seL4 Verified Microkernel Now Open Source
Back in 2009, OKLabs/NICTA announced the first formally verified microkernel, seL4 (a member of the L4 family). Alas, it was proprietary software. Today, that's no longer the case: seL4 has been released under the GPLv2 (only, no "or later versions clause" unfortunately). An anonymous reader writes OSnews is reporting that the formally verified sel4 microkernel is now open source: "General Dynamics C4 Systems and NICTA are pleased to announce the open sourcing of seL4, the world's first operating-system kernel with an end-to-end proof of implementation correctness and security enforcement. It is still the world's most highly assured OS."
Source is over at Github. It supports ARM and x86 (including the popular Beaglebone ARM board). If you have an x86 with the VT-x and Extended Page Table extensions you can even run Linux atop seL4 (and the seL4 website is served by Linux on seL4).
You mean, fortunately. Now, it's more likely to actually be used.
sig: sauer
http://sel4.systems/FAQ/
Is it really that hard to give more background information?
It may have been proven correct, but lets wait and see until after it's actually been used if it really is.
(Knuth said (paraphrased): be aware of bugs in the above code. I have only proved it to be correct; I have not tried it.)
I feel an explaination may help. This project is based on a formal specification (in Isabelle/HOL) about what should be true about the microkernel. This specification rules out things like buffer overflows, null pointer dereferences and other properties by recasting these ideas in terms of higher order logic and uses automatic theorem proving tools to verify the proofs and that implementations match the specification.
There's even a binary verified version for ARM, so you don't even have to trust that your compiler works (but, there is progress in verified compilers, so hopefully an x86_64 version is on the way). The value in this is in using the tool chain and creating new, formally specified abstractions and implementing them in an verified manner to implement more secure, robust programs on top of this kernel. Of course, the microkernel makes assumptions about the hardware, boot loader, but formal verification is used more often in hardware, and you have to trust something at some point.
This opens a whole set of possibilities to the community as a whole. As a random example, you could formalize the Arduino language (or a kernel for that language) and create a verified version of that system that runs on this microkernel. This would be a big effort, but you could do it.
Overall, this is a positive step in lower the costs of verified co-designed systems and I hope it attracts more interest in software formal verification.
Yes, it does mean that any code including v3 code can only be legally licensed as v3 - but there's nothing stopping you from later extracting the offending code and reverting to v2+. You don't magically change the 2+ license under which you gained rights to the other code, you just only have the option of redistributing it under v3 so long as any v3-only code is included. So long as you make sure all contributions made in the interim are made under v2+ you don't have a problem (i.e. v3-only licensing can only spread if you let it).
--- Most topics have many sides worth arguing, allow me to take one opposite you.
While proved software is much better than unproved software, this is not the end of security holes: The proof assumes hardware and compiler behave as specified, which lets a lot of attack surface.
At least it raises the bar much higher.
Surely a formally-proven OS doesn't want a traditional open-source license, because if you let people tinker, what you will end up with is forking... into unproven versions. And suddenly, the world's first formally-proven microkernel is just a plain old microkernel again.
OK, so maybe tinkering is alright as a personal hobby, but it risks the ecosystem.
Got them moderator blues I blieve I walk out the do', With these mod-points I been gettin', I 'most never post no mo'