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How to Maintain Lab Safety While Making Viruses Deadlier

Posted by timothy on from the this-one-goes-to-11 dept.

Lasrick (2629253) writes "A scientist at the University of Wisconsin-Madison published an article in June revealing that he had taken genes from the deadly human 1918 Spanish Flu and inserted them into the H5N1 avian flu to make a new virus—one which was both far deadlier and far more capable of spreading than the original avian strain. In July it was revealed that the same scientist was conducting another study in which he genetically altered the 2009 strain of flu to enable it to evade immune responses, 'effectively making the human population defenseless against re-emergence.' In the U.S. alone, biosafety incidents involving pathogens happen more than twice per week. These 'gain-of-function' experiments are accidents waiting to happen, with the possibility of starting deadly pandemics that could kill millions. It isn't as if it hasn't happened before: in 2009, a group of Chinese scientists created a viral strain of flu virus that escaped the lab and created a pandemic, killing thousands of people. 'Against this backdrop, the growing use of gain-of-function approaches for research requires more careful examination. And the potential consequences keep getting more catastrophic.' This article explores the history of lab-created pandemics and outlines recommendations for a safer approach to this type of research."

28 of 218 comments (clear)

  1. Homeland security would like a word... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Someone put this scientist on the no fly list. That's some Twelve Monkeys shit he's pulling right there.

    1. Re:Homeland security would like a word... by magarity · · Score: 2

      Someone put this scientist on the no fly list. That's some Twelve Monkeys shit he's pulling right there.

      But if they're on the no fly list they won't be able to get a sample of the original virus.

    2. Re:Homeland security would like a word... by mellon · · Score: 3, Insightful

      The thing that boggles my mind about this is that apparently nobody in the chain of command at the university thinks there's anything wrong with what this brilliant idiot has done. If I were the prosecutor here, I would charge everybody who know about the experiment with a billion counts of attempted murder (just a back-of-the-envelope estimate), and throw the fuckers in the can for life. Unbelievable.

    3. Re:Homeland security would like a word... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Interesting

      Scientists do this all the time. My buddy once worked in a lab in Maryland that engineered extremely virulent (in some cases deadly) rhinoviruses. Killer colds!

      They do this to understand what makes a virus more dangerous, or what makes it more contagious. It's part of the scientific method. If you have a theory that gene Z can make a virus more deadly, the best way to _test_ that hypothesis is to add gene Z to the virus and compare its effects to a control. You're not doing it to make a deadly virus; you're doing it so you can detect deadly viruses in the wild. Over time this has allowed us to estimate the future damage of viral epidemics with increasing accuracy.

      Of course, "best" is relative. It's best in the sense that it provides the most sound scientific data. But the potential non-scientific externalities come into play in a big way. The "best" way to test the radiological effects of nuclear fall-out is to drop a bomb on a population, but obviously that's a tad unethical.

    4. Re:Homeland security would like a word... by Oligonicella · · Score: 2

      Your post is true. Your list of horrors should include this one and if those bother anyone, this should as well.

      It is unconscionable for the gov or anyone to actually create this item. There have been too many incidents of accidentally losing and miss filing and just plain letting escape of pathogens here and abroad to purposely create a friggin' virus that is *designed* to elude immune responses - in other words, purposely designed to kill at maximum. Yes, the government is the main culprit but this guy is a definite accessory and if this shit escapes and kills people he definitely shares the guilt.

    5. Re:Homeland security would like a word... by HiThere · · Score: 2

      Not attempted murder, because he didn't attempt to release the virus, and had no intention of doing so. Even if it were released, and he was responsible for the deaths, it wouldn't be murder. Manslaughter, perhaps. As it is it's closer to "reckless endangerment" (a more general class that includes reckless driving as a subclass).

      The problem would be proving that he acted recklessly. I accept that this is probable, given the history of biology lab accidents. (Wasn't it earlier this month that someone found some weaponized anthrax abandoned in a closet?)

      Personally, however, I would question the sanity of the researcher and each and every one of his superiors who authorized the research.

      --

      I think we've pushed this "anyone can grow up to be president" thing too far.
    6. Re:Homeland security would like a word... by mellon · · Score: 4, Insightful

      You are correct—this isn't attempted murder. But IMHO it's in the same moral category. I think you are basically right that it's a failure to think outside of the immediate problem space, but what a failure. Imagine if 40-60% of the people you have ever met or heard of, as well as those you don't, died within a month. The 1918 flu left emotional scars that persisted for generations. And that had a 2% mortality rate. The amount of suffering this person could have caused through his narrow thinking is more than has ever been experienced in all of history.

    7. Re:Homeland security would like a word... by angel'o'sphere · · Score: 2

      Construction of bio weapons is forbidden by multiple multilateral contracts since decades, for a fucking reason, idiot.

      --
      Cost free eBook I read (by iBook/Kobo/Amazon/ObookO/Gutenberg etc.): "The Green Odyssey" by Philip Jose Farmer.
    8. Re:Homeland security would like a word... by mellon · · Score: 2

      No, I mean that by any rational standard, deliberately creating a pathogen that can kill millions, whether you release it deliberately or not, is a crime. It may not be on the books, but it should be.

  2. So ... by gstoddart · · Score: 5, Insightful

    They essentially are making biological weapons in violation of international treaties, but they're saying it's all OK because it's for research?

    Sorry, but what? If someone in Iran was doing this people would be calling for airstrikes.

    The hubris of thinking "it's OK, I'm a trained professional, nothing bad can happen" is mind boggling.

    How is it even legal to be making deadlier strains of viruses?

    --
    Lost at C:>. Found at C.
    1. Re:So ... by Electricity+Likes+Me · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Yes that has to be it. It couldn't possibly be because biological research is amazingly difficult, and of the tools we have to study cells (few) we have even fewer to study viruses.

      The entire point of gain-of-function studies is that you need to do them in order to confirm a hypothesis about what genes in a virus are actually doing. If you don't do them, you can't know. Knock-out studies aren't enough - you can easily break a certain system, but it doesn't tell you that you actually understand how it functions.

      Sensationalist articles like this are incredibly stupid and dangerous to boot. We only have the slim number of effective anti-viral drugs we do because of research like this. How else do you think they figure out which biological pathways are worth targeting to shutdown a virus?

      And that's not all: the other side of gain-of-function is of course to try and predict future vectors. Since treating the common flu is usually a losing prospect at the moment, and it takes time to manufacture things, its important to determine if any given species could trivially gain extra functionality which would make it dangerous - since that affects decisions about what strains to grow up for the yearly flu vaccine.

    2. Re:So ... by Electricity+Likes+Me · · Score: 5, Interesting

      I mean seriously. Skip the stupid article and actually read the abstract:

      Wild birds harbor a large gene pool of influenza A viruses that have the potential to cause influenza pandemics. Foreseeing and understanding this potential is important for effective surveillance. Our phylogenetic and geographic analyses revealed the global prevalence of avian influenza virus genes whose proteins differ only a few amino acids from the 1918 pandemic influenza virus, suggesting that 1918-like pandemic viruses may emerge in the future. To assess this risk, we generated and characterized a virus composed of avian influenza viral segments with high homology to the 1918 virus. This virus exhibited pathogenicity in mice and ferrets higher than that in an authentic avian influenza virus. Further, acquisition of seven amino acid substitutions in the viral polymerases and the hemagglutinin surface glycoprotein conferred respiratory droplet transmission to the 1918-like avian virus in ferrets, demonstrating that contemporary avian influenza viruses with 1918 virus-like proteins may have pandemic potential.

      The entire point of this research was to test whether we're at risk of something like the 1918 flu virus reoccurring, since the current avian flu virus is strikingly similar. This strikes me as kind of an important thing to know, since it informs almost every aspect of disease-response planning.

      The research was about taking avian flu, performing some fairly likely gene splicing of the type we know can happen during viral replication or incubation, and seeing if the observations of similarity are a problem. Turns out they are. But that also suggests that we might be able to make drugs which target the specific genes which confer the worst effects.

      Unless of course we do something really stupid, like letting sensationalist bullshit convince people to go all anti-science.

    3. Re:So ... by Electricity+Likes+Me · · Score: 2

      Go and read the actual abstract. Or look above where I posted it. Because the article buries it under "PANIC", whereas the reasons to do this research are actually pretty obvious. I'll give you a hint: they didn't actually add anything. All they did was re-arrange the existing genome, and do some site-specific mutation tests.

    4. Re:So ... by Goldsmith · · Score: 4, Insightful

      It's not fair at all to link opposition to gain in function research to an "anti-science" mindset. You should be ashamed that you're resorting to that argument.

      This is something which is seriously debated in the pages of serious journals, at scientific conferences and by government program managers. To link valid concerns to an "anti-science" crowd is political bullshit maneuvering.

      There is a very real and valid cost/benefit analysis to be done on pursuing this work. As biology catches up to the physical sciences in scope and function, you're going to deal with the same issues we have dealt with (I am a physicist). One of those lessons is that scientists don't get to decide the purpose of our work. It doesn't matter what you write in your paper, or what the program manager tells you the purpose of the work is. It doesn't matter WHY someone does the work, all that matters is WHAT the work is. It's extremely naÃve to think an abstract in a research paper can properly define the purpose of a piece of research.

      There are experiments and research paths we do not follow because the intellectual benefit does not outweigh the very real possibilities for misuse. You asked how you expect people to validate these hypothesis without the work? Take a page from physical science and learn to use computer modeling and limited experimental work in lieu of full studies. Do some tool development. Don't just throw up your hands and insist this is the only way. It's not.

      This will require a cultural change, and there will be lots of hand-wringing over whether new results are valid, but biology will be a more mature field for it.

    5. Re: So ... by MmmmAqua · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Okay, I hope I've misunderstood you. I work in genomics research, and your post seems, on its face, misinformed at best. Are you seriously suggesting that the computer modeling common to physics and chemistry can be applied to biological systems? Even in the case of something as "simple" as a virus (which may consist of tens to hundreds of thousands of kb pairs, specifying dozens or hundreds of RNA transcripts), simply modeling the virus is meaningless. You would also have to completely model host organisms and their immediate environments. Not even the NSA has that kind of compute power. You're dealing with emergent behaviors in interdependent systems far beyond the scope of what computer modeling can handle. There is no "model it as a simple sphere" approach in biology that can yield meaningful results at this level. Until we can phone up whatever god you happen to believe in (if any), the only way to find out what changing a virus will do to the virus, is to change the virus. The information gained is valuable enough that it is worth the minor risk involved in gaining it.

      --
      Arr! The laws of physics be a harsh mistress!
    6. Re:So ... by Jason+Levine · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Because nature does that sort of thing all the time. If we do it in a controlled, lab environment, we can understand what happens when genes get switched up and how to stop viruses. The alternative is sitting around until a lethal virus appears and then trying to quickly do research on it while people die. If the story was about some guy who did this research and didn't exercise proper safeguards on the viruses, I'd agree that this was stupid, but as long as proper safety protocols are followed, the risk of the virus getting out can be pushed to nearly zero.

      Before someone says "but it's not zero and until there's zero risk you shouldn't do this", that's the same argument that the anti-vaxxers use against vaccines. "They aren't 100% safe so until they are we shouldn't use them." In the case of vaccines, the small risk of the vaccine causing some harm is dwarfed by the huge risk of the disease it prevents. In the case of this virus research, the tiny risk of the virus escaping is dwarfed by the benefit of knowing just how viruses work and how to defeat them.

      --
      My sci-fi novel, Ghost Thief, is now available from Amazon.com.
    7. Re: So ... by gizmo2199 · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Until one day the Level 1 vial ends up in the incinerator, and the Level 4 vial ends up in the trash can, because, you know, shit happens; end result, millions dead.

      --
      This Sig does not Exist.
    8. Re:So ... by Zalbik · · Score: 2

      There are experiments and research paths we do not follow because the intellectual benefit does not outweigh the very real possibilities for misuse.

      And do you have evidence that the possibility of misuse in this case outweigh the benefits?

      This research is specifically designed to gain an understanding of how viruses mutate in the wild. This is something we must know if we intend to continue on as a species. Mother nature (in her infinite wisdom), doesn't give a flying fig whether the viruses she is continually developing and improving are dangerously lethal to the human species. If we don't outrace her at this game, our time on this planet is limited.

      TL;DR: This type of research is already going on all the time in nature. Unless we can understand how and why these changes occur, eventually one of them is going to kill a heck of a lot of us anyways.

  3. WHAT? 2009 pandemic came from Mexico, not China by dtolman · · Score: 2

    Why should anyone take this seriously when the lede itself contains conspiracy fodder? The 2009 swiine flu outbreak started in Mexico - it wasn't some lab virus and it certainly didn't escape from China.

  4. Redundancy or illiterate attempt at intensifiers? by Samantha+Wright · · Score: 4, Funny

    in 2009, a group of Chinese scientists created a viral strain of flu virus

    a viral strain of flu virus

    Well, at least it wasn't a... eukaryotic strain of flu virus?

    --
    Bio questions? Ask me to start a Q&A journal. Computer analogies available for most topics!
  5. It's nuts, and everyone is doing it by Bearhouse · · Score: 2

    http://www.independent.co.uk/n...

    http://thebulletin.org/making-...

    Madness...as if Ebola was not enough.

  6. Re:The solution is quite simple... by Alejux · · Score: 4, Insightful

    No one made the Spanish Flu, yet it appeared and killed millions of people. This type of study, while dangerous if not done safely, will help protect us from future occurrences of similar types of virus. The best way we can protect ourselves from an enemy, if to understand them. This is much needed research.

  7. Re:Haven't they read The Stand??? by Electricity+Likes+Me · · Score: 4, Informative

    Seems pretty obvious you didn't try and click through to the freely available abstract, which explains exactly why they did this. It's linked in the article in the OP (who notably also probably didn't read it).

  8. Disease - deadly vs wide spread by gurps_npc · · Score: 2
    Most of the time, something that is deadly is by definition NOT dangerous.

    Why? Because it kills before it spreads. That is why Ebola is not particularly scary.

    The real 'dangerous' virus kill about 20% of the time, and in the rest of the population it just makes sick - so it can be passed along to other people.

    Now, there are exceptions. Prime examples are diseases that spread by air and can also reproduce in non-humans. Another prime example is a disease with a long incubation and minimal symptoms until it kills. Aids is a good example of this. It suffers from the difficulty in transmission, but otherwise is dangerous.

    But back to the original dangerous virus. Something that kills 20% of the time, but otherwise lives in you without killing you. This is really nasty. Think of one out of every five people you know being killed by something they caught from YOU.

    --
    excitingthingstodo.blogspot.com
  9. Re:Huh by Rob+Riggs · · Score: 3, Insightful

    http://thebulletin.org/making-viruses-lab-deadlier-and-more-able-spread-accident-waiting-happen7374

    Reading comprehension is such a lost art these days. It was the H1N1 virus that caused the pandemic, which the Chinese scientists used in their research; not the results of the Chinese research that caused the pandemic.

    From the cited article:

    a team of Chinese scientists to create a hybrid viral strain between the H5N1 avian influenza virus and the H1N1 human flu virus that triggered a pandemic in 2009 and claimed several thousand lives.

    For those challenged individuals, this sentence fragment should be parsed as:

    (a team of Chinese scientists) ... (create a hybrid viral strain) (BETWEEN) (the H5N1 avian influenza virus) AND (the H1N1 human flu virus that triggered a pandemic in 2009 and claimed several thousand lives).

    --
    the growth in cynicism and rebellion has not been without cause
  10. Risk vs Reward by joocemann · · Score: 3, Insightful

    The inherent risks in producing excessive virulence via human synthesis, not nature, are very high. The reward of studying these types of phenomenon are very low. The virulence factors can be studied in their natural forms, or individually. Studying the impact of excessive synthetic virulence may give some useful insights, but the risks are far too high. I personally would like to see an internationally agreed ban in the following way:

    - It is illegal, and criminal, to knowingly increase the virulence of live or replicating versions of bacterial, fungal, or viral forms. Even under the most stringent biosafety level facilities and care, a deliberate increase in virulence is criminally punishable.

    As people we should hold this very serious. A person with a mere bachelor's degree in molecular biology can initiate extremely dangerous things. I am a cell biologist and I have experience in immunity and have personally engaged in the application of individual virulence factors for research purposes. I have seen what the application of even one virulence factor can do to cell immunity. I am extremely fearful of people gluing these factors together. I consider their work ego driven and not very helpful in the scope of human health research.

  11. Re:Huh by Areyoukiddingme · · Score: 2

    Nobody has been able to explain what correct usage is, however.

    The Chicago Manual of Style has detailed explanations of correct comma usage. So does Strunk and White's Elements of Style. You can also look up individual recommendations. Things like the Serial Comma have Wikipedia articles that quote both of those sources as well as half a dozen more.

    Commas to delimit prepositional phrases have only recently been deprecated. I was taught to use them as well.

  12. Slashdot Propaganda Machine by statemachine · · Score: 2

    10 years ago, there were regularly 800-1000 comments on articles. Now, a highly commented article gets around 200.

    It's a shame that the editors have stopped doing their jobs and post anything without checking it (at best!). But this isn't the first time I've seen it.

    This submission is obviously false, and it needs to be pulled down or with the inflammatory and false sentence deleted. Since it's been up for hours, and there are numerous posts above that debunk the submission, it leads me to believe that Slashdot wants the clickbait and is leaving it up on purpose.

    Do the right thing. Pull the article. Save what's left of your reputation, Slashdot.