built a CA on a non-Internet connected machine which sits behind lock and key. I use it to create SSL certificates for our VPN routers. I'm not building these Certs for Joe Average to connect to my servers, I'm building them so I can be sure that communications between my VPN endpoints is secure, and by securing the CA I can be certain that the likelihood of anyone, including the NSA, can break into my VPN tunnels with any kind of non-local exploit is low to nil.

      Did you secure the machine against passive electromagnetic emissions eavesdropping when it is powered on? That would require making a full faraday cage out of your CA machine's server room, with a fully self-contained power source (possibly a fossil-fueled powered generator?) within and no communication wires whatsoever crossing the cage's boundary.

      Are the private keys of your VPN nodes stored in secure, physically tamper-proof hardware security module devices both resitant to electromagnetic eavesdropping and trusted to not have NSA backdoors, or are they on disks or other non protected memory?

      Depending on answers to those questions, your precautions against NSA spying may not be effective at all.

    76. Re:SSH? by Ash+Vince · · Score: 1

      Only trust open source software where the code has been audited carefully.

      Even in that case there is still the possibility that there are very subtle bugs that can be exploited under certain circumstances.

      Open source software actually has another risk which is that someone at the NSA or GCHQ can be paid to contribute to the project for a few years and do mostly amazing work but deliberately introduce a single bug that can be very carefully exploited. If you are very crafty and hide the bug carefully will it may end up hidden for years.

      This is not to say that open source software is worse than closed source software, just that open source projects need to be very careful about vetting who contributes to them.

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    77. Re:SSH? by L4t3r4lu5 · · Score: 1

      Exactlythis. It's all side-channel or implementation weaknesses. AES / RSA as a mathematical construct itself is sound; The 22 year old trusting a closed-source compiler on a non-OSS platform to build from source is the problem.

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    78. Re:SSH? by Lennie · · Score: 1

      He didn't say why you shouldn't use public-key crypto.

      At first I thought he might still trust the math, not the CAs. He might be saying that because of possible: man-in-the-middle-attacks with a CA-signed certs.

      But in the comments on his site he mentions:

      "It is more likely that the NSA has some fundamental mathematical advance in breaking public-key algorithms than symmetric algorithms."

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    79. Re:SSH? by swillden · · Score: 1

      The context of the discussion was a Joe who buys a certificate.

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    80. Re:SSH? by swillden · · Score: 1

      Certainly cases where you can do manual key distribution/verification are not subject to MITM attacks. This is obvious, and independent of whether the certificate is self-signed or signed by a CA. It's also not scalable.

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    81. Re:SSH? by Lennie · · Score: 1

      If you read the comments on his site he mentions:

      "It is more likely that the NSA has some fundamental mathematical advance in breaking public-key algorithms than symmetric algorithms."

      So he discourages it's use.

      --
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    82. Re: SSH? by rilister · · Score: 1

      Bruce Schneier is on the team reviewing the docs, so it's safe to say that they're pretty technically competent when it comes to encryption:
      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bruce_Schneier

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    83. Re:SSH? by RespekMyAthorati · · Score: 1

      The problem, in general, is that someone somewhere will eventually have to see the plaintext or else the whole system is useless. The NSA does whatever is necessary to ensure that if you can access the plaintext, then so can they.
      The cleverer the key management scheme you devise, the more likely it is that they will threaten you with prison if you don't provide a way for them to circumvent it.

      tl;dr: you can devise a foolproof system, but you can't implement it or admit that it has been compromised.

    84. Re:SSH? by swillden · · Score: 1

      While correct, if you're running in a, say, hosted VPS environment, you're screwed anyways... all they have to do is get access from the host and they have your key. It's only as secure as your own physical control over it.

      Definitely. And if you're running in your own data center and a significant number of employees have access to the private key, and the NSA cares about you, you're screwed. It only takes one bad apple.

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    85. Re:SSH? by RespekMyAthorati · · Score: 1

      Unless the software to generate the public/private pair is itself compromised.

    86. Re:SSH? by RespekMyAthorati · · Score: 1

      CA would help the NSA in this way unless they were put under immense pressure

      Like do as we say or spend the next twenty years behind bars?

    87. Re:SSH? by FireFury03 · · Score: 1

      CA would help the NSA in this way unless they were put under immense pressure

      Like do as we say or spend the next twenty years behind bars?

      Yes, but still, if this was happening on a mass scale we would've heard about it by now because its trivial to detect. So the conclusion is that either its not happening, or is only happening in specific targetted cases.

    88. Re:SSH? by willaien · · Score: 1

      Not even open source software is safe, see: Ken Thompson, etc.

      http://c2.com/cgi/wiki?TheKenThompsonHack

    89. Re: SSH? by Richy_T · · Score: 1

      CAs have been compromised before. The only real way (assuming no other vulnerabilities) to be sure is to verify the certificate yourself. Unfortunately this is "inconvenient".

      Wait a minute, didn't we already go through the whole "Security vs convenience" thing with MS in the 90s?

    90. Re:SSH? by Richy_T · · Score: 1

      Typically it requires the installation of a new CA (which can be done via group policy) into the browser. Certainly Zscalar would nag me incessantly about it until I finally clicked "accept" and when I was the admin of a Bluecoat box, that is the way it would have done it had we implemented it.

    91. Re:SSH? by Richy_T · · Score: 1

      If they were minting private keys for *everyone*, that might be noticed. If they restrict it somewhat, that greatly reduces the chance of detection.

    92. Re:SSH? by Richy_T · · Score: 1

      In theory, the private key itself can be encrypted. But this means you have to enter the passphrase on server startup and I suspect the key is available in memory after that (though steps to mitigate that may be taken) so you're not a whole lot better off.

    93. Re:SSH? by mspohr · · Score: 1

      Nobody is saying that open source software is guaranteed safe.
      The point is that commercial software is now pretty much guaranteed unsafe and there is no way to audit it.
      With open source, you have lots of people looking at the code and they can find problems and fix them so you have a better chance of having safe software.

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    94. Re:SSH? by RespekMyAthorati · · Score: 1

      Carter->Clinton

    95. Re:SSH? by Richy_T · · Score: 1

      It's not that unscalable. It's just that it's inconvenient. Big difference.

      My bank, for example, should have its fingerprint on prominent display in every branch. Possibly on every card or check it issues.

    96. Re:SSH? by willaien · · Score: 1

      Due to the compiler chicken and egg problem, even analyzing excruciatingly the source code of a project doesn't mean it is 'safe', because even though the source code is safe, if your compiler is compromised (and can inject its infected code into the compiled version of any detected compilers), then your compiled binary might not be safe.

      It takes a very careful inspection to determine if your compiler is affected.

    97. Re:SSH? by rahulov · · Score: 1

      This looks like conspiracy theory but still. XSL attack. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XSL_attack Bruce Schneier and Niels Ferguson write, "We have one criticism of AES: we don't quite trust the security What concerns us the most about AES is its simple algebraic structure No other block cipher we know of has such a simple algebraic representation. We have no idea whether this leads to an attack or not, but not knowing is reason enough to be skeptical about the use of AES." (Practical Cryptography, 2003, pp56–57)

    98. Re:SSH? by Marillion · · Score: 1

      Exactly. Although simple resources like SSL Labs has very easy guides.

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    99. Re:SSH? by BitZtream · · Score: 1

      You do realize that the encryption provided by SSL is generally AES, and always symmetrical right?

      The asymmetrical portion is only for initial setup and authentication of who is on the other end, all of the encryption uses a symmetrical protocol.

      Asymmetric algorithms are far to processor intensive for stream encryption on a large scale. Your web browser would grind to a halt if you tried to use asymmetric encryption for the actual data streams.

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    100. Re:SSH? by swillden · · Score: 1

      Obviously.

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    101. Re:SSH? by swillden · · Score: 1

      It's sufficiently inconvenient that it's unscalable.

      My bank, for example, should have its fingerprint on prominent display in every branch. Possibly on every card or check it issues.

      That would make key rotations entertaining.

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    102. Re:SSH? by BitZtream · · Score: 1

      To go a step further, having the private key after the session handshake doesn't do you any good either. You have to participate, NOT WATCH, the handshake in order to know the actual encryption key used for the session.

      If I had every private key in the world right now, it would do me no good in decrypting any SSL sessions I recorded. The certificate is simply used to authenticate who is on the other end, it does nothing with the encryption key negotiation process which requires you to be part of the conversation, actively participating in it, not just watching it.

      The actual keys used to encrypt the session are generated on each end based on the numbers sent during the initial exchange, but neither side ever fully sends or provides enough information to determine the key.

      Its all very complicated math, but the end result is that a private key is only useful for impersonating a host, not decrypting the session. They become useful because you can do a man in the middle attack where you pretend to be the real 'me' and so I don't know that I'm negotiating encryption keys with the wrong person.

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    103. Re: SSH? by Cramer · · Score: 1

      Absolutely WRONG. If I have your server certificate, I can decode your traffic.

    104. Re:SSH? by surd1618 · · Score: 1

      The fundamental flaw is FISA, IMHO

    105. Re: SSH? by Yaur · · Score: 1

      Yes but Schneier isn't making any claims consistent with knowing that RSA, AES, etc is compromised at the algorithm level. One thing I haven't seen him, or any other mainstream news source really call attention to is that one of the released document hints that some (unnamed) encryption chip used for vpns and ssl has been compromised. If they have a backdoor that lets them pull private keys out of gear from one of the big players that could give them everything that has been hinted at.

    106. Re:SSH? by squiggleslash · · Score: 1

      Wow, people blame Carter for pretty much everything.

      Carter was president during the 1970s, predating the Clipper chip by about a decade and a half. Some far-sighted people in the 1970s saw the potential of the Arpanet to change the world, and perhaps a handful of those saw the effect widespread use of strong encryption would have on ubiquitous International unmetered packet-switched data networks, but it certainly wasn't substantial enough to move projects like Clipper forward at that time.

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    107. Re:SSH? by Richy_T · · Score: 1

      How much are current certificate rotations just the CAs making sure they keep getting money year-on-year? I bet if the option was there for a non-expiring certificate, many places would do that.

    108. Re:SSH? by swillden · · Score: 1

      How much are current certificate rotations just the CAs making sure they keep getting money year-on-year? I bet if the option was there for a non-expiring certificate, many places would do that.

      They probably would, but that would be stupid. Key lifetimes need to be limited to ensure they they stay secret. Even if your key is large enough that it can never be brute-forced, there are other ways for keys to escape.

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  3. Uh... okay by cryptizard · · Score: 5, Insightful

    I believe the "working with industries to install backdoors" part, but the cracking internet standards encryption? Nope. The report doesn't even say what they are supposed to have cracked, only some nebulous "widely used internet encryption". Do they have a ton of computation power? Yes. Do they have some magical break on AES that no one in academia knows about or can even fathom? No. Just some FUD.

    1. Re:Uh... okay by cryptizard · · Score: 1

      That's why I said I believe that part. What I don't believe is that they have cracked any widely used standard protocols like the article implies.

    2. Re:Uh... okay by geekoid · · Score: 1

      Nope. But go on with your lunacy.

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    3. Re:Uh... okay by AmiMoJo · · Score: 1

      No cracks in commonly used encryption, just a lot of computing power to brute force it. I remember 10 years ago there was speculation that for a few billion dollars you could build a machine capable of cracking common codes in a few months, and that the some countries probably had them already.

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    4. Re:Uh... okay by Hatta · · Score: 5, Interesting

      Cracking doesn't mean brute force. If you compromise the key, the encryption is just as surely cracked. Chances are what they really mean here is that they've compromised the certificate authorities that are trusted by default by most web browsers. Turns out self signed certificates really are more secure.

      GPG and SSH are probably safe as you generate your own keys on the local machine.

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    5. Re:Uh... okay by cryptizard · · Score: 5, Insightful

      I don't know that it is necessarily true, but I wouldn't bet my life that they don't have a backdoor on at least one root CA. Remember, you don't need all of them, just one can do a lot of damage.

    6. Re:Uh... okay by cryptizard · · Score: 3, Insightful

      No, no and no. It would take a SIGNIFICANT theoretical break on encryptions to bring them within the realm of brute force capability. Even 80 bits of security is considered well outside of the reach of existing machines, and AES has at least 128 bits. Remember, every bit doubles the amount of time it takes to brute force. It would take all the computers in the world billions of years to brute force one key.

    7. Re:Uh... okay by Yaur · · Score: 2

      Even if the CA were in your back pocket how would you go about generating a rogue certificate with the same fingerprint as the real one?

    8. Re:Uh... okay by thue · · Score: 1

      I am pretty sure they are refering to stuff like this: http://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/5/5263/1.html

    9. Re:Uh... okay by Hatta · · Score: 2

      What reason do you have to believe that they haven't compromised the CAs? All it would take is one NSL, which the CAs could never appeal, or tell anyone about. Why would they not do that? Do you know of an alternative method that would be more effective?

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    10. Re:Uh... okay by steelfood · · Score: 1

      Intelligence officials asked The Times and ProPublica not to publish this article, saying that it might prompt foreign targets to switch to new forms of encryption or communications that would be harder to collect or read. The news organizations removed some specific facts but decided to publish the article because of the value of a public debate about government actions that weaken the most powerful tools for protecting the privacy of Americans and others.

      Here's hoping Wikileaks or some other organization will publish more details on what's been compromised.

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    11. Re:Uh... okay by dgatwood · · Score: 5, Informative

      No need to compromise anything. They just need a single CA to be complicit with a court order to produce a certificate that signs an NSA-provided key for a specific site. Then, they can freely MITM that site. SSL is swiss cheese as security goes, because certs are automatically trusted if signed by a CA, are never stored, and their designated requirements are never checked when determining whether a new key should be trusted or not. In short, SSL is a train wreck.

      Self-signed keys are not more secure. If a site goes from a self-signed cert to a signed cert with a different key, most browsers do not display any warning. Although you can install anti-MITM tools that produce a warning when the key changes, those tools would detect such a government MITM whether you're using a CA-signed cert or a self-signed cert. By contrast, a CA-signed cert makes it much harder to perform a MITM attack the first time a user goes to your site, effectively limiting such attacks to those who can convince a CA to give them a cert for your site. Guess which is more likely.

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    12. Re:Uh... okay by MightyMartian · · Score: 1

      So, don't use them. It's trivially easy to build your own secure CA. Whatever technical prowess the NSA may have (and I'm sure they probably have more than any other single organization on the planet), the likelihood that they're going to be able to crack encrypted communications using keys you've signed with your own private CA are pretty bloody low.

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    13. Re:Uh... okay by dmt0 · · Score: 1

      No cracks in commonly used encryption, just a lot of computing power to brute force it. I remember 10 years ago there was speculation that for a few billion dollars you could build a machine capable of cracking common codes in a few months, and that the some countries probably had them already.

      You don't crack commonly known encryption, you just design flaws right into it at the standard level:

      Cryptographers have long suspected that the agency planted vulnerabilities in a standard adopted in 2006 by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the United States’ encryption standards body, and later by the International Organization for Standardization, which has 163 countries as members.

      Classified N.S.A. memos appear to confirm that the fatal weakness, discovered by two Microsoft cryptographers in 2007, was engineered by the agency. The N.S.A. wrote the standard and aggressively pushed it on the international group, privately calling the effort “a challenge in finesse.”

      “Eventually, N.S.A. became the sole editor,” the memo says

    14. Re:Uh... okay by someSnarkyBastard · · Score: 1

      How many people check the cert fingerprint? If the rogue cert has the a good root CA signature then most browsers will likely not flag it and that is probably as far as most users go towards verifying their SSL traffic is not being snarfed by a MITM attack.

    15. Re:Uh... okay by Bert64 · · Score: 1

      But while there's potentially 2^128 possible keys if correctly implemented... Who's to say that the individual implementation actually generates keys truly randomly? A flaw in the key generation algorithm can significantly weaken the system as a whole while still using a strong encryption algorithm.

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    16. Re:Uh... okay by StripedCow · · Score: 1

      Do they have some magical break on AES that no one in academia knows about or can even fathom? No. Just some FUD.

      That might be because NSA may have forward-engineered some tricks/backdoors into AES. Doing the reverse-engineering may be much harder.

      --
      If Pandora's box is destined to be opened, *I* want to be the one to open it.
    17. Re:Uh... okay by thoromyr · · Score: 2

      Cracking encryption isn't a crap shoot -- its not like they get a single roll of the dice and say "damn, we didn't crack that one" -- it is just a matter of time. The question, really, is "how much time would it take to crack this encrypted communication" and the answer depends on a lot of factors. It rarely, if ever, is the theoretical limit to difficulty. A trivial example is the debian fiasco where nearly all entropy was removed from key generation. That is a bit extreme, but the point stands that the difficulty is, due to implementation issues and side channel attacks, very likely less than the theoretical.

      It is popular to express the difficulty of decryption in time-to-decrypt. Even if the difficulty were always the theoretical this would still be wrong. There are orders of magnitude difference in computing power that can be applied. Just switching from a fast CPU to a good GPU will give you a very nice speed up -- and that is before clustering. Periodically I have to update a "time to crack a password based on complexity rules" table and its sad. Anyone using that kind of guidance is being misled: it isn't even useful for doing relative comparisons. "But these complexity rules mean that my password is 1000x harder to crack" is meaningless if it can still be done in less than five minutes.

      Yes, breaking SSL is not the same as cracking passwords. But the same principles apply: a guided attack will usually perform far better. Periodically there is news in the security field about a vulnerability that made communications/stored files/SSL encryption much less strong than it should have been. And some people still don't see why the NSA maintains recordings of encrypted sessions. Can't crack it within a year? Better luck next month.

      But regardless of any of that, it isn't going to do you much good to generate your own certificates when you connect to Amazon, Facebook, Google, etc., etc., etc.

    18. Re:Uh... okay by Charliemopps · · Score: 1

      They said "the majority of" which is not what you're talking about. Even most security minded people don't bother with a private CA. I think most of their "cracks" don't even bother with the encryption anyway. If they have as many back doors as it looks like they do, and they have data collection at nearly every major hub in the world as well as equipment in all the ISPs they are reading so much of your data (basically ALL of it from both ends) they will know just about everything you do. It doesn't really matter if the email was encrypted if they have a keylogger on your PC or can remotely log into the webcam of the guy sitting next to you's laptop. It's kind of like the "eye of sauron" thing. They may not be omnipotent and able to target everyone at once, but once their eye turns your way there's little you can do about it short of jumping into a volcano.

    19. Re:Uh... okay by amorsen · · Score: 1

      There are some nice "QuickSSL" products from the various CAs, which offer to generate certificates without the hassle of you making your own secret key. For those, having the CA in your back pocket is extremely useful.

      --
      Finally! A year of moderation! Ready for 2019?
    20. Re:Uh... okay by Hatta · · Score: 5, Interesting

      No need to compromise anything. They just need a single CA to be complicit with a court order to produce a certificate that signs an NSA-provided key for a specific site.

      That's what's meant by "compromise".

      Self-signed keys are not more secure. If a site goes from a self-signed cert to a signed cert with a different key, most browsers do not display any warning.

      If you remove the CAs from your list of trusted certificates, it would display a warning.

      Although you can install anti-MITM tools that produce a warning when the key changes, those tools would detect such a government MITM whether you're using a CA-signed cert or a self-signed cert

      Unless the NSA is forcing the CAs to compromise every single certificate they offer. They may not be, but it would be foolish to assume that they aren't.

      --
      Give me Classic Slashdot or give me death!
    21. Re:Uh... okay by IamTheRealMike · · Score: 3, Informative

      There's nothing in the articles that implies this. Backdooring a CA only helps if several things hold:

      1) They can not only intercept but also rewrite traffic on the fly. Possible, but if so, not yet mentioned in any leaks.

      2) They're willing to take the chance that someone might notice.

      So an operation against a single site, definitely possible. But they are clearly desperate to grab everything, all the time! Their whole MO is not targeted investigations but to spy on everyone simultaneously. You can't use a rogue CA to do that. They'd be detected immediately, if only by geeks setting up SSL for their new personal VPS and suddenly noticing the CA their browser gets isn't the one they installed.

      The problems with SSL are not that CAs exist. The model holds against the global adversary who wants to decrypt everything. The problems with SSL are almost certainly more prosaic - many websites can be automatically hacked and their keys stolen without the owners ever knowing. In the default config that allows you to then decrypt all past traffic as well. Some implementations will use old, weak keys that were strong once upon a time but have since become obsolete. Some implementations will have bad random number generators. Some implementations will run on VPS providers and are subject to side channel attacks by colocated VMs. Some keys can be subpoenad and others can be obtained by covert agents. And of course you still leak traffic metadata even when SSL works perfectly.

      There are lots of ways to attack SSL that will work some of the time, and that's exactly what the leaks imply - they can beat encryption sometimes but they don't have a magic skeleton key to everything.

    22. Re:Uh... okay by cryptizard · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Note that no-one has been able to prove there are no efficient solutions to integer factorisation or discrete logs - maybe the reason those proofs is so elusive is because it doesn't exist.

      That's because it's impossible to prove such a statement without also proving that P != NP. There is very little hope in constructively showing the difficulty of these problems, we just say "smart people have been working on integer factorization for thousands of years and they haven't figured out a way to do it, so we can trust it for now." It's not foolproof, but it's the best we can do.

    23. Re:Uh... okay by houghi · · Score: 1

      The report doesn't even say what they are supposed to have cracked, only some nebulous "widely used internet encryption:.

      Well, the one way to find on is to look at the budget. There is a 2.7 billion USD hidden budget for the years 2005-2010 for Decrypt ROT 13.
      Probably they went a bit over in both money and time.

      --
      Don't fight for your country, if your country does not fight for you.
    24. Re:Uh... okay by dgatwood · · Score: 1

      That's what's meant by "compromise".

      That's one possible way to interpret that sentence, but only if you use the non-technical (particularly military) meaning of the word "compromise".

      As a programmer, the way I would interpret that sentence is "The NSA cracked into a CA's systems or otherwise holds some technical ability to forge their certificates (e.g. key theft). In a technical context, the word compromise is usually limited to cases of coercion or attack. If you crack into my computer and run code to sign your app, you've compromised my computer. If you ask me to sign your app and I do so, you have not compromised my computer, though if your app is bad, you have compromised others' trust in my signing.

      --

      Check out my sci-fi/humor trilogy at PatriotsBooks.

    25. Re:Uh... okay by epine · · Score: 3, Insightful

      It's kind of like the "eye of sauron" thing. They may not be omnipotent and able to target everyone at once, but once their eye turns your way there's little you can do about it short of jumping into a volcano.

      Did you sleep through the end of the movie? You can't watch everybody all of the time. It ends up becoming a resources issue, and the NSA has finite resources after all (despite spending their secret funds at 100x typical levels of government efficiency).

      A central prong in this campaign is to discourage the vast majority of people from even trying to make their communications secure so that they do have enough resources to watch everyone who poses any threat at any level pretty much all the time.

    26. Re:Uh... okay by mspohr · · Score: 3, Informative

      I think you can assume that most "popular" commercial encryption software has been compromised.
      Bruce Schenier has a good article in The Guardian on how to protect your computer:
      http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-remain-secure-surveillance
      From the article:
      With all this in mind, I have five pieces of advice:

      1) Hide in the network. Implement hidden services. Use Tor to anonymize yourself. Yes, the NSA targets Tor users, but it's work for them. The less obvious you are, the safer you are.

      2) Encrypt your communications. Use TLS. Use IPsec. Again, while it's true that the NSA targets encrypted connections – and it may have explicit exploits against these protocols – you're much better protected than if you communicate in the clear.

      3) Assume that while your computer can be compromised, it would take work and risk on the part of the NSA – so it probably isn't. If you have something really important, use an air gap. Since I started working with the Snowden documents, I bought a new computer that has never been connected to the internet. If I want to transfer a file, I encrypt the file on the secure computer and walk it over to my internet computer, using a USB stick. To decrypt something, I reverse the process. This might not be bulletproof, but it's pretty good.

      4) Be suspicious of commercial encryption software, especially from large vendors. My guess is that most encryption products from large US companies have NSA-friendly back doors, and many foreign ones probably do as well. It's prudent to assume that foreign products also have foreign-installed backdoors. Closed-source software is easier for the NSA to backdoor than open-source software. Systems relying on master secrets are vulnerable to the NSA, through either legal or more clandestine means.

      5) Try to use public-domain encryption that has to be compatible with other implementations. For example, it's harder for the NSA to backdoor TLS than BitLocker, because any vendor's TLS has to be compatible with every other vendor's TLS, while BitLocker only has to be compatible with itself, giving the NSA a lot more freedom to make changes. And because BitLocker is proprietary, it's far less likely those changes will be discovered. Prefer symmetric cryptography over public-key cryptography. Prefer conventional discrete-log-based systems over elliptic-curve systems; the latter have constants that the NSA influences when they can.

      --
      I don't read your sig. Why are you reading mine?
    27. Re:Uh... okay by mspohr · · Score: 1

      They don't need to break AES.
      They just work with their commercial software "partners" to insert vulnerabilities into the software.

      --
      I don't read your sig. Why are you reading mine?
    28. Re:Uh... okay by ras · · Score: 1

      Actually, all they need is the CA to sign a cert with the "allowed to sign" bit set. Then they can MITM anyone. Given TrustWave sold one of these to a company not so long ago, I doubt it would be hard to find a CA willing to pony up. Given some CA's in the world are government owned organisations, this has almost certainly happened somewhere already.

      As others have said, what keeps the current PKI system working isn't the inherent trustworthiness CA's (they aren't trustworthy), or because NSA has scruples (it doesn't). Its the fact that in time they will almost be certainly found out.

      Where I live at least, in Australia, I am not sure what proportion of SSL connections are already MITM'ed. But it would have to be above 10%. All schools do it, many government offices do it, many businesses do it.

      The thing all these organisations have in common is they own the computers they are compromising. The corollary is if you care about your privacy, you need to use only hardware you control. But this has been known for years. What this story makes plain is you must also use software "you control", otherwise NSA and others will backdoor it just as eagerly as they have done with the hardware. You can't absolutely control all software you use of course, but open source is a good proxy.

    29. Re:Uh... okay by okeuday · · Score: 1

      Read about the history of DES, developed with IBM (defense contractor), and the fact the S-boxes used to create the algorithm were never published, but were kept secret, providing a backdoor. AES doesn't have this issue.

    30. Re:Uh... okay by cryptizard · · Score: 1

      How do you think you fill the 2^50 bits in the first place? Time-space tradeoffs are only good for reducing the complexity of repeated attacks on different ciphertexts, and they don't even work against the ciphers I am talking about because correct use implies an IV and a secure mode of operation like CBC.

    31. Re:Uh... okay by cryptizard · · Score: 1

      What are you talking about, the s-boxes have to be public in order for people to implement the algorithm. Everything about it is public. What I think you are alluding to is the fact that the motivation behind the setting of certain s-box values was not made public. It was later found out that the NSA purposefully chose those values so that DES was resistant to differential cryptanalysis, a concept which was not known to the academic community at the time. They made the cipher stronger on purpose.

    32. Re:Uh... okay by Em+Adespoton · · Score: 2

      Do they have some magical break on AES that no one in academia knows about or can even fathom? No. Just some FUD.

      That might be because NSA may have forward-engineered some tricks/backdoors into AES. Doing the reverse-engineering may be much harder.

      No, not with AES. AES was not developed in the US, and has been thoroughly reviewed. However, the NSA may have forward-engineered some tricks into common implementations that use AES -- most likely in the form of reducing the actual-used keyspace.

      No, you're more likely to find the NSA when dealing with public key-based cryptography, where they can just insert their own master key and not have to worry about the encryption method/implementation at all. It's easier to break a web of trust than a mathematical algorithm.

    33. Re:Uh... okay by SpaceLifeForm · · Score: 1

      If they have the certs, they have TLS. So even your TLS secured email is not secure, nor is your HTTPS.

      --
      You are being MICROattacked, from various angles, in a SOFT manner.
    34. Re:Uh... okay by SpaceLifeForm · · Score: 1

      Unless FISC has ordered everyone to turn over a copy of the keys.

      --
      You are being MICROattacked, from various angles, in a SOFT manner.
    35. Re:Uh... okay by shentino · · Score: 3, Informative

      I'm sure part of the NSA's task isn't just compromising root CA's, but shutting down those who refuse to cooperate.

      You may recall that even though lavabit shut down voluntarily the feds are still after them trying to get them busted on contempt charges for pulling the plug on themselves.

    36. Re:Uh... okay by pegacat · · Score: 2

      Schneier suggests elliptic key may be compromised and should be avoided... as with other public key systems it is based on a computationally hard one way problem, it's not beyond the realms of possibility that our TLA friends may have some special insight here.

      http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-remain-secure-surveillance

      As a side issue, I've been to vendor presentations where they've boasted about the ability of their advanced firewalls/edge devices to do real time MITM attacks using valid signing certs obtained from (at least one) top level CA, to enable companies to monitor gmail etc for 'IP protection'. Given the NSA's liking for compromising network devices I wouldn't be surprised if that method was also used.

      --
      Wer mit Ungeheuern kämpft, mag zusehn, dass er nicht dabei zum Ungeheuer wird.
    37. Re:Uh... okay by Trogre · · Score: 1

      You're probably right, but do keep in mind that the NSA was at one stage America's largest employer of mathematicians.

      --
      "Nine times out of ten, starting a fire is not the best way to solve the problem." - my wife
    38. Re:Uh... okay by swillden · · Score: 1

      Chances are what they really mean here is that they've compromised the certificate authorities that are trusted by default by most web browsers.

      That would be noticed. Very quickly, actually. When DigiNotar was compromised and someone issued themselves some certs in various sites' names it was very quickly noticed that although the certs appeared valid, they weren't the same ones served up by the real site.

      Turns out self signed certificates really are more secure.

      Only if the attacker starts the MITM after you've already added the site's certificate to your browser. If the attacker is there from the beginning, you'll have no idea.

      GPG and SSH are probably safe as you generate your own keys on the local machine.

      They rely on different trust models, but aren't necessarily any harder to subvert. With the web of trust, an attacker has to compromise some key that you trust. That's hard when your web is on a small scale, but any attempts to scale it up beyond small circles of people makes it easy (e.g. you end up with keyservers, or widely-trusted signers -- the equivalent of CAs). With SSH you have basically the same situation as self-signed SSL certificates, unless you have some other mechanism for verifying the server key fingerprint. You just have to trust it the first time you see it, though you do have protection against attacks that begin later.

      --
      Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
    39. Re:Uh... okay by Hatta · · Score: 1

      In a technical context, the word compromise is usually limited to cases of coercion or attack.

      NSLs are a coercive attack.

      --
      Give me Classic Slashdot or give me death!
    40. Re:Uh... okay by Dolda2000 · · Score: 1
    41. Re:Uh... okay by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 1

      See my post in this thread.. I don't understand how Bruce Schneier can recommend Silent Circle right after saying "the NSA also works with security product vendors to ensure that commercial encryption products are broken in secret ways that only it knows about. "

    42. Re:Uh... okay by cryptizard · · Score: 1

      Where are you getting this? AES256 is still AES, as demonstrated by the fact that the only known attack against AES works for all key sizes. It also reduces from 128 bits to about 126 bits, not 110.

    43. Re:Uh... okay by ras · · Score: 1

      Thanks, this finally explains how SSL interception proxies are able to intercept my traffic at sites I work at.

      No, I didn't explain that. But since you are so nice about it I will. When the corporation owns the hardware they can install anything they want. What they install is a self signed certificate with the signing bit set into the browser, and they tell the browser this cert is a CA. There are so many CA's there days you would have to be an actuary to spot it in the list. When your browser contacts https://www.host.com/ you automagically get a cert authorised by that self signed cert.

      In the end you trust whoever firefox or whatever trusts says you should trust as CA's. That normally works. Except when someone else installs Firefox. Then you trust whoever they say you should trust, because they can edit the CA list Firefox / Chrome / whatever has.

    44. Re:Uh... okay by AmiMoJo · · Score: 1

      You wouldn't brute force the entire key space, obviously. You would dictionary attack or go after the PRNG. Besides which, things like SSL use weaker encryption to exchange keys which can be attacked. It is known that certain hashing algorithms can be brute-forced in a reasonable amount of time too, meaning fake certificates could be created for MITM attacks.

      You made the classic mistake of relying on the security of one algorithm, while ignoring everything peripheral too it.

      --
      const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
      SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC
    45. Re:Uh... okay by RespekMyAthorati · · Score: 1

      I remember 10 years ago there was speculation that for a few billion dollars you could build a machine capable of cracking common codes in a few months

      And that "speculation" came from idiots. Moore's Law would have to be in effect for millions of years for that to be true.

  4. More technical discussion by veg_all · · Score: 5, Informative

    From Bruce Schneier Here and here.

    Also a nice call to arms here.
    "I have resisted saying this up to now, and I am saddened to say it, but the US has proved to be an unethical steward of the internet. The UK is no better."

    --
    grammar-lesson free since 1999. (rescinded - 2005)
    1. Re:More technical discussion by stenvar · · Score: 5, Insightful

      but the US has proved to be an unethical steward of the internet. The UK is no better

      Any nation would prove to be an unethical steward of the Internet: power tempts and corrupts, whether it's the power to control the Internet, the power to wage war and kill people, the power to mess with the economy, or the power to hand out "benefits" to people.

      The only solution to any of these problems is to rely on decentralized mechanisms that can't be controlled and corrupted by central authorities, and to limit the power of governments as much as possible and to the absolute minimum.

    2. Re:More technical discussion by Yaur · · Score: 1

      Way more useful that what is linked in the summary.

    3. Re:More technical discussion by Opportunist · · Score: 1

      Well, where do you want to put any part of it that won't bend over if the US says so?

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    4. Re:More technical discussion by veg_all · · Score: 1

      I believe this is discussed in link #3 above. Cogently.

      --
      grammar-lesson free since 1999. (rescinded - 2005)
    5. Re:More technical discussion by stenvar · · Score: 3, Insightful

      (1) We need to adopt technologies that are secure no matter what the government wants.

      (2) We need to reduce and devolve the power of government in general in all areas: defense, federal police, welfare, health care, monetary policy, economic policy, etc. And that needs to happen in both the US and Europe.

    6. Re:More technical discussion by Flammon · · Score: 1

      ...to limit the power of governments as much as possible and to the absolute minimum.

      No matter how hard one has tried to keep them small, governments have always grown to the point where civil war erupts to restore sanity. Maybe it's time to try something (sort of) new, no government.

    7. Re:More technical discussion by stenvar · · Score: 1

      Well, governments also used to kill people in large numbers, people used to slaughter each other, and all sorts of other horrible things used to happen. Hopefully, we can fix government by democratic and peaceful means this time around, just like we have learned to do a lot of other things better over the last few centuries.

    8. Re:More technical discussion by manu0601 · · Score: 1

      Any nation would prove to be an unethical steward of the Internet: power tempts and corrupts

      This is why separation of powers is important. Unfortunately it has been neglected by most democratic countries. We do not see very often a parliament spanking the executive for unproper behavior. Justice does not have a much better record. Once cause of the problem is the secrecy culture that executive branches pushed for counter terrorism.

    9. Re:More technical discussion by marcosdumay · · Score: 1

      We can call it something like "Constitution". Maybe somebody will try it some day.

    10. Re:More technical discussion by marcosdumay · · Score: 1

      Maybe it's time to try something (sort of) new, no government.

      There is no such option. Given enough people, government aways exist.

    11. Re:More technical discussion by stenvar · · Score: 2

      "Countries" don't neglect things. "Secrecy culture" doesn't cause anything.

      In democracies, all the faults ultimately come down to who we choose as our representatives. Bush should have been kicked out after his first term. Obama should have been kicked out after his first term. Anybody who voted for the "Patriot' act should have been kicked out after the first term.

      And to make that happen, voters need to be educated better. They need to stop falling for b.s. like blaming evil corporations or evil bankers when it is our elected representatives that are selling us to them. Voters need to understand that there are no "benefits" or free lunches, that government can't create jobs or fix the economy.

    12. Re:More technical discussion by Nemyst · · Score: 1

      That's foolish and you know it. Regardless of the software and hardware, the government will always have control since at some point you need to reach the big backbones in the network. Those are easy to monitor and take over by the hosting government. If the government cannot, for whatever reason, coerce companies or individuals into revealing what they require to snoop on those backbones, then could just shut them off.

      What we need is a large change in mentalities. There shouldn't be any reason to spy on your own citizens. Ever.

    13. Re:More technical discussion by stenvar · · Score: 1

      That's foolish and you know it.

      Which part?

      Regardless of the software and hardware, the government will always have control since at some point you need to reach the big backbones in the network. Those are easy to monitor and take over by the hosting government.

      Not if companies can just tell the government to take a hike. The problem is that we have developed a mentality that government can intrude into everything and regulate everything, and that it has the power and means to corrupt, influence, and direct individual and private behavior.

      Furthermore, purely technologically, if the information flowing over the backbone just isn't transparent, the only choice the government has is to shut down everything, which is simply not feasible.

      What we need is a large change in mentalities. There shouldn't be any reason to spy on your own citizens. Ever.

      You are being foolish; a "change in mentality" will accomplish nothing. We elected Obama because he promised to put an end to the privacy abuses and abuses of power of the Bush government, and he has turned out worse. The only way to fix these problems is by taking away power from the federal government, the power to regulate business, the power to hand out taxpayer money to compliant companies, the power and money to build a large military and espionage infrastructure. As long as you give this power to the federal government, it is going to abuse it, and no "change in mentality" will help.

    14. Re:More technical discussion by Opportunist · · Score: 2

      There should be a change in mentalities, but it has to start with the people. We have to realize and accept that life is simply dangerous and that there is no guarantee, no matter how much we'd wish it or how much we'd be willing to pay and sacrifice for it, that nothing "bad" can happen to us. Life is dangerous. Usually it ends deadly. Face it.

      Then, and only then, there is a chance that governments will be forced to release the power we grant to them. No matter how you twist and turn it, any power some group has over any other one is granted, not taken. You cannot have power over me if I do not allow it, as Kirk put it, the last command on this ship is given by me. Yes, that price is high. And the only reason governments can take power over its subjects is because the subjects are not willing to pay it.

      Now, this is kinda drastic, but what I wanted to convey is that there IS ALWAYS an option. Always. There is never a situation where we do not have any choice but to do X. We might not like the other options present, but they exist.

      And if we want our governments to stop spying on us, we'd have to accept that, and WE will have to change our view on events first of all. We will have to give up security, security that is more likely than not only imagined anyway, but we can get our liberty back.

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    15. Re:More technical discussion by Flammon · · Score: 1

      When did governments stop killing people in large numbers?

    16. Re:More technical discussion by stenvar · · Score: 1

      The wars we have fought since WWII have generally been much less lethal than historical wars.

      (And the causes of war have shifted over the centuries as well, from blind greed among competing dictators, to different visions of how we want to organize our societies that actually matter.)

    17. Re:More technical discussion by Flammon · · Score: 1

      A million deaths in the Iraq conflict alone is less lethal? The causes have not shifted at all. They're still about greed. Don't let government persuade you into thinking that it's about how we want to impose our social structure onto other nations because of altruistic beliefs. It's about oil and there's extensive evidence supporting it.

      http://www.youtube.com/user/StormCloudsGathering/videos

    18. Re:More technical discussion by stenvar · · Score: 1

      A million deaths in the Iraq conflict alone is less lethal?

      Wow, your numbers are even more insane than the Iraq body count data.

      It's about oil and there's extensive evidence supporting it.

      Of course it is about oil, why shouldn't it be? It is about making oil available to the world through market mechanisms, as opposed to having it exploited by socialist, fascist, or dictatorial governments for their own ends. Your error is in thinking that there is something intrinsically wrong with that goal.

      Now, let me be clear again, though: I disapprove of all those wars and have consistently voted against politicians that supported them. I think these wars have been a waste of money and American lives, and I think they have allowed corporations to enrich themselves at the expense of the US tax payer. But just because I think these wars are a bad deal for the US doesn't change the fact that I think free markets are, relatively speaking, a better thing to fight for than which monarch gets which piece of land.

    19. Re:More technical discussion by Flammon · · Score: 1

      Wow, your numbers are even more insane than the Iraq body count data.

      Studies vary between 655,000 and 1.4 million so I went for the average.

      Of course it is about oil, why shouldn't it be?

      It's this kind of aggression that shows how uncivilized governments are. Why do we need oil from the Middle East so badly? Are we dying without it? Canada has plenty of oil and they want to build a pipeline directly to the US. What's wrong with Canada's oil? Can't the US trade peacefully instead?

      The US dollar is on the brink of collapse. The only thing keeping its value is OPEC. See Currencies used to trade oil
      From Wikipedia

      Since the agreements of 1971 and 1973, OPEC oil is exclusively quoted in US dollars. This created a permanent demand for dollars on the international exchange markets.[2][3] As of 2005, OPEC continues to trade in US Dollars, but some OPEC members (such as Iran and Venezuela) have been pushing for a switch to the euro.

    20. Re:More technical discussion by stenvar · · Score: 1

      Studies vary between 655,000 [washingtonpost.com] and 1.4 million [mit.edu] so I went for the average.

      That's politically motivated bullshit. Even the Iraq body count, which already greatly inflates the numbers by attributing Iraqi-on-Iraqi violence to the war gets about 120000 violent deaths. The actual number of people killed by coalition forces is much lower than that, and of that, the percentage of civilians killed by coalition forces is very small by historical standards.

      It's this kind of aggression that shows how uncivilized governments are. Why do we need oil from the Middle East so badly?

      Did I say anywhere that we need it? I said that "It is about making oil available to the world through market mechanisms, as opposed to having it exploited by socialist, fascist, or dictatorial governments for their own ends." We (as in the US) don't need the oil at all, since we have a plentiful supply. So, the war was about oil, but it wasn't specifically about getting the oil for the US (although, of course, US firms are benefiting to some degree, and also lobbied for the war).

      Let me say again: I think the Iraq war was a waste of money and I'm not defending it. But your interpretation that we fought it to acquire oil for the US is wrong as well.

      The US dollar is on the brink of collapse

      I don't see that happening, given the total economic chaos that Europe is in; I think the Euro is on the brink of collapse, actually.

      If anything, I actually think it would be a good thing if the dollar were devalued, because it would make it harder for us to borrow and at the same time erase a large chunk of our foreign debt. But that's precisely why China and Europe are scared stiff of having the dollar devalued and are doing anything to try to prevent that. Because if the dollar falls, they lose a lot of money.

    21. Re:More technical discussion by yabastaaa · · Score: 1

      (2) We need to reduce and devolve the power of government in general in all areas: defense, federal police, welfare, health care, monetary policy, economic policy, etc. And that needs to happen in both the US and Europe.

      And give that power to corporations?

      As can be seen by the massive amounts of data Google, Facebook et al collect on their users and even non-users, corporations already have a big interest in tracking everything we do. If they’re also responsible for physical security, they’ll only get worse.

      Also—corporations are even less accountable than your average made-in-the-last-300-years democracy, thanks to ‘commercial secrecy’ etc. They never have to justify a decision or action. Governments certainly have large black spots of accountability (especially the secret services), but it’s surely easier to spread openness & accountability from a starting point of ‘part accountable’ than ‘totally secretive and unaccountable’?

      Regardless, the UK has started privatising local police services—the people in blue on the streets, but also detectives etc—as seen by recent calls for tendering in various parts of England. Paragons of quality service & high morals such as Group 4 & Securitas are tendering. Wait and see how that goes.

    22. Re:More technical discussion by squiggleslash · · Score: 1

      Decentralized? Are you kidding me? Look at the USA example:

      Federal Government: Bad. Corrupt. Ugly.

      State Governments: Awful. Even more corrupt. Really ugly.

      County Governments: Ineffectual. Usually barely different from State.

      City Governments: Abysmal. A cesspit of corruption.

      HOAs: Only legal because we can superficially escape from them - except modern zoning codes have made this harder and harder over the last few decades.

      Usually we're reliant upon the higher governments to rein in the excesses of the lower governments - for example, if the States start disenfranchising racial minorities, the Feds have a track record of working, however slowly, to stop them. Cities that start clamping down on self defense rights tend to get slapped by the State.

      The reality is that as governments run smaller groups, they lose sight of their responsibility to hold the liberties of individuals sovereign where possible. "Oh, but you don't have to live in Bhurtfuhch City", says a city government politician, "and we don't like weirdos here so..."

      It's a terrible thing to admit but the Federal Government in the United States is the best of the worst. It at least understands it has to work equally for a San Francisco leatherman and a Alabama pick-up truck driver.

      --
      You are not alone. This is not normal. None of this is normal.
    23. Re:More technical discussion by stenvar · · Score: 1

      And give that power to corporations?

      Devolution means handing it back to state and local government. And a lot of that power shouldn't be given to anybody.

      Also—corporations are even less accountable than your average made-in-the-last-300-years democracy, thanks to ‘commercial secrecy’ etc

      It's irrelevant to this point, but corporations are completely accountable: if you don't like what they're doing and they go out of business.

    24. Re:More technical discussion by stenvar · · Score: 1

      Decentralized? Are you kidding me? Look at the USA example:

      I'm happy with my state government (low taxes, few regulations), and happy with my city government too. And I have no problem with my HOA. I used to be unhappy at times with my state and city government, and my HOA, and I moved, simple as that.

      You illustrate the problem: because of a small number of bad incidents, people like you want to kick up more and more power to the federal government. But that's unnecessary. If your state or city government, or your HOA, screws up, you have a much simpler choice: move. Don't wreck the country for the rest of us because you are too lazy to do the right and necessary thing.

      for example, if the States start disenfranchising racial minorities, the Feds have a track record of working, however slowly, to stop them. Cities that start clamping down on self defense rights tend to get slapped by the State.

      Limiting the power of local and state governments is a legitimate and useful function of the federal government, as is defense. But that does necessitate or justify doing the 99.9% of the rest of the crap the federal government does and wastes money on.

  5. The lede leaves out two important points by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Interesting

    1. The NSA actively worked to gain control of standards processes and subvert them.

    2. The NSA covertly employs people in telcos without the knowledge of the telcos.

    The sound you hear is the sound of the last 20 years of work in academic and industry, on standards
    and code, on processes and procedures, quietly disintegrating.

  6. And the crucial details.. missing by hydrofix · · Score: 4, Insightful
    All articles are missing the crucial details; namely which cryptographic algorithms have been successfully cracked and under which parameters. Guardian writes:

    The three organisations removed some specific facts but decided to publish the story because of the value of a public debate about government actions [...] .

    Yet, the article does claim this:

    "Project Bullrun deals with NSA's abilities to defeat the encryption used in specific network communication technologies. Bullrun involves multiple sources, all of which are extremely sensitive." The document reveals that the agency has capabilities against widely used online protocols, such as HTTPS, voice-over-IP and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), used to protect online shopping and banking.

    But they also quote Snowden that:

    "Encryption works. Properly implemented strong crypto systems are one of the few things that you can rely on," he said before warning that NSA can frequently find ways around it as a result of weak security on the computers at either end of the communication.

    Maybe we still have some hope?

    1. Re:And the crucial details.. missing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      I think that implies that some popular implementations of otherwise secure algorithms are compromised. They mention having the NSA social engineer the drafting of industry standards to be insecure, for example. Although a lot of these standards are technically open, few people are apparently reading them, and I'm sure it's not out of the realm of possibility that a subtle detail can be changed somewhere to make what seems like a secure implementation computationally more vulnerable to cracking.

      They also mention having industry cooperate in placing backdoors, which seems to imply that there are many standards which are secure but commercial vendors are paid/strong-armed to introduce a backdoor into the product. I wouldn't trust a Cisco or Juniper (or any other major vendor) VPN appliance, for example.

      Many popular encryption algorithms have had a lot highly intelligent of eyes looking at them to vet them but it's harder to trust that software that implements those algos are doing it properly.

      We need to push The Guardian and etc. to be more specific as to which technologies are compromised so that we can protect ourselves. I believe they have a public duty to do so.

    2. Re:And the crucial details.. missing by Laxori666 · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Could they have just Man-in-the-Middle'd a whole ton of HTTPS connections? If they get certificates signed by the right authorities and have access to backbone routers, can't they just read HTTPS as if it were not even encrypted?

    3. Re:And the crucial details.. missing by hydrofix · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Yes, but this could show up with tools like SSL Observatory, which has recorded millions of certificates from different web sites as seen by hundreds of thousands of Chrome and Firefox users globally. They would risk eventually exposing themselves, and the CAs who signed those bogus certificates for NSA would get nuked from all browsers, which is the absolute worst thing that can happen to a CA. If they use fake certs and MITM, it would have to be very elusive, and carry a calculated risk of exposure.

    4. Re:And the crucial details.. missing by DMJC · · Score: 2

      I think it's pretty safe to assume that all Cisco products have been cracked and the NSA has backdoors into all the infrastructure gear.

    5. Re:And the crucial details.. missing by steelfood · · Score: 4, Insightful

      There are literally hundreds of places to attack encrypted communications. The encryption algorithm itself is just one component in a chain that must be and remain secure. The NSA only needs to compromise one part of that chain to compromise the entire system.

      It can be a mathematical breakthrough. It can be an implementation flaw. It can be an implementation flaw of any related--however loosely--system. It can be an embedded individual on one end. It can be a specific external device. It can be a component--however marginal--of a device. It can be a (secret) court order. It can be a xkcd-style baseball bat to the knee to one or both parties. It can be negotiated with one or both parties.

      The founders knew this. They understood that an individual with limited resources had no chance against the government who would have relatively unlimited resources (the government's resources is the country itself, so it really is Person vs. United States), and the only way to prevent, stop, or avoid such a scenario is for the government to check and balance itself. Those checks and balances have (mostly) failed. We as individuals have no recourse.

      There's always hope, but you'd be deluding yourself if you think there's any chance.

      --
      "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be."
    6. Re:And the crucial details.. missing by poptartx · · Score: 1

      I agree. Ssl, https are based on certs bought, but most of the popular encryption techniques that "are not" cracked yet(256AES) where developed for the U.S. The reason it was created was for a governenment contract, this makes it validity skeptic. We need an strong encryption standard made for the masses by the masses. There is no money making ciphers for free. This is one of the most inportant issues we face as a people. Ofcourse the opposition will say if you have nothing to hide why do you need encryption. I answer them by saying, do you like that creepy feeling of someone looking over your shoulder while you read. I wish a project manager with some brilliant math friends would start work on a stronger cipher for the masses. There might now be a lot of money, but you would be loved.

    7. Re:And the crucial details.. missing by amorsen · · Score: 1

      They could, but they would be noticed. There are browser extensions which check that everyone sees the same certificate. Those would have triggered.

      That approach can be used for targeted attacks but it is useless for mass surveillance.

      --
      Finally! A year of moderation! Ready for 2019?
    8. Re:And the crucial details.. missing by Burning1 · · Score: 1

      You can MITM a SSL connection if you have access to a valid CA key. However, the attack would not be undetected; you need the sites private key in order to create a duplicate certificate. To create a duplicate certificate, you'd need the site's private key. And if you have that, you don't need a CA cert.

      Someone who's paying attention could easily see that the MITM certificate doesn't match the original cert. For example, SSH doesn't use CA key signing. However, clients can still detect a MITM attack because the MITM public key does not match the cached key maintained by the client. (This presumes of course that you aren't performing a MITM attack using the compromised private key.)

    9. Re:And the crucial details.. missing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      "... If they use fake certs and MITM, it would have to be very elusive, and carry a calculated risk of exposure."

      Or, they simply blame the exposure on "leaked Certificates as a result of Hackers", reissue certs and go about their business (that has already happened a couple times in the last year, or so the media would have us believe). Sure, a CA or two might be mulched in the process, but, most importantly, the actual use of the certs by the NSA would remain obfuscated--I'm sure they don't burn such bridges unless they have a very valuable target waiting on the other side.

    10. Re:And the crucial details.. missing by jonwil · · Score: 1
    11. Re:And the crucial details.. missing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      The recourse is to re-balance the balances and re-check the checks. If we elect a congress and a President who are willing to straight-up shut down the NSA, they won't be spying on our communications anymore.

    12. Re:And the crucial details.. missing by hairyfish · · Score: 2

      I was with you all along but I was waiting for the line at the end where you kick off the revolution and we all join in. The biggest problem I see these days is that we're all too slack to do anything about it. The Internet has given us a way to blow off steam without going outside and getting angry and burning shit down. We've forgotten how to revolt. Man, even as I type this I can feel the hate waning. It's all too hard... I might just waste the rest of the day reading Reddit and wanking to porn...

    13. Re:And the crucial details.. missing by fuzzywig · · Score: 1

      Remember all the fuss about the US government using Huawei kit? Whether or not there is backdoors there for the Chinese, you can bet that part of the problem is that they refused to put backdoors in for the NSA. So, to make sure that there wasn't too many routers etc. out there that they couldn't access (and that might be backdoor'ed by the Chinese), they spread FUD about Huawei to make sure that they're not bought. Instead everyone turns to nice, "trustworthy", Cisco gear, and the NSA can has all your data.

    14. Re:And the crucial details.. missing by thoromyr · · Score: 1

      you mean like Apple? I had long wondered why I was getting cert changes for the email. This would appear to explain it.

      The thing is, without some information as to what the NSA is doing you think "that's strange" but unless you're incredibly paranoid you are very likely to chalk up inconsistencies as "unexplained but harmless". We get ssh cert changes all the time where I work because the admins don't bother to preserve them. Its nothing nefarious. So when I get yet-another-cert change for Apple I think: I basically trust my network, it goes to the ISP, across the backbone and to Apple. There just doesn't seem like much opportunity for a MITM attack.

      With the recent revelations, however, perspective changes and it would appear *very* plausible that the NSA is using one of its back bone intercepts to MITM traffic.

      What isn't clear is if it was my session that was being compromised or if it was a general attack against Apple's mail servers. But it is looking less likely all the time that it has been innocent cert changes or load balancing without sharing cert or whatever else.

    15. Re:And the crucial details.. missing by bingoUV · · Score: 1

      There might now be a lot of money, but you would be loved

      Gitmo love.

      --
      Bingo Dictionary - Pragmatist, n. A myopic idealist.
    16. Re:And the crucial details.. missing by rnicey · · Score: 1

      As it's fairly obvious that the NSA has access to major routers at telecoms, SSL Observatory wouldn't notice a thing. The attack is trivially aimed at specific targets only. i.e. only redirect traffic from the target IP to the fake server with the real looking certificate that's recording everything.

  7. INteresting ebcasue by geekoid · · Score: 1

    all the leaked evidence suggests otherwise.

    --
    The Kruger Dunning explains most post on /. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
  8. So much for open source... by dmt0 · · Score: 1

    "Cryptographers have long suspected that the agency planted vulnerabilities in a standard adopted in 2006 by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the United States’ encryption standards body, and later by the International Organization for Standardization, which has 163 countries as members.
    Classified N.S.A. memos appear to confirm that the fatal weakness, discovered by two Microsoft cryptographers in 2007, was engineered by the agency. The N.S.A. wrote the standard and aggressively pushed it on the international group, privately calling the effort “a challenge in finesse.”

    So much for having your source open. It takes time to find bugs even in standards that guide the way software is written. How many people are out there who are qualified to find such issues in the code?

    1. Re:So much for open source... by Impy+the+Impiuos+Imp · · Score: 1

      One would think "somebody" does it. People who know the latest of each kind of crypto work on it as a hobby or professionally. I also assume people have hardware monitors on Windows (and other OS machines) at their router level and understand every single packet going out from the computer, and their contents, of the base OS. Does MS really only phone home for things they say in their EULA?

      --
      (-1: Post disagrees with my already-settled worldview) is not a valid mod option.
    2. Re:So much for open source... by mspohr · · Score: 1

      It looks like researchers discovered the flaw in the 2006 Standard in 2007... not bad... (and Microsoft, too).

      --
      I don't read your sig. Why are you reading mine?
    3. Re:So much for open source... by gweihir · · Score: 1

      This is not about "bugs". This is about a questionable set of parameters for ECDSA. And the crypto community has publicly voiced suspicions right from the publication of that standard.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
  9. The View From Jerry's Desk. by bmo · · Score: 1, Interesting

    When writing finite bits to the disk sector, there is a finite probability that the resultant string of randomised bits MAY in fact generate something incriminating.

    For example: (regardless of how unlikely this may seem), any string of random characters may well create a brand new wordfile on the computer by pure chance .. which contains legible words, which string together to form sentences which may in turn connect the previous owner of the hard disk with Al-Qaida, the Mafia, insider trading, un-patriotic activites, Linux 'development', or any manner of unsavory activities.

    The larger the hard disk being randomly 'wiped' in this fashion, the greater the probability that some new and undesirable content would be created by chance.

    I for one would NOT place my trust in such a tool, risking a lifetime of torment in Guantanimo Bay in exchange for the 'security' of having my hard disk cleaned prior to resale.

    The solution ? One should purchase a new copy of the Windows 8 for the said hard disk, and install this on the disk. This would effectively wipe clean the disk of any previous content. The disk could then be disposed of cleanly, with a note that the new owner must purchase another legal copy of the Windows 8 before installing the disk.

    In this situation - everyone wins.

    --
    BMO

    1. Re:The View From Jerry's Desk. by wonkey_monkey · · Score: 1
      What has this copypasta from 2007 (or before) got to do with anything?

      I for one would NOT place my trust in such a tool

      And yet you walk the streets every day blithely ignoring the much greater probability of being struck by a falling meteorite?

      --
      systemd is Roko's Basilisk.
    2. Re:The View From Jerry's Desk. by dgatwood · · Score: 1

      One should purchase a new copy of the Windows 8 for the said hard disk, and install this on the disk. This would effectively wipe clean the disk of any previous content.

      I think you're on the right track. Installing a single copy of Windows 8 should fill pretty much any hard drive, thus completely overwriting any contents that might have been there before.

      --

      Check out my sci-fi/humor trilogy at PatriotsBooks.

    3. Re:The View From Jerry's Desk. by gweihir · · Score: 1

      I vote this "Most clueless posting in this entire discussion". Quite an achievement. I also think you may be clinically paranoid.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    4. Re:The View From Jerry's Desk. by gweihir · · Score: 1

      And fail. That overwrites exactly nothing. Reading from /dev/null simply closed the input. You need to read from /dev/zero.
      I am constantly amazed by the number of f***ing bloody clueless amateurs here.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    5. Re:The View From Jerry's Desk. by the_olo · · Score: 1

      Some flaws with your argument and proposal:

      1. 1) Windows 8 install will not overwrite the *whole* contents of your disk, only the parts that will be written to during the installation process - that's only as much as the OS needs for its system files. The rest of the disk content will remain untouched.
      2. 2) You can always configure your disk wipe tool so that the last passes over the disk will write non random content - e.g. only zeros or ones, and random writes will only be used with preceding intermediate passes. So the disk will end up guaranteed holding non-random, non-incriminating content.
      3. 3) The probability of random data creating incriminating stuff you refer to is so negligible that you suffer from larger risk of being hit and killed by a meteorite falling from the sky during the next minute. That is considering that there has only been a single recorded case in human history of a person being killed by a meteorite, and, coming from a 1677 italian manuscript, it cannot be considered a verified fact. In other words, you have much more probable risks to worry about than that.

      Statistically speaking, you almost certainly lost more of your lifetime only by thinking about that risk just now, than lost to the actual risk. Please, read this article so that you're more rational about thinking about your risks.

    6. Re:The View From Jerry's Desk. by omnichad · · Score: 1

      Writing all zeroes to the drive is better than just installing Windows 8. It would not effectively wipe the disk clean - it's more likely to do a quick format, and overwrite the first several GB of the drive. Booting to a drive-zeroing utility will wipe the entire drive. I'm honestly not sure how you got modded upward.

    7. Re:The View From Jerry's Desk. by bmo · · Score: 1

      I got modded up because it's a JerryLeeCooper.

      That's why.

      --
      BMO

    8. Re:The View From Jerry's Desk. by gweihir · · Score: 1

      And fail again. /dev/random gives you less than 100B/sec (yes, that 100 bytes) in a typical environment. What you want is /dev/urandom, which is still pretty slow at something like 20MB/s.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
  10. Trojan by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Funny

    So I'm left with the impression that the NSA will add features in return for improved access.

    SELinux comes to mind as a gift from the NSA to the Linux community. A gift with a hidden payload.

    Hmm.... We can call it Trojan Linux. Ribbed for your pleasure. The ultimate in back door penetration.

    1. Re:Trojan by gweihir · · Score: 2

      Very , very unlikely. SELinux is not complicated enough to guard against such back-doors being found. And then they would have lost a lot of trust, making it useless and decreasing their chances of doing something like it again. Also, while for example weakening key generation in commercial SSL or VPN products can be done in very subtle ways and requires extensive experience and knowledge to recognize, SELinux has no "analog" or "complex mathematical" components. It is simply a permission system for capabilities and can be understood by any reasonably competent engineer or hacker.

      Of course, nobody will trust them now, so trusting anything they produce in the future would be a really, really bad idea.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    2. Re:Trojan by Tom · · Score: 1

      You have no idea what you're talking about. Many years ago, I was one of the top SELinux guys in Europe, so allow me some remarks:

      SELinux has nothing to do with cryptography.

      It's an RBAC/MAC system to secure your local computer at the kernel level.
      That also means most ring-0 exploits will go right past it. So backdooring SELinux is basically the same as backdooring any other Linux.

      Are we 100% certain that it contains no backdoors? Nope, of course not. You never can be. Are we 100% certain that gcc doesn't contain backdoors?

      If you're afraid the NSA is after you, disabling SELinux is probably the least effective action you can take. There's at least 20 other things you should be more worried about.

      --
      Assorted stuff I do sometimes: Lemuria.org
    3. Re:Trojan by Tom · · Score: 1

      Glad to hear that. There's been NSA paranoid around SELinux ever since it was released. I'm pretty sure no other part of Linux has been so thoroughly searched for backdoors.

      --
      Assorted stuff I do sometimes: Lemuria.org
  11. perspective by geekoid · · Score: 3, Interesting

    the NSA has done over a 100,000,000 million legal searches.
    From all the leaked records, 22,000 are questionable. Those 22,000 lie everywhere between needing a judicial interpretation, to blatant breech.
    The leaks also show NSA's number one whistle blower to the courts is the NSA. They report them and correct them.

    Not to excuse there blatantly illegal searches, but to thing the whole system is some corrupt entity that s out to get everyone is simply wrong.
    No evidences supports that at all.we have a lot of hope becasue none of the evidences shows it to be nearly as bad as the media claims. And certainly nowhere near where the chicken littles on /. claim.

    --
    The Kruger Dunning explains most post on /. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
    1. Re:perspective by intermodal · · Score: 1

      That's fine and well in a ballbearing factory where the defective ballbearings are simply rejected and not used. But the NSA is not a ballbearing factory, and instead of being defective, each of those 22,000 violations of constitutionally guaranteed civil rights is a large problem that does not simply disappear due to "reporting and correcting" them. So I'm sorry, but your argument doesn't hold up.

      --
      In SOVIET RUSSIA... erm...NSA AMERICA, the Internet logs onto YOU!
    2. Re:perspective by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative

      It needs to be kept in mind that the definition of "legal search" in this day and age doesn't exactly translate into what a normal thinking person would think it does. Plenty of things are "legal" in this country that are in fact rather blatantly unconstitutional.

      Remember, we've had a "conservative" Supreme Court for a long time now and they're doing what every consertative court has done before them: making it harder for people to hold big business and law enforcement accountable for anything. The only rule of law they're interested in is ruling over you and other actual people. They're not interested in the rule of law as it applies to restrain those in power. That's how you create a dictatorship. We may not have a single dictator, but make no mistake, in every way that actually matters, that's what we have now.

    3. Re:perspective by Opportunist · · Score: 1

      The problem is not their legal, not even their illegal, searches. The problem is a lack of oversight. The NSA has been granted a vast amount of leeway and freedom along with the powers they got. Which of course makes them highly efficient in what they do, but even assuming they're currently staffed with honest, upstanding people who have nothing but the good of the planet in mind, there is a nonzero chance that this will not stay that way.

      The chance for abuse is huge. They are in a position where they can get "secrets" about pretty much anyone. Including the people and organizations that could and should check and control them. When they have dirt on every politician, who will have the guts to commit political suicide to stand up against them should they decide to take over the country?

      I'm not saying they are. I only say that the risk is there that at some point in the future any attempt at oversight will be futile.

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    4. Re:perspective by JanneM · · Score: 4, Insightful

      That's like saying almost all sex they've ever had was consensual and legal, so we really shouldn't blame them for the few cases of rape they committed.

      --
      Trust the Computer. The Computer is your friend.
    5. Re:perspective by AlphaWoIf_HK · · Score: 2

      the NSA has done over a 100,000,000 million legal searches.

      Legal? Maybe. Constitutional? No. Rubberstamped warrants don't count.

      --
      Da derp dee derp da teedly derpee derpee dum. Rated PG-13.
    6. Re:perspective by X.25 · · Score: 1

      the NSA has done over a 100,000,000 million legal searches.
      From all the leaked records, 22,000 are questionable. Those 22,000 lie everywhere between needing a judicial interpretation, to blatant breech.
      The leaks also show NSA's number one whistle blower to the courts is the NSA. They report them and correct them.

      100,000,000. "Legal".

      Just think about it.

    7. Re:perspective by Mr.+Slippery · · Score: 1

      Not to excuse there blatantly illegal searches, but to thing the whole system is some corrupt entity that s out to get everyone is simply wrong.

      Sure. Even the Nazis weren't "out to get everyone" -- just troublemakers. Good Germans had nothing to fear from the SS.

      (Yeah, yeah, Godwin's law, I lose, whatever.)

      If you're a middle-class white American of mainstream religious and political beliefs, someone whose idea of a wild time is drinking four Bud Lights at a Kenny Chesney show, of course you've got nothing to fear from massive government surveillance. (Well, unless you used to date someone who worked at the NSA or something.) You can scamper about on your merry way knowing that the state is only interested in spying on deviants. You know the type. Malcontents. Dreamers. Granola peaceniks.

      Good citizens like you have nothing to fear. You can feel safe, knowing the government is your friend. Heck, almost family! It's like having a protective old sibling watching you. I mean, watching out for you.

      --
      Tom Swiss | the infamous tms | my blog
      You cannot wash away blood with blood
  12. Yes by MRe_nl · · Score: 1

    Code breaking.
    That is sort of what their stated mission is.
    Not that i believe the premise of the article.
    Which encryption, and more importantly how long does it take?
    (offtopic)
    Shouldn't it be "NSA foils a lot of encryption" or "NSA foils most encryption" instead of "much encryption"?
    It don't sound right to me.
    /
    "from the do-your-taxes-buy-civilization? dept"; are we referencing slashdot users sigs in the by-line now?

    --
    "Kill 'em all and let Root sort 'em out"
  13. Suprising why? by The+Grim+Reefer · · Score: 2

    Does anyone really find this surprising? Wasn't it a few years back that the NSA told the banks that 128-bit encryption was perfectly safe, but mandated that the military switch to 256?

    1. Re:Suprising why? by LainTouko · · Score: 1

      Without knowing the details, this sounds perfectly reasonable. Going to 256-bit symmetric keys is future-proofing. Nobody can break 128-bit encryption now, but in thirty years time, it's quite possible that someone could. (In particular, quantum computing could effectively halve symmetric key lengths, in addition to its better known effect of killing all the practical asymmetric crypto we've got right now.) So if the military didn't want their messages to be readable in even 30 years time, they would be advised to use 256-bit, whereas if a guy who decrypts a message which is part of some banking protocol 20 years after it was sent couldn't do much with the information because everything has already happened, it would be an unnecessary move for the banks.

    2. Re:Suprising why? by AHuxley · · Score: 1

      It makes the domestic and international banking sector less hard for the NSA.

      --
      Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
  14. Nice. by MobSwatter · · Score: 1

    So now they've created a high value job because of the level of information access and made breaking the law classified on top of it!!! Next they will be hiring directly from minimum security detention facilities.

  15. SSL Obviously by mrspoonsi · · Score: 1

    The picture on the guardian site mentions:

    CA Service Requests (certificate authority)

    Now the question is...what is hardware accelerated decryption, they would not need this if they had the keys....they must have a weakness in SSL in its current form, one they can quickly get that sessions encryption, and if it cannot break in real time, then the encrypted data is saved for later.

    1. Re:SSL Obviously by mrspoonsi · · Score: 1

      ...bad form replying to myself, however - they have a budget of $250M per year...lets say it has been running for 10 years, that is $2.5B spent on breaking encryption. Lots of $$$, could they have a form of quantum computer, one which can process 128bit keys and crack in near realtime? But the diagram mentions, pairing and crypt attacks, to me a crypt attack is a weakness in the encryption, pairing is a matching previous keys.

      >Among the specific accomplishments for 2013, the NSA expects the program to obtain access to "data flowing through a hub for a major communications provider" and
      >to a "major internet peer-to-peer voice and text communications system". Why do they not call it skype by name?....I cannot imagine skype is encrypted much, this must talk about gaining access to the root skype servers so they know everyone who is connected to everyone else, this information is important as randomly picking through the skype data on internet.

      >decode the encrypted traffic certified by three major (unnamed) internet companies
      Is this Certification Authorities? ie SSL from those 3 majors is broken, perhaps the CAs intentionally (or unintentionally) have weak keys? Symantec (which owns VeriSign, Thawte and Geotrust), Comodo, Go Daddy - these 3 account for 83% of the market...

      If GCHQ/NSA were able to figure out the non-randomness of new keys, they have a weakness to exploit.
      >and 30 types of Virtual Private Network (VPN)
      All those VPN built into routers - they are pretty much toast

  16. eveBot intercepts aliceCopter! by Thud457 · · Score: 4, Funny

    surely there should be a ripe market niche for some smart geek to 3D print arduino-controlled quadcopters to facilitate key exchange. hmmmm... hold on, still a few bugs to be worked out...

    --

    the preceding comment is my own and in no way reflects the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

    1. Re:eveBot intercepts aliceCopter! by the_B0fh · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Just don't use paypal to get funding...

  17. I call bullshit by JoeyRox · · Score: 4, Insightful

    The NSA can crack 4096-bit PGP keys? I doubt it. Seems like FUD to dissuade people from even attempting to use encryption

    1. Re:I call bullshit by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Informative

      You can make keys longer than that too.... google on how to patch gpg for large keys.

      I personally use a 16384 key for weaker stuff, and a 32768 bit key for more serious things.

      The 4096 bit ceiling was purely for computational speed. Any higher back in the day would take over a day to generate the key. Took my machine 4 hours to make the 16384 key with modern hardware but this is significantly more secure than 4096.

      Protip, you can still work with unpatched clients as long as your key is 16384 or less. You can go higher but only then with everyone you communicate with having the patched client. That's why I stick to 16384 for compatibility but go larger when serious.

    2. Re:I call bullshit by Rich0 · · Score: 4, Interesting

      The NSA can crack 4096-bit PGP keys? I doubt it. Seems like FUD to dissuade people from even attempting to use encryption

      There is no mathematical proof that 4096-bit PGP keys are secure. You can only say that known algorithms cannot find a key in a practical amount of time on known computational hardware.

      You don't know if an algorithm exists that would allow the keys to be factored in a short period of time. You also don't know if somebody has developed a practical quantum computer - it is already known that one would allow certain encryption systems to be trivially broken.

      For every mathematician publishing articles about cryptography in the public space, there are probably 100 much-better-paid ones publishing articles in internal NSA publications. The NSA is by far the largest employer of mathematicians on earth - and they hire the best and the brightest they can find.

    3. Re:I call bullshit by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Key length doesn't matter if there is a bug in the implementation.

    4. Re:I call bullshit by Trax3001BBS · · Score: 1

      The NSA can crack 4096-bit PGP keys? I doubt it. Seems like FUD to dissuade people from even attempting to use encryption

      Doesn't say they cracked a PGP Key, they "acquired" them.

      FTA:

      by getting their voluntary collaboration, forcing their cooperation with court orders or surreptitiously stealing their encryption keys or
      altering their software or hardware.

      To get a key, you give it to them, they take you to court, they install malware. or mechanical key logger.

      A PGP message has been cracked by using Distributed computing (think Folding@home) and lots of time.

      But just that one message you would have to do the same thing all over again to another message even if from the same person.

      Security is a strong PGP key kept safe and away from your PC, using a spare computer running DOS PGP version 2.6.Xg.
      PGP commercial versions of course are useless.

      Never under estimate the power of the press and what "they" want you to know and/or believe.
      http://tinyurl.com/lc8znnf links to: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propaganda_of_the_Spanish–American_War
      a link /. breaks - even preview at tinyurl breaks it. (damn weird link)

    5. Re:I call bullshit by cohomology · · Score: 1

      "More mathematicians" does not mean "better mathematics." Also, I don't think the best and brightest are motivated by money. Those people are like hackers. They don't care whether they eat or not.

      --
      Don't mess with The Phone Company. Piss them off and you'll be using two tin cans and a piece of string.
    6. Re:I call bullshit by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      I was in a mathematics PhD program. The brightest people there all wanted jobs on Wall Street - even the number theorists. Not one wanted to work for a 3 letter agency (most are foreign anyway). The pay on Wall Street is literally over 30 times higher.

    7. Re:I call bullshit by foniksonik · · Score: 1

      You could just make up a language and use that instead. Even better, make up a language that looks like the result of encryption. They'll try to decrypt but will just scramble it up worse. They'd have to have a lexicon to make any headway and that would require active surveillance.

      I have no use for such a thing personally. Just a random comment.

      --
      A fool throws a stone into a well and a thousand sages can not remove it.
    8. Re:I call bullshit by bill_mcgonigle · · Score: 1

      You also don't know if somebody has developed a practical quantum computer - it is already known that one would allow certain encryption systems to be trivially broken.

      If the NSA had a magic encryption breaker, it wouldn't need to bother strong-arming companies into crippling their products for them. The NSA are like roaches - they only come out into the light when desperate.

      --
      My God, it's Full of Source!
      OUTSIDE_IP=$(dig +short my.ip @outsideip.net)
    9. Re:I call bullshit by hairyfish · · Score: 1

      You know that the NSA don't just have money, they have access to guns and torture too?
      NSA: "We'd like to pay you a good salary to work on some important projects that will help the country"
      Mathnerd "no thanks, I prefer to hack in my basement"
      NSA: "How would you like a life sentence being waterboarded at Gitmo instead?"
      Mathnerd "I'll start on Monday"

    10. Re:I call bullshit by heypete · · Score: 1

      Security is a strong PGP key kept safe and away from your PC, using a spare computer running DOS PGP version 2.6.Xg.

      Using such an ancient version of PGP is probably a horrible idea, as there's been numerous security issues reported and fixed over the years by newer versions.

      It'd probably be a better idea to use a modern copy of GnuPG: it's widely available, free and open source, implements the OpenPGP standard, and (while certainly not perfect) it lacks the known security issues that ancient versions of PGP have.

    11. Re:I call bullshit by bingoUV · · Score: 2

      You haven't thought about it much. Unknown languages are deciphered all the time. Those with weird grammar and scripts.

      The statement of Sherlock Holmes - "What one man can invent, another can discover" - applies to invented language.

      So we need cryptography, where the statement doesn't apply.

      --
      Bingo Dictionary - Pragmatist, n. A myopic idealist.
    12. Re:I call bullshit by ToddInSF · · Score: 1

      I remember Decaln McAsshole years ago sent me a belligerent email when I pointed out to him that he was naive at best and a tool for the government at worst, by insisting that PCP was uncrackable byt he government.

      Well, FU, Declan, you were wrong then, and you were a tool then, and you're a tool now.

      And you screwed people who trusted your "technical expertise".

    13. Re:I call bullshit by Rich0 · · Score: 1

      Nonsense. Quantum computers aren't magic; they can't magically break powerful encryption schemes.

      Go look up Shor's Algorithm. Nothing magical about it - large numbers are trivial to factor with a quantum computer, and many asymmetric crypto algorithms depend on large numbers being unfactorable. These algorithms are used for all kinds of things.

      Sure, they aren't magical - they may not be able to break every encryption system. However, I'm not aware of any proofs that a quantum algorithm does not exist to simplify cryptanalysis on other systems. Sure, nobody has published an equivalent to Shor's for ECC, but that doesn't mean that such an algorithm doesn't exist, or that it isn't known to the NSA.

  18. Re: The good news is that you can change your pass by techprophet · · Score: 1

    I never even changed away from that

  19. Lenovo? by steelfood · · Score: 5, Interesting

    From ProPublica:

    In one case, after the government learned that a foreign intelligence target had ordered new computer hardware, the American manufacturer agreed to insert a back door into the product before it was shipped, someone familiar with the request told The Times.

    Who else remembers the debacle about the government no longer purchasing Lenovo computers? I remember some people saying that if the U.S. government is making all this fuss about it, they're probably the ones doing it.

    This seems to indicate those people are correct.

    --
    "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be."
  20. Re:I've got really good encryption by Thud457 · · Score: 1

    Bah, that's easy.
    With MY algorithm, you don't even need to transmit the message to me, I can just generate it locally.
    Heck, that's faster than the speed of light, time to fire up the patentbot9000 again!

    --

    the preceding comment is my own and in no way reflects the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

  21. Remember when RSA was hacked? by thejynxed · · Score: 1

    They claimed it was "China". Now we know the truth.

    My guess is for most of their easy-mode access, they are actually using a rootkit of some sort to simply pass along whatever they want before any encryption is applied.

    --
    @Mindless Drivel: 100% of Twitter posts ever Tweeted.
    1. Re:Remember when RSA was hacked? by AHuxley · · Score: 1

      Yes its the network, the OS the hardware, the tracking... you can enjoy all the encryption you like in the middle.

      --
      Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
  22. Hacking private keys by jdev · · Score: 1

    Here's what I found in the article.

    N.S.A. documents show that the agency maintains an internal database of encryption keys for specific commercial products, called a Key Provisioning Service, which can automatically decode many messages. If the necessary key is not in the collection, a request goes to the separate Key Recovery Service, which tries to obtain it.

    How keys are acquired is shrouded in secrecy, but independent cryptographers say many are probably collected by hacking into companies’ computer servers, where they are stored. To keep such methods secret, the N.S.A. shares decrypted messages with other agencies only if the keys could have been acquired through legal means. “Approval to release to non-Sigint agencies,” a GCHQ document says, “will depend on there being a proven non-Sigint method of acquiring keys.”

    So various agencies hack companies' servers to obtain their private keys. Those keys get stored in some central NSA database and are used later to decrypt messages. That would indicate they didn't break all the encryption algorithms, but are getting around them via other means. Of course, it does sound like the NSA has backdoors in other protocols which let them get in. That part has been known for years, but hacking companies' servers sounds like something new. And probably illegal.

  23. NSA did it... by MetricT · · Score: 1

    Over the past few years I have read about mind-boggling exploits in protocols WEP, WPS, and now IPMI. I have always thought it was either "idiot programmer who doesn't understand security 101" or "NSA". I think it's fairly obvious that a number of these things probably are their doing. Wonder if they are legally liable for the cost imposed on others to fix/repair/restore?

    1. Re:NSA did it... by AHuxley · · Score: 1

      History shows a long hint of export grade units from the UK and USA for NATO and other friendly nation use. TEMPEST (compromising emanations) back to plain text ~ just been able to get near the physical plain text side was the way in.
      Now we have the consumer OS and network code as the ENIGMA of the day... going up to other more complex exported hardware all on a known telco network.
      The cost imposed where passed on as part of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) generation of trade deals and worldwide standards.
      The US was not going to allow their US vendors to have huge unique costs for domestic units, while international brands sold cheaper "encrypted" products of the same generation.
      So we got the push for global law enforcement hardware and software entry on US terms.

      --
      Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
  24. Land of the free by Hamsterdan · · Score: 1

    Glad I live in Canada, hold on, someone's knocking on my door...

    --
    I've got better things to do tonight than die.
  25. Key distribution by jotaeleemeese · · Score: 1

    The CAs' public keys come with your browser (or SSL client, it could be a web server or other piece of software). If you sign your own the problem becomes to distribute the keys.

    Also it is trivial to stop the server with your private keys serving authentication requests. Governments will say terrorism, national security or one of those scary words and no judge will try to defend you rights, as shown in the UK they will even widen a narrow law to suit the needs of the security and/or intelligence bodies.

    We are really fucked.

    --
    IANAL but write like a drunk one.
    1. Re:Key distribution by BitZtream · · Score: 1

      The CAs' public keys come with your browser (or SSL client, it could be a web server or other piece of software). If you sign your own the problem becomes to distribute the keys.

      Problem? Stop using shitty OSes, both Windows and OSX have no problem distributing certs to internal machines using their own CAs. Microsoft solved this issue in the 90s, OSX didn't come around till a bit later, but OSX server has no problem distributing to OSX clients either.

      --
      Persistent Volume manager for Kubernetes - https://github.com/dwimsey/openshift-pvmanager
  26. Why is that organization still legal? by Opportunist · · Score: 2

    By any stretch of the definition it fits the pattern as an organization that has a harmful, if not outright destructive, impact on the stability of the country and its relationships to other countries.

    But probably they already have more than enough dirt on any politician to keep them in line. It's kinda scary if you think about it.

    --
    We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
  27. shared private passwords by goffster · · Score: 1

    Between two individuals:
    It seems to me that encryption based on a shared private password
    and then encrypted again with public/private key encryption gains you the best
    of both worlds.

    1. Re:shared private passwords by Sigmon · · Score: 1

      Not if the NSA has what is effectively a key-logger installed on your machine.

  28. How To Securely Store / Transmit Data by sexconker · · Score: 1

    How To Securely Store Transmit Data

    Encrypt your whole fucking drive. Don't use Bitlocker or any hard drive manufacturer's built in shit that stores the key anywhere.

    For instance: http://www.truecrypt.org/

    How To Securely Transmit Data

    Encrypt it your fucking self before you send it. Send the key separately, securely.

    For instance:

    Install 7zip
    Right click the file you want to transmit
    Click "Add to archive..."
    Archive format: 7z
    Compression level: Whatever you need / want (I almost always use Ultra)
    Compression method: LZMA2
    Enter a secure password
    Encrypt file names if you want
    Click OK

    Then distribute the file however you want. Transmit the password to the recipient in person only.

  29. Think of the Possibilities! by gooman · · Score: 1

    I'm a bit off topic but... Just as information is shared with the DEA, it will probably also be shared with major media companies and the **AAs. They spend a lot of money in D.C. and "piracy" is on an equal footing according to them. The media companies say it is illegal to break their encryption or bypass DRM, explain to me again why its OK to break mine? Seems like fair game when the authority engages in the same behavior they would punish you for (see Parenting 101).

    --
    "Kittens give Morbo gas!"
  30. Re:Microsoft by Opportunist · · Score: 1

    Back then it probably did. And I sure agree that for an update of WinXP in the year 2000 it is sufficient to use a method that was secure in the year 2000.

    There are essentially two kinds of considerations when you wonder whether encryption is "good enough": How long does it take to crack it with current means and how long will it take to crack it by the time it becomes obsolete and replaced with a newer version. There is a good reason why RSA keys have an expiration date. Computers get faster and after a few years we notice that what we considered secure is no longer.

    Now, there are rarely big leaps in security obsolesce. One of the few I can think of right now of the more recent past is back when we learned how GPUs are great at calculating primes and how we can use clusters thereof to do it. Usually, it is pretty predictable how it will developed, simply by predicting how hardware and clock speeds progress, which is pretty well predictable. We can fairly well predict how many years we'll still be "secure" (read: it takes too long to crack it to be sensible).

    Of course, this applies mainly to information transfer that itself has an expiration date. The data that was transferred during the Windows update in 2000 is no longer secure, but it does not matter. It was never secret in the first place, and the encryption served mainly the purpose of ensuring that the source is genuine (more a signature than an encryption matter). That purpose it served back then, and that it doesn't serve that purpose anymore does not matter, since any transfer today would not be done with this kind of encryption (at least I'd CERTAINLY HOPE SO!).

    Other information that had to be secret but still doesn't need encryption that stands the "test of time" is data where its secrecy has an expiration date. Discussions about a merger of companies X and Y have to be tightly secret before the merger, they're by no stretch secret anymore when the merger has happened, usually it's announced big time by the companies themselves. That secret does not matter anymore, despite being important back when it was encrypted.

    There is other information, though, that suffers from the problem you mention, but it's not updates or anything like that: It's when data should UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES, EVER, be public. The transfer of such data is problematic, since its "expiration date" is quite far in the future. Data that has a negative impact on your person should not get out before you die, which can be a few decades away. Data that has a negative impact on your company probably should never get out, provided your companies stands the test of time. How do you want to encrypt something for that purpose?

    For transit, I'd suggest against it and instead ensure that the channel you choose is secure itself. Don't encrypt and send it via Internet, store it on a HD and transport that HD in an armored car. Any data you send today can be stored. No, they cannot decrypt it. Now. But they will, in a year, in 10 years, in 50. What channel you choose for transport of data, and what encryption, depends highly on the expiration date of the secret.

    --
    We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
  31. Re:I've got really good encryption by Opportunist · · Score: 1

    It's like my 100% encryption, but at 100% loss kinda lossy, too...

    --
    We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
  32. torches, pitchforks, etc by PopeRatzo · · Score: 1

    The agency, according to the documents and interviews with industry officials, deployed custom-built, superfast computers to break codes, and began collaborating with technology companies in the United States and abroad to build entry points into their products.

    It's probably too late to do anything about our totalitarian police state through regular political means. Unfortunately, if it's going to be stopped, and rolled back, it's going to mean that some people are going to have some very bad days.

    Let's hope that more courageous whistleblowers step forward. I have a feeling that citizens will get motivated to address this issue head-on much sooner than most people think. Yes, we like our creature comforts, but human beings can get pretty obstreperous when they learn they're being watched all the time, notwithstanding any possible good intentions by the snoops-in-charge.

    --
    You are welcome on my lawn.
  33. Raw document by Rytis · · Score: 4, Informative

    The raw document provides some more details but remains not especially explicit.

    "The fact that NSA/CSS has some capabilities against the encryption in TLS/SSL, HTTPS, SSH, VPNs, VoIP, WEBMAIL, and other network communication technologies".

    Capabilities are defined here as NSA/CSS ability to exploit a specific technology. This may encompass acquiring and processing plaintext data and/or acquiring, decrypting and processing encrypted data.

    1. Re:Raw document by AHuxley · · Score: 1

      Time to air gap some parts of the communications networks and take a good look at that standard nation state hardware.

      --
      Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
  34. Re:I'm stunned. by Opportunist · · Score: 1

    I'm already stunned that there is a government agency that actually can get something accomplished besides lining the pockets of a few officials.

    Why can we have such people in domestic spying but not in domestic economy?

    --
    We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
  35. Re:Works for me by kilfarsnar · · Score: 4, Insightful

    So do you want the NSA to break Syria's encryption about their chemical weapons attacks?

    Or do you prefer we not know that the Syrian government uses chemical weapons to kill civilian populations, affecting public policy?

    Which social contract would you prefer government to break? the "Government shouldn't know private activities of foreign governments" or "Government shouldn't allow foreign governments to kill civilians"?

    If your privacy is important, then you think that means your government shouldn't monitor foreign communications, correct? And that means you think it's ok for foreign governments to kill civilians as they please? And if you think foreign governments should be allowed to kill civilians, then I guess you don't donate to charity either? Why would you want to help other people, after all?

    You can pick either charity or privacy, but you can't have both. Sorry. That's because bad guys have power, and you need more power to overcome those bad guys for the purposes of charity.

    So charity or privacy? What's it going to be?

    Won't somebody please think of the civilians!

    All else aside, if you think the NSA breaks codes in order to prevent civilian casualties, or for "charity", you have another thing coming. They do it to provide intelligence to the US government to facilitate furthering its national interest, in whatever form that may take. And if you think civilian casualties or chemical weapons are the actual reason we are considering whether or not to attack Syria, you have yet another thing coming.

    --
    "What the American public doesn't know is what makes them the American public." -Ray Zalinsky (Tommy Boy)
  36. Re:I've got really good encryption by Score+Whore · · Score: 1

    Whatever. I've got a write only disk. Doesn't need encrypting.

  37. Re:Works for me by aaaaaaargh! · · Score: 4, Insightful

    "Government shouldn't allow foreign governments to kill civilians"?

    Incidentally, that policy also applies to the Syrian government versus the US. Cos', you know, the US is a foreign government and airstrikes would surely also kill civilians.

    Also, your entire post is a false dichotomy.

  38. Information leakage attacks most likely vector by m.dillon · · Score: 2

    I don't think the NSA has to break actual keys brute-force, but with information leakage it has been shown that data can be sussed-out of an encrypted stream (particularly an interactive one). Given sufficient leakage of known quantities, keys can be broken in much less time.

    As we've seen just recently, even something as innocuous as HTTP compression over a SSL link can result in serious information leakage by anyone monitoring the size of the payloads.

    Encryption streams, in general, require additional random data to be inserted into the stream and for the salt to be continuously modified (i.e. feedback) to remain strong. If one does neither of those things than the information leakage increases to the point where the keys can be broken without spending years of cpu cycles.

    -Matt

  39. Where random number gen "flaws" come from. by Animats · · Score: 5, Insightful

    There are a surprisingly large number of public key generators with weak random number generators:

    And those are the ones we know about.

    For open source systems, the person or persons who inserted the weak code should be identified and kicked off the project. It may just be incompetence, but that's a good reason to keep them out of security-critical areas.

    Weak keys don't just let the NSA in. They let the People's Liberation Army of China in, too.

    1. Re:Where random number gen "flaws" come from. by Eythian · · Score: 1

      For open source systems, the person or persons who inserted the weak code should be identified and kicked off the project. It may just be incompetence, but that's a good reason to keep them out of security-critical areas.

      You want to kick off the people who are most likely to never make that mistake ever again? That doesn't seem wise.

    2. Re:Where random number gen "flaws" come from. by Tom · · Score: 1

      For open source systems, the person or persons who inserted the weak code should be identified and kicked off the project. It may just be incompetence, but that's a good reason to keep them out of security-critical areas.

      You'll end up with nobody left.

      Cryptography is hard. I don't think anyone in the field has a perfect track record. Kicking people out for mistakes is the most stupid thing you can do. What you need is more quality control. Crucial parts of the code need to get the OpenBSD treatment - full code review by multiple people.

      --
      Assorted stuff I do sometimes: Lemuria.org
    3. Re:Where random number gen "flaws" come from. by jcdr · · Score: 1

      "For open source systems, the person or persons who inserted the weak code should be identified and kicked off the project."

      Learning by errors also apply to security-critical areas if you known a little about the history. The NSA just hit this fact right now...

    4. Re:Where random number gen "flaws" come from. by ray-auch · · Score: 1

      You want to kick off the people who are most likely to never make that mistake ever again? That doesn't seem wise.

      Pop Quiz.

      Alice and Bob are in a secret club. Alice discovers that Bob has broken club procedure and re-used cipher keys resulting in Eve being able to read secret club comms. Bob says it was a mistake.

      Does Alice:

      a) kick Bobs arse out of the club so hard that footwear will need to be surgically removed from orifices
      or
      b) have Bob messily and permanently removed from the gene pool and the video posted online as a warning to others not to f*** up
      or
      c) grant Bob an increased level of trust because he is less likely to make the same mistake again

      For bonus points, compare and contrast the vetting procedures used by [choose three letter intelligence agency] with those used by a typical open, or closed, source crypto project, and determine the likelihood that [agency] knows whether or not one of its employees works on [crypto project] in their spare time, versus the likelihood that [crypto project] knows whether or not one of its contributors works for [agency] in their spare time.

  40. Expectation of privacy? by whoever57 · · Score: 3, Interesting

    The agencyâ(TM)s success in defeating many of the privacy protections offered by encryption does not change the rules that prohibit the deliberate targeting of Americansâ(TM) e-mails or phone calls without a warrant.

    I can see (although I don't necessarily agree with) the argument that we have no expectation of privacy on metadata, but surely there is an expectation of pricacy on encrypted data. Surely the fact that the user has encrypted his data (or knows that it will be) provides an expecation of privacy that would invoke a 4th amendment protection.

    --
    The real "Libtards" are the Libertarians!
    1. Re:Expectation of privacy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      The agencyâ(TM)s success in defeating many of the privacy protections offered by encryption does not change the rules that prohibit the deliberate targeting of Americansâ(TM) e-mails or phone calls without a warrant.

      I can see (although I don't necessarily agree with) the argument that we have no expectation of privacy on metadata, but surely there is an expectation of pricacy on encrypted data. Surely the fact that the user has encrypted his data (or knows that it will be) provides an expecation of privacy that would invoke a 4th amendment protection.

      The expectation of privacy applies to US citizens only, as far as NSA is concerned. But if the contents are encrypted, the NSA does not know whether it carries messages to/from a non-US person, so they have to assume that it does. Thus they are free to target any and all seemingly encrypted traffic.

  41. Assumptions by PraiseBob · · Score: 1

    Using that number 22,000 assumes two things:

    A) The NSA reports ALL privacy breeches using their internal procedures.

    B) The NSA is aware of all privacy breeches using their systems.

    We know for a fact the NSA hasn't been reporting information properly to the oversight committees in congress or the court system. Indeed they have gone to some lengths to avoid oversight and intentionally lie under oath. This misinformation has been carried out at the very highest leadership levels for years, which nearly always breeds a pervasive culture of the same across the organization. This certainly calls into question point A.

    Apparantly Snowden got around their internal security to the point that they don't even know what files he took. Out of tens of thousands of employees that specialize in computer security, is he the only one who knows how to skirt their security systems? That throws B into question.

  42. Re:Works for me by XanC · · Score: 2, Informative

    The phrase is "you have another think coming".

  43. Re:Works for me by xevioso · · Score: 2, Insightful

    I do. I do give a fuck about people who nerve gas to kill civilians in large amounts. If you don't, you are a sociopath.

  44. Re: Works for me by tolkienfan · · Score: 5, Insightful

    How did the NSAs ability to decrypt most of the encrypted communications of the world prevent Syria's chemical attack on its own people?
    Or even help after the fact, for that matter?
    How is helping Syria's people even part of the NSAs charter?

  45. As I said in the last article on the subject by msobkow · · Score: 1

    You can't underestimate the power of clusters the size of the NSAs, especially the dedicated/custom hardware components.

    Most of the encryption standards supported by TrueCrypt would fall to the NSAs clusters in a matter of hours or days at most. Only the "hardest" of encryptions like AES256 or RSA2048 have any hope of keeping them out. And that presumes they don't just install a backdoor on your computer to steal your keys.

    --
    I do not fail; I succeed at finding out what does not work.
  46. Deniability has been improved by jacobsm · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Now that we know the NSA can intercept and decrypt any message, doesn't it also mean that they can change the message to whatever they want, re-encrypt it, and pull it out in a court of law as evidence?

    If they do, or even if they don't, I can now say they did, and they can't prove they didn't.

  47. NIST 2006 by shaitand · · Score: 1

    They censor the names of the algorithms for the NSA but mention one was adopted by NIST in 2006 and later by ISO. That would be AES ladies and gentlemen. The article strongly implies they can decode all SSL and AES in real time as it flies over the fiber... You aren't using AES anywhere are you ladies and gents?

    1. Re:NIST 2006 by sexconker · · Score: 1

      They censor the names of the algorithms for the NSA but mention one was adopted by NIST in 2006 and later by ISO. That would be AES ladies and gentlemen. The article strongly implies they can decode all SSL and AES in real time as it flies over the fiber... You aren't using AES anywhere are you ladies and gents?

      They can decrypt anything they have the keys for.
      If your protocol involves generating and sending keys, then the encryption algorithm is useless against a MITM attack.

      There is no reason to believe the NSA can break AES without devoting massive brute force power to do so.
      There is reason to believe they can MITM pretty much the entire western internet.

    2. Re:NIST 2006 by shaitand · · Score: 1

      The article specifically says they introduced fundamental weaknesses in the algorithms by influencing their development and built specialized computing clusters to exploit those weaknesses IN ADDITION to their key gathering programs.

    3. Re:NIST 2006 by sexconker · · Score: 1

      The article specifically says they introduced fundamental weaknesses in the algorithms by influencing their development and built specialized computing clusters to exploit those weaknesses IN ADDITION to their key gathering programs.

      Articles can say a lot of things.
      We know the NSA is MITMing everything the can.
      We don't know what, if anything, the NSA did to compromise AES. Until someone provides actual evidence, and a breakdown of what effects NSA's tampering had, you can file the claim under FUD.

    4. Re:NIST 2006 by letsief · · Score: 3, Informative

      No, the article wasn't referring to AES. AES was developed by a pair of Belgian cryptographers as part of an open competition. The NSA approves the use of AES to protect Top Secret information. They didn't put a back door in AES.

      The article was referring to the Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generator (Dual EC DRBG), published as part of SP800-90. The DRBG uses a set of constants, like many crypto algorithms. The NSA, as the designer of the DRBG, selected the constants. Microsoft researchers noted that if the constants were carefully chosen, the NSA could predict future outputs of the DRBG. Despite what the New York Time article says, the NSA probably didn't do that. No one was going to use this DRBG anyway, except for the NSA and their partners, so they would have very little reason to sneak in a backdoor. Still, it's a bad property to have in a crypto algorithm. You should really explain the provenance of any constants used in a crypto algorithm, and there was no explanation of how the Dual EC DRBG constants were selected.

    5. Re:NIST 2006 by IamTheRealMike · · Score: 1

      Did you RTFA? The articles say specifically that Dual_EC_DRBG was a backdoor operation and even quotes from the documents themselves (look for the word finesse).

    6. Re:NIST 2006 by letsief · · Score: 1

      Yes, I read the article. I know what quote you're referring to from the article. I'm skeptical it means what the NY Times thinks it means. Getting anything through a standards process is "a challenge in finesse."

  48. Re:Works for me by Dishevel · · Score: 5, Insightful
    How about the NSA do its fucking job.

    Spy on foreign governments and foreign citizens. They need to stay the fuck away from Citizens of the United States of America. Spying on Americans is what other governments are for.

    The NSA is operating far outside of its charter. Put them straight.

    --
    Why is it so hard to only have politicians for a few years, then have them go away?
  49. Re:Works for me by mendax · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Actually, you will get neither if the NSA is able to read all encrypted communication. Simply put, if the government has the ability to penetrate all encrypted communications, there will be no privacy. If there is no privacy the government will eventually degenerate to a tyranny. Given a choice between a tyranny and dead Syrians, I choose the dead Syrians. I don't like the idea of people being killed by their government but I'd rather have the Syrian government killing Syrians than the American government killing Americans, something which will eventually happen if we lose our civil rights.

    Don't doubt for a minute that there are forces in the government that are working toward that. They're mostly not evil people and most don't really understand what the ramifications of what they are doing, but history does repeat itself and there is plenty of history that demonstrates what happens when a government can do whatever it wants. Orwell's "1984" is fiction, not history, but it is based upon history and basic psychology. If we want to retain our civil rights, we need to fight and struggle for them, both in the courts and in civil disobedience if necessary.

    --
    It's really quite a simple choice: Life, Death, or Los Angeles.
  50. Stallman warned... by fredprado · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Richard Stallman warned us about this decades ago. It is incredible how people are still able to dismiss his warnings as more and more of his predictions come into reality.

    1. Re:Stallman warned... by AHuxley · · Score: 1

      You have to wonder what generations where doing at the CS and math conferences around the world.... even with huge hints in the press about plain text from embassy hardware or other hardware, software~ reports.
      I guess it was always a beta race - just get the software out and we can hide the better intensive 'code' needs with the next CPU generation.
      Look how fast and responsive the new complex product is with the older code.
      The software/hardware ships. The expert staff build the next products.

      --
      Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
  51. what don't we know by cinnamon+colbert · · Score: 1, Flamebait

    in the 1980s, under R Reagan, the USofA supported one S Hussein in his war against Iraq, and in his use of chemical weapons.
    So what the US govt won't do is pretty extreme

  52. Re:Works for me by mi · · Score: 4, Informative

    So do you want the NSA to break Syria's encryption about their chemical weapons attacks?

    I'd like us to continue treating encryption as weapons and regulate its export accordingly. Unfortunately, it is not really possibly — any enemy worth the designation would be able to get it anyway, because moving an algorithm is much easier than a gun. And, unlike guns, you only need to move an algorithm once.

    So charity or privacy? What's it going to be?

    I wish I had sufficient confidence in my own government to be able to sincerely pick charity... Unfortunately, I do not. If the President can already ask the IRS to hurt opposition's finances, what's to prevent him from asking the NSA to look into the opposition's e-mails? The sort of thing, that got Nixon to resign is barely an issue with today's Americans...

    However, according to an earlier article about Snowden's interaction with journalist(s), PGP (with sufficiently large keys) is still unbreakable even to the NSA — at least, as far Snowden was aware:

    This past January, Laura Poitras received a curious e-mail from an anonymous stranger requesting her public encryption key. For almost two years, Poitras had been working on a documentary about surveillance, and she occasionally received queries from strangers. She replied to this one and sent her public key — allowing him or her to send an encrypted e-mail that only Poitras could open, with her private key — but she didn’t think much would come of it.

    So that's, what a particularly private person should be using for all of his communications...

    --
    In Soviet Washington the swamp drains you.
  53. Re:THIS... by mspohr · · Score: 5, Insightful

    This has nothing to do with liberal or conservative and everything to do with the power of government.
    From Bruce Schneier:
    Dismantling the surveillance state won't be easy. Has any country that engaged in mass surveillance of its own citizens voluntarily given up that capability? Has any mass surveillance country avoided becoming totalitarian? Whatever happens, we're going to be breaking new ground.
    http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/05/government-betrayed-internet-nsa-spying

    --
    I don't read your sig. Why are you reading mine?
  54. Re:Works for me by shentino · · Score: 1

    Fucking false dilemma and you know it.

    The feds can snoop OTHERS without snooping US.

    And honestly, with all the hackers out there I'd rather they spend their time protecting us FROM hacks than making other people easier to crack.

    Sure, it's an arms race and things will filter out eventually, but I think we can stay further ahead of the encryption arms race by investing in our own cybersecurity first, rather than trying to leave exploits we can use to snoop on everyone else.

    I would rather let ten terrorists go free than invade the privacy of even one innocent citizen.

  55. that's not enough by stenvar · · Score: 1

    Unfortunately, Schneier doesn't go far enough. The problem isn't specifically that the US government has betrayed the Internet, the problem is that governments in general have acquired too much power over our lives. In the US, between Obamacare, e-Verify, gun registration, income tax, banking regulation (and the associated data disclosures), TSA, DHS, and other laws, the federal government would get detailed and personal information over every aspect of our lives even if there were no Internet at all.

    We need a fundamental shift of government power back from the federal government to state and local governments, and we need to limit government power in general. But that requires sacrifices. Unfortunately, many of the same people who complain about the NSA are unwilling to actually make the necessary sacrifices; they erroneously think that there is some magic solution that keeps the government out of people's hair while still delivering a social welfare state.

  56. Re:Works for me by AHuxley · · Score: 1

    We did not care about Iraq when they where 'stopping' Iran. Now we care about mercenaries moving into Syria?

    --
    Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
  57. Re: Works for me by dataspel · · Score: 2, Informative

    Yes, it is. Citation: http://grammarist.com/usage/another-think-coming/

  58. Re:Works for me by mi · · Score: 2
    Though I sympathize with the gist of your position, I must question this particular argument:

    If there is no privacy the government will eventually degenerate to a tyranny.

    Why exactly is this so? Of course, it would be rather uncomfortable to have no privacy, but would it necessarily lead to tyranny? Why not the opposite, for example — if no one's dealings are private and all information (from banking transactions, to kissing, to bowel movements) about everyone is readily available to whoever cares, wouldn't it be harder to subdue the electoral process, for example?

    --
    In Soviet Washington the swamp drains you.
  59. Re: Works for me by AHuxley · · Score: 1

    Well we got that sound clip from Syria....... What is strange is the lack of detail from the UK and the GCHQ listening post in Cyprus.
    They have the range and skill to pick up everything in the region.

    --
    Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
  60. Re:Uh... okay / Like Debian? by Aguazul2 · · Score: 1

    How about weakening it enough that it is crackable. Like when Debian accidentally weakened all the keys generated by ssh, but done intentionally. Also I like the 'humint' reference, i.e. they are planting moles in these organizations for their own purposes ... great.

  61. Re:Works for me by TheSeatOfMyPants · · Score: 2

    Plenty of people like me cared. Just because you (or even most people you noticed) didn't care doesn't mean " we " didn't.

    --
    Now mostly at Usenet:comp.misc & SoylentNews.org (it's made of people!)
  62. Re:10 year NSA program... by gweihir · · Score: 1

    Very unlikely. Far more likely is a passive attack against one or several major SSL implementations.

    --
    Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
  63. Re:Works for me by chihowa · · Score: 2

    Because that world would never come to be. What we'd have is certain people being completely transparent and other, more privileged, people having privacy. All of the shady stuff that happens today would continue to happen in private, but everyone would also know about every BM you made.

    --
    If you want a vision of the future, imagine a youtube comments section scrolling - forever.
  64. Re:Works for me by mcl630 · · Score: 4, Informative

    Though I sympathize with the gist of your position, I must question this particular argument:

    If there is no privacy the government will eventually degenerate to a tyranny.

    Why exactly is this so? Of course, it would be rather uncomfortable to have no privacy, but would it necessarily lead to tyranny? Why not the opposite, for example — if no one's dealings are private and all information (from banking transactions, to kissing, to bowel movements) about everyone is readily available to whoever cares, wouldn't it be harder to subdue the electoral process, for example?

    You would make it much, much easier to "subdue the electoral process". If you're currently the party in power and facing re-election, you first kill everyone who donates money to the opposition--everybody stops giving them money, hampering their campaign. Then you kill anyone who's given any hint that they might vote for the opposition. You and your cohorts get re-elected. Rinse and repeat, and eventually nobody dares form an opposition party, much less support one. If anybody says or does anything that remotely sounds like rebellion, you kill them too. Your party stays in power indefinately, the only things that might end your reign are a split in your party, or killing off so many people that there not enough people left to work and your economy collapses.

  65. Re:Works for me by AndreasVukman · · Score: 1

    I've never seen a bomb that doesn't kill EVERYBODY in an area. As I understand you US have invented a bomb which when exploding sends its parts to search for military people?

  66. Re:Works for me by mi · · Score: 1

    What we'd have is certain people being completely transparent and other, more privileged, people having privacy.

    I'm not sure, this is, what the OP meant. His statement was simply "If there is no privacy the government will eventually degenerate to a tyranny."

    Maybe, he meant something like: "If only government-connected people retain privacy, the government will eventually degenerate to a tyranny," — but that's not, what he wrote...

    --
    In Soviet Washington the swamp drains you.
  67. How can I encrypt my pigeons... by AndreasVukman · · Score: 1

    ...so they don't get decrypted while resting on NSA controlled communication cables?

    1. Re:How can I encrypt my pigeons... by hey! · · Score: 1

      You take them apart and put them back together into apparently random-looking assemblages of pigeon-pieces. The recipient then follows the exact reverse process to reconstitute each pigeon in its original form.

      --
      Post may contain irony: discontinue use if experiencing mood swings, nausea or elevated blood pressure.
  68. Re:Works for me by mirix · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Yeah, 'accidental' civilian deaths, or deaths from 'necessary collateral damage' are so very noble and just.

    In Serbia the US/NATO 'accidentally' bombed a farmers market, two hospitals, the Chinese embassy, civilian radio/TV stations, bridges on the wrong side of the country with civilians on them, etc. Also random factories that weren't military-related industry (eg. tobacco) - Interestingly the tobacco factory got bought by Phillip Morris a couple years later...

    Chemical weapons are abhorrent, absolutely. But unless use is widespread, picking winners and causing more death and destruction isn't ideal, neither.

    --
    Sent from my PDP-11
  69. Re:Works for me by mi · · Score: 1

    you first kill everyone who donates money to the opposition--everybody stops giving them money, hampering their campaign. Then you kill anyone who's given any hint that they might vote for the opposition.

    But how would you be able to do all of this, if everybody — including your would-be victims — can access your communications (such as the orders to kill) just as well?

    Obama has already ordered the IRS to suppress the opposition, because the opposition's records weren't private, while Obama's and the IRS' still were. I'd argue, that opening everybody's records and communications would help prevent tyranny just as much as keeping records properly private.

    --
    In Soviet Washington the swamp drains you.
  70. Re:Works for me by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Insightful

    > I'd like us to continue treating encryption as weapons and regulate its export accordingly.

    Except that:
    - encryption is not a weapon so treating it as such makes no sense.
    - the rest of the world is able to invent encryption algorithms too. While creating good encryption requires very specialized knowledge and skill, these things are not exclusive to the US.
    - strong encryption is a requirement for electronic commerce, when the rest of the world does not have access to encryption this hurts the US financially.

  71. HTTPS forward secrecy to the rescue by wytcld · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Your can configure your HTTPS server to use forward secrecy. Forward secrecy uses one-time keys, generated by between the website and the browser for the single session. Most modern browsers support it. But it generally requires compiling the latest version of OpenSSL and the compiling Apache 2.4.x against that, not using the Apache 2.2.x versions that are standard in most of the Linux distros. More detail also here.

    If you set up your webserver this way, and your visitors use the right browsers, they NSA's having good copies of the site's certificates won't gain them much. At least that's what Ivan Risti's saying. On TLS/SSL stuff, there may be no one better.

    --
    "with their freedom lost all virtue lose" - Milton
    1. Re:HTTPS forward secrecy to the rescue by heypete · · Score: 3, Informative

      Forward secrecy is supported in Apache 2.2.x in the form of ephemeral Diffie Hellman key exchange ("DHE"). This works out-of-the-box on Debian and Ubuntu servers (I run a few Debian/Ubuntu servers, and have those options enabled) without needing to recompile anything.

      Apache 2.4.x is require for use of elliptic curve ephemeral Diffie Hellman ("ECDHE"), which provides greater protection with shorter key lengths (e.g. a 256-bit EC key is equivalent to a 3072-bit discrete log key, but Apache 2.2.x uses a baked-in set of DH parameters that's only 1024-bits long). EC is also a lot faster than discrete log DH which is useful in certain environments.

    2. Re:HTTPS forward secrecy to the rescue by heypete · · Score: 1

      True, and that's certainly a concern. The NSA could have chosen those parameters to weaken the algorithms or they could have chosen them to strengthen them much like they did with DES. Alternatively, the parameters could have been chose to optimize performance on certain systems, or perhaps even at random. It's not known why they chose what they did, so it makes sense to be somewhat skeptical. Still, the NSA recommends ECC for government use, so they seem to be reasonably confident about its security.

      Additionally, ECC offers considerable performance improvements over discrete log algorithms. According to this site, adding perfect forward secrecy with ECC requires an additional overhead of 15-30% or so, depending on optimizations. Using discrete log-based Diffie Hellman key exchange there's an overhead of about 300%. That can be considerable when you're running services at the scale of, say, Google.

      If you're particularly concerned about the security of ECC, and it's reasonable to be concerned, you could only use it where performance is important and extremely high security is not required.

  72. Sure, let's all take their word for it. by Valdrax · · Score: 1

    Where do your numbers come from? Who is making the judgment on whether the acts were legal or not? (i.e. Is following a very questionable interpretation of a law that is itself possibly unconstitutional still counted as legal?) Could the answer to both questions be the very agency whose conduct is being called into question?

    And if the NSA's portrayal of themselves as ultimately noble and only breaking the law because of training failures and low-level misconduct here and there is accurate, how long can you say that that will remain true? I'm guessing you'd probably just ask the NSA on that one too.

    --
    If it's for-profit but free, you're not the customer -- you're the product (e.g., the Slashdot Beta's "audience").
  73. Re:THIS... by AHuxley · · Score: 1

    The idea would go back to WW1 with a slight need for extra funding in the 1920-30's.
    The only other low point would have been in the 1990's as in CIA tensions.
    Foreign stations, staffing, meaningful political power vs just been on endless sub-committees.

    --
    Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
  74. The NSA must serve us, not attack us. by dweller_below · · Score: 3, Interesting
    As a security professional, one of my greatest threats is the Exploit Marketplace. You can fight mistakes. You can fight attackers. But it is almost impossible to fight economics. The exploit market is creating an economy that creates and enables exploit. It is the greatest driving force optimizing the Internet for Attack, instead of Defense. Now, it looks like the Exploit Marketplace was justified, founded and sustained by the NSA. We have learned that the NSA has enormous budgets devoted to purchasing exploits. Today we learn:

    "The NSA spends $250m a year on a program which, among other goals, works with technology companies to 'covertly influence' their product designs."

    So, the NSA creates exploit in everything they can influence. And they can influence almost everything. The NSA purchases exploit. Many times, they must be purchasing info on the exploits that they created. They preserve exploit. They mask everything in secrecy. And it all enhances the exploit marketplace.

    If we could just get the NSA out of the exploit market, the whole thing would probably collapse like a real-estate broker's wet dream.

    The other chilling revelation is the names of these programs:

    "The NSA's codeword for its decryption program, Bullrun, is taken from a major battle of the American civil war. Its British counterpart, Edgehill, is named after the first major engagement of the English civil war, more than 200 years earlier."

    The NSA has crappy internal discipline. Instead of using meaningless codewords for project names, their codewords frequently describe the project. PRISM described how the NSA collects info. These project names shout that the NSA is fomenting civil war. They are at war with the rest of the country.

    • * The NSA must be stripped of it's ability to create exploit.
    • * The NSA must be stripped of it's ability to purchase exploit.

    If we survive as a nation of liberty, the NSA must serve us, not attack us.

  75. Re:Works for me by Zak3056 · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Perhaps we shouldn't have provided the Syrians with the precursor chemicals to make weapons in the first place.

    Your position is laughable. You have the precursor chemicals to make weapons under your kitchen sink. It's basically impossible to have any kind of modern industrial base without them.

    People like you are why I can't buy fucking cold medicine anymore.

    --
    What part of "shall not be infringed" is so hard to understand?
  76. Re:THIS... by Swampash · · Score: 1

    The NSA was built in the 1950s. No conservative politician since then has attempted to have its powers limited.

  77. Re:Works for me by Pseudonym+Authority · · Score: 1

    And I suppose you think we should do something about it? Why are you such a bloodthirsty warmonger? Why do you support the huge military-industrial complex's war machine to violate the sovereignty of other nations and assert imperialism around the globe?

    False Dichotomy, I love this game and I'd love to play another round with you!

  78. Re:I'm stunned. by currently_awake · · Score: 2

    We do have such people in domestic economy, hence the wall street collapse. The total collapse of the reputation of the USA just takes longer to hit the ground is all.

  79. Re:Works for me by Pseudonym+Authority · · Score: 2

    Except it's nothing even close to that. The voyeurs with badges are absolutely shitting themselves over the face that someone had the nerve to expose their secrets. They sit in their tower, safe from any public scrutiny at all. They have so much privacy that you can't even tell others that you got a `warrant' served to force you to put in a backdoor apparently.

  80. Re:Wikileaks forced AES at least once by cryptizard · · Score: 1

    Nobody knows how it was encrypted, maybe it was a zip file with a password that they broke? If they had decrypted an AES file with a random key, we would know about it.

  81. Easy fix: by Tablizer · · Score: 1

    I just encrypt everything in Perl. It may be breakable, but it drives the analysts insane before they ever finish.

  82. Responsibilities by pgpalmer · · Score: 1
    From the Guardian article:

    The files show that the National Security Agency and its UK counterpart GCHQ have broadly compromised the guarantees that internet companies have given consumers to reassure them that their communications, online banking and medical records would be indecipherable to criminals or governments.

    As an example to compare against, I chose a major bank in my country (Australia's Commonwealth Bank), and looked around their website. There is a page called 'Security', and the first thing I spot on that page is the statement: "100% Security Guarantee: With NetBank, the safety of your money is 100% guaranteed."

    Putting aside the fact that the SAFETY of something is not necessarily the same as the SECURITY of something, what does this news mean to a banking customer? Does the bank have the obligation, under the advertised "100% Security Guarantee" to find and implement methods that hinder NSA/GCHQ access?

    And this doesn't affect just Commonwealth Bank (I just chose it as an example). One of the main points of putting money in a bank is that it's SECURE. If a government agency (from another country, even) has the ability to reach into my bank account and make my money disappear in a virtual puff of smoke, then how is the account any more secure than, for example, hiding cash under a mattress?

  83. Re:FREEEEEEEDOM! by cluedweasel · · Score: 3, Informative

    The Guardian article refers to it as a "10 year program" which would put it's inception in the Bush Jr. years. As for the EU is better argument, it looks like my own country's government was a prime mover in this. Way to go guys.

  84. expanding on this post. by Wycliffe · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Expanding on the above post, if the US is installing and/or exploiting bug related backdoors in
    commercial software it would take relatively few to reach 99+% coverage.
    If you can get the OS's you're set as you can hit 99% with less than a half dozen.
    Likewise with cellular providers, handset makers, virus scanners, printer (driver) manufacturers,
    cpu manufacturers, router manufacturers, email clients, web browsers, office suites, etc....
    Take any category of software or hardware most of which are dominated by only a few major players
    and if you can get your foot in the door with any of them then you have control of the computer or
    device. I'm not sure that linux even has that much advantage as there are few if any people who
    compile everything from scratch and even if they do, how hard would it really be to get an
    undocumented bug inserted into one of several hundred programs that run on a typical computer.
    If they're willing to throw enough time, money, and power behind it, there is no way someone can
    avoid being eavesdropped on.

  85. The more revelations we get about NSA spying... by Fantasio · · Score: 1

    The more revelations we get about the extent of NSA spying, the less I believe its purpose is fighting terrorism as it has always be claimed, or even ensure the security of American citizen. This cannot be justified in a democracy, even in a state of war.

  86. Re:Works for me by mrchaotica · · Score: 1

    Because knowledge is power, and people with power use it.

    Because the anointed Ruling Class will keep their privacy, and have an advantage... or they'll just apply the laws unequally (because what are you going to do about it, you little piss-ant plebe?)

    There's also an Ayn Rand quote about turning everyone into criminals that applies, but I hesitate to mention it because of all the objectivist baggage that comes with bringing her up...

    --

    "[Regarding the 'cloud,'] ownership was what made America different than Russia." -- Woz

  87. Re:Works for me by b4upoo · · Score: 1

    It's hardly a new issue and don't think for a moment that any form of encryption is safe and reasonably easy to use. Usually the spooks have both software and hardware alterations in place before they are released to the public. Also it is the very nature of communications that in a network or organization one or more members will be involved in crime or terror plots and foreigners as well. Interception of communications in foreign nations will capture much of what goes on inside the US as well.
                What will really rock your socks off is that technology is getting very close to operation lie detection methods that are very reliable. Imagine court rooms in which all witnesses as well as cops, lawyers and judges are wired and can not lie. What a party time that will be.

  88. Re:Works for me by marcosdumay · · Score: 4, Insightful

    You can't do much with the knowledge that a government wants you dead.

    But a government can do a lot with the knowledge that you want it replaced.

  89. Re:Works for me by PNutts · · Score: 1

    The phrase is "you have another think coming".

    Judas Priest disagrees.

  90. Tough Guys by PPH · · Score: 1

    From TFA:

    The secrecy of their capabilities against encryption is closely guarded, with analysts warned: "Do not ask about or speculate on sources or methods."

    Speculate away. What are they going to do? Assassinate you? And how long do you think the public would put up with that nonsense? You TLA boys will get defunded and your toys taken away. Then NSA will truly mean "No Such Agency".

    3000 deaths every dozen years? We can live with that. al Qaida isn't even as dangerous as Detroit.

    --
    Have gnu, will travel.
  91. Re:Works for me by casings · · Score: 1

    Your whole post is fucking retarded:

    1. Encryption isn't a weapon. Period. Comparing the two is fucking stupid.

    2. The president didn't ask the IRS to hurt opposition's finances. You were lied to by Darrell Issa who had no evidence but a heavily modified report which when taken as whole actually painted the IRS as anti-liberal rather than anti-conservative. But please keep spouting your ignorance on the subject, you really deserve those moderation points!

  92. Re:Works for me by andydread · · Score: 1

    Sorry Daily Caller is an "opposition" propoganda news source and therefore is hardly credible.

  93. Well, it's a good bet this is safe by FatherBash · · Score: 1
    This certificate is currently valid.

    User-ID:

    Ed Snowden

    a.k.a.:

    Ed Snowden

    a.k.a.:

    Edward Snowden

    a.k.a.:

    Edward Snowden

    a.k.a.:

    Edward Snowden

    Validity:

    from 2013-03-24 07:21 until forever

    Certificate type:

    4,096-bit RSA

    Certificate usage:

    Key-ID: 21B7141F

    Fingerprint: 21B7141F"

    So now we know what he uses

    1. Re:Well, it's a good bet this is safe by FatherBash · · Score: 1
      Oops, silly mistake. It should read This certificate is currently valid.

      User-ID:

      Ed Snowden edsnowden@lavabit.com

      a.k.a.:

      Ed Snowden edsnowden@hushmail.com

      a.k.a.:

      Edward Snowden edsnowden@hushmail.com

      a.k.a.:

      Edward Snowden edward_snowden@bah.com

      a.k.a.:

      Edward Snowden esnowden@boozallen.com

      Validity: from 2013-03-24 07:21 until forever Certificate type:

      4,096-bit RSA

      Certificate usage:

      Key-ID: 21B7141F

      Fingerprint: 21B7141F

  94. The only way by Reliable+Windmill · · Score: 1

    In the end, the only way to make sure no one is looking at your private conversation and data is to use end-to-end encryption in open source software on open source operating systems. Your data must be encrypted before it even reaches your hard drive or Internet stack, and you must know that there are no foreign programs running on your computer. You no longer have any guarantee of privacy on Windows and Mac OS X.

    --
    Signature intentionally left blank.
  95. Re:Works for me by Kazoo+the+Clown · · Score: 2

    I don't care what discussions Syria has internally about chemical weapons. I do care when they actually USE them, though I doubt that cruise missiles are an effective or moral response. The fact Syria HAD such weapons seemed to be known already, we're only now getting into a tiff over it since they may have actually been used. But If you think you need to decrypt someone's communications to figure that out if WMD has been used, you've got bigger problems, because Syria or the next Syria could end up using sneakernet for that communications, or a form of encryption you can't decrypt. This whole reliance on knowing everyone's electronic thoughtcrimes about WMD or whatever is simply laziness. There's this idea that you don't need spies on the ground who risk detection anymore and that it can all be done from an office chair in Langley, and frankly, that's dangerous thinking that puts us all at risk. Similar the idea that you don't need boots on the ground and can wage an effective pushbutton war. You can certainly kill a lot of people with a pushbutton, but that's not the same thing. However, it's easy to sell these ideas to get big budgets for cool equipment and the ability to violate privacy just like the Stasi and you don't even have to get out if your office chair to earn your paycheck. I'm sorry but it's a really lousy long-term solution for the rest of us.

  96. Re:Works for me by marauder · · Score: 2

    Why are you lot the only people in the world entitled to privacy?

  97. Re:Works for me by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative

    Spy on foreign governments and foreign citizens. They need to stay the fuck away from Citizens of the United States of America. Spying on Americans is what other governments are for.

    The NSA isn't actually spying on US CItizens, they're just storing the data in easy-to-interpret databases so that other governments can do the spying for the NSA. Oh, and probably also providing those governments with the tools they need to better spy on US Citizens.

    Skirting the law is easy with the right thinkers. New Zealand was doing a similar thing with the GCSB by sending their contractors off to work for other government agencies. The contractors, being employed by the other agencies and hidden from the GCSB by a really secure "please don't let us know if you use our computers while working for them" policy, weren't part of the GCSB, so didn't have to play by their rules (which basically said "no spying on NZ citizens", recently changed to "only spy on NZ citizens if the government-selected overseer decides there's good reason for it").

  98. Re:Works for me by Zontar+The+Mindless · · Score: 2

    I also give a fuck about the Syrian civilians who've been gassed.

    I also realise that bombing Syrian won't bring them back to life.

    It also occurs to me that the Assad régime's reaction to strikes against their country might well employ some "Now see what you made me do" logic to justify gassing some more.

    --
    Il n'y a pas de Planet B.
  99. NIST 2006 IT security related documentation by bytesex · · Score: 2

    The following documents were published in 2006 by NIST that relate to IT security:

    SP 800-96 PIV Card to Reader Interoperability Guidelines

    SP 800-103 DRAFT An Ontology of Identity Credentials, Part I: Background and Formulation

    SP 800-92 Guide to Computer Security Log Management

    SP 800-89 Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature Applications

    SP 800-88 Guidelines for Media Sanitization

    SP 800-69 Guidance for Securing Microsoft Windows XP Home Edition: A NIST Security Configuration Checklist

    SP 800-18 Rev.1 Guide for Developing Security Plans for Federal Information Systems

    --
    Religion is what happens when nature strikes and groupthink goes wrong.
  100. Re:Works for me by dcollins · · Score: 1

    "So do you want the NSA to break Syria's encryption about their chemical weapons attacks?"

    I want the NSA to tell us exactly when you stopped beating your wife.

    --
    We know where leadership by an anti-intellectual "strongman" who scapegoats minorities and likes boisterous rallies goes
  101. Question about Google's HTTPS by MatthiasF · · Score: 1

    Google pushed all of it's searches to SSL, thus encrypted, as a way to supposedly protect our searches from other's eyes.

    But doesn't doing our searching over encryption also put us into the situation where the NSA will record it "to be decrypted later"?

    Was Google one of the companies that shared keys or added a backdoor?

    1. Re:Question about Google's HTTPS by IamTheRealMike · · Score: 1

      Not all Google searches are encrypted. Only if you're logged in, or specifically visit encrypted.google.com. The reasons are complicated and stupid - to do with US schools with political clout that outsourced their internet filtering and couldn't filter searches (for the children!) if SSL was enabled for everyone. A bunch of companies/orgs in similar positions also complained.

      If you use Chrome at least then Chrome-Google communication is forward secure (compromise of the private key let's you MITM but not passively decrypt).

  102. FISA warrent gets ISP Private Keys by redelm · · Score: 1

    I would be surprised if the NSA did _NOT_ have all (few dozen) the private keys behind the Certs of Google, Yahoo, Hotmail, and their ilk. Trivially easy to get:

    1) Find credible evidence of certifiable badguy using service;

    2) Make application to FISA court for all keys & gag;

    3) Read _all_ traffic on the service, now or later (if cycles short at that time).

    The obvious problem is that ISP does not have keys for just target badguy, so have to hand everyone's keys over. The solution is to switch to per-user keys after auth, but that is more trouble.

  103. Do the numbers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Insightful

    the NSA has done over a 100,000,000 million legal searches.

    That means there is a court order for each of the searches. Assuming that every of the 300 million inhabitants of the U.S. is a certified judge, that still means that every of those judges is responsible for about 330000 court orders. Assuming that it takes about half an hour to evaluate and fill such an order and that an average month has about 165 working hours, it means that the average U.S. citizen has spent about 1000 months or 80 years of signing court orders for legal searches so far.

    Of course assuming that all of those searches were legal.

    Sounds legit to me.

  104. Always assume it is broken by Darinbob · · Score: 2

    First off, assume encryption is broken.
    Second, if you're relying on a third party to encrypt for you, then assume that they read your stuff before they even encrypted it.
    Third, if you're at all concerned about this stuff, then don't do anything on the internet that you don't want the entire world to know about.

    None of this news story should be a surprise to anyone. Everyone should already have assumed that the NSA cracked it all, and everyone should already have assume that the handy third party web sites are busily sending all your data to the NSA or someone else.

    This doesn't mean it's hopeless. It means don't be naive and trust third parties if you want security. Security does not coexist with convenience. Encrypt your sensitive data before you hand it off to someone else for transport (even then it may be broken, but it's vastly more secure than handing plain text to third party site and asking them to encrypt it on your behalf).

  105. Re:Works for me by DocHoncho · · Score: 4, Insightful

    So because there are scary bad men out there the government should be able to do whatever the fuck it wants to be able to catch them? Even if that includes massively violating the privacy of every citizen (never know who's a scary bad man!!) in the country? Even if it includes building a massive database filled with who the fuck knows what that never, ever, gets erased? You know how they say the internet forgets nothing? This is even worse, since random fruit loops on the internet don't have access to your phone records, your banking records, your phone calls, your location and every niggling little detail of your entire life! If you think it's bad that /b/ can access something stupid you said on your blog and troll you even if you delete it, just wait until some scary bad men, I mean trusted public servants, get ahold of all that juicy personal information that those stalwart do-gooders of the NSA put together for them, they'll have a field day! Accidently piss off some bureaucrat at the DMV? He'll just call his cousin at the Ministry of Love and they'll whip up some charges doubleplusquick then off to the Re-education centers (actually, that's too expensive, off to the work camps, more than likely).

    If you really think it's just "metadata" you're deluded. All this stuff that's coming out used to sound like the fever dreams of the loony fringe, and god damn does it suck having to listen to them smugly say "We told you so."

    --
    Celebrity worship is a poor substitute for Deity worship and costs more to boot.
  106. Encryption is a joke by WindBourne · · Score: 1

    Stenography is what is interesting.

    --
    I prefer the "u" in honour as it seems to be missing these days.
    1. Re:Encryption is a joke by Alioth · · Score: 2

      Being able to write in shorthand is good and all... but how is that going to help?

      (Or did you mean steganography?)

    2. Re:Encryption is a joke by WindBourne · · Score: 1

      LOL; Sometimes, I really hate chrome's spell checker combined with my words, but they do produce some interesting writing.

      --
      I prefer the "u" in honour as it seems to be missing these days.
  107. Back to snail mail by Lawrence_Bird · · Score: 1

    and one time pads for me

  108. Good thing. by yusing · · Score: 1

    Clearly all the years of talk of security and encryption has accomplished is to lull many of us into a false sense of security. (Much like meeting with the TSA at the airport.) That false sense has kept many of us from asking the hard questions and really thinking about the weaknesses of the whole setup... which, as we are seeing more and more clearly, is rotten to the stinking core.

    Good. Thinking about it all is good, and so is talking about it.

    --

    "You must try to forget all you have learned. You must begin to dream." -- Sherwood Anderson

  109. Re:Works for me by __aaltlg1547 · · Score: 1

    All else aside, if you think the NSA breaks codes in order to prevent civilian casualties, or for "charity", you have another thing coming. They do it to provide intelligence to the US government to facilitate furthering its national interest, in whatever form that may take. And if you think civilian casualties or chemical weapons are the actual reason we are considering whether or not to attack Syria, you have yet another thing coming.

    Well, yes. The NSA breaks codes to provide intelligence to the US government. We've known that for a long time. It's not a secret.

    And I do think the chemical weapons are the issue -- not civilian casualties. The government hardly raised an eyebrow for two years while the Assad government murdered its citizens by the thousands with bullets, shells, grenades and fuel-air bombs and anything else they could think of. It's not like anything else changed. The chemical weapons are the only difference I see.

  110. Hezbollah or Al Qaeda? by ulatekh · · Score: 1

    So which side are you taking in the Syrian conflict...Hezbollah's or Al Qaeda's?

    It's like debating virtue among whores.

    --
    "Once we've identified and embraced our sickness, we'll have strength...and that's when we get dangerous." - John Waters
  111. Re:Works for me by MacDork · · Score: 1

    because the opposition's records weren't private, while Obama's and the IRS' still were. I'd argue, that opening everybody's records and communications would help prevent tyranny just as much as keeping records properly private.

    And now that you know about it, what have you done exactly? You've lifted a finger to complain on slashdot. I'm sure that will scare Obama into being a good boy again. Thanks Captain Freedom.

  112. Re:Works for me by DocHoncho · · Score: 2

    I interpreted that the GP as meaning that as it is the government eliminating privacy there would be an implicit asymmetry in the access of such information. That is, the government, or more properly its agents, would have unprecedented access into the personal lives of, well, everybody. The statement "If there is no privacy the government will eventually degenerate to a tyranny" does not imply that absolutely all privacy is removed, rather, the privacy of ordinary citizens is removed and those who can pay or otherwise maintain control of their own privacy, i.e. by brute force, have a grossly unbalanced amount of power and tyranny results from the malicious use of that power.

    I mean really, if the NSA can break all encryption what exactly leads to the conclusion that everyone can do it? Even in the event that some clever crackers find and exploit whatever backdoors the NSA had placed in some encryption method most people would not have the resources or skills to intercept enough of other peoples traffic to make any real use of that ability. We've been hearing about how the NSA basically stores all, or nearly all, internet traffic. Do you have a tap at ATT&T as well?

    --
    Celebrity worship is a poor substitute for Deity worship and costs more to boot.
  113. Re:Works for me by ulatekh · · Score: 1

    That reminds me...I have a rock that wards off tigers. I'll sell it to you. You want proof that it works? Well, I don't see any tigers around, do you?

    --
    "Once we've identified and embraced our sickness, we'll have strength...and that's when we get dangerous." - John Waters
  114. Re: Works for me by dataspel · · Score: 2

    lol ok not gonna argue with Judas Priest

  115. you seriously need to back up that claim by SuperBanana · · Score: 2

    how do we know that the session keys are chosen securely and not divulged with steganography somehow? I know that products have existed which did exactly that, revealing part of the encryption key in the encrypted data stream (and I know that because the vendor was fairly open about the practice).

    If you're going to make such a massive claim, you need to back it up. Name the vendor/manufacturer and equipment, or I, and every other slashdot reader, will consider this bullshit.

    1. Re:you seriously need to back up that claim by CBravo · · Score: 1

      I would call it 'unverified statement' or 'rumour' instead of bullshit. His uid counts for something as do his previous postings. It is a massive claim though.

      --
      nosig today
    2. Re:you seriously need to back up that claim by amorsen · · Score: 1

      Raptor Eagle Firewall, which later became the Symantec Enterprise Firewall (but by then the code was hopefully gone). Due to export restrictions, its DES encryption revealed 24 bits that the US authorities could somehow extract. At least that was the explanation given to resellers. This code presumably existed only in the export version. Eventually the export restrictions were lifted and hopefully the code was removed.

      I think it is unfair to single out that product though, since every US vendor complied with the same restriction somehow. Others chose to implement IBM's CDMF 40-bit degrade of DES instead.

      --
      Finally! A year of moderation! Ready for 2019?
  116. Why does the NSA HQ look like Mecca? by aNonnyMouseCowered · · Score: 1

    A bit OT. But the first thing that struck me when I got to the NY Times story is a picture of the NSA headquarters that vaguely reminded me of Mecca, particularly the Kaaba, that black building at the center of the Islamic religion. Both buildings appear to rise up from their surrounds like the real life equivalent of the black monolith in 2001: A Space Odyssey.

    See for yourself and compare:

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Mosqu%C3%A9e_Masjid_el_Haram_%C3%A0_la_Mecque.jpg
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:National_Security_Agency_headquarters,_Fort_Meade,_Maryland.jpg

  117. Re:Works for me by zaft · · Score: 1

    You don't think we won the first Gulf war? Well, it probably depends both on your definition of "war" and "win". We haven't declared war since 1941.

  118. Re: Works for me by naranek · · Score: 2

    You guys have a good think going!

    --
    Only dumb birds land downwind.
  119. On the bright side... by nicc777 · · Score: 1
    --
    Need an ISP in South Africa?
  120. Re: Works for me by SpaghettiPattern · · Score: 1

    Be gentle man. You just broke to him that he has a kitchen sink. You insensitive clot!

    --

    I hadn't the slightest objection to his spending his time planning massacres for the bourgeoisie... (P.G. Wodehouse)
  121. Re:Works for me by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Interesting

    So it's okay if you're spied on by Australians, and Australians are spied on by the USA, and any intelligence is shared?

  122. Actually... by lhaeh · · Score: 1

    I read about this one a while back:
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CBU-97_Sensor_Fuzed_Weapon

    It's pretty amazing how it works, I didn't know anything nearly this advanced was around until I accidnetly stumled across its wikipedia page.

  123. Re:Works for me by jandersen · · Score: 1

    Children children, there is no need to get emotional or fight about this. Like all technology, the ability to break codes can be used for both good and bad.

    The real worry is - when NSA can do it, then there will be other criminals who can as well. You may not like your government, but they are pretty sweet compared to Mexican drug cartels or the Mafia; and even they are notable for their humane touch compared to some of the major gangs in SE Asia.

  124. Re:I'm stunned. by Opportunist · · Score: 1

    The reputation of the US has already reached rock bottom. The reason it still has "friends" is the same why the school bully still has "friends". They don't really like him, but by pretending they do they not only don't get beaten up by him, they might even enjoy some of the spoils when he beats up the geeks for their lunch money.

    --
    We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
  125. Self Signed Certs by flyingfsck · · Score: 1

    Self Signed Certs are good, if you control both ends of the pipe, as for a corporate VPN. If you only control one end, as for a public web server, then a self signed cert system doesn't confirm the identity of the other end, so you could be talking directly with Edward Snowdon's second cousin twice removed at the FSB and would not know it.

    --
    Excuse me, but please get off my Pennisetum Clandestinum, eh!
  126. Works well with "All your base..." by advid.net · · Score: 1

    The famous joke is allready at equilibrium and the site knows this !

    BTW, thanks for the link

  127. The real concern by Taco+Cowboy · · Score: 5, Insightful

    While you guys are cracking jokes on ROT13, a letter to NYT ( http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html?_r=0 ) caught my attention

    - - - B Missouri Reader
            Missouri

    On the one hand, âoeIn the future, superpowers will be made or broken based on the strength of their cryptanalytic programs,â but on the other hand the liberties of Americans are at risk by such programs.

    In other words, we face a situation where the strongest, most secure nation can no longer be a nation that guarantees the rights of its citizens.

    Privacy is not simply a convenience, but it is intimately linked to free speech and to the future prospects for democracy in America. Key elements of the Constitution provide a framework where incumbents can be challenged in free elections, ensuring that better ideas and better leaders will become available to guide the nation. But nobody can win an election against an incumbent with unlimited access to the communications of its rivals. We're not there yet, but the trend is in that direction.

    It is high time that members of both parties in Congress get off of their high horses and address this growing threat to our democracy. Technical and legal hurdles must be cleared, and it may even be necessary to make significant changes in the way the internet works. But time passes very quickly in the technology world, and the clock has already been ticking for quite a long time."

    --
    Muchas Gracias, Señor Edward Snowden !
  128. What is Bruce Schneier's game? by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 1
    From the second link:

    Since I started working with Snowden's documents, I have been using GPG, Silent Circle, Tails, OTR, TrueCrypt, BleachBit, and a few other things I'm not going to write about.

    He recommend Silent Circle right after saying "the NSA also works with security product vendors to ensure that commercial encryption products are broken in secret ways that only it knows about. "

    Silent circle - a US and UK connected commercial company - propriety closed source, and in a sneaky "no we are open, really trust us" sort of way. W T F!???

    let me reproduce this message posted to the comment section of the second link you posted.

    I usually rate Bruce Schneier highly, except for his faux pas a few years ago when he initially endorsed showing passwords on screen, saying that shoulder surfing is not such a big deal.

    But I am not sure about some of the security mobs he is advocating here.

    GPG: OK, clever people can read the source code (though most average Joe programmers can't)

    Silent Circle: It's USA based, and subject to the same backdoor 'requests' as anyone US-based company. It also employs ex-special forces 'security experts' - just the sort of people who might go and do wiretaps in foreign climes.

    Tails: What I have just seen on their website, 'Numerous security holes in Tails 0.19 Posted Mon 05 Aug 2013 12:00:00 AM CEST'. Not exactly the best advert and hardly comforting if one wanted security.

    OTR: Same as GPG as the source code is available.

    Truecrypt: Well the soruce code is avaiable, so I would put it in the same basket as GPG. It has a choice of algorithms, including one (partly) designed by Schneier.

    Bleachbit: Well that is client-side. Anything in the clear across the net (i.e. non encrypted traffic) can be read anywhere along the route.

    But the big glaring thing is, at least in the UK, you can be sent to prison for refusing to hand over your encryption keys. And this has happened. People like to talk big, but the prospect of eating porridge with a lot of nasty looking and foul smelling prisoners, does not appeal to most people.

    I would say that doing your own encryption, by this I mean using some of the open source tools and not closed source ones (and definitely not American ones) is a good thing.

  129. Re:THIS... by FriendlyLurker · · Score: 1

    See my post here in this thread.. I don't understand how Bruce Schneier can recommend Silent Circle right after saying "the NSA also works with security product vendors to ensure that commercial encryption products are broken in secret ways that only it knows about. "

    Silent circle - a US and UK connected commercial company - propriety closed source, and in a sneaky "no we are open, really trust us" sort of way. W T F!???

  130. Re:Works for me by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    I do. I do give a fuck about people who nerve gas to kill civilians in large amounts. If you don't, you are a sociopath.

    Why does "caring about the civilians" have to equate to "bombing Syria"? Bombing Syria is likely to shatter human lives, civilian, military, and political; leaders and followers. How many more civilians need to be killed to punish Assad for killing civilians? It is the leap of faith from compassion to violence that much of the world is unwilling to make. Right now, the US is running around telling everyone that, if we 'allow' Assad to use chemical weapons, we send the message that such use is ok. Every time the US takes more-or-less unilateral military action against a sovereign power, it sends the message that preemptive or punitive military action is OK, and nevermind what the UN says.

    The US wants to lead the world? Fine: do it by example. Show us a world of rational, adult politicians capable of building consensus support for carefully considered decisions. Show us a world that respects both sides of a dispute and finds the common ground among all parties. For now, US international policy seems to be stuck in the same uncompromising, do-as-I-say under progressively more violent sanctions, paradigm that characterizes playground bullies. The US is showing the world that bigger, better guns give a nation the right to impose its fickle will on other countries. It's showing the world that possession of a nuclear weapon makes you immune to serious military action.

  131. Re:Works for me by captjc · · Score: 2

    Your whole post is fucking retarded:

    1. Encryption isn't a weapon. Period. Comparing the two is fucking stupid.

    You do realize that up until around 1992 cryptography was considered a munition in the US and the export of which was heavily regulated.

    --
    Slow Down Cowboy! It's been 1 hour, 47 minutes since you last successfully posted a comment
  132. Re:That's no fix by Lennie · · Score: 1

    > better to keep your communications inside your own country.

    This is not enough. Just look at Germany.

    Transit providers were involved with providing copies of traffic to the NSA or GCHQ (basically a port-mirror) in Germany, there is a compound about 30 kilometers away from the DE-CIX Internet Exchange in Germany.

    Here is an introductory article:

    http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/08/seven-telcos-named-as-providing-fiber-optic-cable-access-to-uk-spies/

    --
    New things are always on the horizon
  133. Re:MISINFORMATION by TCM · · Score: 2

    Stop writing. Just stop.

    Private keys are not sent anywhere, ever. If someone is generating your private key for you, in a browser nonetheless, you are doing PKI wrong. Period.

    --
    Of course it runs NetBSD. BTC: 1NT7QvbetmANwaMzhpVL6
  134. Re:THIS... by Sigmon · · Score: 1

    George W Bush was not remotely conservative. Dumbass.

  135. Re:THIS... by Sigmon · · Score: 1

    You fail at reading comprehension. Nowhere in my comment did I say that.

  136. Re:THIS... by Sigmon · · Score: 1

    Um.. huh? You just contradicted yourself. Do you not realize that 'liberal' and 'conservative' - in the political sense, in the U.S. - are words used to describe one's political philosophy on how much power government should have?

  137. Re:THIS... by Sigmon · · Score: 1

    They weren't spying on the entire American population's communications the last time conservatives held any significant political power either.

  138. Re:THIS... by Sigmon · · Score: 1

    Prat, eh? I presume you're a Brit...
    I shall forgive your apparent ignorance of American politics - or perhaps I should have mentioned that I'm a conservative in the context of American politics.
    There are differences - some subtle, some significant - between the meaning of liberal and conservative in American vs. British politics.

    I define 'big government' by the scope and breadth of its power over its governed. A government so powerful it can record virtually ALL of its citizen's electronic communications - and even decode supposedly private communications - is decidedly 'BIG'. If you disagree with this, fine... but you and I have nothing to discuss. It's not a meaningless phrase, however...

    Liberal political ideology leads directly to government having these kinds of unchecked powers - that are sometimes secret and shrouded in mystery... Powers that will eventually be abused - no matter how good the intentions were at the start. Political leaders are not angels - they are humans who, like everybody else, are fallible, imperfect, greedy and power-hungry to one extent or another. Conservatism seeks to limit the scope and power of a centralized government - and guard against too few people gathering too much power unto themselves.

  139. NSA=China by zeroryoko1974 · · Score: 1

    Really, all the things they have been complaining that China was doing, the NSA was also doing, and more. All that encrpytion cracking stuff, just waiting to be stolen by an enterprising hacker. Start sending your bills for identity theft to the NSA

  140. Re:Works for me by mi · · Score: 1

    Encryption isn't a weapon. Period.

    Encryption is no less a weapon than, for example, a bulletproof vest. And though you can buy those on eBay, you must vouch to be an American and promise not to export it...

    The president didn't ask the IRS to hurt opposition's finances

    Oh, but he did... Of course, he retained a perfectly plausible deniability, and there is not enough evidence for a "beyond reasonable doubt" conviction. But there is plentiful "preponderance of evidence" none-the-less...

    --
    In Soviet Washington the swamp drains you.
  141. Re: Works for me by Dishevel · · Score: 1

    What does your naive ass think the NSA is for? It is for gaining intelligence on foreign countries. Other governments have similar operations.

    --
    Why is it so hard to only have politicians for a few years, then have them go away?
  142. Encryption is useless by jodido · · Score: 1

    If you read the article carefully--I know, that's a stupid thing to say on /.--you'll see that the NSA often simply bypassed encryption entirely by grabbing the data either before it was encrypted or after it was decrypted. So the argument about which encryption is "better" is irrelevant. More importantly, anyone who believed that any of their communications COULD NOT through technical means end up in the hands of the government was/is naive.

  143. Re: Works for me by kilfarsnar · · Score: 1

    Interesting! Thanks for the link. But because I am a child of the 80's, and because it rocks, I'm sticking with the Judas Priest interpretation.

    --
    "What the American public doesn't know is what makes them the American public." -Ray Zalinsky (Tommy Boy)
  144. Re:Works for me by mi · · Score: 1

    - encryption is not a weapon so treating it as such makes no sense.

    It is, and was even treated as such until 1992 — when the export bans were abolished because of being impractical.

    - the rest of the world is able to invent encryption algorithms too

    Absolutely. But if the foreigners were unable to use our algorithms, there would've been no justification for the NSA to seek to undermine and break them. They would've been able to perform their mission — spying on foreigners — while unable to spy on Americans.

    - strong encryption is a requirement for electronic commerce, when the rest of the world does not have access to encryption this hurts the US financially.

    As you said, the rest of the world can invent their own methods — and the NSA would be allowed (nay, encouraged!) to covertly break into them. And the American firms would've had the advantage of being able to use American algorithms (even if only with American customers).

    But all of this is moot, because it is between simply impossible to keep an algorithm a secret for very long — all the while various implementations of it are in daily use by millions of people.

    --
    In Soviet Washington the swamp drains you.
  145. Re:Works for me by Dins · · Score: 1

    Dear America, The world does not belong to you. You have a pretty big country, to take care of, please mind your own business. We are sure Syrian will come to a solution by themselves, because you know, they are a sovereign country. Best regards, The rest of the World

    Yeah. Thing is, the overwhelming majority of Americans agree. But Obama drew a line in the sand last year, and now we have to kill people in order to save face, you know......

  146. Scared by phorm · · Score: 1

    Which is probably what actually scares the government. Civilians are generally outgunned by the military (and particularly the US military), however - while sarin etc are not quite as easy - there's a *lot* of stuff that can be made from common chemicals.

    They're afraid that not presenting a show of force now will "encourage" further use of such chemicals in the future, which puts their own military at somewhat of a disadvantage. Big guns don't do much against nerve gas, and it's already been shown that basic (component-wise) roadside bombs etc are pretty hard to defend against too.

  147. Re:Works for me by Mephistophles · · Score: 1

    Totally agree. I'd expect the NSA to be the best at what they're supposed to do. Trouble is, the have no regulation or scrutiny. The rubber stamp FISA court is a joke. The NSA spends a lot of time lying, spying on, and gaming American citizens, when they should be devoting that time and energy to cracking codes from our enemies. Sheesh.

  148. Why should anyone be surprised? by Benders · · Score: 1

    The NSA is the supreme code-cracker of all code-crackers. They basically invented the word encryption as it relates to modern times. If they can access it, I bet they can crack it, (since they wrote most of the algorithms used for encryption). They now read your emails, listen to your cell calls, and probably read your letters. And, they provide that information to the Administration in power. George Orwell was being a fortune teller, he was demonstrating what you get when you give a government that much power. We weren't there in 1984, so his timing was off, but we most certainly are there now. And it is all covered under the blanket of protecting the National Security, and Mr Snowden has tried to show us and the world just exactly what we are paying our government to do. Absolute Power Corrupts Absolutely! Benders

  149. Re:THIS... by mspohr · · Score: 1

    I hate to get into a political philosophy argument since these tend to go around in circles, generating lots of heat but no light so I will just quote William Buckley from the first National Review in 1955. I believe that he can be considered an authority on American Conservatism.
    "It is the job of centralized government (in peacetime) to protect its citizens’ lives, liberty and property. All other activities of government tend to diminish freedom and hamper progress. "
    Unfortunately, all of this spying is being done in the name of protecting citizens' lives, liberty and property. I see no difference between liberals or conservatives on this issue... they are both corrupt.

    --
    I don't read your sig. Why are you reading mine?
  150. Re:Works for me by BitZtream · · Score: 1

    Problem is, as everyone likes to ignore, most of the middle east is BEGGING US to do something.

    If the wikileaks cables showed the world anything it was the while countries in the middle east 'denounce' America in public, they secretly beg us to fucking help take out their trash.

    Funny how people ignore these things, but seem to be too fucking stupid to notice the edits in the whole collateral murder video.

    --
    Persistent Volume manager for Kubernetes - https://github.com/dwimsey/openshift-pvmanager
  151. Again, not big news by cundare · · Score: 1
    Reported in Wired over a year ago. Check out the cover story that described the Utah NSA construction. A paragraph is buried in there about reports within the encryption community about the NSA making a "game-changing" advance in encryption-cracking a few years after 9/11. I don't think I'm reading too much into it to interpret Wired's language as implying that cryptologists had figured a way to circumvent even 128-bit keys.

    Or maybe I am? Read the piece and let me know what you think. The language does appear to be deliberately vague.P?

  152. "Digital Scrambling" by DarthVain · · Score: 1

    If the NSA has referred to encryption as "Digital Scrambling" I think we are just fine.

  153. Re:Works for me by ae1294 · · Score: 1

    I've never seen a bomb that doesn't kill EVERYBODY in an area. As I understand you US have invented a bomb which when exploding sends its parts to search for military people?

    Whaat? That would be pointless... They are all guilty of something! They shouldn't have done whatever it was they did.

  154. Re:Works for me by steelfood · · Score: 1

    Your party stays in power indefinately, the only things that might end your reign are a split in your party, or killing off so many people that there not enough people left to work and your economy collapses.

    In a resource-thin country, that'd be true. In a resource-rich country, the government and people left would raze the country's available natural resources if only in order to survive.

    And then, after that, a stronger country, probably a neighboring one, will continue to prop up your government, because that country wants to keep your's stable.

    --
    "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be."
  155. bluff by tom+arnall · · Score: 1

    there is no way to affirm or refute the assertion, by definition. So we're supposed to believe a statement which can't be proved or disproved and which is made by known liars. duh?

    aren't these the same people who claimed they were firing 90% of their sysadmins?

    bluff, bluff, bluff.

    you've got no clothes on, fellas, and people are talking about you.

  156. Re:Works for me by Patch86 · · Score: 1

    As a citizen of a foreign country, allow me to be the first to say: fuck you.

    Also: I hope you enjoy having every byte of data and second of phone call monitored by the Chinese intelligence services, because you have rather surrendered the moral high-ground and with it any right to complain about your privacy being violated by malicious superpowers.

  157. Re:Works for me by Dishevel · · Score: 1

    Say whatever you want. It is my governments job to secure my freedoms from foreign intervention. It is your governments job to do so for you. Your lack of understanding is really cute. Do you go to your boss everyday and list out the things that happened yesterday that "Just were not Fair!"?

    --
    Why is it so hard to only have politicians for a few years, then have them go away?
  158. I am thinking internet, not intranet.. by jotaeleemeese · · Score: 1

    Having a CA public key changed is a real PITA because there is no easy way to update such key in Joe Public's web browser.

    Of course in your Intranet you can do whatever you want to Joe Employee's computer, and I am sure proper OSes, where their code can be inspected for added security, can comply with this task.

    --
    IANAL but write like a drunk one.