Target Credit Card Data Was Sent To a Server In Russia

angry tapir writes "The stolen credit card numbers of millions of Target shoppers took an international trip — to Russia. A peek inside the malicious software that infected Target's POS (point-of-sale) terminals is revealing more detail about the methods of the attackers as security researchers investigate one of the most devastating data breaches in history. Findings from two security companies show the attackers breached Target's network and stayed undetected for more than two weeks. Over two weeks, the malware collected 11GB of data from Target's POS terminals. The data was first quietly moved to another server on Target's network and then transmitted in chunks to a U.S.-based server that the attackers had hijacked. Logs from that compromised server show the data was moved again to a server based in Russia starting on Dec. 2." A related article at Wired points out that Target suffered a similar breach in 2005, and apparently didn't learn its lesson.

Comments

POS

[tompatman]

Target's terminals are aptly named.

Re: POS

[Anonymous Coward]

Considering that the terminals in question were running un-patched, net booted XP SP2 WinPE instances with an old Java 4 version, the fact that there were attack vectors should be a long ways from shocking.

Re: POS

[Anonymous Coward]

Target doesn't really care. They had $100 million in cyber security insurance so most of the cost of this will be covered. AFA the public not trusting Target, well, it will pass quickly because the masses have a short attention span.

Re: POS

[ChromaticDragon]

I am curious regarding your information. Got source?

Last I'd heard, the expected sum of lawsuits, settlements, fines, etc. would be WELL over $100mil (as in several times that). Apparently, for reference, a similar breach, TJ Maxx, ended up being closer to $200mil.

Furthermore, it seems Target was self-insured for this. So it isn't quite correct to think they will glibly had this bill to an insurer - they ARE their own insurer.

Re: POS

[Megane]

The thing that bugs me most is that they were on a network that was routed to the entire internet. Yeah, I don't think a POS terminal needs to be able to check Google or Facebook, much less "chernyykhod.ru". Even simply putting them on a VLAN with a very restrictive firewall to the public internet would have avoided the problem. And a RFC-1918 network doesn't count if it's behind a NAT router, since these packets went outbound from the POS. Belt and suspenders.

Re: POS

[Anonymous Coward]

They might care, but I can bet their solution will be more bureaucracy rather than better technology. There are likely IT people within the company that see the problems and know how to fix them but they will be ignored. CxO types hate those annoying IT people that are always complaining about security. They will bring in a solution sold by a slick sales person at a major company.

Re: POS

[jythie]

It is also possible that their underwriters could claim that Target did not take due diligence in protecting its network and thus a full payout is not warranted. Insurance companies do not like being treated like a blank check to not take precautions.

Re: POS

[mythosaz]

Doesn't appear that way to me..

The actual report on the software installed on the agent makes it pretty clear that the information was being gathered locally and forwarded internally to a collection point before being sent to Russia, like I suggested in previous threads:

http://krebsonsecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/POSWDS-ThreatExpert-Report.pdf

The point of sale machines try to make a connection to \\10.116.240.31\c$\WINDOWS\twain_32 -- an obvious store-and-forward point on the network for exporting the card data otuside of Target. Hackers compromised this box, likely named ttcopscli3acs, since the credentials passed to 10.116.240.31 were ttcopscli3acs\Best1_user with a password of BackupU$r.

It also made port 80 requests to 10.116.240.31 -- the server the hackers "owned" inside of Target.

The rest of the breakdown only details the registry changes that happen when you install a service -- which was the install vector. There isn't a discussion of how the skimming/scanning/card-stealing software was distributed, but...

IT WAS OBVIOUS THEY WERE ALREADY INSIDE THE NETWORK - they (p)owned servers - so it's a reasonable guess that they just deployed the software without needing any hole on the workstations.

The twain_32 folder is one of those things that casual inspection would overlook - and obviously did.

in soviet russia

[Joe_Dragon]

In Soviet Russia We Target You!

And the NSA Missed All Of This?

[littlewink]

Where's our protection from Russian financial terrorists? Were the NSA employees in charge distracted by their Starbucks carmel macchiatos at the time this was coming down?

A clear instance of international crime/terrorism and NSA was asleep at the wheel.

Re:And the NSA Missed All Of This?

[ruir]

NSA is too busy reading their ex emails...

PCI compliance?

[NynexNinja]

Target suffered similar data theft in 2005, and now again in 2013. By storing cardholder information, CVV's and (worst) PIN's in the clear, they obviously are not PCI DSS compliant. If this happened to any other retailer, Visa would revoke their PCI compliance status. If nothing happens regarding their PCI compliance status, what does it say about PCI compliance in general? PCI compliance is nothing but a joke, not to be taken seriously. Why even go through the work and trouble to get PCI DSS certified if companies like Target can flout the rules and get away without any penalties.