Apple Can Extract Texts, Photos, Contacts From Locked iPhones

Trailrunner7 (1100399) writes "If law enforcement gets hold of your locked iPhone and has some interest in its contents, Apple can pull all kinds of content from the device, including texts, contacts, photos and videos, call history and audio recordings. The company said in a new document that provides guidance for law enforcement agencies on the kinds of information Apple can provide and what methods can be used to obtain it that if served with a search warrant, officials will help law enforcement agents extract specific application-specific data from a locked iOS device. However, that data appears to be limited to information related to Apple apps, such as iMessage, the contacts and the camera. Email contents and calendar data can't be extracted, the company said in the guidelines."

Comments

So... cloud access?

[Kenja]

All the things listed, are synced to the iCloud. Sounds to me like they are not accessing the phone, but the contents of the cloud server, which have push/pull access to selected apps. Wonder if this is true if you disable cloud access or simply don't sign into it.

Re:So... cloud access?

[Number42]

TFA says that the data can only be accessed at the company HQ, so no, it seems that they are referring to local data that is unencrypted. It also states that they can access some data in the iCloud, too.

Re:So... cloud access?

[Sockatume]

Apparently not. It sounds like they're limited to whatever applications are currently running though:

Upon receipt of a valid search warrant, Apple can extract certain categories of active data from passcode locked iOS devices. Specifically, the user generated active files on an iOS device that are contained in Apple’s native apps and for which the data is not encrypted using the passcode (“user generated active files”), can be extracted and provided to law enforcement on external media. Apple can perform this data extraction process on iOS devices running iOS 4 or more recent versions of iOS. Please note the only categories of user generated active files that can be provided to law enforcement, pursuant to a valid search warrant, are: SMS, photos, videos, contacts, audio recording, and call history. Apple cannot provide: email, calendar entries, or any third-party App data.

Re:So... cloud access?

[Anubis IV]

If you read Apple's document, they make it pretty clear in Section I that they're talking about extracting data from an iOS 4 or later iOS device that is passcode locked and in good working order. Besides which, not all of that data goes through iCloud (e.g. call history, audio recordings (unless you're backing them up), etc.).

Moreover, they've detailed the security of their iCloud offerings before, and what I noticed immediately is that while SMS texts can be extracted according to this document, iMessages are not listed, suggesting this isn't just an iCloud backdoor. Likewise, if they were able to access your iCloud stuff, they'd have access to a whole lot more, such as calendar events, e-mails, and any third-party data you had backed up using iCloud Backup.

Re:So... cloud access?

[swb]

So what exactly constitutes a "user generated active file"? Some kind of temp file kept open as long as an app is "open"? And what does "open" mean, really? Shows up when you double-click the home button? Many of those apps aren't really running, if you switch to them most seem to revert to cold-start behavior.

It makes me wonder if there's a paranoia step a person could take before entering a known security zone, like force-quitting the native apps in question, or whether powering the device off does this (which I always do anyway when dealing with a security checkpoint).

Re:So... cloud access?

[VortexCortex]

So what exactly constitutes a "user generated active file"? Some kind of temp file kept open as long as an app is "open"? And what does "open" mean, really?

Look at the source code and see. Oh, right. Never mind, it's proprietary and thus 4200% fucked.

Add this question to your list: How do you even trust them to be telling the truth with national security gag letters now standard?

Re:So... cloud access?

[blueg3]

The appropriate paranoid step is enabling encryption. Then, turn off your phone if you suspect it may be taken from you.

Re:So... cloud access?

[swb]

Look at the source code and see.

Even if I had the source code, it wouldn't do me personally any good as I couldn't grok what it did just from reading it. It would do me as much good as it did 99.99% of OpenSSL users.

Gag letters prohibit what they can say, they don't require them to make false statements of fact. You might make the argument that they could in fact be strong-armed through some extralegal method of making false statements of fact to engender false confidence in potential targets of spying, but that's getting a little into tinfoil hat territory.

In fact, I think an Apple statement of what little they can extract is pretty good and serves as a kind of interesting statement on what they believe is recoverable. It doesn't include third-party techniques or equipment that you might find in an NSA laboratory, but I don't know that Apple makes that kind of penetration test of their own devices.

Re:So... cloud access?

[swb]

I've had encryption enabled since it became available.

Re:So... cloud access?

[BasilBrush]

It would do me as much good as it did 99.99% of OpenSSL users.

Actually 100% of OpenSSL users, for several years.

Re:So... cloud access?

[BasilBrush]

So what exactly constitutes a "user generated active file"?

From the document: "Please note the only categories of user generated active files that can be provided to law enforcement, pursuant to a valid search warrant, are: SMS, photos, videos, contacts, audio recording, and call history. Apple cannot provide: email, calendar entries, or any third-party App data."

It's things that no phone tends to encrypt.

Re:So... cloud access?

[TheP4st]

Likewise, if they were able to access your iCloud stuff, they'd have access to a whole lot more, such as calendar events, e-mails, and any third-party data you had backed up using iCloud Backup.

From the source you linked:

iii. Email Content
iCloud only stores the email a user has elected to maintain in the account while the customer’s account remains active. Apple is unable to produce deleted content. Apple will produce customer content, as it exists in the customer’s mailbox in response to a search warrant.

Re:So... cloud access?

[TheP4st]

By mistake I clicked submit before adding section iv

iv. Other iCloud Content. PhotoStream, Docs, Contacts, Calendars, Bookmarks, iOS Device Backups
iCloud only stores the content for these services that the customer has elected to maintain in the account while the customer’s account remains active. Apple does not retain deleted content once it is cleared from Apple’s servers. Apple will produce customer content in these categories only in response to a valid search warrant.

Re:So... cloud access?

[MachineShedFred]

Or, smash it. Apple specifically states that the phone must be in good working condition for them to do shit.

Re:So... cloud access?

[Mordok-DestroyerOfWo]

The biggest problem is that since the Snowden revelations, the tinfoil hat wearers are beginning to sound more and more reasonable.

Re:So... cloud access?

[blueg3]

They mean functional. If you break the screen, they may still do it. Drop it in some water, though, and it may be hosed enough for them to not bother. (Really, the "in good working condition" statement is there for one purpose: it says that they won't go to any extreme measures to make it work. They have a process in place for doing this, and if it's successful, they'll give you the data; if it's not, they're not doing experimental forensics for you.)

I was thinking more of something you could do to secure your phone if you *suspect* it may be taken. You know, something reversible in the event that it's not. Breaking your phone is a one-time-only operation.

Re:So... cloud access?

[Plumpaquatsch]

It would do me as much good as it did 99.99% of OpenSSL users.

Actually 100% of OpenSSL users, for several years.

Well, at least the NSA quickly found it, so not quite 100%.

Re:So... cloud access?

[Paradise Pete]

And the SMS specifically means SMS, not messages. Messages sent using iMessage cannot be retrieved (nor can FaceTime calls), as they are end-to-end encrypted.

I don't know if services like Line and WhatsApp encrypt their messages.

Re:So... cloud access?

[chihowa]

Actually, less than 100% and probably less than 99.99%. Heardbleed only affected OpenSSL versions 1.0.1 through 1.0.1f. Many devices and OSs never moved to the 1.0.1 version and were never vulnerable. A huge number of systems used, and still use, 0.9.8 (eg all Macs, many routers).

Re:So... cloud access?

[exomondo]

All the things listed, are synced to the iCloud. Sounds to me like they are not accessing the phone

How? How can it possibly sound like that to you?

The story explicitly says they are extracting data from the device Apple Can Extract Texts, Photos, Contacts From Locked iPhones , the article says its technicians can only extract the data from a locked iOS device at the company’s headquarters in Cupertino and the guidelines say Apple can perform this data extraction process on iOS devices running iOS 4 or more recent versions of iOS.. Nowhere does it say anything about iCloud yet in many devices it specifically says they are extracting information from the device, not only that but iCloud is not mandatory so this would be thwarted by anybody who doesn't use iCloud - something that you would expect to be pretty prominent in the material if it were relying on iCloud.

Where do you get any kind of idea that this gets the data from iCloud?

Re:So... cloud access?

[iluvcapra]

Set your phone to automatically wipe if the wrong passcode is entered 10 times. (iPhones have this, I'm sure Android has a solution along these lines as well.)

Re:So... cloud access?

[Jane Q. Public]

I think the appropriate paranoid step is getting an Android phone, and installing Cyanogenmod over the stock OS.

Just saying.

I like Apple. I like Apple products and Apple software.

However, I don't much care for Apple's snoopy walled garden in regard to their iPhones.

Re:So... cloud access?

[Jane Q. Public]

iii. Email Content iCloud only stores the email a user has elected to maintain in the account while the customerâ(TM)s account remains active. Apple is unable to produce deleted content. Apple will produce customer content, as it exists in the customerâ(TM)s mailbox in response to a search warrant.

Really, this is only normal. They don't have a choice about producing existing emails IF they're presented with a search warrant.

But this brings up the point: because of the Government's current attitude about email (i.e., that it is not protected by 4th Amendment), I will continue to use POP3 rather than IMAP. As soon as that email hits my inbox it is gone from anyone's servers. At least on my end.

Granted, there have been some recent sounds by Congress that they intend to fix this (partly, no doubt, due to the years-long valiant efforts by the EFF), but it hasn't been done yet.

First Law of Oppressive Government: If It Ain't There, They Can't Grab It.

Re:So... cloud access?

[blueg3]

If you're concerned about someone who has physical possession of your phone accessing data stored on it, a Cyanogen Android phone isn't helping you one bit.

If you have some ideological goal unrelated to the security problem being discussed here, maybe.

Re:So... cloud access?

[blueg3]

It's very uncommon for LE to sit there trying different passcodes. They'll either use a tool that bypasses the passcode completely or they'll ask Apple.

Re:So... cloud access?

[Jane Q. Public]

If you have some ideological goal unrelated to the security problem being discussed here, maybe.

It's not "unrelated". It might be peripheral, but it's not unrelated.

Both major phone OSes are full of security holes, many of them related to the parent companies gathering information about the users. So far, Apple has remained a pretty benign player in that particular arena. But that is no guarantee they will remain so.

Re:So... cloud access?

[david_thornley]

The NSA announced that it had not known about Heartbleed, and I'm inclined to believe them. One of their responsibilities is securing US communications, and this was a really gaping security hole. A NSA-friendly bug is one only they can exploit, or at least that they can exploit a lot easier than most. Ideally, they want people using software with only NSA-approved vulnerabilities.

Re:So... cloud access?

[MikeBabcock]

99% of software isn't as complicated as OpenSSL but thanks for the red herring ...

Re:So... cloud access?

[MikeBabcock]

Enable the full-disk encryption feature, validate there aren't any backdoors, and power off the phone so the next user has to enter a password no matter how they try to access your data.

Sounds like Cyanogen is a good answer.

Hmmm some artful Apple misdirection

[bazmail]

How about google, hotmail, facebook etc passwords from Safari's settings? Thats what law enforcement always look for. That is cop gold right there. Who gives a crap about the data in the calendar app, thats all hosted on apples cloud anyway.

Re:Hmmm some artful Apple misdirection

[RyuuzakiTetsuya]

Keychain's encrypted. So I'm guessing no, but it could be back doored.

Re:Hmmm some artful Apple misdirection

[Number42]

Those passwords are encrypted using the phone's UID (which can't be accessed directly), and their backups in the iCloud are presumably highly encrypted too. According to TFA, however, the types of data law enforcement would be able to access in the iCloud don't seem to cover the iCloud Keychain, so those would be safe. Plus, the Calendar app also interfaces with Google Calendar, etc. depending on the account.

Re:Hmmm some artful Apple misdirection

[jones_supa]

Wouldn't law enforcement just require the account usernames and then get the data from the respective service providers with a warrant? Sounds a bit unprofessional that they would go logging in to the accounts by themselves.

Re:Hmmm some artful Apple misdirection

[fermion]

And here is the question. Is it accessing the phone, in which case a remote wipe can protect the citizen from a warrent, or is it accessing the 'cloud' in which case the courts have ruled that because you have shared the information with a third party, i.e. your service provider, the privacy of the data is much more limited.

I don't have as much issue with this kind of police state antics as some other things because these kind of communications just don't seem to have as much expatiation of privacy. Like when people take naked picutres of themselves or of them having sex, and then being shocked when the ex-lover posts them or they get leaked, like WTF. Yes, it is a violation of trust, but that is why we used to take our nakes using Polaroid and not film. There used to be some common sense. It is why we bitch over the phone or in anonymous postcards, not writing letters detailing our crimes and misdemeanors.

The lesson here is don't put your hitman in your contact list, don't film yourself committing a burglary, and don't keep a burner for each of the jealous lovers.

Re:Hmmm some artful Apple misdirection

[Penguinisto]

How about google, hotmail, facebook etc passwords from Safari's settings? Thats what law enforcement always look for. That is cop gold right there.

No, that is prosecutor cyanide. Cops do not generally log in with the user's credentials, because it poisons the evidence gained from that site. Any competent defense attorney could get the subsequent evidence found that way thrown out almost immediately ("So, officer, you logged in as the user and acted on his behalf in the website? How do we know that you and your cohorts didn't plant the evidence yourself? Tainted evidence, yerhonor!")

Easier to get a warrant, have the provider give you the data. That way you can have a valid chain of custody, proof that there was no impersonation by cops or prosecutor, and absolutely no chance of any claims being valid that questions the veracity and integrity of the evidence found. Hell, even in those few cases where a user/pass is used, both prosecution and defense attorneys are present during its use (and depending on locate, a clerk of the court) - the defense (and clerk) are there to keep 'em honest.

Re:Hmmm some artful Apple misdirection

[Charliemopps]

Wouldn't law enforcement just require the account usernames and then get the data from the respective service providers with a warrant? Sounds a bit unprofessional that they would go logging in to the accounts by themselves.

You've never been in court have you?

The primary legal argument in most cases in this country are: "Well we're the police we can do that. Constitution? Sure you could appeal this but the fines $500, you're legal fees on appeal would be at least $5000... tell you what, pay the fine and we expunge the charges in 6 months!"

Yes, this has happened to me. I even got a ticket once for "unlawful use of horn" when I honked at a guy that almost hit me. But he was the cops uncle (cop told me this) he then proceeded to tell me "Sure this would get thrown out of court, but I get paid to go to court. You don't. I can give you a ticket every day you drive through here. How long would you keep your job? Now how about you stop being a jerk and honking at old people?" I called the police station later and spoke with the guys boss who laughed at me and said his officer told him "Some jerk will be calling you..."

The police only follow proper procedure and what-not when they think the case is big enough that it'll mater... i.e. you're going to jail and they know you'll fight tooth and nail. Otherwise they just search illegally, bully and batter people, contaminate evidence (if they even bother to collect any) and then slap a fine on you. If the fines aren't over a couple of thousand and there's no jail involved, its almost always in your financial best interest to just roll over and take it. In the few cases where the person doesn't? They don't care, 100 other people got arrested on the same day.

Re:Hmmm some artful Apple misdirection

[BasilBrush]

How about google, hotmail, facebook etc passwords from Safari's settings?

No, they can't extract those.

Who gives a crap about the data in the calendar app, thats all hosted on apples cloud anyway.

Well it might be. If the user chose to set up an iCloud account, and hasn't deleted the data since. In every other case it's unavailable. It can't be extracted from the phone.

Re:Hmmm some artful Apple misdirection

[MachineShedFred]

They require the phone to be shipped to Cupertino, in good working order. So I'm guessing that if you execute a remote wipe (which, on an encrypted iPhone constitutes the disk controller basically forgetting the encryption key), that law enforcement is fucked. And, because we're not talking about a magnetic medium, there's very little forensic recovery possible.

Re:Hmmm some artful Apple misdirection

[BitZtream]

Or in the Enterprise, the calendar data is stored on MY servers. MY caldav, MY carddav, MY imap server.

People who care about security don't use someone else's servers to store their important data.

Re:Hmmm some artful Apple misdirection

[vux984]

("So, officer, you logged in as the user and acted on his behalf in the website? How do we know that you and your cohorts didn't plant the evidence yourself? Tainted evidence, yerhonor!")

Yet...
"So, officer, you opened the defendants trunk and 'found' drugs there? How do we know that you and your cohorts didn't plant the evidence yourself? Tainted evidence, yerhonor!"

Doesn't seem to be a get out of jail free card for people getting pulled over and having their vehicle searched.

Hell, even if the police get a warrant before searching the car, they can still theoretically plant evidence --since the police are the ones executing the warrant.

Re:Hmmm some artful Apple misdirection

[Penguinisto]

The difference is that when opening the trunk, the defendant is either present, or (if the car is impounded) there is an official chain of custody where witnesses are present. Also, physical items found during that search will most likely have forensic evidence attached (fingerprints, etc) that can tie the item to the defendant.

Snatching a logon and going onto the website while impersonating that user is a whole different bucket of fish, and is way too vague to prove to a jury that you were just looking versus planting evidence.

Re:Hmmm some artful Apple misdirection

[vux984]

Snatching a logon and going onto the website while impersonating that user is a whole different bucket of fish, and is way too vague to prove to a jury that you were just looking versus planting evidence.

I don't see how that is different. Why can't the defendant be present?*, and/or there be a chain of custody with other official witnesses to verify what was done. e.g. the police logs on with the account at the station, with cameras, and witnesses...??

* And how does the defendants presence even establish anything anyway? His testimony isn't given a lot of weight in a he-said she-said vs the police - if getting out of a drug bust was as simple as saying "I was there when the police searched my jacket and he planted the drugs on me" then every dealer and junkie who ever got picked up would say just that whether it was the truth or not. Clearly "its not mine, you put it there" isn't generally a viable defense.

Re:Hmmm some artful Apple misdirection

[AmiMoJo]

This is why you should always record your conversation with cops, ideally secretly if your jurisdiction allows that.

Re:Hmmm some artful Apple misdirection

[cbhacking]

Tell them you're recording the conversation (even if you're not, though it's a good idea to do so). In some states you're allowed to record *without* telling them, but that wastes the deterrent benefit (useful if you actually want to be able to sue the asshole though, and yes, you can sue cops just like anybody else).

Re:Hmmm some artful Apple misdirection

[mjwx]

How about google, hotmail, facebook etc passwords from Safari's settings? Thats what law enforcement always look for. That is cop gold right there. Who gives a crap about the data in the calendar app, thats all hosted on apples cloud anyway.

I'm less worried about the Australian Federal Police and more worried about the "partners" Apple can and is with all likelihood, selling it to.

No doubt you agreed to this with some tiny line in the Itunes T&C's.

Cops are only interested in this data when it has something to do with their case, business want it so they can better annoy you with ads.

Google are doing the same, but at the very least they're honest about it. They tell you what they're selling and how they anonymise it. You get no such guarantees from Apple (and if the Google terms and conditions bother you, decline and dont use Google services).

Re:Hmmm some artful Apple misdirection

[rtb61]

Keep in mind, you are not just rolling over and taking it, you are also helping to stick it to everyone else. You are nearly as bad as the corrupt police sticking it to you (have to be cruel to be kind), sounds like you deserve it.

Once again, Apple iOS security is a sham

[Anonymous Coward]

If you want real, audited & certified security, get a blackberry.

Based on sales for the last few years, it looks like the market just doesn't care about security. As people put more & more of their life on their phone, you might think people would care.

Sad.

Re:Once again, Apple iOS security is a sham

[Anonymous Coward]

Blackberry... wasn't that the company that sends all your mail and everything you ever communicate through their servers?

You don't understand how blackberries work.

Yes, they send your data though their servers, in the same way that your data goes through your cell phone company.

BUT, with a blackberry enterprise server, Blackberry does NOT have the decryption keys. That is the relevant point - even if Blackberry wants to hand over information to law enforcement, Blackberry isn't able to decrypt the data.

Blackberries were designed by intelligent people who understand security.

Re:Once again, Apple iOS security is a sham

[BasilBrush]

Blackberry's BBM message facility is the most secure in the business. Which is why Blackberry's are the criminal's first choice of phone. I'm not just saying that, the London looting "riots" of a few years ago were organised by criminal gangs and they used BBM to do it.

Apple's pretty secure though. If you want to see a real sham, look to Android - remove the SSD from most Androids, and you have all the user data right there, unencrypted. Users have to take active steps to encrypt stuff. And how many do that?

Re:Once again, Apple iOS security is a sham

[xclr8r]

Not that CNN is the most reliable source.. but I wonder if there is any follow up in this debacle - http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/...

Re:Once again, Apple iOS security is a sham

[xclr8r]

found it doesn't look promising. http://yro.slashdot.org/story/...

Re:Once again, Apple iOS security is a sham

[guruevi]

Wasn't there a story a couple of years ago that Blackberry DID have backdoors to both BES and their own system and shared it with not just US but also Indian and other governments around the world.

Neither Blackberry nor any other corporation is to be trusted, as long as your security is closed source or you have no control over it, it is to be seen as compromised. Use open source security on your OWN systems, that's the only way to be halfway sure that there are no immediate backdoors.

Re:Once again, Apple iOS security is a sham

[exomondo]

Wasn't there a story a couple of years ago that Blackberry DID have backdoors to both BES and their own system and shared it with not just US but also Indian and other governments around the world.

That was BIS not BES. BES you run yourself, BIS is run on Blackberry's own servers.

Enterprise customers will remain safe from India’s spooks after BlackBerry presumably persuaded the authorities that it doesn’t have – and indeed never did have – the BES encryption keys for individual corporates to hand over.
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/07/11/blackberry_gives_indian_spooks_access/

Re:alt: guys who built iphone know how it works.

[killfixx]

There's a built in file manager for the iphone?

Weird... Had no idea...

Re:News?

[LaughingVulcan]

The news is the Apple has received enough LEA requests for information that they've put together guidelines as a pre-emptive against being bothered about things they can't do.

I suppose we could be heartened that it specifically states upon receiving a warrant thus-and-such are available? Until a three-letter agency gives them a Sekrit Not-A-Warrant Order requiring the information. And that, Government, is the whirlwind you reap when you play fast and loose with the Constitution - there should be no trust of you, ever.

Duh

[Anonymous Coward]

Ah, I can do this also. It was helpful during my divorce. If the device is locked the encrypted data is unreadable without a recovery key. The encrypted is still accessible if you can get to it. (through jailbreaks, exploitable boot-loader, or physically reading the ram chips.)

Another "threat post" blog entry.

[Bill_the_Engineer]

How much is threat post paying timothy to drive up their traffic with these half ass stories?

The summary fails to mention that the phone must be in their possession and the both the phone and the search warrant must be delivered to Apple's headquarters which is the only place Apple will perform the extraction.

If anything I applaud Apple for both publicly disclosing their policy for dealing with law enforcement and requiring a search warrant with more detail than "suspect's phone". They require the model number, phone number, serial of IEMI number and FCC ID number.

Pro Tip:

[Zanadou]

Whoever owns the system, owns the system.

Re:Pro Tip:

[VortexCortex]

Got Root?

If the answer was ever anything other than "Yes" then you don't own shit.

Re:Pro Tip:

[mmell]

...and physical possession is ownership (or nine tenths of it, which is good enough for the Law).

Re:Pro Tip:

[BasilBrush]

Are you saying I don't really own my (Linux powered) Garmin GPS and my Nintendo Wii? They sure seem like mine. If I sell them I get the money.

Or is this one of those Stallman "political correctness" things?

Re:News?

[Sockatume]

The page states that they can only access information which is not encrypted, and is "active", whatever that means. Reading between the lines, it seems they can get at information that's currently in RAM.

Re:Hey!

[Anonymous Coward]

if served with a search warrant

Nothing to see here.

Re:alt: guys who built iphone know how it works.

[tapspace]

https://support.apple.com/kb/h...

If passcode-protected whole phone encryption is enabled, no one should be able to access that without the key. I guess they know how it works more than I do. They've even redefined encryption. It's "encrypted" just like everything else these days. I guess it's still technically encrypted even if everyone has a key.

iMessage?

[kurowski]

"iMessage" is a message transport. The app is "Messages". The document from Apple specifically says "SMS": it does not mention either Messages or iMessage. While it's possible that Apple leaves iMessages unencrypted on the device, it would be surprising given how much trouble they go through to protect then in transit. So while this document doesn't explicitly say iMessages are safe, it also doesn't say they're vulnerable.

Re:iMessage?

[BasilBrush]

You;re right. The only mention in the document of either "iMessages" or "messages" is:

"Apple cannot intercept usersâ(TM) iMessage or FaceTime communications as these communications are end-to-end encrypted."

As this is a document saying what Apple CAN get with a warrant, clearly iMessages can't be.

Can't they just push a 'dump' app to the phone?

[pedrop357]

Given that Apple, like Google, can push apps to the phone, what's to stop them from just pushing a custom app that just copies everything to a designated place?

Re:Can't they just push a 'dump' app to the phone?

[BasilBrush]

Given that Apple, like Google, can push apps to the phone

Apple can't. Can Google?

Re:Can't they just push a 'dump' app to the phone?

[MachineShedFred]

Well, as their actual policy states that the law enforcement agency must deliver the actual phone in good working condition, with a search warrant or court order specifically stating the IMEI and FCC ID of the device on it to Cupertino in order to get data extracted, I'm guessing that they can't simply toss a data dumper on it.

If they could just do that, then they could do that over the air.

Re:Can't they just push a 'dump' app to the phone?

[BitZtream]

If you have automatic downloads of apps on, they most certainly do.

All my iDevices always have all new apps on them that I get on any one device, automatically. Means I can get an app in iTunes and my wifes phone will get it automatically, so I don't have to send her searching for it.

Since its optional, they certainly have the ability to do so, its up for debate as to if they can override the choice you set on the device.

Re:Can't they just push a 'dump' app to the phone?

[BasilBrush]

If you have automatic downloads of apps on

So it's optional, and that's updates, not new apps.

Now can Google do it?

Re:Can't they just push a 'dump' app to the phone?

[pedrop357]

From Google Play, I can select apps and tell it to install them on my phone, which it does over wifi/cell connection. This happens without me touching the phone.

I was being a little presumptuous about Apple - I was given the impression by a few iPhone users that you could push apps to your phone the same way.

Re:Can't they just push a 'dump' app to the phone?

[pedrop357]

Yes.

From the google play website, I select an app, click install and it lets me choose which devices to install to.

This doesn't say much about Apple in fact.

[foxx1337]

Taking apart an iPhone 4(S) is fairly straightforward and the various connectors on the boards inside appear to be pretty much "standard". The various flavors of 5 shouldn't be too far off. I would expect some levels of the law enforcement to even have the know-how and equipment to connect to those ports and access an iPhone's internals beyond the device's standard operation - and I don't think it's anything wrong with that. By the user experience it seems that the iPhone's memory is not scrambled.
Assuming anyone would use that, at least we can hope now that such an expensive phone will still be functional when the process is done.

Re:"Law Enforcement" doing their damnedest to kill

[pedrop357]

Sort of like they've been doing with cash.

Give it a few years, maybe a decade, and people who don't regularly use a smartphone/messaging system to interact and/or exchange paper notes will be viewed as highly suspicious.

I wouldn't trust them

[koan]

It's been known for a while that their "Filevault" has a corporate key (allegedly for employees but wouldn't it work for anyone?) to unlock it.
Of course if you're a smart criminal you aren't using this sort of tech or if you are you have a second level of protection.

Considering the timing of the Apple "bugs" such as the SSL fiasco why would anyone think they are protected in any way while using using Apple gear?
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sci...

http://daringfireball.net/2014...

Re:I wouldn't trust them

[gnasher719]

It's been known for a while that their "Filevault" has a corporate key (allegedly for employees but wouldn't it work for anyone?) to unlock it.

Oh my god. When you turn Filevault on, it displays a 20 digit hex string which you can write on a piece of paper, hide in your cupboard, and use to decrypt the hard drive if you forgot the password. Alternatively, in an enterprise setting, where your Mac is under company control, that same 20 digit hex string can be sent to your company, so they can decrypt your drive if you unexpectedly leave the company. And third alternative, you can enter three security questions + answers, the same 20 digit hex string is encrypted with the answers, and sent to Apple with that encryption. You need the exact answers to get your 20 digit hex string back.

Re:I wouldn't trust them

[Noah Haders]

ssl bugs like heartbleed? ohyeahright apple was immune to heartbleed because they fixed it years ago across all their products and services.

Re:I wouldn't trust them

[MachineShedFred]

It's been known for a while that any enterprise-grade encryption software worth talking about can do that. It's called key escrow, and it's necessary to recover company data should the user leave / get fired / forget their password / etc.

How is this a mystery to people?

The actual article

[rabtech]

Hey, let's link to the actual document in question! What a novel concept!

http://www.apple.com/legal/mor...

Good news:

- Apple cannot track a phone via GPS, nor forcibly enable Find My Friends/Find my iPhone

- Apple cannot monitor FaceTime or iMessage conversations since they are end-to-end encrypted

- Apple cannot provide third-party app data that is encrypted since the files are encrypted with the user's passcode.

- It appears if the user does a remote wipe before law enforcement can get a warrant and ship the phone to Apple (or fly it there), then there is nothing that can be done. I wonder if they power up the device in an anechoic chamber so it can't receive the remote wipe signal? I would guess no because most people aren't smart enough to do an immediate wipe.

- We already knew the only trick they have as far as encrypted files goes is a custom firmware that bypasses the max attempt auto-erase and rate limit feature, so it can attempt to brute-force passcodes quickly. However it requires the attempt be made on-device, since the keys are stored in the secure storage with no facility to get them off-device. So even a moderately complex passcode is effectively unbreakable, let alone a good strong password.

Questionable:

- user generated active files (this is what SMS/call logs/photos/etc are listed under). Normally if a device is powered off and rebooted, I was under the impression that these things were not available because the files are encrypted. It seems that iMessage is at least encrypted here, but I would be curious to find out what the situation is. Everything except photos, videos, and recordings is a moot point because you can get stuff like SMS history and call logs from the carrier anyway so those are the only ones I'd be concerned about.

There are some definite good points here - Apple has chosen not to build themselves backdoors or workarounds, presumably because they can't be ordered to disclose information they don't have access to... same reason they built iMessage the way they did. A court would have to order them to refactor their software before it could order them to intercept messages, and at least in the US there is no precedent or law that can compel them to do so.

However I would expect the âoeuser generated active filesâ to be encrypted after a device reboot until the passcode is entered. If that is not the case, Apple should fix it pronto.

I would also expect Apple to refactor the storage of those things to be segmented, given the NSA revelations and increasingly authoritarian behavior of law enforcement; for example, photos pending background upload could be kept unencrypted, but once uploaded they should be rewritten as encrypted so they require the passcode to access. They already have the ephemeral key tech and per-file key support so you can generate a key for the unencrypted file while the device is unlocked, then toss the passcode key when the device locks and only hold onto the file key until the upload is finished, then toss it. Thus no risk to the main key but you can still encrypt the file in the background.

I won't bother discussing Android phones - they are almost all trivial to break and access all the user's data, when people like Samsung aren't coding back doors directly into the firmware.

Re:The actual article

[rwv]

if the user does a remote wipe

I do not claim to know details... but as you mentioned a remote wipe won't work on a phone that is powered off and there are things known as Faraday Cage that should block signals once the time to power on the device and take evidence off it arrives.

Re:alt: guys who built iphone know how it works.

[ackthpt]

MS on the other hand, really don't know how to build a filemanager for their phone, so they gave up.

I'm honestly surprised when someone on MSDN knows the precise reason something works or does not, their own code probably looks like muck to them, too. Keep going through these exercises of "try this..."

OT - I'm not surprised. Is anyone surprise? Apple is the private sector equivalent to the NSA.

Re:alt: guys who built iphone know how it works.

[Lumpy]

All phones probably use the same salt so it's a backdoor it also means that someone out there will find that backdoor.

Surprised?

[Ravaldy]

If at this point people are still surprised that this is possible then they are just naïve. Privacy in public forums (internet being the biggest forum of all) is not possible in this current age. Other than my personal information I don't care what people know or get from me. Some people have a dark past and don't want information to leak but I honestly have nothing to hide so I don't care.

Think of it this way: We are all Truman in the Truman show. The public is watching and so are the officials. Crooks will be caught and honest people LOLd if dumb moments make it online...

Re:Surprised?

[DigitAl56K]

No, think of it this way: You don't understand what is and is not a "public forum". The "texts, contacts, photos and videos, call history and audio recordings" stored on your personal phone are not accessible in a "public forum", and Apple is somehow (allegedly) pulling these things from your device remotely (heaven knows why the security model even allows this to happen) at the behest of law enforcement.

Other than my personal information I don't care what people know or get from me.

What if people knew you were an idiot? Congrats, you just displayed it in a public forum.

Re:Surprised?

[gnasher719]

No, think of it this way: You don't understand what is and is not a "public forum". The "texts, contacts, photos and videos, call history and audio recordings" stored on your personal phone are not accessible in a "public forum", and Apple is somehow (allegedly) pulling these things from your device remotely (heaven knows why the security model even allows this to happen) at the behest of law enforcement.

The whole thing and how it works has been well-documented for a long time.

First, an iOS device's flash storage is always encrypted. The encryption is basically unbreakable. But obviously, the iPhone can still read it. That's because you enter your passcode, and that passcode is used to unlock the data.

The bit of code where you enter your passcode is written and signed by Apple. Only code that is cryptographically signed by Apple is capable of checking a passcode and with the right passcode giving access to the flash drive. And Apple's code that you have installed on your iOS device has features like erasing the drive when you enter the wrong code too often, requiring longer and longer delays between attempts, and so on. So a policeman taking away your phone can try a few times to unlock it, but most likely this doesn't work.

Apple, and nobody else, can write code that tries more passcodes and sign it with Apple's key, which is required for it to work. The passcode checking algorithm is designed to take about 1/10th of a second. So if Apple has your phone, and a search warrant, they can check passcodes at a rate of ten per second.

Without the phone physically there, or with a broken phone, there is no way. If the data has been erased, no way. Removing the flash drive from the phone, no way. Imagine a switch where any delays in the passcode checking is turned off, and a robot hand capable of entering ten keys per second. That's about what Apple can do. 8 digits + letters is uncrackable.

Re:Surprised?

[tlhIngan]

Apple is somehow (allegedly) pulling these things from your device remotely (heaven knows why the security model even allows this to happen) at the behest of law enforcement.

Not remotely, unless your definition has changed to "using some other computer hooked up to it".

Apple needs to be in physical possession of the suspect device, AND said device needs to be delivered with warrant simultaneously.

Likely this means the phone needs to be hooked up to a special test rig to actually work.

Older iPhones and other phones often have special download rigs that police can have and they use over USB to extract data, but later ones only Apple can retrieve data from. With physical possession. And that hasn't been remotely wiped. And with a warrant.

It's actually kind of refreshing that Apple details what it can and cannot retrieve and the conditions for it publicly

Re:Surprised?

[MachineShedFred]

Except that they aren't pulling that stuff remotely, as their policy requires the device be sent to Cupertino in good working condition.

Doesn't sound very remote to me.

Re:Surprised?

[Ravaldy]

You are correct, text, video and contact isn't public forum other than the fact that they are stored in the iCloud (for most users) or a device available to the world. How is that not a public forum? It's like you leaving your contact list in a locked suit case in the middle of central park. Someone will figure out how to get inside. Sure I deviated from the main article but it seams people are surprised data can be read. If it can be written it can be read. Stop being naïve and stop storing dumb shit on your devices.

Re:alt: guys who built iphone know how it works.

[NemoinSpace]

Sorry, I was too brief. Apple doesn't include a file manager because thy want to try to control the experience. (Bad enough). MS doesn't include a file manager because they can't do it without totally destroying security on the device. At least that is their official story. I think the real answer is much worse.

Mod parent up

[OneAhead]

The AC nailed it; this is an utter non-story. Last time I checked, locking an iPhone does not enable full -disk encryption. Raise your hand if you thought the iPhone contains some magical Steve Jobs fart that would prevent someone with hardware access (leave alone Apple with hardware access!) from ripping the unencryped data (which, in a default setup, is essentially everything except your e-mail) from the flash chips. And yes, hardware access is necessary even if it isn't explicilty stated in the summary. Anyhow, those that did raise their hands earlier, please hand in your geek card and don't let the door hit you in the ass on the way out.

Re:Mod parent up

[crdotson]

Here is the fart you requested.

http://images.apple.com/ipad/business/docs/iOS_Security_Feb14.pdf

Re:Mod parent up

[BasilBrush]

Raise your hand if you thought the iPhone contains some magical Steve Jobs fart that would prevent someone with hardware access (leave alone Apple with hardware access!) from ripping the unencryped data (which, in a default setup, is essentially everything except your e-mail) from the flash chips.

*RAISES HAND*

From iOS 4 onwards, all disk data is encrypted if you have set a passcode. Hardware access to the flash chips won't help you.

And the only people that don't set a passcode are people that don't care about security. Without a passcode Law enforcement don't need Apple's help. They just open the app and read the data.

And yes, hardware access is necessary even if it isn't explicilty stated in the summary. Anyhow, those that did raise their hands earlier, please hand in your geek card and don't let the door hit you in the ass on the way out.

Either you are badly misstating what you believe, or you already lost your geek card.

Re:Mod parent up

[OneAhead]

Yeah, that's what you'd think if you were to skip the fine print. In truth, the "disk encryption" in iOS 4 is not full disk encryption. An app has to specifically request for its data to be encrypted through the Apple Data Encryption API, and of the default apps, only the e-mail one does that. More details in the two links in my last post (which date from the first half of 2013 and are specifically talking about iOS 4). I assume they did this for performance and battery life reasons.

I got more than one answer such as yours, so if this many geeks are still deluded about the nature of the "disk encryption", then perhaps I am mistaken and this is not a non-story after all.

Re:Mod parent up

[OneAhead]

Yeah, and if you skim through that document for a few minutes, it becomes clear that the encryption is not applied to the whole disk, and that only apps that use the Apple Data Encryption API benefit from it. The only app that does this in a stock configuration is the e-mail one, so I stand by what I wrote. More about this here and in the 2 links in my previous post.

Re:Mod parent up

[OneAhead]

Okay, I had a closer look at p. 8-9, and together with information from yet another source, I have to concede it's slightly more complicated than stuff not being encrypted at all and "ripping directly from the flash ships" being possible. Yes, the whole "disk" is behind one layer of encryption, but all a person with hardware access has to do to get around this is access the flash chips through the regular DMA data path (which in many scenarios may be simper than reading directly from the flash chips anyway) in order to ensure the AES hardware automatically and transparently decrypts everything. Everything, except the data that is hidden behind the second layer of encryption, which is where the Apple Data Encryption API comes in. Still, while my observations were not formally correct, my main point remains valid: it is trivial for a hardware hacker to retrieve all the data that is not protected though the Apple Data Encryption API (only e-mail in a stock install), and this has been known since April 2013.

Re:Mod parent up

[OneAhead]

Correction: what I wrote is not fully correct but my main point remains valid.

Re:Mod parent up

[BasilBrush]

Hmm. We're both right in a way. This is why I said about maybe you were misstating what you believe.

All files are encrypted. You know what a remote disk wipe does on iOS? It deletes the encryption key(s), nothing more. It doesn't delete the data. It doesn't have to because without keys, the data might as well be random bits.

What's causing you to be mistaken is there are different categories of file protection on different files. One is called "No Protection", but it isn't no encryption.

Re:Mod parent up

[BasilBrush]

So, about that geek card... ;-)

Re:Mod parent up

[OneAhead]

I finally got to the bottom of it. We were indeed both right in a way. There are two layers of encryption, one that is always on, and a second one that is only engaged through the Apple Data Encryption API. However, for the one that is always on, the decryption is also always on (without the user needing to enter their passcode), so it might just as well not be there (except for the remote disk wipe feature). There's nothing a hardware hacker needs to do to bypass the always-on decryption, so from that point of view, only the Apple Data Encryption API layer counts.

Re:Mod parent up

[OneAhead]

Uh... I'm invoking... uhm... the reverse true Scotsman fallacy. Yeah, that's the ticket: either everyone in this thread loses it, or nobody does. Oh look a squirrel! Wait... what were we talking about again? Global warming, right?

Re:Mod parent up

[bill_mcgonigle]

The trouble there is that the iMessage stuff is all based on key escrow by Apple (obvious results are obvious) but also troubing is keychain sync - look there on Page 24 - they're having the user sign it with ECC P256 which everybody knows is broken and an NSA setup.

This iOS security document is probably the best they can do to warn us, given a gag order. Given that the rest of the document proudly calls out P25519 usage (smart) and then the one-of-these-things-is-not-like-the-other-ones moment is the keychain sync, that seems to point to that being the target of the Bullrun operation at Apple.

If I were trying to be secure on iOS (hypothetically) I'd have turned off keychain sync by now.

I concur

[Zeorge]

If all companies would detail how they deal with LEA's then everyone would be the wiser. And, if it's as simple and direct as this, even better. This is about the same as a search warrant for a private container (which might be how a phone is seen in court). I really like this approach via Apple, they'll have LEA but only if there is a valid and legal reason. Not just witch hunting or easter egging.

Re:alt: guys who built iphone know how it works.

[alvinrod]

My understanding has been that they are capable of bypassing the OS restriction on unsuccessful login attempts before the phone's data is wiped. Since most people just use a 4-digit pin, it wouldn't take very long to brute force even if they don't know what the salt is.

Re:News?

[blueg3]

To my knowledge, Apple doesn't do RAM access. Some law-enforcement forensic analysts might, but I don't know of iOS RAM-capture tools that actually work. The whole field is poorly-understood.

"Active" here almost certainly means "not deleted". LE analysts usually ask if you can access deleted data.

The story here is that Apple can unlock and access the files on an unencrypted iPhone. That shouldn't come as a surprise to anyone. You can do that without Apple's help, and you can do it to unencrypted Android phones, unencrypted hard drives, and pretty much any unencrypted data-storing device you have physical access to.

Re:alt: guys who built iphone know how it works.

[Noah Haders]

there's no back door. Apple's iCloud syncs some information across all devices. For ex if I take a photo with my iphone it automatically syncs with my ipad and my macbook. obv the photo must be uploaded from the phone and live on an apple server somewhere, so it's vulnerable to supoena.

in other news, apple will begin notifying users of supoena requests LINK

Re:alt: guys who built iphone know how it works.

[Noah Haders]

Apple is the private sector equivalent to the NSA.

any support for this argument? goog and fb are the ones sucking up and sorting through everybody's info. how is apple the bad guy here? they've gone to great lengths to limit govt intrusion and even notify people when the govt serves a warrant on their accounts.

Re:alt: guys who built iphone know how it works.

[Anonymous Coward]

http://www.reddit.com/r/windowsphone/comments/24jtcy/hi_im_joe_belfiore_from_the_windows_phone_team_ama/ch7vbb4

"We are doing a File Manager for WP8.1! I know a LOT of you are looking for this (thanks for the tweets, I've read them all). In fact, I've been running a build of it on two of my phones for the last week or so and it's getting to pretty good shape.

Here's what it looks like: http://imgur.com/a/hvqGD#nRuOFXp

We are expecting to get it into the store HOPEFULLY by the end of May."

Maybe not anyone

[Anonymous Coward]

At least not trivial task. Per the iOS Security white paper:

"The device’s unique ID (UID) and a device group ID (GID) are AES 256-bit keys fused into the application processor during manufacturing. No software or firmware can read them directly; they can see only the results of encryption or decryption opera- tions performed using them. The UID is unique to each device and is not recorded by Apple or any of its suppliers. The GID is common to all processors in a class of devices (for example, all devices using the Apple A5 chip), and is used as an additional level of protection when delivering system software during installation and restore. Burning these keys into the silicon prevents them from being tampered with or bypassed, and guarantees that they can be accessed only by the AES engine."

Hence, needing some specialized equipment, ergo, ship to 1 Infinite Loop to get the data.

Re:Maybe not anyone

[OneAhead]

Going a few sentences up: "Every iOS device has a dedicated AES 256 crypto engine built into the DMA path between the flash storage and main system memory." So all one needs to do to bypass that encryption layer is access the data through the DMA path (which I'd imagine to be a set of copper lines on the PCB). So no specialized equipment that interacts physically with the silicon necessary. And note that the user's passcode does not come into play at this level. More info here.

Re:Maybe not anyone

[guruevi]

But you'd have to prod that data to pass that line though. That's probably why they can only access the data that is basically already visible through the locked front screen (messages, photos).

Either way, if my phone were confiscated for whatever reason, the first thing that would happen is a remote wipe - basically a deadman's switch, if my phone doesn't check into a server every 12 hours, it wipes. Backups are also encrypted and can be restored in less than 5 minutes (there is no data locally that isn't synced) so accidents are a minor inconvenience.

EaseUS Mobisaver Freecan download that stuff...Duh

[DanSSJ4]

I just did this on a locked iPhone i Found Yesterday to try to identify the owner.

It was locked from too many bad PIN's entered and I was able to access Photos, Call Log, TXT Messages, etc.

Didn't give me access to every single thing on the phone, but that is still a lot considering this is a shareware limited app anyone can download.

There are more advanced Forensic programs that are available, but they can get more pricey.

But if anyone with google can find a shareware app, what hope to you have against the government with all their money and resources.

http://www.easeus.com/mobile-t...

Re:alt: guys who built iphone know how it works.

[kthreadd]

https://support.apple.com/kb/h...

If passcode-protected whole phone encryption is enabled, no one should be able to access that without the key. I guess they know how it works more than I do. They've even redefined encryption. It's "encrypted" just like everything else these days. I guess it's still technically encrypted even if everyone has a key.

Not everything is encrypted. According to the guidelines:

Specifically, the user generated active files on an iOS device that are contained in Apple’s native apps and for which the data is not encrypted using the passcode (“user generated active files”), can be extracted and provided to law enforcement on external media.

So, data can only be extracted if it is not encrypted. Sounds reasonable. Of course it would be better if everything was encrypted.

Even though apple phones have encrypted files...

[spinozaq]

I had someone give me an iphone 4 last year where a child playing with the phone had accidentally deleted all the pictures. My task was to recover all the deleted pictures. It took me a few hours, mainly because I had never done anything with an iphone before. The process that worked invovled booting the phone with a different bootloader and breaking the encryption key. Most of the information and software to accomplish this can be found with a few minutes of searching.

Seconded. Mod non-A/C parent up.

[mmell]

I was thinking about the FROST attack against Android devices. Sounds like something similar here - lower the temperature enough to get the phone to reveal its encryption key in RAM, then just read the key off the RAM chips. Now you have the key to decrypt all of that lovely cloud data yon LEO has been after.

Re:alt: guys who built iphone know how it works.

[tapspace]

Every iOS device has a dedicated AES 256-bit crypto engine built in that is used to encrypt all data on the device at all times. In addition, the iOS Cryptographic Modules have been granted FIPS 140-2 compliance by the U.S. federal government on devices running iOS 6.

Emphasis mine. Sounds like doublespeak to me.

s/kill/control

[mmell]

Why would they want to kill the future of personal technology, when there's so much in there for law enforcement?

Re:Therefore

[mmell]

It takes more than that to wipe the data. Look at the specs for military secure communication equipment - you need a mechanism to actively destroy all data present in the event of any detected tampering. It'd be nice if that mechanism were proof against accidental implementation, yet robust enough to prevent intentional intrusion.

Military grade technology will cost military grade bucks and will not be made generally available to the public. It will certainly not be made available for import/export on any civilian market you or I have access to.

And so can just about everyone else

[fma]

See http://www.cellebrite.com/mobile-forensics. Every Apple store has Cellebrite phone forensics software and so do a every police agency who can afford it.

Re:closed-source shitheads

[BasilBrush]

Clearly the intelligencia is backing open-source these days...

Re:EaseUS Mobisaver Freecan download that stuff...

[BasilBrush]

what hope to you have against the government with all their money and resources.

Given that the App you mention and Apple's list of what they can extract amount to the same thing, it's probable the government also can access the same things. Basically anything that not encrypted on the device or backup can be accessed by all (with physical access). Things that are encrypted can't be. Even by people working for scary 3 letter acronyms.

The official documentation

[crdotson]

I posted this elsewhere in the thread, but this describes the iOS security mechanisms in excruciating detail, including the full-disk encryption, etc. etc. Note that it does vary by hardware platform (3GS, 4, 4S, 5, 5S) and iOS version, so this is the "new hotness". There's a lot of incorrect information in the comments.

http://images.apple.com/ipad/business/docs/iOS_Security_Feb14.pdf

Re:The official documentation

[Kimomaru]

So, let me understand your point better. You're saying that you believe what Apple publishes on its own security mechanism?

Re:The official documentation

[gnasher719]

So, let me understand your point better. You're saying that you believe what Apple publishes on its own security mechanism?

Don't you?

Remember, we are Apple's customers. We are the people paying Apple. How much money do you think does Apple make by supporting law enforcement? I'd say $0 if they are lucky, but quite possibly a loss. What interest does Apple have in reading your data or making it available to someone? Apple's biggest source of profit is selling phones, followed by selling tablets, followed by selling computers. Just like Google, Apple's interested in keeping their customers happy so they keep paying money. Unlike with Google, _you_ are Apple's customer.

Re:The official documentation

[NicBenjamin]

So, let me understand your point better. You're saying that you believe what Apple publishes on its own security mechanism?

Don't be silly.

Apple is monopolistic, greedy, and power-hungry. As a non-Apple source of power they do not particularly like the government. Particularly the law enforcement bits, which a) cost them money and b) stop them from monopolizing further.

Most importantly Apple isn't stupid. They make money by making consumers happy. They make approximately $0 from making law enforcement happy. Therefore they have literally no reason to lie in something like this. There's no reason for them to do it. At all. Their job is to make money. Paying for back doors, and engineers to use said back doors, is literally the opposite of what Apple is supposed to do.

Moreover, if they did they'd almost certainly be caught. There are literally millions of local cops in the US. Each and every one of those guys will probably test some aspect of Apple's claims sometime in the next month, because an awful lot of Americans have iPhones. And if any one of those millions of guys has a twitter account and agrees with geeks on privacy rules then we'll all know about it tomorrow.

Re:The official documentation

[Kimomaru]

"Remember, we are Apple's customers."

I am not an Apple customer.

The rest of your points - Are you being serious? No, sorry, you're completely wrong about every point you made. Here, read this; http://articles.economictimes....

Re:The official documentation

[Kimomaru]

Here, read this https://threatpost.com/legal-g... .

Re: alt: guys who built iphone know how it works.

[maccodemonkey]

Encrypted by the hardware encryption key that's physically on the device.

Some data is encrypted by hardware encryption and pass code.

Some data is encrypted by just the hardware.

That's why Apple requires the entire phone. Just an image of the device is not enough. They've got to lift the actual encryption key off of the hardware.

Still a little double speak, but not too much. They're saying everything is encrypted, but not necessarily by the PIN.

Most IT departments see this as reasonable encryption, as getting the key back out of the encryption chip is not simple.

Re:alt: guys who built iphone know how it works.

[tysonedwards]

Technically, there *is* a backdoor in the sense that Apple signs the ramdisk with their private key. As such, should they build and sign a "data recovery ramdisk" with their private key and supply said software to Law Enforcement (such as when subpoenaed), then one can boot to DFU, load the "data recovery ramdisk", mount the phone as read-only flash that the agency can copy data from it.

Any entity with the private keys control what happens with the data on the device.

Re:alt: guys who built iphone know how it works.

[MachineShedFred]

They don't supply shit to law enforcement - their policy says that the device has to be shipped to Cupertino in good working order, where they will do the data extraction only with a proper search warrant or court order. The data is then provided on optical media:

Specifically, the user generated active files on an iOS device that are contained in Apple’s native apps and for which the data is not encrypted using the passcode (“user generated active files”), can be extracted and provided to law enforcement on external media. Apple can perform this data extraction process on iOS devices running iOS 4 or more recent versions of iOS. Please note the only categories of user generated active files that can be provided to law enforcement, pursuant to a valid search warrant, are: SMS, photos, videos, contacts, audio recording, and call history. Apple cannot provide: email, calendar entries, or any third-party App data.

See section I of the linked document, entitled "Extracting Data from Passcode Locked iOS Devices".

Re:closed-source shitheads

[MachineShedFred]

Yeah, because most Android device manufacturer's legal policy about data extraction from phones is far better for privacy advocates.

Wait, where are their policies published again? They're not?

Re:alt: guys who built iphone know how it works.

[gnasher719]

All phones probably use the same salt so it's a backdoor it also means that someone out there will find that backdoor.

The lack of thought... What happens when the passcode screen comes up and you type in your passcode 1234? The software takes your passcode, 1234, and no other input that isn't directly available to the passcode software, and unlocks your phone. A police officer taking your locked phone takes five seconds to type a passcode, and your phone gets erased after ten attempts, because that's what Apple's passcode software does.

Apple can replace the passcode software. (Nobody else can, because only software codesigned by Apple can do the needed hardware access). The replacement software tries 0000, 0001, 0002, etc. as if you had typed them in, just faster, at a rate of ten per second. That's it. And then they try until they find the right passcode. You can calculate how long it takes at ten keys per second.

There is no back door. Apple patiently tries all the possible combinations on the front door, while turning the burglar alarm off.

Re:alt: guys who built iphone know how it works.

[BitZtream]

Using the same salt doesn't change anything.

In order for the salt to be useful, it can't be stored encrypted anyway, so they don't need to use the same salt, it would be very easy to read.

The system has to be able to read the salt in order to combine it with your password to make the actual key or password hash or whatever.

Same salt is the same as no salt, it doesn't provide a back door.

Re:News?

[BitZtream]

You should look up JTAG, the whole field is fairly well understood to any hardware developer on the planet, its not even all that complex.

To think Apple has no JTAG support on their devices is just silly and shows a lack of understanding the hardware development process.

CORRECTION

[OneAhead]

Correction: what I wrote is not fully correct but my main point remains valid.

Re: News?

[guruevi]

If there were a master key, they would be able to get the whole system and also, it would be trivial for someone to find/leak that key and every single device would be at risk. Also, having encryption with 2 simultaneous private keys is impossible if you don't have access to both keys at time of encryption (and hardcoding a key in software would defeat the purpose of the encryption all-together). The device self-destructs when attempting brute forces so that's not it either. I'd say they can access 'some' data, the same data which is displayed on the front of your phone without being unlocked (a set of photo's, last dozen or so text messages, alerts) which live in RAM or on the 'OS' side of the storage.

Re:News?

[blueg3]

I haven't actually disassembled an iPhone to see if it has an exposed JTAG header. I've connected to a lot of other consumer devices with JTAG, though. It's extremely common to disable JTAG entirely on the devices that are sold to consumers (though the header and traces are still there, they just don't do anything). Most devices where it does work only talk on JTAG if the device powers up with something connected to the header -- which eliminates using it for RAM access for forensic purposes. Lots of densely-packed consumer devices actually don't have the JTAG headers on them at all. It's very inconvenient.

I love my BlackBerry

[Rigel47]

A phone that puts security first. No ifs, and, or, buts about it. Not to mention 2-day battery life and a seamless OS experience.

Re:alt: guys who built iphone know how it works.

[cbhacking]

Oh please, you are *completely* full of shit. WP8 has Pocket File Manager, and WP8.1 has added even more support for file access (I don't know if anybody has yet published an app that uses it to make a general-purpose file browser).

Yeah, the apps can't *see* much because they run with excruciatingly low privileges - PFM has a special capability that gives full access to some locations most apps can't access at all - but the SD card and public folders are accessible.

There's also homebrew, like https://wp8webserver.codeplex.... or http://forum.xda-developers.co...

Which explains why they block alternatives...

[KreAture]

If you have to use their email client, camera-app and messenger they have control on your data.
This really sheds light on this lack of freedom.

Re:Which explains why they block alternatives...

[mjwx]

If you have to use their email client, camera-app and messenger they have control on your data.
This really sheds light on this lack of freedom.

Wait...

You're only just now figuring out you have a severe lack of freedom with Apple devices?

Do you mind if I borrow the rock you're living under, I want to sit this decade out.

Re:EaseUS Mobisaver Freecan download that stuff...

[BitZtream]

I was able to access Photos, Call Log, TXT Messages, etc.

Thats a configurable option, to allow those things to be accessed from the lock screen.

Disable access to those and the silly little app you used would't have worked either.

Re:alt: guys who built iphone know how it works.

[david_thornley]

Google and Facebook profit by extracting information from you and using it for targeted advertisements and/or more nefarious purposes. Apple mostly profits by selling you stuff. If we found out that Facebook was collecting information on its users and selling it or otherwise disseminating it, well, that's business as usual. If Apple were to do it and get caught, it would likely hurt sales some, so there's little upside and some downside for them to do it.

You can't trust corporations, but you can get clues to their behavior by observing what makes money for them and expecting them to do things to keep making that money. As a result, I'm not nearly as worried about Apple knowing about me as Google or Facebook. In this particular situation, Apple is unlikely to be the bad guy.

Hi Allie!

[mmell]

Keep those spamposts comin' - I need to tweak my email filters.

Anonymous coward.

[mmell]

Who are you?

Alexander Peter Kowalski

[mmell]

I'm sorry - you post as A/C everywhere. No wonder nobody takes you seriously.

Wow. That's original. Who are you?

[mmell]

Are you this guy? The Start64 malware site shows the following:

Company: Panisz Peter

Address: Kossuth Lajos u. 51 Dunabogdany 2023 HU

Phone: +36.203367173

Fax: +36.203367173

But I think he's living at his mother Jan Kowalski's basement at:

Alexander Peter Kowalski

903 East Division Street

Syracuse, N.Y. 13208

Apartment #1, Lower Level

At least, that's where he wants users of his hostfile manager to send him money.

Re:alt: guys who built iphone know how it works.

[MikeBabcock]

If that were true, there wouldn't be limitations on what data they can extract. Sounds like you're guessing.