Security Expert: Yahoo's Email Encryption Needs Work
itwbennett writes "On Tuesday, Yahoo delivered on a promise that it made in October to enable email encryption for everyone by default by January 8. While this is a great step, the company's HTTPS implementation appears to be inconsistent across servers and even technically insecure in some cases, according to Ivan Ristic, director of application security research at security firm Qualys. For example, some of Yahoo's HTTPS email servers use RC4 as the preferred cipher with most clients. 'RC4 is considered weak, which is why we advise that people either don't use it, or if they feel they must, use it as a last resort,' Ristic said."
I don't understand how yahoo can be alive today. It's been way behind competitors for about a decade. This type of story fits right in with that picture. Okay, if they are still alive, I guess they must be making money. But I'm happy they are still around. Now and then I find that I need to reconnect with a site I haven't used for years, where I registered with my yahoo address... And in that case, it's nice that I'm able to receive a password reset link. But what's the attraction today, besides that?
It was around at the right time to capture a large percentage of normies just getting online for the first time. These people don't like change. They don't really "like" computers in general. To them they're just tools; very frustrating and obtuse tools. Changing e-mail addresses is far more trouble than it is worth--we can barely get these people to give up Windows XP.
If you build it, nerds will come. Soylentnews.org
It's important to remember that only a year ago RC4 was a recommended solution and TLS1.2 support in browsers like Firefox and older operating systems has been slow to arrive. So I look at this as an important first step, with progressive refinements sure to follow. In the same way that Facebook introduced https in response to Tunisia and slowly made it an option for all users before making it default, Yahoo, while slow in adopting a model of default security, has to walk similar steps. They may have had an SSL-beta-option for the last year, but given their AOL-Like user base, I can understand being conservative in adopting new methods and being liberal in the ciphers they provide. Someone using Chrome in Mavericks may expect support for SPDY3 with AES-GCM, but for a user base that may be using IE6 or FF3 on XP still, for a company that caters to people who will never know what GCM or SHA2 is it best to avoid the headline, "Yahoo Mail is Broken for tens of thousands of users." They'll get there. Thanks for trying, Yahoo.
Now, can someone at Microsoft turn on STARTTLS? For that matter, I wish NANOG would turn on STARTTLS for inbound connections.
Also, IPv6... please... IPv6...
Unfortunately — in Firefox, at least — ciphers can only be toggled, not given a priority. Control over cipher selection (and other HTTPS parameters, such as key length, key exchange, hash (MD5/SHA)., etc.) lies with the server operator. In my own testing, the arbitrated HTTPS parameters are most frequently prioritized in some order without regard to strength, or prioritized from weakest-to-strongest (or perhaps least-to-most expensive to execute).
In order to retain manageable security, I have only TLS 1.0-1.2 enabled, MD5 disabled, all RC4-employing combos disabled, with the last being switchable via a check box provided by "CipherFox." (Additional features of use to "CipherFox" users are provided by "Calomel SSL Validation."; I recommend both.)
Thank you, Edward Snowden.
"Arguments from authority are worthless." —Carl Sagan
I wonder, in real world, how big percentage of the attacks are performed by man-in-the-middle (where strength of cypher matters). Between
1) 3 letter agencies just accessing content directly on Yahoo servers
2) Somebody hacking router between you and Yahoo (or evesdropping on physical line) and performing very costly cypher break
3) Having trojan/keylogger/whatever on your machine giving access to everything
How much point 2 is a problem compared to 1 and 3? People can write a lot about how usage of bad cipher will allow your mails to be cracked in 1 day instead of 5 billion years... but probably 99% of compromised emails are accessed through 1 or 3.
It is like with optimizing code. You could optimize hotspot where 99% of cpu time is spent, but it is hard. So instead you optimize all things around, making other 1% order of magnitudes faster and then forget than you cannot do anything about remaining 99%...
Yahoo reminds me of a journeyman heavyweight boxer taking the champ into deep rounds despite taking a serious beating. He simply will not go down.
They impress for sheer resilience, if for nothing else.
While the article is correct and uses precise terminology, the summary is wrong to use the term "email encryption". That term is for encrypted email messages using PGP/GPG/S-MIME.
Yahoo have no framework for email encryption. This article is about use of HTTPS for their webmail service and (a) whether that has been implemented and, if so, (b) whether it has been done correctly.
The answers to which are: (a) mostly and (b) no.
"If you think the problem is bad now, just wait until we've solved it." --- Arthur Kasspe
Why do people insist on using a web browser to read their mail instead of a proper e-mail client that implements proper TLS and every other feature that an e-mail client has that the web interface doesn't. It's not like people can't access their webmail over proper IMAP or POP3, which has advantages like seeing no advertising and the ability to use GnuPG or S/MIME encryption if one wants.
I got sick to death of my 10+ year yahoo account being "compromised", just out of the blue. My passwords are always secure using multiple caps/numbers/symbols etc.
My gmail/hotmail accounts never gave me this hassle.
Everytime you want to "recover" your account, you have to siv through pages, and pages of crap. Once you confirm your account with another email on file, you then have to provide your current password (which has been compromised and changed) to get in.
This could all be avoided if Yahoo mail actually had a "SECURE" system in the 1st place.
Hence why i haven't bothered with Yahoo Mail since. Yahoo is too far behind and too careless for my attention.
Hotmail and Gmail is all you need, and, will save you so much frustration.
So if a website gives you only HTTPS with RC4 or HTTP in clear text as options - why would you choose clear text?
This is totally illogical. Yes RC4 sucks but it is better than clear text - ANYTHING is better than clear text. The only possible argument for this would be "false sense of security", but if you think average people pay any attention to that padlock in the status bar, you are delusional.
I agree with you wholeheartedly — in fact, I accept some questionable certs in my zeal to transfer ciphertext instead of plaintext.
However, I neglected to mention in my previous post that I also use EFF's "HTTPS Everywhere," and an extension for that extension called "HTTPS Finder" — the former forces HTTPS if the host is known to support it, and the latter forces HTTPS if an HTTPS connection is possible (and creates a new rule for "HTTPS Everywhere"), even with requisite security.ssl3. cipher suites disabled in about:config .
(I figured anyone knuckle-deep in their browser's HTTPS configuration would be aware of them (and hopefully, using them). I recommend both, emphatically — "HTTPS Everywhere" alone yields a vast improvement in security/privacy, and has the benefit of a very long, expert-managed list of defaults.)
Thus, if RC4 is needed and I have it disabled, I'll be presented with an "ssl_error_no_cypher_overlap" error page, then I enable RC4 and reload. The only weakness there is in my forgetting to re-disable RC4, but the two extensions I mentioned in my initial post help in this effort, alerting me in various ways if/when I connect to another host using weak security:
"CipherFox" displays the cipher suite (or configurable portions thereof) in use on the status bar (e.g., it shows me "AES-256 RSA-4096 SHA1" on DDG), as well as providing the "Enable RC4" check-item on the Tools menu.
"Calomel SSL Validation" displays (on my nav. bar) a color-coded shield that represents a percentage security rating based on weighted factors drawn from the cert and cipher suite, the breakdown of which is displayed via clicking the shield icon.
Thank you, Edward Snowden.
"Arguments from authority are worthless." —Carl Sagan
It's important to remember that only a year ago RC4 was a recommended solution and TLS1.2 support in browsers like Firefox and older operating systems has been slow to arrive.
It was only recommended as a counter to the BEAST attack, which exploited the way block ciphers worked. Since RC4 is a stream cipher it was not subject to this exploit, but a lot of people were uneasy about the recommendation. This is because while it was resilient against BEAST, everyone knew that RC4 was/is on its last legs, but it was the lesser of two evils.
When a workaround for BEAST was created (n/n-1 record splitting), and implemented in just about every browser, the BEAST attack became mostly moot, and at that point people should have put RC4 lower down on the list of allowed ciphers, whose only purpose was to support legacy clients (read: XP).
So basically RC4 should have been put at the bottom of the cipher list for about 18-24 months:
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/01/15/beastfollowup.html
If you're running a Unix system with OpenSSL 0.9.8, then put the following in your Apache configuration:
SSLHonorCipherOrder On
SSLCipherSuite DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:AES128-SHA:RC4-SHA:HIGH:!MD5:!ADH:!DES
If you have OpenSSL 1.0.1+, then:
SSLHonorCipherOrder On
SSLCipherSuite ECDH+AES128:DH+AES128:RSA+AES128:RC4-SHA:HIGH:!ADH:!AECDH:!MD5:!DES
More details:
https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2013/08/05/configuring-apache-nginx-and-openssl-for-forward-secrecy
TLS 1.2 everwhere will add to the security, but the above will go a long way for SSL 3 and TLS 1.0:
https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2013/03/19/rc4-in-tls-is-broken-now-what
PS: the above two weblogs are two good resources on keep up to date on TLS stuff. The traffic is low, and so when they do post, it's usually worth looking at.
I ran into someone yesterday with an MSN address -- the 72-year-old contractor about to repair my sidewalk.
The only person I deal with regularly using an AOL account is my in-law/accountant -- age 74.
Sounds like a two horse race to me. Wait, what about webtv?
I come here for the love