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NSA Infiltrated RSA Deeper Than Imagined

Rambo Tribble (1273454) writes "Reuters is reporting that the U.S. National Security Agency managed to have security firm RSA adopt not just one, but two security tools, further facilitating NSA eavesdropping on Internet communications. The newly discovered software is dubbed 'Extended Random', and is intended to facilitate the use of the already known 'Dual Elliptic Curve' encryption software's back door. Researchers from several U.S. universities discovered Extended Random and assert it could help crack Dual Elliptic Curve encrypted communications 'tens of thousands of times faster'."

168 comments

  1. Surprise surprise, they lied and it's still there. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    The only question is WHY DO THEY GO ON RECORD with the bullshit denials?

  2. If you can't beat 'em, join 'em by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Why do you think encryption was taken off the export controls list in the late 90s? It wasn't just out of the goodness of their hearts, people.

    1. Re:If you can't beat 'em, join 'em by flyingfsck · · Score: 1, Flamebait

      Why? Because the Yanks realized that the European encryption tools are stronger than the American and they wanted people to use their inferior algorithms. That is why. Any self respecting computer Geek knew that all along.

      --
      Excuse me, but please get off my Pennisetum Clandestinum, eh!
    2. Re:If you can't beat 'em, join 'em by fustakrakich · · Score: 1

      ...European encryption tools are stronger than the American...

      How do you know this??

      --
      “He’s not deformed, he’s just drunk!”
    3. Re:If you can't beat 'em, join 'em by TheCarp · · Score: 5, Interesting

      How? Easy for me, I was alive and paying attention.

      The problem wasn't so much that good tools from American sources were unavailable, they were just subject to onerous restrictions, that made it hard to distribute. So producers of software were stuck either producing an "international" version which was easy to distribute and download, but had restrictive key length limits and a seperate, harder to download version for the US.

      So yes, European tools were generally better, because they were not under such restrictions, and worked just fine in or outside the US. A lot of people in the US even used pgp "international" version just because it was easier.

      It really was little more than a lame attempt to stuff a genie back in a bottle; after the bottom was smashed off. The ONLY thing it served to do was make the US into a laughing stock.

      --
      "I opened my eyes, and everything went dark again"
    4. Re:If you can't beat 'em, join 'em by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It's right in the summary! US encryption tools have been deliberately weakened by the NSA and as far as we know, European encryption tools haven't.

    5. Re:If you can't beat 'em, join 'em by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It's right in the summary! US encryption tools have been deliberately weakened by the NSA and as far as we know, European encryption tools haven't.

      Critical words there.

    6. Re:If you can't beat 'em, join 'em by NatasRevol · · Score: 1

      It should be 'relatively' easy to see if the NSA put people into place to 'adjust' the European standards like they did the American standards.

      --
      There are two types of people in the world: Those who crave closure
    7. Re:If you can't beat 'em, join 'em by fustakrakich · · Score: 2

      So yes, European tools were generally better, because they were not under such restrictions...

      Yes, they are better than the crippled exportable versions, but you still don't know if they've been compromised. You are speculating. Unless you have some kind of security clearance, you don't know as a fact if all publicly available encryption doesn't have a built in backdoor, as future documents might indicate. The tin hatters are looking a little less crazy every day as their suspicions become vindicated.

      --
      “He’s not deformed, he’s just drunk!”
    8. Re:If you can't beat 'em, join 'em by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Because US businesses were finding out that virtually everyone else was working on encryption that was useful, and it would have locked American companies from being able to compete in the expanding Internet bubble.

      One reason why DVD got cracked so quickly was due to ITAR and the short bit length of the crypto involved.

    9. Re:If you can't beat 'em, join 'em by Aighearach · · Score: 1

      I hate to go all Rumsfeldian on you, but a known known does not negate a known unknown. We already know we don't know what Europe did.

      We simply need more public intelligence in order to convert the known unknown to a known known before we can make any judgements about which is better, or even the ways that they may be different.

    10. Re:If you can't beat 'em, join 'em by TheCarp · · Score: 1

      You are correct but I don't see how that is relevant. Yes, just about any software you choose to use COULD be backdoored. In fact, even having the source doesn't protect you from clever attacks that are well hidden.

      The point remains, which is the point that was being made, and you responded to, that these international versions which were crippled actually made use of algorithms and key lengths that were already too weak to be recommended. THAT was the direct result of regulation, and the ONLY thing it was effective at doing. It certainly didn't prevent the worldwide dissemination of strong encryption tools...that happened in spite of their efforts.

      Another effect, which I failed to mention, is that often the decision in the face of the restrictions was not to produce a US and crippled international version, but to JUST make the crippled exportable version.

      --
      "I opened my eyes, and everything went dark again"
    11. Re:If you can't beat 'em, join 'em by WillAffleckUW · · Score: 1

      Oh, trust me, GCHQ and the other agencies weakened your protocols as well.

      Ask not what you can do for your corporation, ask only how high should you jump, sheeple.

      --
      -- Tigger warning: This post may contain tiggers! --
    12. Re:If you can't beat 'em, join 'em by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      If it's not American then it cannot be trusted. Europeans are just just a bunch of passive aggressive socialist nanny-state lovers.

    13. Re:If you can't beat 'em, join 'em by fustakrakich · · Score: 1

      Really all I'm saying is that none of this is stopping these guys, or even slowing them down much. It's difficult for me the say which tool is best if I can't be sure at least one of them work. Trust has been successfully destroyed.

      --
      “He’s not deformed, he’s just drunk!”
    14. Re:If you can't beat 'em, join 'em by AHuxley · · Score: 1

      Re how do you know this.
      Think back to how many firms had total control over emerging telco standards and the UK and US gov deep interest in emerging export/domestic standards crypto - Clipper, Public Key Cryptography. Key Recovery and the few very public legal cases.
      Then nothing, you could just have it all...
      Then Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) ensured US crypto law enforcement hardware access as a world wide standard as to not hurt US telco exports.
      Then nothing, you could have even more new devices/software with very few limits... Many bought into some review of public and private standards for crypto. The idea that no brand would risk its image with weak crypto, political leaders would not risk their nations science standards trust, the press would find out, lawyers would find out, experts doing deep reviews would find out.
      The fact the US gov and UK gov gave up on crypto export laws was telling. Then Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) was telling.
      A generation of experts trusted in the skills of their peers to review cryptography and now everybody can understand where the maths left us and gov moved in.
      Just as a set of trusted computer brands where shown to be of interest to the US gov via Prism and many other efforts, expect the same for many trusted telco brands in the 1970's or emerging in the 1980's.
      The long decades old idea is the same - plain text will emerge - via junk encryption, via a software layer, or hardware layer. The only trick is getting the public to buy now "cheap" hardware from trusted brands globally.

      --
      Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
    15. Re:If you can't beat 'em, join 'em by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      In all relevant mainstream software projects the focus is on "more features".

      That is a convenient way of ensuring there will always be a sufficient supply of exploitable bugs. If security were important, we would go for Formal Verification of existing stuff such as the FF web browser. But no, we need more and more crap loaded into it. So that gobbermint will ALWAYS be able to subert it. Achmed the Terrist enables this.

  3. Sales plummeted by spacepimp · · Score: 5, Interesting

    I can only hope that this sort of bullshit maneuver by RSA reflects both globally and in the USA with respect to sales. Name one Government willing to buy this equipment any longer? 10 M compared to what they're going to lose now is nothing.

    1. Re:Sales plummeted by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

      I can't imagine why anybody anywhere would ever invest in proprietary crypto software.
      The risk is too great to just take your vendor's word.

    2. Re:Sales plummeted by Charliemopps · · Score: 1

      The problem is, given their resources and drive to spy, I doubt there's an alternative that hasn't been targeted by them.

    3. Re:Sales plummeted by NatasRevol · · Score: 2, Insightful

      So your solution is what? Build your own crypto software?

      Should every company and person wanting to have encrypted communications do this too?

      Do you trust your compiler? Or your hardware?

      --
      There are two types of people in the world: Those who crave closure
    4. Re:Sales plummeted by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Ken Thompson has personally assured me he will not hack my compiler. Siri is the real threat.

    5. Re:Sales plummeted by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I can only hope that this sort of bullshit maneuver by RSA reflects both globally and in the USA with respect to sales. Name one Government willing to buy this equipment any longer? 10 M compared to what they're going to lose now is nothing.

      Yes, you should definitely buy European crypto software instead. They certainly don't have a history of state and industrial espionage abetted by their national intelligence services. </sarcasm>

    6. Re:Sales plummeted by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative

      So your solution is what? Build your own crypto software?

      Use open source implementations of the established standard algorithms, with many eyes on them.

      Should every company and person wanting to have encrypted communications do this too?

      Yes. Proprietary software should have zero market share in this area. It's too important.

      Do you trust your compiler? Or your hardware?

      Yes, I do, but you don't have to.
      If you're very very paranoid, use the "countering trusting trust" techniques.

    7. Re:Sales plummeted by ron_ivi · · Score: 3, Interesting

      why anybody anywhere would ever invest in proprietary crypto software.

      People forced by their customers to buy off of this list (i.e. people who sell to the federal government):

      http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST...

      Sure there are a couple F/OSS groups that paid the pretty significant cost to get a certificate. But not that many, especially when it comes to networking products.

    8. Re:Sales plummeted by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Because it was patented, so you had no choice as an commercial actor.

    9. Re:Sales plummeted by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Compilers are easy to make. Crypto is easy, if you trust the algorithms. Yeah, you migh mess up a bit and create some obscure possibilities for side channel attacks, but it's still light years ahead of having backdoored software. You can make your own crypto hardware with FPGAs if you want to. Easy to verify what goes in and comes out. Nothing impossible, or even particularly expensive there.

  4. Goverments + Crypto == unsecure by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    that is why you don't want to have goverments around the world involved in any crypto

  5. Fookin' NSA! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    No wonder world's confidence in American tech companies has dropped more than sharply!

  6. Re:Surprise surprise, they lied and it's still the by fustakrakich · · Score: 1

    It is a calculated risk, and maybe out of habit.

    --
    “He’s not deformed, he’s just drunk!”
  7. Re:Surprise surprise, they lied and it's still the by interkin3tic · · Score: 4, Insightful

    I'm guessing it's because they honestly believe what they are doing is necessary to keep America safe. To the point that they think lying to the people who are supposed to be overseeing them is necessary for the greater good.

    Which is terrifying. Give me all the cynical, greedy, lying, corrupt asshole politicians you want. Just please, don't put zealots in power.

  8. Desensitizing the masses by wjcofkc · · Score: 5, Interesting

    I can't help but wonder...

    When the acts of the NSA first came to light as we now know them, there was outrage not just from the tech sector, but from the general population as well. As these stories continue coming at a steady and regular pace, I still see outrage over the infringement of our rights - and the understanding of the general slippery slope creepiness of it - from those technically inclined. But less and less are the major outlets making a fuss, and even when the general population catches wind of each new story it is increasingly met with a sarcastic, "Gee, didn't see that coming." and a shrug of the shoulders. Is the possibility of a tipping point in favor of our rights being eliminated be the increasing apathy of the greater people toward these issues? I suspect we are on the losing side. I suspect that as the stories come out, and people in general not only become desensitized - but worse, it becomes the norm. In becoming the norm it will balloon to scales and scopes unimaginable. I feel we will reach a point where the majority of people will have forgotten that it was ever any other way. Even as it continues to get worse, they will continue to forget.

    --
    Brought to you by Carl's Junior.
    1. Re:Desensitizing the masses by wiredlogic · · Score: 2

      It is unfortunate that the popular media does what it does these days and ignores "boring" news in their chase to find the next hot story. Still, this is an election year and the Snowden revelations will likely come back to the foreground as candidates pander for votes, especially with the GOP fractured, having no real consensus on how to sell themselves.

      --
      I am becoming gerund, destroyer of verbs.
    2. Re:Desensitizing the masses by TheCarp · · Score: 1

      "...Depression, strife, riots, murder, all this dread. We're irresistibly drawn to that almost orgiastic state created out of death and destruction. It's in all of us. We revel in it. Sure, the media tries to put a sad face on these things, painting them up as great human tragedies. But we all know the function of the media has never been to eliminate the evils of the world, no. Their job is to persuade us to accept those evils and get used to living with them. The powers that be want us to be passive observers. Hey, you got a match?"

      --
      "I opened my eyes, and everything went dark again"
    3. Re:Desensitizing the masses by neiras · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Government organizations like the NSA are playing a long game. If one generation is desensitized, the next will be uncaring as long as basic needs and a sense of freedom are preserved.

      They are winning, and even if we form long-lived organizations to fight them on their terms they will undermine until those organizations are publicly ridiculed and useless. Individuals who speak up will be tarred as "activists", "protestors", and later "traitors". They have the upper hand and there's no way to get it back without an actual war, which no one wants.

      They are winning.

      This began a long time ago. In two generations they will have won.

    4. Re:Desensitizing the masses by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Insightful

      You could write a series of books on why this occurs but in a nutshell it comes down to this:

      What are you (we) going to do about it?

      Sure "we" could all get together an elect people to "fix" things. That will never happen. Your special interest isn't the most important thing to everyone and most people vote based on a few select issues. Making sure this issue is everyone's core issue is impossible. Gay rights, women rights, abortion, religion, gun rights, taxes, welfare, etc are generally more important to those affected. Candidates can't run on only one issue so they must decide their stance or non-stance on each issue. Each of these decisions will alienate voters. The system creates two parties that bicker and can only focus on a few problems at a time. These problems are highly influenced by what the media focuses on. Read into that what you want.

    5. Re:Desensitizing the masses by ewieling · · Score: 1

      The only way to win is to not play the game. Unfortunately most people won't stop playing the game. They won't stop using the internet and won't stop using credit/debit cards. I am slowly weaning myself off the internet. At this point I use the internet around 90% less than before the Snowden revelations. I can't seem to give up that last 10% (which includes).

      --
      I really shouldn't have used someone else's email address for this account.
    6. Re:Desensitizing the masses by stevez67 · · Score: 1

      They know how to sell themselves ... it involves large bags of unmarked currency and plausible deniability.

    7. Re:Desensitizing the masses by Aighearach · · Score: 1

      The idea of Greenwald was to trickle the stories out so they last years and he can get the most attention for his career. That started with 3-6 months of lies, where poorly written and misleading training PDFs were paraded out before they even started to trickle the documents talking about actual programs. Of course that reduced the effectiveness of the leaks to inform the public. That is a no-brainer.

      It won't "become" the norm, it is the norm, and it already was the norm.

      Many of us who are "on the left" were warning of all this when the "Patriot Act" was first proposed; it is not some secret thing the NSA did. It is something that Congress did right in public, put the permissions right into law, and wishy-washy voters just said, "ah, gee, we can trust `em" even though their next sentence was, "drown the government, the government only can do evil, blah blah blah."

    8. Re:Desensitizing the masses by wjcofkc · · Score: 1

      I agree. I wonder, yet also dare not wonder, what will become of those of us (a lot of people here) who will never be able to stop seeing the forest through the trees. Complacency from fear? Revolutionaries? Found out by technology that can spot us and executed? Perhaps all three where option two may be impossible.

      --
      Brought to you by Carl's Junior.
    9. Re:Desensitizing the masses by Aighearach · · Score: 2

      The pendulum swings both directions. I recommend thinking bigger.

    10. Re:Desensitizing the masses by Jiro · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Reeasing things in dribs and drabs has benefits, though. It probably keeps the public's interest more than releasing the whole thing as a lump; even if public interest is down because of exhaustion, it's probably not as far down as it would be if nothing had been released in a year.

      The other reason is that it makes it harder for the government to lie. If you release a document, the government can't lie and deny it because they don't know that maybe tomorrow you'll release a document that could expose the lie. If you release the whole thing in a lump, they could just carefully tailor the lie to match the existing releases.

    11. Re:Desensitizing the masses by tinkerton · · Score: 1

      I think Glenn Greenwald sees benefit to the approach of piecemeal releasing the Snowden files . Sensitizing rather than desensitizing.

    12. Re:Desensitizing the masses by nblender · · Score: 1

      They're winning too. My family doesn't fly anywhere. We don't have passports. We don't visit places like Hawaii, Disneyland, Mexico, etc... All the places that other people take their families to for vacations... We only visit places in Canada (where we live) because there's plenty to see and do here without leaving the country... We've told our son why we've made this conscious decision... But our friends believe we're being unnecessarily cruel and inhumane by denying our son the experience of going to Disneyland which is seen to be some sort of inalienable right of children or something... They also think we wear tinfoil hats and believe in conspiracies...I think we're making a point and if more people stood their ground and made their point, eventually the travel/tourism industry would scream loud enough that the situation might reverse... But as it is, everyone I know figures their all inclusive vacation is more important than worrying about the occasional groping at the airport...

    13. Re:Desensitizing the masses by mdielmann · · Score: 1

      This seems to be the attitude of the Roman government for a couple hundred years before the complete collapse of their nation. Then they started thinking that little things like the basic needs of the majority didn't really matter so much, and there was a revolution. America has gotten there a lot faster than Rome did. Maybe they will get to the next couple steps faster, too.

      --
      Sure I'm paranoid, but am I paranoid enough?
    14. Re:Desensitizing the masses by AHuxley · · Score: 1

      That was the long issue of tension between the NSA and GCHQ. The UK wanted it all kept very much out anything public: no books, no news, no helping sealed courts and no scientific review.
      The NSA seems to have more of a story to share to ensure standing and funding in the USA - they needed winning press to out flank other aspects of the US mil and gov getting material to political leaders.
      The UK saw great harm in hinting at a global domestic and international surveillance networks - i.e. seamless tracking within the UK and around the world.
      The US view saw no escape from surveillance so why not use the material in domestic courts via parallel construction, lock box of all calls over a lifetime, weak domestic oversight.

      --
      Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
    15. Re:Desensitizing the masses by BrianPRabbit · · Score: 1

      You might be right. The slow release has kept the story gong far longer than a quick dump would have, right up to the point Sen. Feinstein was livid at the idea the CIA spied on Her.

    16. Re:Desensitizing the masses by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Actually, the Rome never had that revolution. It fell because their population became disenchanted and every province and every little community turned to itself and minded their own business first. Meanwhile, the barbarians around them desperately wanted IN, to become a sort of Romans themselves, at the time when the party was already over. So, the barbarians surged in, the Romans was, like, meh, and so the empire shattered into little shards which only recently started to splice again, but without solving the original problem which led to its breakup some teen-hundred years ago. They just forgot about it. And new hungry, thirsty, ragged barbarians are on the fences again.

    17. Re:Desensitizing the masses by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I can assure you that the Germanic soul still is NOT yearning for Roman "values". Our forest hunter spirits and our will to resist all their shite is alive under the surface. There is a reason we cut their asses once.

      We adopted some of their stuff and we have tons of traitors here (all full in favor of sodom&gomorrea), but in the end, it is alien to us.

    18. Re:Desensitizing the masses by Aighearach · · Score: 1

      If public interest is down by the time the real programs get talked about, that is a recipe for people NOT ever knowing even what is going on. If you measure "public interest" by newspapers sold, sure it sells more papers. But if instead you were to take polls of how well the public understands what is happening, then no. Telling people the truth during the initial period of interest is what would do that.

      If people are already "exhausted" with the subject by the time the truth even comes out, they not only won't know what the truth is, they won't be interested in trying very hard to stop any of it.

      If I worked for the NSA and wanted to condition the public to accept this sort of thing, the Snowden/Greenwald approach is exactly what I would do. Get them riled up in a way where they will get bored and move on without turning over any sort of "smoking gun" of it being used to harm innocent people. Then later if it is used differently, people will already be comfortable with it being this far.

  9. Thank goodness for open-source alternatives by mrflash818 · · Score: 3, Informative

    So those that know how, can test and verify open-source alternatives are cryptographically secure, not back-doored, and safe for people to use.

    --
    Uh, Linux geek since 1999.
    1. Re:Thank goodness for open-source alternatives by cryptizard · · Score: 4, Interesting

      Open-source doesn't help for shit in this situation. Dual_EC_DRBG was an open standard, all the details were public. The problem is that, with cryptographic algorithms, only a handful of people in the entire world are qualified to say whether something might or might not be secure. And even if there is a problem, it might go for years without being found.

    2. Re:Thank goodness for open-source alternatives by jandrese · · Score: 4, Interesting

      For what it is worth, people who know the math thought Dual_EC_DRGB smelled funny from the first time it was announced, although it was impossible to prove if it was actually compromised or not. Combined with the fact that it's much slower than its competitors (and low speed is not a virtue in a RNG like it is in a crypto alg) and you have something that was only used by people who were explicitly told to use it.

      --

      I read the internet for the articles.
    3. Re:Thank goodness for open-source alternatives by swillden · · Score: 1

      low speed is not a virtue in a RNG like it is in a crypto alg

      FYI, low speed isn't a virtue in a crypto algorithm, either. This is true whether by "crypto algorithm" you mean "cipher" or "secure hash". Really, the only context in which poor performance is a virtue is password hashing, and you can always make a slow hash out of a fast one by iterating it.

      --
      Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
    4. Re:Thank goodness for open-source alternatives by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You bet they* have ensured there are tons of exploitable C and C++ bugs in those. Deeply hidden in complex event sequences, now that their attempt to nuke the Debian/Ubuntu physical random generator has been revealed.

      *powerful people who also run the entity under discussion

    5. Re:Thank goodness for open-source alternatives by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      A strong secure hash can also be rigged into a cipher. Just chose a secret key SK, hash it, increment SC, hash and so on. Voila, a Vernam cipher bitstream.

      Likewise, any cipher can be rigged into a PRNG. RC4 is already one, AES, GOST, IDEA and 3DES can be made into one by inputting a number and then incrementing the number. AES is fast enough.

      Only Dumb-Os needed this EC_DRGB thing.

  10. Times have changed by PvtVoid · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Remember when the NSA was secretly changing widely-used crypto algortithms to make them stronger? I'm thinking of the DES sbox and differential cryptanalysis.

    One thing's for sure, RSA is toast. They can issue all the denials they want. Nobody's ever going to trust them again.

    1. Re:Times have changed by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I'm thinking that is how it was sold to the people up the chain making the decisions. Remember how we added those apparently random things that made it better? How bout we add random things that make it easier for us, but people assume we're doing the opposite?

    2. Re:Times have changed by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Yet the NSA got accused of weakening DES just the same, since the sboxes were modified, but no explanation was given since the technique was modified.

      Its hard to trust people with questionable motives.

    3. Re:Times have changed by thue · · Score: 1

      Meh - NSA at the same time asked them to use a too short key length. And it was an open secret for a long time that NSA could brute-force it. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...

    4. Re:Times have changed by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Actually, I think the NSA both strengthened and weakened DES at the same time.
      They made it stronger by fixing the S-Boxes which would have rendered the system entirely broken within days of the technique being discovered.
      They made it weaker by lowering the key length from 64 bits to 56 bits (and the NSA tried to lower it to 48 bits!).
      So a fair analysis would be the NSA un-broke it, but made it weaker. This seems to be in character of what we know today too.

    5. Re:Times have changed by MisterBlue · · Score: 2

      I think this is the basis of Snowden's disagreement with the NSA -- the NSA could have taken a defensive mode and worked to make the country and its people more secure but it instead took an offensive mode and made crypto-weaker and found software bugs and used them to break in rather than working to have them fixed. The long term effect if this choice is a less secure country and a country with a shit reputation.

    6. Re:Times have changed by bill_mcgonigle · · Score: 1

      One thing's for sure, RSA is toast.

      Toast implies a nice, controlled browning. RSA? Burn it with fire.

      --
      My God, it's Full of Source!
      OUTSIDE_IP=$(dig +short my.ip @outsideip.net)
    7. Re:Times have changed by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      > Nobody's ever going to trust them again.

      Hmmm... the ones they serve certainly will!

  11. Re:Surprise surprise, they lied and it's still the by fuzzyfuzzyfungus · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Anyone who falls into that belief might as well be written off and put up against the wall, second in line to the people who believe that their own possession of arbitrary power is the only way to ensure the nation's safety. They can go first.

  12. Mole in Mozilla / "Eric Rescorla" ? by burni2 · · Score: 3, Interesting

    I think Mozilla needs to be cleaned of moles and it seems "Eric Rescorla" is one of them, and look where he is active:

    https://tools.ietf.org/html/dr...

    -- snip from reuters story -- .. Information Assurance Directorate, and an outside expert named Eric Rescorla.

    Rescorla, who has advocated greater encryption of all Web traffic, works for Mozilla, maker of the Firefox web browser. He and Mozilla declined to comment. Salter did not respond to requests for comment.
    -- snip --

    1. Re:Mole in Mozilla / "Eric Rescorla" ? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      -- snip from reuters story -- .. Information Assurance Directorate, and an outside expert named Eric Rescorla.

      I bolded the other interesting thing. NSA has a dual mandate - pwn Their(tm) boxen, and secure Our (i.e., American) boxen. Information assurance is the part of the organization that's (supposed to) secure American IT assets.

      But if the IAD is the whitehat side of NSA, supposedly tasked with securing our boxen against the forein h4xor h0rd3s, and they're into this up to their necks, it raises an interesting question: whether or not (a) IAD participated willingly, (b) IAD, as a sub-organization, was deemed not to have a need to know that NSA, at a higher level, had decided to compromise the information assurance portion of NSA's dual mandate. That is, did NSA, for lack of a better word, "compromise" IAD? And if that's the case, was it done with or without the knowledge of the rest of NSA's chain of command?

      I don't have a need to know, but I sure have a want to know. I hope I'm around in the 2040s when it's all declassified.

    2. Re:Mole in Mozilla / "Eric Rescorla" ? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      "7. Security Considerations Everything in this document needs further analysis to determine if it is OK."

  13. Not just the tip? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    They said it was just going to be foreplay!

  14. Re:we must end this jewish problem once and for al by Ziest · · Score: 5, Insightful

    America today is NOT the country my ancestors fled Eastern Europe for nor is it the country my wife and I grew up in. America is now a country run for the benefit of the wealthy, the privileged and the corporations. The CIA, NSA, FBI, DEA, etc. now exist to keep the powerful in charge and to detect and eliminate any movement that will challenge the status quo. Google "Green is the new Red"

    --
    Another day closer to redwood heaven
  15. Proving trust by sjbe · · Score: 1

    So those that know how, can test and verify open-source alternatives are cryptographically secure, not back-doored, and safe for people to use.

    Simple question. Since I don't know or trust any of those people doing the evaluation of the open source alternatives, exactly how do you propose I trust that they are not back-doored as well? It's not a trivial question. I am not a software developer nor am I a cryptography expert. No one I know fits both categories either. Open source stuff could be absolutely riddled with holes and I'd have really no way to know. Even if numerous parties declare it safe, how can I be certain the compiled copy hasn't been tampered with?

    1. Re:Proving trust by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Even if numerous parties declare it safe, how can I be certain the compiled copy hasn't been tampered with?

      MD5.

    2. Re:Proving trust by cbhacking · · Score: 1

      There's something very, very funny about suggesting using a broken, cryptographically insecure hash function to verify that a cryptographic program hasn't been tampered with?

      Oh, and where do you get the original (that is, verified-and-found-safe version) to run your hash on anyhow?

      --
      There's no place I could be, since I've found Serenity...
    3. Re:Proving trust by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      But then, how do you know to trust the MD5 signer?

  16. Re:we must end this jewish problem once and for al by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0, Insightful

    Go google the revolutionary war and see who was running the country back then. Wealth, privileged corporate owners.

  17. RSA's name is dirt in the security industry by bazmail · · Score: 4, Interesting

    RSA are little more than a government puppet. If you are serious about security, avoid their products.

    "RSA, now owned by EMC Corp, did not dispute the research when contacted by Reuters for comment. The company said it had not intentionally weakened security on any product and noted that Extended Random did not prove popular and had been removed from RSA's protection software in the last six months ."

    lol. Wonder what new broke ~6 months ago.

    1. Re:RSA's name is dirt in the security industry by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      IS RSA's name, dirt in the info-sec/sec industry? Please! I'd really like to know that's actually the case!

      I see headlines here and there on popular tech news sites, and catch the occasional announcement from a high-profile programmer, professor, CEO, or industry leader, but I'm not seeing or hearing the wholesale damnation from an entire industry that I'd expect, given the circumstances. Maybe I'm just not in the right listservs, irc's, or missing specific security news outlets, but I honestly expected tar and feathering to near crucifiction of RSA by now. Sure a few security professional protested the RSA conference, and started their own, but how many people still went to that conference? I'm honestly starting to think there is a fear in the info-sec/sec industry to voice an opinion on this matter. Or rather, the damnation of RSA is best left to the high-profile characters whose name is almost universally without question in the comp-sec industry. Schneier obvious comes to mind, but on something as important as information security confidence, one voice just isn't enough.

  18. Re:Still don't know what everyone's complaining ab by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The NSA has not been authorized to cryptanalyze American traffic, only foreign.
    They have no business weakening American cryptography.

  19. Re:Still don't know what everyone's complaining ab by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Because it's not the same data, you idiot.

  20. Re:Surprise surprise, they lied and it's still the by Aighearach · · Score: 1

    And when their culture of lies and secrecy was started, in WWII when we'd secretly broken our enemies codes, it might have even been true.

  21. Re:Still don't know what everyone's complaining ab by lister+king+of+smeg · · Score: 1

    I know I'm in the minority on this one, but I really don't see a problem with this. People voluntarily hand over every detail of their personal lives to Facebook, Apple and Google every single day. Why are they shocked that the NSA uses this same data for tracking? I'd be a lot more worried about private companies having access to data.

    Because the people using these algorithoms arn't the ones handing out all of their information and often the information isn't theirs to hand out, for example medical institutes use them to store your information they need it you need them to have it but it is not suposed to be public or shared knowledge.

    Additionally just because many people do throw all of their info at facebbok and google does not mean everyone does or that anyone should. I for example use encryption wherever possible, I use pgp to sign nearly all of my email and enrypt with others that uses it, I uses ssh to proxy much of my traffic to secure it and to keep my location privet to me. I don't share my every detail of life with every corpration on the planet. they have no right to my privet data and neither does the government. As for being woried more about the corps than government why? Can corperations arrest and imprison you? If not then you really have screwed up threat assesment abilities.

    --
    ---Saying gnome 3 is better than windows 8 not so much a compliment as it is damning with light praise.
  22. Re:we must end this jewish problem once and for al by Aighearach · · Score: 0

    While there are legitimate problems, I don't think derping all over yourself offers any sort of solution, alternative, or progress.

  23. FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by TechyImmigrant · · Score: 5, Interesting

    I think people are being blinded a bit by the dual_EC_DRBG issue. It makes people think the other 3 DRBG algorithms in SP800-90A are OK.

    However if your system implements FIPS140-2 compliance, there's another hole which affects all RNGs within the FIPS boundary. Please read section 4.9.2 of FIPS140-2. You will see this. I call it the FIPS entropy destroyer...

    "1. If each call to a RNG produces blocks of n bits (where n > 15), the first n-bit block generated
    after power-up, initialization, or reset shall not be used, but shall be saved for comparison with
    the next n-bit block to be generated. Each subsequent generation of an n-bit block shall be
    compared with the previously generated block. The test shall fail if any two compared n-bit
    blocks are equal. "

    This will eliminate all adjacent pairs, which would otherwise appear with a frequency dictated by the binomial distribution derived from the bit width of the output and for a 16 bit source, is trivially distinguishable from random with less that 1MByte of output data.

    For the record, RdRand doesn't do this because I refused to put it in because it's a back door in the spec.

    --
    I should use this sig to advertise my book ISBN-13 : 978-1501515132.
    1. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by thue · · Score: 1

      I agree that the output is not random by the standard definition. And obviously a bad RNG.

      But making a practical attack based on that seems unlikely to me.

      > For the record, RdRand doesn't do this because I refused to put it in because it's a back door in the spec.

      Wait what - you designed Intel's RdRand hardware RNG?

      So, since there is a lot of paranoia about backdoors in that, is there a backdoor? :P

    2. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by cryptizard · · Score: 2

      The 16 is just a lower limit. Almost every cryptographic RNG has a block size much, much larger so it's no big deal. Many applications rely on the fact that you will not get two blocks from an RNG that are the same so it seems like a good test to me.

    3. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      OK, so instead of 16 bits of entropy on the next block, you get log2(65535) = 15.999978 bits of entropy. This doesn't seem to have much practical impact. On the other hand, you've detected a common hardware error mode from the entropy source.

    4. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by TechyImmigrant · · Score: 3, Informative

      >But making a practical attack based on that seems unlikely to me.

      Q: If you have a 128 bit 'full entropy' key K[127:0] , how much is the entropy reduce if K[(n*16)+15:(n*16)] K[((n+1)*16)+15:((n+1)*16)] for n in {0..7} ?
      A: A lot.

      I.E. It reduces the brute force search space by a lot.

      --
      I should use this sig to advertise my book ISBN-13 : 978-1501515132.
    5. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by TechyImmigrant · · Score: 2

      >The 16 is just a lower limit. Almost every cryptographic RNG has a block size much, much larger so it's no big deal.

      But it asks for the test to be made at the output. The block size might be 128 or 256 bits, but the output is often less. E.G. RdRand has a block size of 16, 32 or 64 bits. So if you built a FIPS140-2 compliant software stack and didn't want to fight with the certification house and so implemented 4.9.2, it would fail easily at 16 bits and fairly easily at 32 bits.

      --
      I should use this sig to advertise my book ISBN-13 : 978-1501515132.
    6. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by TechyImmigrant · · Score: 2

      But it gives you a set of algebraic equations you can use to attack a key composed of multiple of these values.
      key[31:16] != key[15:0]
      key[47:32] != key[31:16]
      key[63:48] != key[47:32] ...
      key[127:112] != key[111:96]

      Imagine all the ways you could use these equations to attack they key schedule in a block cipher.

      --
      I should use this sig to advertise my book ISBN-13 : 978-1501515132.
    7. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by TechyImmigrant · · Score: 1

      >Wait what - you designed Intel's RdRand hardware RNG?
      Me and many others. I was the primary designer of the crypto processing hardware which intersects with these specs. My public comments on the specs are here .

      >So, since there is a lot of paranoia about backdoors in that, is there a backdoor? :P
      No. I say that as a personal statement. I don't speak for my employer in public forums.

      I'm in it to improve security of users from all comers. Good RNGs are a prerequisite for good security and in my design philosophy, security wins over slavish compliance to debatable clauses is specs. I'll seek a waiver for not putting in the back door, but I won't knowingly ship an insecure design.

      --
      I should use this sig to advertise my book ISBN-13 : 978-1501515132.
    8. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      A: 128 - 8*log2(65535) = 128 - 127.9998 = 0.0001 bits of entropy.

      Not a lot.

    9. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by Solandri · · Score: 1

      I dunno. I agree it reduces entropy by eliminating adjacent pairs, but the frequency of sequential 16+ bit random numbers being identical is 1/65536. 0.0015% or less. You're losing just a tiny bit of entropy.

      OTOH if the RNG breaks for whatever reason and keeps returning the same value, then throwing away identical sequential results would prevent the broken values from passing into the algorithm. It sounds to me more like this is a safeguard against the RNG crapping out, or attack vectors where the RNG is replaced by a call which returns the same value all the time. I mean if you compromised the system's RNG, the encryption software would still function without complaint and pass any binary md5 checksum. But by feeding it a known value instead of a random number, the encryption would be compromised. This requirement makes the software complain (by hanging in a loop) if it's being passed bad random numbers.

    10. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by TechyImmigrant · · Score: 2

      It's more than that by a lot. The min entropy of a composed number isn't the sum of the shannon entropies of the constituent numbers.

      I'd post the math here, but I'm a work and my half written book that addresses this is at home.

      --
      I should use this sig to advertise my book ISBN-13 : 978-1501515132.
    11. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by TechyImmigrant · · Score: 1

      >OTOH if the RNG breaks for whatever reason and keeps returning the same value, then throwing away identical sequential results would prevent the broken values from passing into the algorithm.

      Yes, but SP800-90 has proper tests for addressing a crapped out RNG. FIPS140-2 (the enclosing spec) is no place to add ad-hoc tests that reduce the entropy of the output.

      --
      I should use this sig to advertise my book ISBN-13 : 978-1501515132.
    12. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by IamTheRealMike · · Score: 1

      Perhaps I will phrase the question in a more helpful manner.

      Let's take it as read that you are indeed a (possibly former) Intel employee who worked on RDRAND. Given the black box nature of the RNG and the fact that some time ago someone posted anonymously to Slashdot claiming that a small number of chips were jinxed so that RDRAND was predictable, do you know of a good way to rebuild confidence in the integrity of a particular chips RNG?

      More generally, do you have any interesting thoughts on the topic of building trust in blackbox hardware, whether it be an RNG or otherwise (e.g. Intel SGX)?

    13. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by TechyImmigrant · · Score: 1

      >Let's take it as read that you are indeed a (possibly former) Intel employee who worked on RDRAND.
      You may, but I should really stick to bitching about the spec rather than things concerning my employer.

      I'm working on persuading NIST and X9.82 to write the specs such that a conformant implementation could expose internal state (like the raw entropy) without violating FIPS140-2 which has all sort of restrictions on that sort of thing. This also has to be done right so that it would make sense in a CPU. This is what's known as a 'hard problem'. If I succeed I expect it would be in 3-5 years and it might be somewhere other than in NIST, since those crypto specs are mostly untrusted toast now except for US government suppliers.

      While it's entirely possible to create trustworthy hardware, I don't know how it's possible to convey the trustworthiness. What you can do, which is probably as good as can be done, is to create things such that individually subverted instances of the hardware could be trivially distinguished from the standard issue hardware.

       

      --
      I should use this sig to advertise my book ISBN-13 : 978-1501515132.
    14. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by TechyImmigrant · · Score: 2

      Here's the basic idea...

      Given say a 128 bit key made from a FIPS compliant 16 bit output RNG:

      Take the upper 32 bits. There are 2^16 values where the upper half==the lower half. For each of those 2^16 values, there are 2^96 values removed from the 2^128 bit number space (I.E. all the combinations of the lower 96 bits with the upper 32 where the halves match). So that's 2^(16+96). So the size of the output space is reduced to 2^128 - 2^112.

      Then slide right 16 bits and repeat. Subtract another 2^112, but eliminate the overlap with the first elimination - that's where the math gets tricky. I have it written down at home.

      Repeat until you have considered all adjacent 16 bit pairs in the key.

      What you end up with is a 2^128 number space with a large number of holes. All present values are equally likely and the probability of all other values is 0. In terms of reducing the brute force search, it's significant, especially if you have a huge data center in Utah.

      What may be worse (I don't know) is the simultaneous equations that it creates that are invariant for keys from such a source. Maybe they could be used in a cryptographic attack to help solve the sorts of attack that try to build big systems of simultaneous equations to attack the key schedule.

      --
      I should use this sig to advertise my book ISBN-13 : 978-1501515132.
    15. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by thue · · Score: 1

      > 2^128 - 2^112 [...] it's significant, especially if you have a huge data center in Utah.

      But 2^128/2^112=2^16=65536

      As an upper limit, assume that you remove 100*2^112. But that will still only eliminate 100/65536=0.1% of the search space. Any key that is brute-forceable by NSA with those 0.1% removed is also brute-forceable without those 0.1% of the search space removed.

      > What may be worse (I don't know) is the simultaneous equations that it creates that are invariant for keys from such a source. Maybe they could be used in a cryptographic attack to help solve the sorts of attack that try to build big systems of simultaneous equations to attack the key schedule.

      Something like this seems slightly more likely. But assuming the bits were perfectly random before the removal of repeated blocks, for finite keys it still doesn't generate anything that couldn't have been generated by chance without the removal of repeated blocks.

    16. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by TechyImmigrant · · Score: 1

      I've got a proper crypto mathematician helping me on this. If there's a concrete finding it'll be published, but for now, it's more than enough to want to steer clear of it from a cryptographic perspective.

      --
      I should use this sig to advertise my book ISBN-13 : 978-1501515132.
    17. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      you could know that the stream isn't random, or encypted data: it's generated by a specific rng/standard... isn't this information leakage?

      as a rule of thumb, I think, it's always a bad idea to "improve" randomness by deterministically "filtering" the result. which may then seem nicer and pass more useless tests, but is certainly less random than before fiddling with it. I'm not a matematician, I don't even hold an high school diploma, but this is *obvious* to anyone who actually tried generating random data (and using it).

      why should I care about the possibility of discerning a random/encrypted stream from fips-whatever generated data? IDK, I'm not in the field. But I can think of one single obvious reason:

      let's say you are the russian federation. you want to hide not only your exact plans on annexing crimea, or launching a nuclear strike, but the very fact that you are "talking" or organizing something massive.
      you may want to conceal when you are using your link(s) to organize yourself, the fact that you are sending orders or talking.
      it's obviously impossible to hide the fact that you are talking, but if your link(s) are always transmitting something, eg, always transmitting random data, and meaningful encrypted data on some occassions, Eve may find it difficult to discern when you are actually talking... speaking of 'metadata'.

      obviously, this depends on encrypted data and random (encrypted?) data being statistically indistinguishable. that's obviously not the case with the case exposed by 'TechyImmigrant'

    18. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by ObsessiveMathsFreak · · Score: 1

      Me and many others. I was the primary designer of the crypto processing hardware which intersects with these specs. My public comments on the specs are here .

      And how do you know the NSA's influence didn't simply steamroll over all your professional objections and put the flawed standard in the chips anyway? The NSA has social as well as technological backdoors.

      --
      May the Maths Be with you!
    19. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      you could know that the stream isn't random, or encrypted data: it's generated by a specific rng/standard... isn't this information leakage?

      as a rule of thumb, I think, it's always a bad idea to "improve" randomness by deterministically "filtering" the result. which may then seem nicer and pass more useless tests, but is certainly less random than before fiddling with it. I'm not a mathematician, I don't even hold an high school diploma, but this is *obvious* to anyone who actually tried generating random data (and using it).

      why should I care about the possibility of discerning a random/encrypted stream from fips-whatever generated data? IDK, I'm not in the field. But I can think of one single obvious reason:

      let's say you are the russian federation. you want to hide not only your exact plans on annexing crimea, or launching a nuclear strike, but the very fact that you are "talking" or organizing something massive.
      you may want to conceal when you are using your link(s) to organize yourself, the fact that you are sending orders or talking.
      it's obviously impossible to hide the fact that you are talking, but if your link(s) are always transmitting something, eg, always transmitting random data, and meaningful encrypted data on some occasions, Eve may find it difficult to discern when you are actually talking... speaking of 'metadata'.

      obviously, this depends on encrypted data and random (encrypted?) data being statistically indistinguishable. that's obviously not the case with the problem exposed by 'TechyImmigrant'

    20. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by TechyImmigrant · · Score: 1

      Yup, if you take the output of an RNG and change it, you're probably alright as long as you don't add non random data to the stream or you make changes based on the data values.

      E.G.
      Throw away every third value -- OK
      Add a zero every three values - Not OK
      XOR pairs and output a single value - OK
      Throw away matching pairs - Not OK
         

      --
      I should use this sig to advertise my book ISBN-13 : 978-1501515132.
    21. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by TechyImmigrant · · Score: 2

      >And how do you know the NSA's influence didn't simply steamroll over all your professional objections and put the flawed standard in the chips anyway? The NSA has social as well as technological backdoors.

      There are publicly published and peer reviewed mathematical proofs that the extraction algorithm (AES-CBC-MAC) and the PRNG algorithm (AES-CTR-DRBG) are secure outside of the NIST specs.

      I have also done things to work around all the questionable aspects of the SP800-90 spec. E.G. Massive over reseeding. Not throwing away data marked as unhealthy by the online heath test - mix it in instead, just don't count its entropy. Not implementing FIPS 4.9.2 because it's evil. Not implementing the Dual_EC_DRBG because it was shown to be broke in 2006 and it's stupid anyway being slow and hard to understand. Preventing the personalization strings and 'additional entropy' inputs that could be used as an attack vector or side channel stimulus. Etc.

      I've done my best to ensure that if there is some trick up their sleeves in the spec, I've done what's necessary to work around it.

      --
      I should use this sig to advertise my book ISBN-13 : 978-1501515132.
    22. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by swillden · · Score: 1

      But it asks for the test to be made at the output.

      No, the text you quoted asks for the test to be made at n-bit block generation, not output. And I'd say for n greater than, say, 40, any incidence of consecutive identical blocks indicates, with very high probability, that the RNG is broken. I do think the clause is odd, though, and can't think of any good reason to have it in there.

      --
      Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
    23. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by TechyImmigrant · · Score: 1

      The 'block generation' term is not very well defined in SP800-90A, B, C or FIPS140-2. It could be interpreted as the output size of the drbg at the SP800-90 boundary or an internal service boundary or the FIPS140 boundary.

      Either way, FIPS 4.9.2 introduced algorithmic invariants that reduces the entropy. Depending on the model you choose, it could increase episilon in the full entropy source definition in SP800-90 to above 1 in 2^64, thus breaking SP800-90.

      I submitted comments to NIST telling them to fix it.

      --
      I should use this sig to advertise my book ISBN-13 : 978-1501515132.
    24. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by plover · · Score: 1

      My company had a security policy that required iPhones to have PINs that met certain conditions, such as: no repeated digits, no consecutive digits can be an increment or decrement by one. The goal was to prevent people from picking 1111, 1234, etc. These rules were so restrictive that what they really did was reduce the number of potential PINs by about 33%.

      Research on leaked PINs (at least here in America) has shown that over 50% of user-selected 4 digit PINs follow the pattern of dates, with the first two digits being 01-12 and the last two being 01-31. The silly rules eliminated months of 01, 10, 11, 12, and days of 01, 10, 11, 12, 21, 22, and 23. Given the additional factors that if a phone locks itself after 5 tries, and if a user has a 50% chance of having selected a date for their PIN, a thief would have to steal relatively few phones from employees (perhaps a couple dozen or so) before finding one that he could unlock just by trying random dates. He would improve that dramatically if he could learn the victim's birthdate, or other significant dates such as family birthdates, anniversaries, etc.

      I'm not saying that the limiting rules you are opposed to are on the same level of broken as a poorly thought out corporate policy, but I do know that limiting rules have a significant compounding impact on the overall security of a system.

      --
      John
    25. Re:FIPS 140-2 4.9.2. The Other Back Door. by TechyImmigrant · · Score: 1

      Yes. This is a fairly general problem. People think they can identify 'bad' random from 'good' random sequences, whereas in reality all random sequences are equally likely.

      Testing random data is really a case of separating all the sequences into two sets - the bad and the good. The trick is to make the bad set match to well understood error modes of the source, otherwise it's a waste of time and detrimental to the security. You are trying to detect bad random data. You can't. You are trying to identify a bad source, and that is a different thing.

      In the iPhone case, I wouldn't even try to dictate pin usage. I'd bolster the post-theft-location services and separate he corporate app, whatever it is to use a better credential but they'd have to pay me to come and help them :)

      --
      I should use this sig to advertise my book ISBN-13 : 978-1501515132.
  24. Could EMC sue? by real+gumby · · Score: 2

    EMC paid $2.6B for RSA. Could they sue the NSA for destroying the value of their property? What would be just compensation?

    1. Re:Could EMC sue? by sjames · · Score: 1

      No. RSA willingly prostituted itself.

    2. Re:Could EMC sue? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      No. RSA willingly prostituted itself.

      In other words, you can't sue for your virginity when you put yourself out as a whore.

    3. Re:Could EMC sue? by arth1 · · Score: 1

      EMC paid $2.6B for RSA. Could they sue the NSA for destroying the value of their property?

      Two words: Sovereign Immnunity.
      In short, the NSA being an arm of of the government cannot be sued unless it consents to being sued.

    4. Re:Could EMC sue? by whoever57 · · Score: 3, Interesting

      EMC paid $2.6B for RSA. Could they sue the NSA for destroying the value of their property?

      No, because the PHBs at EMC/RSA already accepted payment from the NSA. Someone should be fired over the fact that a $2.6B investment was hugely devalued for a payment of only $10M.

      --
      The real "Libtards" are the Libertarians!
    5. Re:Could EMC sue? by real+gumby · · Score: 1

      EMC paid $2.6B for RSA. Could they sue the NSA for destroying the value of their property?

      Two words: Sovereign Immnunity.

      Well, the fifth amendment to the US constitution ends with

      nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

      Seems like a clear case of "private property being taken for public use." Possibly even "deprived of property".

    6. Re:Could EMC sue? by real+gumby · · Score: 1

      I might be naive in believing that this second "extended random' was covert, rather than the EC weakening that the NSA bought.

    7. Re:Could EMC sue? by sjames · · Score: 1

      I suspect it was paid for. Notably, like the dual elliptic curve, RSA was one of the very few who adopted extended random. meanwhile, because RSA already took NSA money to incorporate a deliberately weakened standard, they were uniquely aware of NSA's program to weaken commercial crypto.

      Given how incredibly stupid and naive they would have to be (neither being a good quality in the security and crypto world) to have fallen for a covert weakening at that point (when nobody else did), assuming they prostituted themselves (again) is the kinder option.

    8. Re:Could EMC sue? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      RSA "security" is a bunch of traitors. They effected the stealing of F22 data by the chinese by means of completely irresponsible practices in their one-time-password generator business.

      NSA, JCS, DISA, nobody cared to check this company.

      Totally unfixable corruption, in short.

  25. Re:Still don't know what everyone's complaining ab by bigmo · · Score: 1

    I can understand your feelings and I don't completely disagree with them either. However I think the issue is that many if not most people have a line they draw where everything beyond it is personal and private and they do not willingly share this information with people unless it's family or very close friends. There have been suicides over people being "outed" for their sexual preference or other intensely personal things. This is bad enough in the hands of normal bullies, but in the hands of government bullies people can be jailed, legitimate governments destroyed and illegitimate governments upheld. Commercial bullies can use secret information to coerce officials into placing outlandish restrictions on our rights as well. I could of course go on and on.

    I am under no illusions that we in fact have any sort of real privacy anymore. I know that ended decades ago. However I think that we have the duty to try to make it difficult for those that want to catalog us in every way, reducing our humanity to data points. I for one will continue to try to shovel back the tide, no matter how pointless it may be.

  26. Re:we must end this jewish problem once and for al by Dishevel · · Score: 2, Insightful

    It was. Then they lost that war.

    --
    Why is it so hard to only have politicians for a few years, then have them go away?
  27. Where is the science? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Adding it doesn't seem to provide any security benefits that we can figure out," said one of the authors of the study, Thomas Ristenpart of the University of Wisconsin.

    Doesn't seem to? How is it SUPPOSED to work? The article says there are papers written on it. So can you reproduce the claims.. or not?
    Can we get something a little more sciency sounding?

    The academic researchers said it took about an hour to crack a free version of BSafe for Java using about $40,000 worth of computer equipment. It would have been 65,000 times faster in versions using Extended Random, dropping the time needed to seconds, according to Stephen Checkoway of Johns Hopkins.

    Would have? Is it particularly hard to actually verify?

    "It's certainly well-designed," said security expert Bruce Schneier, a frequent critic of the NSA. "The random number generator is one of the better ones."

    So... there's a lot I don't understand about cryptography, but I'll go out on a shorter limb and suggest this "news" is a lot stupider than it sounds.

    The NSA is what it is, whatever your feelings on the field of intelligence work, but I really doubt something known to be crackable in an hour is going to be seriously recommended for use within our government. The U.S. Government is HUGE. There is no such thing as "Hey y'all, we think you should use this spiffy new crypto algorithm", "OK boys, heyuck, make sure you don't use that broke ass new algorithm we just told everyone about".

    If it's in the FIPS standard, everybody and their mother will use it within the government, period. IDK, forgive me if I feel things might be played up a bit. I mean the $10 mil figure... that's what it costs for big boys to have some enterprise software tweaked to their preference. That's not the rate you'd pay for a big company to compromise their integrity.

  28. Re:Surprise surprise, they lied and it's still the by erikkemperman · · Score: 4, Insightful

    The only question is WHY DO THEY GO ON RECORD with the bullshit denials?

    It is a calculated risk, and maybe out of habit.

    Somewhere along the chain of command, though, the denials do become true. A good underling knows when to grant his masters the ultimate in plausible deniability by simply not filling them in on certain matters.

    --
    Gosh, thanks. That must be why the other ships call me Meatfucker -- GCU Grey Area (Eccentric)
  29. Use of the past tense - Infiltrated by WillAffleckUW · · Score: 1

    I think you fail to understand how deep the rabbit hole goes, Neo.

    --
    -- Tigger warning: This post may contain tiggers! --
  30. Re:Still don't know what everyone's complaining ab by ErichTheRed · · Score: 1

    As for being woried more about the corps than government why? Can corperations arrest and imprison you? If not then you really have screwed up threat assesment abilities.

    This is kind of what I was getting at -- among those more concerned about privacy, everything is part of a vast government conspiracy, and they're lurking behind the next corner just waiting to imprison and torture you. I think the reality is a little different -- the US has become way too diverse even in the last 50 years to allow any one group to gain enough power to do anything major. There's 300+ million people, spread over a huge geographic area, all with different opinions on pretty much everything. Even if you did live in a mountaintop compound stockpiling ammunition for the revolution, no one would bother you unless you start using it on your neighbors. Look at how hard it is to get anything accomplished with a divided Congress...the entire country is polarized like that, and I doubt that will change anytime soon.

    Companies having access to your personal data is a little different. There's an incentive to squeeze every last cent out of every single customer interaction now, and I think most people don't realize how much their data is being mined, for whatever reason. I find the increasingly focused ad targeting I've been noticing lately to be a little more invasive than an imagined threat. I'd love it if Google charged a subscription fee instead of using my data as payment for their services, but I guess they make way more from advertisers or they would have offered it as an option by now.

  31. Re:we must end this jewish problem once and for al by Dishevel · · Score: 1
    Nope. :)

    It worked out well for us though.

    --
    Why is it so hard to only have politicians for a few years, then have them go away?
  32. Re:Surprise surprise, they lied and it's still the by Rinikusu · · Score: 1

    Probably also because they had a vew "backroom" visits by the NSA who explained quite clearly that revealing or admitting to this sort of behavior will quickly get them thrown into a federal PMITA prison instead of a cushy white-collar prison. How many "hackers" have been "accidentally" put into a "real" prison who end up getting beaten nearly to death and viciously raped because they pissed off a particularly vindictive DA? (I can remember at least one. And there only needs to be one...)

    --
    If you were me, you'd be good lookin'. - six string samurai
  33. Re:Still don't know what everyone's complaining ab by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    People voluntarily hand over every detail of their personal lives to Facebook, Apple and Google every single day.

    I can refuse to join Facebook, purchase from Apple, and attempt to minimize my contact with Google. I have no such options with respect to the US government; as we have learned, even emigrating wouldn't work.

    Just because some Americans don't value their privacy doesn't give the American government the idea to compromise mine.

  34. Re:Surprise surprise, they lied and it's still the by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I'm guessing it's because they honestly believe what they are doing is necessary to keep America safe.

    Funny thing is that a lot of Democrats feel that way. And Hitler honestly believed he was making Germany better by eliminating all the Jews.

    Whenever there is a section of government that isnt held accountable then its going to create tyranny. The only question is "how long will that take".

  35. Re:Surprise surprise, they lied and it's still the by mbkennel · · Score: 1

    | The only question is WHY DO THEY GO ON RECORD with the bullshit denials?

    Because they'd be put in federal prison---no parole system, extremely long sentences---if they don't. This is not an exaggeration, they were obviously forced to agree to certain national security requirements, and this is what they mean.

    The USA is slightly kinder than the equivalent in China or Russia (and there's no doubt they do just as much, but no defectors)---you'd get a multiple-gunshot suicide and polonium in your tea.

  36. Deeper than *I* imagined? by maliqua · · Score: 1

    I can't imagine anything deeper than "balls deep" as i originally assumed the NSA was into RSA. This leaves me dumbfounded I have written the NSA and asked for schematics on how they managed to get past balls deep, how much further they went, and did they get a whole leg in? did they get past the hips? was there a a device similar to the jaws of life employed in the process?

    1. Re:Deeper than *I* imagined? by TechyImmigrant · · Score: 1

      You are assuming they have balls to go deep with.

      --
      I should use this sig to advertise my book ISBN-13 : 978-1501515132.
  37. Re:Surprise surprise, they lied and it's still the by Wootery · · Score: 3, Insightful

    A good underling

    Good for whom, exactly?

  38. I just want to know by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    When we the people will reach the point of they've had enough and take this fucking country back from the hand full that somehow think it's theirs. Sign me up for when it happens. I'm ready.

  39. What to do about it. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Since from my perspective its gone completely terminal....... im gonna take them for the biggest fscking ride / free vacation of all time.

  40. Re:Surprise surprise, they lied and it's still the by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    No. They don't believe that. That's a comfortable lie to make them appear more human.

    Money. Greed. Power. These are the things that drive those sorts of people. The NSA is a collection of private contractors that enjoy their black budget. They're willing to invent boogeymen, find terrorists under every bed, and destroy your privacy to make a buck.

  41. Re:USA Is a discusting country by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    disgusting

  42. Re:USA Is a discusting country by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Just stop playing sheep. Go and join your brothers from North Korea, hold hands and admit you are a Fucking Communist Regime called U.S.A

    No, no, no. The USA is not at all like NK! We're allowed to get whatever haircut we want, not just Obama's (or our real supreme leader, Sam Walton's) haircut!

  43. So What by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The job is the NSA is espionage ! Duh !

    And that is approved and protected, as anybody else can do, by the laws of the USA. Duh !

    LOL

  44. Re:Surprise surprise, they lied and it's still the by ObsessiveMathsFreak · · Score: 4, Insightful

    I'm guessing it's because they honestly believe what they are doing is necessary to keep America safe.

    This is like the banks and sub-prime lenders "honestly believing" that house prices would go up forever and money would always be cheap.

    Read my lips: Everyone involved knew exactly what was going on.

    Everyone inside the NSA with so much as a high school Diploma, when encountering even a low level program, knew that it was fundamentally wrong, probably illegal, and corrosive to the civic society. You don't even need to know what civic society is to know that tapping and permanently recording all calls in the US is both dangerous and wrong.

    The on the record denials are effectively the NSA aping of the likes of John Corzine's claims of "We have no idea where the money is", despite being the man who took it right out of customers accounts. I dwell on the financial crisis because the breakdown in the rule of law, propriety, common sense, and all morality there is a mirror image and ultimately a fore-runner of the excesses and lies we now see in the NSA.

    All that Keeping America Safe is BS. This is all about budgets, contracts, staffing levels, prestige and power seeking on the part of an entire city block of executives, officers, and IT workers throughout the NSA. The purpose of the NSA is to procure BMWs and range rovers for its management, and for favored private contractors and sub-contractors. That is why the price of a incorporated city is being spent on all these ludicrously overblown surveillance programs.

    Forget the lies. Follow the money. Men will do anything, say anything, to anyone to keep such a gravy train flowing.

    --
    May the Maths Be with you!
  45. Re:Surprise surprise, they lied and it's still the by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    +1

    The road to hell is paved with good intentions.

  46. Re:Surprise surprise, they lied and it's still the by AHuxley · · Score: 1

    Re: WHY DO THEY GO ON RECORD
    If you make a fuss you join
    "Only One Big Telecom CEO Refused To Give The NSA The Access It Wanted... And He's Been In Jail For 4 Years"
    http://www.businessinsider.com...
    Former CEO Says U.S. Punished Phone Firm
    http://www.washingtonpost.com/...
    NSA Domestic Surveillance Began 7 Months Before 9/11, Convicted Qwest CEO Claims
    http://www.wired.com/2007/10/n...

    --
    Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
  47. Solution = PR? by PiMuNu · · Score: 1

    You should decide on the solution then agitate for it. For example, one might say Proportional Representation is a solution, as it permits for a broader spectrum of parties/mandates/issues to be represented. (This is my opinion having voted in UK for ~ 4 elections).

  48. Re:Surprise surprise, they lied and it's still the by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The on the record denials are effectively the NSA aping of the likes of John Corzine's claims of "We have no idea where the money is"

    Psssst... President Regan laid this groundwork during the Iran-Contra trial with "I don't recall".

  49. Re:Surprise surprise, they lied and it's still the by thegarbz · · Score: 1

    Anyone who falls into that belief might as well be written off and put up against the wall.

    This would result in a dramatic reduction of the population of the USA. I have never seen a country as full of *braindead patriots as the USA.

    *Not implying patriotism is stupid, just that a disproportionate number of patriots in the USA are actually braindead.

  50. Re:we must end this jewish problem once and for al by phantomfive · · Score: 1

    America has always had good and evil, side by side. Remember Lincoln was right there along slavery. Benedict Arnold and Washington. Even the puritans were impressive and horrifying at the same time.

    America has not changed.

    --
    "First they came for the slanderers and i said nothing."
  51. Complete Bullshit. by sethstorm · · Score: 1

    Nice, but it relies on unreliable sources to make these assumptions. When they can do it without handling improperly disclosed material, perhaps they might have a point.

    The silver lining of it is that these individuals won't be getting clearances anytime soon.

    --
    Twitter supports and protects racists - by smearing their critics with the "Hate Speech" label.
  52. Re:Surprise surprise, they lied and it's still the by Cthefuture · · Score: 1

    FWIW, BMW is a budget brand these days

    --
    The ratio of people to cake is too big
  53. Re:Surprise surprise, they lied and it's still the by tragedy · · Score: 1

    Ah, time for an _Independance Day_ quote.

    Why the hell wasn't I told about this place?

    Two words Mister President: Plausible deniability.

  54. Re:Surprise surprise, they lied and it's still the by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    > _Independance Day_ quote.

    Diiiiiiiiiiiiiiiieeeeee

  55. Re:Surprise surprise, they lied and it's still the by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The masters, you fool. Imps may burn in hell. That's where they belong. Keep your masters happy. Smile. They won't save you if feces hit rotating things, but they might remember how stupidly loyal you were, and thank themselves for finding such a fool to work for them.

  56. Re:Surprise surprise, they lied and it's still the by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I find it kinda funny how americans think nationalism is good when it's them and called patriotism, and bad when it's called nationalism in other countries. Also, americans look the second most foolish with their flags. The most idiotic are the rag heads(yeah, call me racist. Wearing a rag on your head is not a race..) who are waving burning american flags. I always hope they catch fire and get burned. I mean, they are so annoying I can almost forgive US for blindly dropping bombs around their turf.

  57. Trustworthiness: what can be done? by handy_vandal · · Score: 1

    While it's entirely possible to create trustworthy hardware, I don't know how it's possible to convey the trustworthiness. What you can do, which is probably as good as can be done, is to create things such that individually subverted instances of the hardware could be trivially distinguished from the standard issue hardware.

    Yes. I think you have nailed it, right on the head.

    --
    -kgj
  58. Re:Surprise surprise, they lied and it's still the by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Read Herbert Yardley. It started much earlier.

  59. Re:Surprise surprise, they lied and it's still the by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Nice of you to advertise what a shitplace the U.S. is.

    But actually, my father, a Luftwaffe POW in U.S. hands told me: Another German POW did not admit the shooting of a US airman until they drove over his foot with a truck.

    So, nothing to see here.

  60. I take it then by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    ...you use the horse carriage instead of this horrible German, socialist inventions which drive those Petrol/Diesel cars.

  61. Re:Still don't know what everyone's complaining ab by bugmenot462 · · Score: 1

    "We already know you have sex with your wife, why does it bother you if we watch?"