Ed Felten: Why Email Services Should Be Court-Order Resistant
Jah-Wren Ryel sends this excerpt from Ed Felten at Freedom to Tinker:
"Commentators on the Lavabit case, including the judge himself, have criticized Lavabit for designing its system in a way that resisted court-ordered access to user data. They ask: If court orders are legitimate, why should we allow engineers to design services that protect users against court-ordered access? The answer is simple but subtle: There are good reasons to protect against insider attacks, and a court order is an insider attack. To see why, consider two companies, which we’ll call Lavabit and Guavabit. At Lavabit, an employee, on receiving a court order, copies user data and gives it to an outside party—in this case, the government. Meanwhile, over at Guavabit, an employee, on receiving a bribe or extortion threat from a drug cartel, copies user data and gives it to an outside party—in this case, the drug cartel.
From a purely technological standpoint, these two scenarios are exactly the same: an employee copies user data and gives it to an outside party. Only two things are different: the employee’s motivation, and the destination of the data after it leaves the company."
So a court case that was created as a knee-jerk response to Snowden is arguing that organizations shouldn't take steps to prevent leaks like Snowden .....
This model describes the problem pretty well. Of course it can be extended: What if the judge or (given an over-broad wiretap order) the police is in league with the attacker, freely or by coercion? That is not unheard of either.
Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
What next? Complaining about hidden compartment in desks?
Oh, I don't know...because of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"? I don't know about you, Mr. Judge, but I personally don't want a court, court-ordered or not, snooping on my life--such inherently is a big way to disrupt my happiness. But, even if we forgo the DoI and move to the CotUS, it's "life, liberty, and property". Well, whether you view it as the user's property or Lavabit's property, they sure as fuck can do what they want with it. What part of any of that should be to make the court's job easier? Why would they seek to bend over backwards for any court?
Of course, the big one is liberty. The biggest liberty of all is exploring the possibilities of math and the universe. And that heavily flows into attempts to make functionally unbreakable encryption resistant to even the US government. And is also flows from the point of just being a general asshole, which God Bless the United States of America, is very much recognized as a Creator given right. Clearly the judge is exercising it when he shows contempt for other people daring to live their lives in ways he doesn't like.
Honestly, though, I do not try to be too much of an asshole. And I do recognize that there does need to be a means for courts and court-orders to function. The problem the judge seems to realize--and honestly why the NSA keeps getting the go ahead--is that criminals are most inclined to use those sorts of tools to hide their activities. The good response should be the obvious: most criminals don't go through the bother because they don't think they'll be caught and the rest are almost always found before the court-order (after all, you have to have evidence to get that far) or the court-order is a very inappropriate fishing expedition. All a court-order is there for is to solidify a case, not to make one. And so the very notion that there's something wrong with efforts to make their case inherently harder to prove is, well, fine by me. It almost always just means the prosecutor and the police have to work a bit harder to prove their case, if they care enough to go through the effort. The real limit of justice then is not the strength of encryption or the willingness of first or third parties to comply with handing over incrimination evidence. It has almost everything to do with running a decent investigation in the first place.
PS - *sigh* The NSA part was probably unnecessary, but it reeks of the same stupidity and with the same sorts of results. Trying to find a needle in a haystack is easier because at least then you know you're looking for a needle. And if, by analogy, you know you're looking for a specific terrorist plot in a general time frame with certain people, you're already 90% of your way towards having a prosecutable case and a pathway to find accomplices.
Eurohacker European paranoia, gun rights, and h
Actually, the employee's motivation is likely the same as well. And the destination seems to getting more similar every day.
As to his comment about turning over the master key, it would have made no difference if they had protections on their master key. They didn't turn over their master key anyway. They did shut down, and they would have had to shut down either way. Because if they didn't shut down and had their key secure (say in an RSA box), the government would have just compelled to give them access to their key to sign stuff or to present as a credential. In other words to impersonate them.
The only way to avoid all this was to just shut down so there could be no mistake. If that key is used again, you know it's the NSA doing it, not Lavabit.
I would love to hear how Ed Felten thinks a private key can be both kept inaccessible and used tens of thousands of times a day to secure SSL connections.
Even if you keep it in a box, if the box will gleefully operate on the key thousands or millions of times a day, then you can just virtualize the key to a remote location (like say NSA HQ) by forwarding any requests to use the key to the box across the net. No need to even have the key at all in that case.
http://lkml.org/lkml/2005/8/20/95
Yeah, I'd like to appeal my murder...
Yeah, lots of others would like to appeal theirs' too.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wrongful_execution#United_States
Cameron Todd Willingham was executed February, 2004, for murdering his three young children by arson at the family home in Corsicana, Texas. Nationally known fire investigator Gerald Hurst reviewed the case documents, including the trial transcriptions and an hour-long videotape of the aftermath of the fire scene and said in December 2004 that "There's nothing to suggest to any reasonable arson investigator that this was an arson fire. It was just a fire."[12] In 2010, the Innocence Project filed a lawsuit against the State of Texas, seeking a judgment of "official oppression".[13]
Statistics likely understate the actual problem of wrongful convictions because once an execution has occurred there is often insufficient motivation and finance to keep a case open, and it becomes unlikely at that point that the miscarriage of justice will ever be exposed. In the case of Joseph Roger O'Dell III, executed in Virginia in 1997 for a rape and murder, a prosecuting attorney argued in court in 1998 that if posthumous DNA results exonerated O'Dell, "it would be shouted from the rooftops that ... Virginia executed an innocent man." The state prevailed, and the evidence was destroyed.[14]
Johnny Garrett of Texas was executed February, 1992, for allegedly raping and murdering a nun. In March, 2004, cold-case DNA testing identified Leoncio Rueda as the rapist and murderer of another elderly victim killed four months prior.[15] Immediately following the nun's murder, prosecutors and police were certain the two cases were committed by the same assailant.[16] In both cases, black curly head hairs were found on the victims, linked to Rueda. Previously unidentified fingerprints in the nun's room were matched to Rueda. The flawed case is explored in a 2008 documentary The Last Word.
Jesse Tafero was convicted of murder and executed via electric chair May, 1990, in the state of Florida for the murders of two Florida Highway Patrol officers. The conviction of a codefendant was overturned in 1992 after a recreation of the crime scene indicated a third person had committed the murders.[17]
Carlos DeLuna was executed in Texas in December 1989. Subsequent investigations cast strong doubt upon DeLuna's guilt for the murder of which he had been convicted.[18][19]
Thomas and Meeks Griffin were executed in 1915 for the murder of a man involved in an interracial affair two years previously but were pardoned 94 years after execution. It is thought that they were arrested and charged because they were not wealthy enough to hire competent legal counsel and get an acquittal.[20]
Chipita Rodriguez was hanged in San Patricio County, Texas in 1863 for murdering a horse trader, and 122 years later, the Texas Legislature passed a resolution exonerating her.
The list of wrongly jailed for life is too long to list.
They ask: If court orders are legitimate, why should we allow engineers to design services that protect users against court-ordered access?
The real answer question is, in what fucking world is it appropriate for courts to say what a private company programs?!? If the encryption is not illegal (it shouldn't be either way, but encryption is still legal in the US) the judiciary has no business saying whether it should be used or not.
"If court orders are legitimate..." -- see there Mr Judge, you've answered your own question.
Technically, the sequence was a little more complicated.
They were ordered to insert a backdoor. They ignored the order. The government then asked to get the master key. At that point they consented to putting the backdoor in, but it was too late. When they were ordered to hand the master key, they quit.
Shachar
Feds asked without a court-sanctioned warrant to insert a backdoor. When LavaBit didn't respond, Feds got a warrant, but this time to hand over the SSL private key. That''s when LavaBit decided that it was useless trying to fight, and quit instead.
Help I am stuck in a signature factory!
Try using the tried and true encryption method. A piece of paper inside an envelope, with a stamp and an address.
That has got to be one of the dumbest comments I've ever heard on the internet. Wow. Just, wow.
Tic-Tac-Toe, Global Thermonuclear War, and relationships all have the same winning move.
Imagine that one wishes to prevent subversion by drug cartels but honour (or appeal) court orders. This is the problem that public libraries have dealt with since their creation. Someone always wants to know what person X has been reading, in hopes of using it against them....
Library software is normally written to preserve privacy, and discard the record that "X has book Y" when the book is returned. It can be written this way because several of the countries where it is sold require privacy as part of their legal system. Purchasers in other countries get privacy as a side-effect.
Countries prohibiting privacy would require a special version for a quite limited market, and the library software companies aren't motivated to deal with them: just doing an internationalization/localization to get into a small market is hard enough!
When an individual library is served with a court order, they can honour it by doing a lookup once a day and writing X's new books down on a piece of paper. As this doesn't scale, and is also a credible cost, the willingness of courts to order it is reduced, and the damage to privacy is limited.
Applying this to email, one wishes to keep routing data only until a message is delivered to the next host and we get a "250 OK" from SMTP. If a court wishes to collect that metadata, they can station an officer with a laptop at the ISP and gobble up the packets routed to/from him. This is onerous, and in Canada at least requires a "wiretap warrant", which the courts restrict more than ordinary search warrants.
The person wishing to provide this kind of information to a drug cartel has the same hard task, and is also more likely to be detected by the ISP.
To oversimplify, we're keeping far too much information about email: an author or vendor should take notice of the privacy laws of their preferred markets and discard debugging/diagnostic information at the end of a successful delivery. If they wish to cover themselves against customer complaints, they might send delivery notices that the customer can read or filter out at their convenience.
--dave
davecb@spamcop.net
How many government employees combing through Lavabit's customer data are delivering it to the drug cartels?
Court orders help because it forces crooked government employees to go before a third party to explain themselves.
The primary problem most people have with the NSA data dragnet is that there is no system of checks to prevent such access. Once the data has been scooped up, nothing can stop an insider from misusing it. Look at Snowden. Only his motives differed from those of crooked employees.
Have gnu, will travel.
Feds asked without a court-sanctioned warrant to insert a backdoor. When LavaBit didn't respond, Feds got a warrant, but this time to hand over the SSL private key. That''s when LavaBit decided that it was useless trying to fight, and quit instead.
and this is why the Lavabit Design was inferior. They held a Master Key to all of their users encryption, thus any government/employee could access what you considered private. The main point is that Lavabit held the Private Keys that could decrypt any/all messages sent through their system and this is what People need to scream about due to the security violations it created by design. A better use of the Defective by Design tag
One thing that folks haven't thought of though I doubt the Feds haven't missed is both the potential SarBox and Insider Trading issues. By Lavabit having a private key that could decrypt everything, they had the potential to scan any corporate mail for confidential information that could/would affect the share price - thus the insider trading issue. The SarBox issue comes from the same ability to decrypt information at will as it gave employees the oppurtunity to sell information that allowed a competitor an advantage, thus decreasing profits and they could be tied up in court for the rest of their lives while the sharks go through discovery.
Anyone that used Lavabit for any reason had better consider this as any and all information that was exchanged using their service will be decrypted and read by the Courts, Lawyers and everyone else. In other words, all Lavabit users are "Screwed, Blued and Tattooed".
Fast Turtle