Heartbleed To Blame For Community Health Systems Breach
An anonymous reader writes: The Heartbleed vulnerability is the cause of the data breach at Community Health Systems, which resulted in 4.5 million records (containing patient data) being compromised. According to a blog post from TrustedSec, the attackers targeted a vulnerable Juniper router and obtained credentials, which allowed them access to the network's VPN.
Oh wait, that's right, they have. Heartbleed became public in early April.
They've been jealous of our health care, I've seen this coming.
It would have been good form to update the vulnerable device. But it's not "to blame" for the data loss. The people who willfully broke in and grabbed the patient data are the cause of the loss.
Don't disappoint your bird dog. Go to the range.
The hospital had an Internet-facing router that was accessible via SSH or HTTPS?
If they were stupid enough to do that, then someone else had probably stolen all their data already.
I want to delete my account but Slashdot doesn't allow it.
How does getting onto the VPN equate to accessing the secret stuff? Isn't there another layer of security?
Whatever punishment these guys ( the sys admins ) get, it won't be enough. At some point it would be nice to see people who screw up suffer the consequences.
I admin a few machines (annoying, but required). Heartbleed got so much press, I thought everyone patched all their systems within days. I did.
Aren't Juniper routers based on a proprietary version of FreeBSD? Is FreeBSD also vulnerable too then?
The Heartbleed vulnerability is the cause of the data breach at Community Health Systems
Oh no. The cause isn't a specific software vulnerability, let alone one for which a patch exists from several months now and is universally known. Don't blame Heartbleed, blame the technical stuff. Had they have adequate security and audit policies in place designed to protect the information they guard, and Heartbleed (or any other well-known exploit) couldn't have been used in the first place.
The only way to keep medical information of any type safely is to keep to paper and folder . There is no way that i will ever trust any network attached device with private medical information.
Should such data be on a network accessible from the Internet (even secured)?
It's not like having a second network dedicated to medical enterprise inter-connectivity would make much of a cost difference in the US system.
blindly antisocialist = antisocial
also if they had there or some of there it farmed out to some outsourcing firms that can slow down updates / make hard to get stuff done even more so if there is a lot of contractors and sub contractors in the mix.
If they would have simply required some type of 2 factor authentication like SecurID for ALL VPN access this would never have happened. Token codes can't be reused.
What OS do their applications run on? Heartbleed didn't affect Windows, which has it's own SSL code. OpenSSL was the culprit and that's primarily used on *nix/posix systems.
This doesn't prove much of anything, but:
[user@system ~]$ curl -I www.chs.net | grep Server:
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5
With always on and 0 downtime, they are the ultimate target to hack. No need for zero-day exploits. Now, one can get all the personal information they need from the most vulnerable of people. Really makes me sick.
2F was demonstrated to be bypassed with Heartbleed due to the ability to grab the authentication token on devices. Heartbleed was unique because it blew most security technologies using OpenSSL out of the water regardless of best practices and two factor.
...brad porter. he pushed really hard to get junipers in to replace the cisco vpn solution. he is also keen on dragging his feet on anything that really didn't matter to him.
On the day that they bug was proclaimed to the world, just before the proclamation, there was a OpenSSL release, which *FIXED THE BUG*. You you get either a patch, or a whole new version (with the patch in). All you have to do is download, do an md5 checksum, compile, install. All of that should take between 5 and 10 minutes (depending on speed of compilation, your exact installation, etc.). I use OpenSSL with a large web application, and because it comes along with 26 other programs, I install, then test the installation, then build it along with rebuilding everything else (building everything else using one script that calls 10 other scripts that build 26 packages takes about 40 minutes (running the script takes 5 seconds of my time, but the computer (4 cores/8 threads) takes 45 minutes @ 100% load and nothing else running). So it might take them a day, or to be in line with weekend processes, 1 week, or maybe even 1 month to get the fix in. 5 months later, they find a problem, and I'm telling you that heartbleed isn't their biggest problem: the CXO in charge of security needs to meet the axe.