Researcher Finds Hidden Data-Dumping Services In iOS
Trailrunner7 writes There are a number of undocumented and hidden features and services in Apple iOS that can be used to bypass the backup encryption on iOS devices and remove large amounts of users' personal data. Several of these features began as benign services but have evolved in recent years to become powerful tools for acquiring user data.
Jonathan Zdziarski, a forensic scientist and researcher who has worked extensively with law enforcement and intelligence agencies, has spent quite a bit of time looking at the capabilities and services available in iOS for data acquisition and found that some of the services have no real reason to be on these devices and that several have the ability to bypass the iOS backup encryption. One of the services in iOS, called mobile file_relay, can be accessed remotely or through a USB connection can be used to bypass the backup encryption. If the device has not been rebooted since the last time the user entered the PIN, all of the data encrypted via data protection can be accessed, whether by an attacker or law enforcement, Zdziarski said. Update: 07/21 22:15 GMT by U L : Slides.
Jonathan Zdziarski, a forensic scientist and researcher who has worked extensively with law enforcement and intelligence agencies, has spent quite a bit of time looking at the capabilities and services available in iOS for data acquisition and found that some of the services have no real reason to be on these devices and that several have the ability to bypass the iOS backup encryption. One of the services in iOS, called mobile file_relay, can be accessed remotely or through a USB connection can be used to bypass the backup encryption. If the device has not been rebooted since the last time the user entered the PIN, all of the data encrypted via data protection can be accessed, whether by an attacker or law enforcement, Zdziarski said. Update: 07/21 22:15 GMT by U L : Slides.
Everyone else, every law-abiding citizen, may move on, nothing to see here...
1) Can this method be used to bypass iCloud?
2) Does anyone have a write-up of how it works? I've got a lost-to-pawn iPad that need wiped, and will likely have more come into the shop in the future.
An enigma, wrapped in a riddle, shrouded in bacon and cheese
There is a huge caveat here:
You can only do this if you have the keys from a computer you have sync'd with previously. That only happens if you enter your passcode then see the "Trust this Computer" prompt on a computer that has iTunes installed and you click "Trust" at the prompt. That creates a set of sync keys that the iOS device will then accept to access the various services.
Some of the stuff he complains about is only enabled for devices used for development or if the device is enrolled in enterprise provisioning. As far as I'm aware, Apple requires that the company purchase the device on the company account to support over the air enrollment in this system so it wouldn't affect personal devices. Even for USB connected devices, you must enter the password/passcode to allow the device to be visible to MDM tools in the first place. Even enabling development mode requires entering the password/passcode.
The one main point he brings up (which I agree with) is Apple needs to provide a way to see the list of computers on your device and remove them.
There are some other more theoretical issues here that Apple should address, but no your iPhone is not running a packet sniffer and will not hand over files to anyone who connects. If your device isn't provisioned for enterprise and has never connected to a PC to sync (the vast majority of iOS devices these days) then as far as I can tell, none of the issues he found are of any use whatsoever.
Natural != (nontoxic || beneficial)
whether by an attacker or law enforcement
For those who are innocent, law enforcement IS the attacker.
This may be the backdoor known as DROPOUTJEEP, which was described in some Snowden-leaked documents last year.
Looks like Apple sold out, put in a backdoor, and then lied about it.
The summary seems to imply that law enforcement and being an attacker are mutually exclusive...
Why link to a re-post and not to the source: http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/
There we find this:
Apple is often prone to adding capabilities without thinking through the security implications. But this researcher should do some more research into what constitutes legitimate engineering uses.
From TFA:
“Some of this data shouldn’t be on the phone. HFSMeta creates a disk image of everything that’s on the phone, not the content but the metadata,” Zdziarski said. “There’s not even an engineering use for that.”
I can imagine plenty of legitimate uses of just metadata. For example, the old iOS backup mechanism basically took a snapshot of everything and something like HFSMeta could be used to identify the files that have changed so only those files are backed up.
For people who lose/have their device stolen.
People want to read something like "The iPhone has a secret backdoor for the NSA!!!". Anything much longer than that will never be read or understood by most people.
It's hopeless. Ask 100 people who have heard of this and 95 of them will tell you that it is proven now that the iPhone has a secret backdoor for the NSA over which all data can just be read by them.
(And I'm not even saying that it has NO such backdoor. Maybe it has. But this isn't it. This just isn't designed for mass surveillance, it needs a cooperating user and individual access to a device the user has connected his iPhone to. Maybe it's a side door for law enforcement and/or forensics additionally to a debugging tool.)
Don't by the corporate colored glass beads, but roll your own crypto. Its not actually hard.
WHAT THE FUCK ARE YOU SMOKING? Rolling your own crypto is HARD. The near infinite number of ways you can screw up (fucked implementations like "optimizations", timing attacks, electromagnetic leakage, poor handling of entropy and key material--the list goes on and on) automatically make rolling your own crypto a bad idea.
You want better security, support the open source hardware and software guys (especially crypto devs who put out established/trustworthy products like OpenBSD).
And yes, I've written plenty of crypto code and STILL don't trust any of it.