Linux Distributions Storing Wi-Fi Passwords In Plain Text
Bill Dimm writes "An article on Softpedia claims that Linux distributions using NetworkManager are storing Wi-Fi passwords in plain text in /etc by default. The article recommends encrypting the full disk or removing NetworkManager and using a different tool like netctl. Some of the article comments claim the article is FUD. Is this a real problem?"
Simple. Stop using Gnome shit.
How can I store passphrases associated with encrypted wireless networks?
The first time KNetworkManager is used, it will try to set up the KDE Wallet (encrypted password storage) to save wireless network passphrases and other passwords. If you choose not to use KWallet, KNetworkManager will store passwords in its configuration files, only readable by the logged in user.
http://old-en.opensuse.org/Projects/KNetworkManager#Wireless_LAN
Learning HOW to think is more important than learning WHAT to think.
While it is true that the passwords are stored as plain text, in order to view the "plain text" one must have root privileges to view the text file.
I would venture to state that "if" one's system is open enough (a stranger has root privileges) for some unwanted person to view that text file, then one has much more to worry about than the fact that one's wifi password is not encrypted.
Also, to fix it, one must disable the "Available to All Users" option... thus requiring one to enter one's password for wifi on every login... which is annoying to say the least.
Personally, I think the issue is pretty much a mountain out of a molehill... because, and again, if to view it, you have to be root, then the whole system is vulnerable and not just the wifi password.
Which completely ignores security vulnerabilities in Linux, as many advocates do. Still, the relevant point is that for someone to steal your wifi password this way, they're already in position to do much worse.
It's anti-Linux [...] -Stallman fan
Fraudster! You didn't put GNU/Linux.
Generally, storing passwords on the verifying machine in plain is a really bad idea. This is not the verifying machine. On the supplying machine, you usually do not have a choice but allow access to the plain-text password, how else would it be supplied? Hence, while you can store it encrypted, that encryption must either be automatically reversible (making it pointless) or protected by an additional password the user enters each time (making the storing pointless).
So, no, these people crying "insecure" do not understand what they are talking about and do not know that either (Dunning-Kruger Effect at work). This particular kind of incompetence has seen an increase with the Snowden-relevations, where people with no clue about IT security, risk evaluation or crypto do "pattern matching" with a list of "bad" things in crypto, like "password stored in plain", "SHA1" and then claim insecurity when the keywords turn up in something. They are basically always wrong, because they do not even begin to understand the specific use of the mechanism. Typically the do not even have beginner-level knowledge, like these cretins here. Otherwise they would have understood that Wi-Fi does not do a challenge response authentication with a shared secret, but a plain, one-way password submission. For these, the password does need to be available in plain or things cannot work. Instead, these idiots cry "insecure".
The only possible other explanation I have is that these people are NSA shills that try to confuse the issue.
Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
If someone has physical access to your drive, you have much, much worse problems than someone sniffing your WiFi traffic. To do this, someone has trespassed into your house. I'm much more concerned with strangers stomping around my living room than I am about someone sniffing my WiFi traffic.