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Cornell Team Says It's Unified the Structure of Scientific Theories

An anonymous reader writes "Cornell physicists say they've codified why science works, or more specifically, why scientific theories work – a meta-theory. Publishing online in the journal Science (abstract), the team has developed a unified computational framework they say exposes the hidden hierarchy of scientific theories by quantifying the degree to which predictions – like how a particular cellular mechanism might work under certain conditions, or how sound travels through space – depend on the detailed variables of a model."

22 of 115 comments (clear)

  1. Short answer by BenSchuarmer · · Score: 4, Funny

    42

  2. Theories about science... by fatphil · · Score: 2, Insightful

    ...are by definition metaphysics.

    So perhaps this belongs in a philosophy journal, not a scientific one?

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    1. Re:Theories about science... by mbkennel · · Score: 2


      "That is why science wins eventually and every time over superstition and ignorance."

      Unless accompanied by massive barbarian hordes.

      "Non-science can only win if no players remain ;)"

      That's an accepted strategy: off with their head.

    2. Re:Theories about science... by DriedClexler · · Score: 4, Interesting

      Scott Aaronson (of quantum computing fame) wrote a great paper on the implications of computational complexity theory for for philosophy, and he addresses a related issue, about "why should science work at all", specifically Occam's Razor.

      He relates it to Valiant's PAC-learning model, which says that the more complexity your model allows (higher VC dimension), the lower the probability that any theory you match to the observe data will correctly generalize, hence why less complex theories tend to be more correct when going outside the sample data.

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    3. Re:Theories about science... by icebike · · Score: 2

      Not much from what I can see.
      The buzzword laden title suggests a whole lot more than the (limited) information in the article or the summary, and it all boils down to:

      they find that in an impossibly complex system like a cell, only a few combinations of those variables end up predicting how a system will behave.

      Which translates into Wheat from Chaff:
        After evaluating every variable you can find, only a few of those will be found to be important.

      Well DUH!
      The statisticians figured this out a hundred years ago. Just about every statistical test invented is designed to figure out precisely which variables matter.

      Now if the good professor could just predict which variables will be important in advance, we could skip all this messy data collection and analysis and simply leap to conclusions.

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    4. Re:Theories about science... by minstrelmike · · Score: 2

      I don't think scientists need to understand how theories work in order to come up with better theories.
      In reality, you discover exact places where your theory does NOT work in order to develop a better theory.

      What they have discovered is statistical regression, not basic science. Sure, there are just a few factors of a cell that will predict--WITHIN A REASONABLE RANGE OF ERRORS--what a cell will do in the future.
      That doesn't mean you can build a cell with only those parts and nothing else. If you want a working cell, you need all that 'irrelevant' crap.
      imo, if you're going to try to prove proof, start with math. Read Godel then realize that Pythagoras was wrong about both of his major ideas--that the infinitely long and infinitely dense set of rational numbers describes every length possible and that the harmonics of a plucked string are self-consistent (read about the differences between the equal-tempered and well-tempered musical scales).

    5. Re:Theories about science... by ljw1004 · · Score: 3, Informative

      If you take as axiomatic that all science should go solely in a science journal, and all discussion about science should go solely in a philosophy journal, and there exists science which is also a discussion about science -- then where should it go?

      The authors are making the claim that science can be used to discuss science, and they back it up with a decent analysis. Either their claim is wrong, or your axioms are wrong. You can't make this go away just by waving your hands about definitions.

      PS. Original definition of metaphysics was "the chapter in the book that came after [greek: "meta"] the chapter on physics". So no, not metaphysics by this definition either :)

  3. Long answer by buchner.johannes · · Score: 4, Informative
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    1. Re:Long answer by alexo · · Score: 2

      A shorter, more understandable version: http://i.imgur.com/gTRNR.jpg

  4. The abstract.. by TechyImmigrant · · Score: 2

    The abstract is a heck of a lot more clear than the description posted:

    "We report a similarity between the microscopic parameter dependance of emergent theories in physics and that of multiparameter models common in other areas of science. In both cases, predictions are possible despite large uncertainties in the microscopic parameters because these details are compressed into just a few governing parameters that are sufficient to describe relevant observables. We make this commonality explicit by examining parameter sensitivity in a hopping model of diffusion and a generalized Ising model of ferromagnetism. We trace the emergence of a smaller effective model to the development of a hierarchy of parameter importance quantified by the eigenvalues of the Fisher Information Matrix. Strikingly, the same hierarchy appears ubiquitously in models taken from diverse areas of science. We conclude that the emergence of effective continuum and universal theories in physics is due to the same parameter space hierarchy that underlies predictive modeling in other areas of science."

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    1. Re:The abstract.. by icebike · · Score: 2

      More like a group of physicists suddenly discovering ANOVA

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  5. Car analogy? by sinij · · Score: 3, Funny

    Can someone explain this with a car analogy?

    1. Re:Car analogy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Funny

      A quantum mechanic is a person who works on really tiny cars.

    2. Re:Car analogy? by sharknado · · Score: 2

      Easy. Cornell physicists say they've codified why cars work, or more specifically, why car theories work – a meta-car-theory. Publishing online in the journal Science (abstract), the team has developed a unified driving framework they say exposes the hidden hierarchy of car theories by quantifying the degree to which predictions – like how a particular cellular battery might work under certain conditions, or how sound travels through the car's subwoofer – depend on the detailed variables of a model car.

  6. Double Pendulums of Reality by deathcloset · · Score: 4, Interesting

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double_pendulum

    There is so much redundancy in the universe. It looks chaotic to us, but I think that really everything is just looping (orbiting/spinning) asynchronously so it appears that all this complicated random stuff is happening, but really it's all just a crap-ton of super-simple systems interacting. I think that science and reality are so obvious sometimes that we just can't see them - like air. The ancients knew that there was wind, that they could blow paper off a table and that it was hard to breath at high altitudes, but they didn't know until Empedocles (500–435 B.C.) used a clepsydras, or water-thief, to discover air that these were truly the same things.

    And gravity, the overused example, was thought by the ancients to be a set of unrelated actions and happenings - to quote Disney's "the Sword and the Stone"

    Merlin: Don't take gravity too lightly or it'll catch up with you.

    Arthur: What's gravity?

    Merlin: Gravity is what causes you to fall.

    Arthur: Oh, like a stumble or a trip?

    Merlin: Yes, it's like a stumble or a- No, no, no, it's the force that pulls you downward, the phenomenon that any two material particles or bodies, if free to move, will be accelerated toward each other

  7. Re:Damn paywalls! by mghiggins · · Score: 2

    > Can anyone find a free copy that we can examine?

    Archive link

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  8. Falsifiable? by tepples · · Score: 2
    Anonymous Coward wrote:

    Metaphysics is a science

    I'll believe you when you can devise a way that metaphysical results, such as the result presented in this article, can be falsified.

  9. in other words by slew · · Score: 2

    Scientific theories only works when the minute details don't significantly affect the macro behavior (and vis-versa). That is, if there is a hierarchy of behaviors where theories can match the observations with some small uncertainty, the illusion of science is created with the assumed emergent continuum between apparently self-consistent levels of heirarchy.

    Example of a simple hierarchy: the earth going around the sun is a macro-behavior, and testing molecular motion in a test-tube is a micro behavior. Although the hierarchy is not restricted simply to scale, but any aggregated parameter scientific model.

    If a theory emerges for each where you assume the parametric effects on the other level of hierarchy are in the noise, you can discover a scientific theory (e.g., make hypothesis, test them, refine, etc), if no hierarchy emerges, you apparently cannot have scientific theory (e.g., cannot create testable hypothesis). Additionally, if you do have a scientific theory, you are implicity assuming that there is a continuum between the levels of your hierarchy (which is the underlying assumption of science).

    These folks apparently assert that taking the eigenvalues of the Fisher Information Matrix predicts the emergence of a hierarchy. This apparently is because similar patterns result when analyzing the scientific modeling in other fields which have presumed scientific theories and they are theorizing that this is some sort of prerequisite of any model for which a scientific theory can be formed.

  10. Possible answer by Okian+Warrior · · Score: 5, Interesting

    My question is "how is this research more useful than a phone sanitizer?"

    I can't speak of the article because it's paywalled, but if you like I can answer your question from my impression of the abstract.

    Scientific theories are ultimately about data compression: they allow us to represent a sea of experiential data in a small space. For example, to predict the travel of a cannonball you don't need an almanac cross-referencing all the cannon angles, all the possible gunpowder charges, and all the cannonball masses. There's an equation that lets you relate measured numbers to the arc of the cannonball, and it fits on half a page.

    Scientific models are the same: they allow us to predict results from a simplified description. The brain contains an id, an ego, and a superego which have their own goals and weaknesses, and from this we can predict the general behaviour of people.

    The problem is that we don't have any way to measure how good a theory is, or even whether it is any good at all; viz, the second example above. This, and our society's desperate motivation to publish, has led to a situation where we cannot always tell whether some science finding is significant or even true.

    Some specific problems with science:

    .) There's no way to determine which observations are outliers that should be discarded: It's done "by eye" of the researcher.
    .) There's no way to determine whether the results are significant. Thresholds like "p<0.5" are arbitrary, and 5% of those results will be due to random chance.
    .) There's no way to determine whether the data is linear or polynomial. It's currently done "by eye" of the researcher.
    .) Linear and polynomial regression are based on minimizing least-squared error, which was chosen arbitrarily (by Laplace, IIRC) for no compelling reason. LSE regression is "approximately" right, but is frequently off and can be skewed by outliers &c.

    (Of course, there are "proposed" and "this seems right" answers to each of these problems above. A comprehensive "theory of theories" would be able to show *why* something is right by compelling argument without arbitrary human choice.)

    To date, pretty much all scientific research is done using "this seems right" methods of correlation and discovery. This is not a bad thing, it has served us well for 450 years and we've made a lot of progress this way.

    If we could tack down the arbitrary choices to a computable algorithm, it would greatly enhance and streamline the process of science.

    1. Re:Possible answer by Prune · · Score: 2

      A momentary web search for the title immediately returns the free preprint version: http://arxiv.org/pdf/1303.6738v1.pdf

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  11. Re: http://xkcd.com/927/ by bluewhale · · Score: 2

    Ok, here you go : http://xkcd.com/793/

  12. Non-paywalled full text by Prune · · Score: 2
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    "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."