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Dropbox Head Responds To Snowden Claims About Privacy
First time accepted submitter Carly Page writes When asked for its response to Edward Snowden's claims that "Dropbox is hostile to privacy", Dropbox told The INQUIRER that users concerned about privacy should add their own encryption. The firm warned however that if users do, not all of the service's features will work. Head of Product at Dropbox for Business Ilya Fushman says: "We have data encrypted on our servers. We think of encryption beyond that as a users choice. If you look at our third-party developer ecosystem you'll find many client-side encryption apps....It's hard to do things like rich document rendering if they're client-side encrypted. Search is also difficult, we can't index the content of files. Finally, we need users to understand that if they use client-side encryption and lose the password, we can't then help them recover those files."
Search is also difficult, we can't index the content of files.
umm duh, that's the point? sucks when your customers can't trust you.
With the keys we readily hand over when warranted.... o_O
Dropbox has Condoleeza Rice on its board of directors. If anyone remembers, she was Secretary of State and also the president's National Security Advisor during the Bush administration. She basically allowed torture, and is responsible for Guantanamo. She had no problem with torturing people without even doing a basic check to see if the person being tortured was guilty of the crime he was being tortured for. And you want to talk about spying? She was part of the administration that developed the PATRIOT Act. The justification being "it's ok to spy on foreigners" .. Oh and we can DECLARE you a foreigner without any due process by making you prove your Americanness. She was cool with torturing foreigners without giving them any sort of due process, so why would you assume that she wont torture citizens if she was scared into doing so? We already know she doesn't think people need privacy.
It's not stupid; it's just a fact. Obviously they can't do any of that crap if they can't decrypt your data, but that's fine by me.
It's not stupid; it's just a fact. Obviously they can't do any of that crap if they can't decrypt your data, but that's fine by me.
Exactly. Gotta love the knee-jerk, I can't have a logical thought because I'm just so ready to rant about "the man" bullshit. Especially since it sounds like it's coming from someone who doesn't even use or understand the service.
Dropbox is file storage, plain and simple. I use it to make a few music files and some reading material available across my devices. That's it's main function, to store/share files.
All that other shit he is talking about that encryption won't work with is all fluff and ancillary stuff - I name my files properly, for example, so I don't need them to search within them for me. The service works just fine with encrypted files - you just can't use the fancy doodads that you don't really need anyway.
I applaud him for being honest - if this was certain other companies they'd be telling you "oh trust us. It's secure!" He's being honest - it's a dumping spot for files, if you want encryption, BYO.
Christ some of the folks around these parts don't know their heads from their asses - use the words encryption or privacy and they don't even listen or understand wtf is being talked about they just automatically jump to tired fear mongering rhetoric. Just like the folks who take rifles strapped across their backs to Starbucks - I want to say, WTF are you so scared of? And if you do have something to be scared of - stay the fuck home, or in this case, don't be a complete retard and use a "cloud" service to begin with.
So, you would have preferred a positive sounding statement indicating that they are aware that some users have privacy concerns and a vague reference to ongoing efforts to address these concerns?
I didn't find that response "worst of all time". It came across as lacking in the bullshit department, almost refreshingly so, actually.
Steve Gibson's mantra: TNO. If the host has your encryption password/key, then they can't be trusted. If you don't believe that, ask Snowden's email provider, Lavabit's founder Ladar Levison: http://www.wired.com/2014/04/l...
In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act. George Orwell
iDrive, which is supposed to be a remote backup service, has a similar problem. They used to be a honest remote backup service, with client-side encryption. (They didn't protect the client password very well on the client machine, but at least the server didn't have it.) File contents were encrypted, but filenames were not, so you could look at logs and the directory tree on line. Then they came out with a "new version" of the service, one that is "web based" and offers "sharing".
For "sharing" to work, of course, they need to know your encryption key. They suggest using the "default encryption key". Even if you're not "sharing", when you want to recover a copy of a file, you're prompted to enter your encryption key onto a web page. The web page immediately sends the encryption key to the server as plain text, as can be seen from a browser log. Asked about this, they first denied the problem, then, when presented with a browser log, refused to answer further questions.
They try real hard to get their hands on your encryption key. After you log into their web site, a huge pop-up demands your encryption key. Without it, some of the menu items at the top of the page still work, and with some difficulty, you can actually find logs of what you backed up. You can't browse your directory tree, though.
It's possible to use the service securely (maybe), but you have to run only the application for recovery, and never use the web-based service. They don't tell you that.
This isn't a free service. I pay them $150 a year.
Try to convince a Manager hellbent on joining "The Cloud" and you know the answer is no.
For a chuckle, have him explain what "The Cloud" is before you do. At least it provides some entertainment before you try to convince him he's about to sink his business.
We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
You know there is a web interface to Dropbox too? People expect to read their documents, like word or PDF right there online. To do this the service must index the files and read them. Obviously if you encrypt the files, this can not be done.
I use Dropbox as my offsite backup of sensitive information and I trust the information to be safe. Simple, I encrypt the tar-ball with symmetric GPG. But then again I can only download the file vie the web interface if I wish and not view the contents online... buhuhu
You realise dropbox is free, right? Why should they do something expensive like offer encryption on a service that is (a) free, and (b) for sharing files. Sharing's hard if your stuff is encrypted, and sharing is the source of most of Dropbox's value.
If you want encryption, then fine, do it yourself. You obviously know that your stuff won't be indexable or shareable so won't be calling for support or slagging Dropbox off online when you find indexing and sharing not working.
There's room to suggest Dropbox should offer a pay-for encrypted service. The thing is, no matter how well they do it, it'll always be vulnerable to government interference, and it'll never be fully trusted anyway. BYO means no government interference and trust *for the relatively small number of people who care* without raising the costs too much for the multitudes who don't.
As long as you still trust TrueCrypt, there's no reason you shouldn't use an encrypted container file (or multiple smaller containers) in your Dropbox. Some people might not know this, but Dropbox only re-uploads the parts of the file that change (it does a binary comparison), and TrueCrypt typically only updates relatively small sections of the container file when you add/remove/modify a file in the container, so it doesn't take much bandwidth except for the initial upload. Just make sure you dismount frequently enough to allow Dropbox to sync when you make changes. (I'd recommend setting TrueCrypt to automatically dismount after an hour or so of no data being read/written.)
You could use the dynamic disk option when creating the TC container to save bandwidth during the initial upload, if you're starting with an empty container (the size of the container will change, up to a set maximum, to match the contents), but that will have other performance penalties when using the container, and it brings with it the increased risks. In particular, it makes it possible for an analyst to get some idea of how you are storing files in the container, potentially making it easier to break the encryption.
And since it's being stored in the cloud, you should maximize your security by using local keyfiles/tokens rather than a single password. You might as well assume that the whole world has a copy of the container.
For convenience, you can store a portable unencrypted copy of TrueCrypt in Dropbox as well, but you should really only do that if you keep a local copy of the checksums for the binaries and compare them to the files whenever you run them. (That will ensure that nobody has accessed your account and replaced your portable TC binaries with compromised versions capable of stealing your keys.) Or carry a portable version on a USB drive.
The only downside I can see to this is that if you need access to your files on a new machine, you will need to download the whole container, and if the new machine is compromised, you could have your keys stolen. Even so, it's much more secure than using Dropbox on its own, and in my opinion, it's worth the potential inconvenience to have good encryption and cloud access.
If you use their web interface, they will store your password on their servers. Be aware of that.
Also, your account password is the the key used to encrypt your data (easy to verify: accessing your data on a new device only requires your account password). They use PDKDF2, which expands the password into a larger key, but (obviously) doesn't add any entropy to that already present in the password. Choose your password wisely.
That password is also used to access the billing, etc web interface, so they do keep at least a hashed copy of your password on their servers.
As with any closed source and opaque solution, you shouldn't depend in any way on unverifiable claims. They could now, or at any time in the future, store your passwords. You're better off handling your own security than trusting magic black boxes.
If you want a vision of the future, imagine a youtube comments section scrolling - forever.