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Akamai Warns: Linux Systems Infiltrated and Controlled In a DDoS Botnet
An anonymous reader writes Akamai Technologies is alerting enterprises to a high-risk threat of IptabLes and IptabLex infections on Linux systems. Malicious actors may use infected Linux systems to launch DDoS attacks against the entertainment industry and other verticals. The mass infestation of IptabLes and IptabLex seems to have been driven by a large number of Linux-based web servers being compromised, mainly by exploits of Apache Struts, Tomcat and Elasticsearch vulnerabilities. Attackers have used the Linux vulnerabilities on unmaintained servers to gain access, escalate privileges to allow remote control of the machine, and then drop malicious code into the system and run it. As a result, a system could then be controlled remotely as part of a DDoS botnet. The full advisory is available for download only with registration, but the (Akamai-owned) Prolexic page to do so is quite detailed.
They should have installed Gentoo!
#naabhaprzrag, #sverubfr-000, #agi-fcbafberq, negvpyr[pynff*=' negvpyr-ary-'] { qvfcynl: abar !vzcbegnag; }
So, to remove this do I just have to do this? /sbin/iptables
sudo rm -r
GLaDOS for President 2016! "Well here we are again. It's always such a pleasure." -- GLaDOS, 2011
They should have installed Gentoo!
In hopes that the 'malicious actors' would get tired of waiting for the required binaries to be built and give up?
Never start vast projects with half-vast ideas.
It's news because it illustrates that, as much as Linux users like to throw stones at Windows, they too are vulnerable. Anyone can pick through the source and find security holes what can be exploited - perhaps even much more subtle ones than anyone would ever find on Windows.
Not a Linux apologist (Windows pays my bills), but in defense of Linux, these were programs running on Linux that had exploits. Of course, many of the exploits in Windows are through programs running on Windows and not the OS itself.......but Linux fanboys wouldn't be as quick to point that out.
Oh yes, I am familiar with this iptables malware. I once had a machine running using ipchains, but iptables somehow made its way on to my machine and pretty much just killed ipchains functionality. I could not get it working again no matter how hard I tried. In case it modified my kernel, I even downloaded the latest from kernel.org (2.4.x) and compiled a new one, but to no avail.
I gave up and went to Windows.
It was not a virus, it was an exploit of server software that was unpatched.
The vast majority of Linux deployments are on server systems. These are easier to lock down, since there are no users downloading cool stuff and bringing in malware. Generally speaking, a remote exploit is required to bring down a server system. There are two newsworthy things in this report. First, a botnet of (presumably well-connected) Linux machines has been used in a DDOS, probably not the first time this has happened. Secondly, and this should not be newsworthy, not keeping up with patches will sink a system of any kind. Server, client, Linux, Mac, Windows, all need to keep up with rapidly evolving security threats.
The people that have their servers compromised in this way are amateurs and shouldn't have put their servers on the web, EVER. This is roughly equivalent to fielding IIS from 2001 on windows XP and not keeping your patch set up to date. You are going to be hacked.
Any sysadmin who is thinking about it, would put a web server and all it's components in a chroot jail and force it to run in user space and set up to refuse interactive logins for this user.. That way any "escalations" of privilege won't get you much more than the web server. It's easy, quick and effective.
So this isn't a really fair comparison you are making. Linux is BY DEFAULT more secure than Windows, mainly by design. Microsoft has made great strides of late, but fundamentally they are starting from a weak position (remember Windows 3.1?) and you have to install components to make it more secure, where Linux starts secure and gets security downgrades when you install and configure stuff. Either way, if you don't manage your server, you will have problems.
"File to fit, pound to insert, paint to match" - Aircraft Maintenance 101
From TFA.
"Attackers have exploited Linux servers that run unpatched versions of Apache Struts and Tomcat with vulnerabilities"
Apache Struts, Tomcat, and elasticsearch (mentioned in the summary) are all written in java.
To me, that indicates a JAVA vulnerability, not a Linux vulnerability.
Death has been proven to be 99% fatal in lab rats.
insert joke about there being no linux desktops, and the eventual "year of linux on the desktop" ?
Yes, but there is a logical reason for this.
Linux and Windows approach security in totally different ways. When you load a Linux kernel, it's secure, it starts that way. When you load windows, it's NOT secure, you have to load other stuff to make it secure.
So, if you have a Linux box that get's hacked, the admin really is a lot more responsible for this. He/she left the hole open for the attacker to get in. Sure, there are times when we don't know the hole exists, but the admin loaded the software.
Windows boxes? They come out of the install process wide open with a whole raft of dangerous services turned on. Not to mention they are starting from the security posture of Windows 3.1 and have been trying to put up defenses since. They have made a lot of progress, but it's still harder to shore up a bad design then it is to loosen up a secure design.
"File to fit, pound to insert, paint to match" - Aircraft Maintenance 101
Are you still bitter about that because I'm pretty sure most people got over that pretty quickly.
What, none of all 5 of them?
Now seriously, if you want to develop malware, you'd first think of "how many potential victims would I have?".
Also... a Linux box is a Linux box. The difference between "server" and "desktop" lies in which software it runs, period. One could become the other just by installing something or enabling something.
Question for you: if I have a Linux server and install KDE on it, or X - would you name it a "Desktop"? Or is it still a server? Or both? I'm confused.
...gis sdrawkcab (usually not responding to ACs; don't bother posting as AC)
Are porn sites part of "entertainment industry"? If so, this is a serious threat and it needs dealt with ASAP.
...gis sdrawkcab (usually not responding to ACs; don't bother posting as AC)
I prefer to throw at the users. The chance to hit the culprit is so much higher.
We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
This used to be true, it's by far no longer the case.
It's the ancient battle of usability vs. security. The most secure system is by design also the least usable one. And that's where the two systems came from. Windows was once "usability trumps security, no matter what". Linux was the exact opposite. Hence the reputation of Linux that you need to have a masters in CS to boot the damn thing, and for a network connection nothing less than a doctorate will do.
Various distributions now made it all a bit easier while at the same time Windows tightened security quite a bit (I mean, look back at Win95 and tell me they didn't...). The are approaching each other... if they haven't met already in the middle between the two extremes.
We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
> may use infected Linux systems to launch DDoS attacks against the entertainment industry...
WHERE IS THE DOWNLOAD LINK?
It's behind a registration form so that the fine folks at Prolexic can get your PII for marketing purposes. One of the *many* benefits is that once you register, nice folks from Prolexic will send you emails and maybe even call you on the phone to let you know about all the wonderful products and services you can buy from them.
So many vendors just report this kind of stuff to CERT so it gets assigned a stupid CVE number and all the details are then available without the consumer of information giving up any PII that can be used to sell them stuff. Stupid vendors!
Prolexic is using a real vulnerability to enhance their contacts DB and increase the surface area of their sales efforts. Disgusting.
No, no, you're not thinking; you're just being logical. --Niels Bohr
Yes, but there is a logical reason for this.
Linux and Windows approach security in totally different ways. When you load a Linux kernel, it's secure, it starts that way. When you load windows, it's NOT secure, you have to load other stuff to make it secure.
Sorry, but that is BS. When you load Linux it comes up with a security model through which there has already (by design) been punched a big hole: SUID. When you load Windows it comes up with a security model which has no need for such a massive hole. Countless otherwise benign bug has been turned into total system compromise bugs because of SUID.
Under Windows, all kernel objects types are securable with security descriptors. Linux was designed with only file system permissions. Processes did not have security descriptors, and such objects need to be mapped to files and filepermissions used to (inadequately) describe access permissions.
Windows services run in a separate session - interprocess communication is severely restricted. A process in another session cannot break through to e.g. the desktop, i.e. a daemon/background service cannot interact with the desktop. There is no such isolation in Linux unless you run SELinux. In Windows it is the default.
Most Windows services run under service hardening. Even custom sites you set up will by default run under service hardening. Under service hardening an ad-hoc identity is implicitly created for the service/website and this identity has no permissions whatsoever by default. It has to be granted any access permission it needs. You'd have to run SELinux or apparmor with a significant amount of configuration to achieve the same level of isolation under Linux. Under Windows it is default and straightforward.
Windows has mandatory DEP, much stronger ASLR, stack and heap encryption/checksumming and several other mitigation technologies not found in Linux. On by default.
Windows boxes? They come out of the install process wide open with a whole raft of dangerous services turned on. Not to mention they are starting from the security posture of Windows 3.1
What century do you live in? Since Windows Server 2008 (!) only the minimal set of services are turned on, and *no* network facing services until you configure them.
Reading slashdot one-liner: (irm http://rss.slashdot.org/Slashdot/slashdot).rdf.item | fl title,desc*
"It's news because it illustrates that, as much as Linux users like to throw stones at Windows, they too are vulnerable. Anyone can pick through the source and find security holes what can be exploited - perhaps even much more subtle ones than anyone would ever find on Windows."
I find this fascinating. Some Windows fans will grab onto something like this, an exploitable bug in Linux, and use that to "prove" that Windows is better. "Look here, Linux has an exploitable bug, obviously it's no good. I told you how much better Windows is, now it's proven science!" And the additional comment about finding bugs more subtle than those on Windows? Where's the evidence for that statement, other than perhaps in the fact that Linux source is readily available while Windows source is not?
Any OS has exploitable bugs. Failure to patch is, as noted by many other posters, the real issue. Don't necessarily condemn one system or the other because there are bugs. Instead, maybe we might look at the track record, in which case some conclusions should emerge.
On one hand, Linux has had a reputation for being secure. On the other hand, Windows has made great strides in improving things.
On the gripping hand, security really belongs to the person sitting at the admin console [1]. The first thing a lot of Linux users do is kill SELinux, which weakens the security model tremendously, where it takes is just one weak SUID program or one running as root to have the machine. The second thing is that because Linux doesn't have signed executable functionality [2], something like AIDE or tripwire is a must.
From there, it is about basic security practices. If a server sits for months to years without updates, it doesn't matter what OS it runs, eventually there will be a hole, and eventually it will get pwned.
[1]: Be it an actual window, a serial port, a VMWare console, SCVMM window, remoted in via SSH or RDP.
[2]: It would be nice if the Linux kernel had functionality compared to trustchk in AIX. It isn't signed executables per se (since it uses a manifest list), but it does help prevent unauthorized stuff from loading, even libraries.
There is a lot of room for improvement on both sides of this argument. I would support a "trusted" executable and shared library loader as being a vast improvement in Linux security, but the fact remains... Windows/Microsoft has been playing catch-up in security where Linux has been leading over the last decade. Microsoft has been gaining ground, but they are still running in second place in security (well, maybe third if you include Apple, Fourth if you include SCO Unix and fifth if we include Solaris).
"File to fit, pound to insert, paint to match" - Aircraft Maintenance 101
Let me see, last time I loaded Windows 8 pro, there was a raft of services turned on for me by default.
Windows 8, Windows 7 and even Windows Vista comes up and asks you if you *want* to turn on services. If you answer no, it will not have any network ports listening. Get it yet? That's the *desktop user* targeted operating systems.
Windows Server comes by default with NO network services turned on by default, and NO listening ports. Get it yet?
Linux *desktop user* targeted distros do turn on network services. Get it yet?
Yes the distribution may turn on some services
Yes, indeed. Get it yet?
Linux distributions targeted at "servers" generally come w/o any services even installed by default.
Yes. Just like the Windows Server versions. Get it?
If you go to "desktop" installs, where Windows 8 Pro lives, Linux comes out of the normal distribution much more locked down and secure
Nope. Linux lacks many, many of the security features in Windows 8. In distros using apparmor it only protects some of the daemons. Windows 8 comes with Mandatory Integrity Control built-in sandboxing.
Windows 8 supports multiple (and simultaneous) network firewall profiles which are automatically selected based on where you are: On a corporate network SMB services may be available, on a public network without a trusted domain controller it selects the public (locked down) profile. Linux does not.
I still cannot believe that the DEFAULT behavior of a Windows box is to have the main user be an Administrator
Good you do not believe it, because it is false. This is one of the hardest things for Linux fanatics to understand: Windows has tokens and with UAC even if you do log in with an account with administrative rights, the token will not have administrative rights. This means that the processes started by the shell will not have administrative rights. Get it yet?
Linux is not like this, and most desktop distributions today don't allow you to login as root.
No, but they do allow you to elevate to root as effective user - using sudo or other SUID utilities, which is a blatant violating of one of the most fundamental security principles: Least privilege.
In Linux you elevate to the highest, unrestricted and all-powerfull user just to change your own password??? Have you any idea how f* up that is?
Get it yet?
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Well, it's for a good cause... TFS did mention DDOS against the entertainment industry. Good news is news worth reading.
$
Ok your brain is broken in two ways here:
1. You keep talking about history. Nobody gives a shit which OS was more secure in 1986, we care which is more secure now. The question is, if I were standing up a server today, which OS would be the best choice?
2. You're redefining "Linux" to mean whatever happens to make it best in any given situation. Saying OpenSSL isn't part of "Linux" is both technically correct, and extremely intellectually dishonest.
To be perfectly frank: the grandparent has an extremely good point that you're completely ignoring. In recent years, Linux server security has been measurably worse than Windows server security.
Comment of the year
Do you remember DOS? Windows 3.1.1? Security was woefully lacking, it wasn't even a concern. At the same time, Linux was being developed, with the security model it has today, mostly unchanged. Windows has gong though many revisions and changes in the security design from ZERO security and no such thing as having separate user accounts to where we are now. Linux started out, very similar to what it is now.
Please stop repeating that, it stopped being true as of 10 years ago since Windows ME was the last OS based on DOS/Win 3.1.1 code.
XP, Vista, 7 and 8 are all based on the Windows NT family which was developed with security in mind and separate user accounts etc.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W...
Windows 8 isn't a server. You're comparing apples to oranges, and being intellectually dishonest, and you know it.
The truth is: you haven't used Windows Server 2008, you haven't used Windows Server 2012, and you (obviously from your grandparent post) have absolutely NO idea what you are talking about when it comes to Windows Server security.
And instead of just admitting as much and bowing-out gracefully, you pull the "hahaha you are wrong but it's a waste of time to argue with you!" card. Disgusting.
Comment of the year
So when Linux gets infected, it's the users fault but when Windows gets infected, it's Microsoft's fault?
Personally, I haven't said that here..
Microsoft chooses to install and activate a lot of risky stuff that most Linux distributions don't, but having a box compromised is not the vendor's fault. I'd never put a Windows freshly installed box on the network without first applying all service packs and locking the system down. However, a Linux box is not a risk (at least not the distributions I run) after a clean install so I don't have an issue drooping them on the net to pull patches and configure the software.
In both cases, if you mismanage their security, you get a bad result. It's just harder, in general, to get a secured Windows box, because you have to actively do something to secure things before it is safe, while a minimal Linux box starts out fairly safe and goes down hill from there. One comes off the install media in an unsafe configuration, the other is usually locked down.
So who's fault is it? Yours, if you put an unpatched unconfigured Windows box directly on the net right after you install it. It's also yours if you open up the holes in your Linux install.
"File to fit, pound to insert, paint to match" - Aircraft Maintenance 101
Ok your brain is broken in two ways here:
1. You keep talking about history. Nobody gives a shit which OS was more secure in 1986, we care which is more secure now. The question is, if I were standing up a server today, which OS would be the best choice?
Best choice or most secure choice? I cannot answer the first question for you because there are reasons to use Windows and reasons to use Linux which have noting to do with security. Most secure choice? That too depends, but if you are talking about a situation where "all other things are equal" then a properly configured Linux box seems like a better choice to me. Of course, if you cannot manage a Linux box properly, then go with what you know that you can manage, but in that case we are not "all things being equal" anymore.
2. You're redefining "Linux" to mean whatever happens to make it best in any given situation. Saying OpenSSL isn't part of "Linux" is both technically correct, and extremely intellectually dishonest.
To be perfectly frank: the grandparent has an extremely good point that you're completely ignoring. In recent years, Linux server security has been measurably worse than Windows server security.
I think you are wrong on that. There has been an explosion of Linux based servers on the Web in the last decade. Many of these are not appropriately managed and suffer as a result, plus you also see a lot LESS Windows/IIS installs out there for a number of reasons (mostly due to cost and the past issues with IIS exploits) so the attack surface is much larger. Given the number of these servers which are not appropriately managed, there are a lot more systems compromised. If you don't keep your system up to date and watch the security posture of your system, it's going to eventually get hacked, I don't care what OS you run.
You see, I'm not claiming Linux is perfect, obviously it has had issues. I'm claiming that Windows has been playing catch up on security issues. Obviously they have made great strides. You want to claim windows is better... Ok, if that's what you can manage correctly, it's better for you. IMHO Linux is better, both historically (which even you cannot argue with apparently) and currently remains better. Your mileage may vary, past performance is no guarantee of future performance, and all such fine print you are accustom to reading..
"File to fit, pound to insert, paint to match" - Aircraft Maintenance 101
Mostly valid points. None of them invalidate the parent's point. If there is a significant infection of malware, then it is newsworthy. What factors led to the infection don't make it unnewsworthy.
"These[server systems] are easier to lock down, since there are no users downloading cool stuff and bringing in malware." Your comparing desktop usage to server usage. Regardless of Linux or Windows the same issues are there for each usage scenario.
-Desktop: If there is a vulnerability in a Linux or Windows desktop, the usage pattern of users is going to be a pathway onto the machine for malware. These days you could probably take any average user since most are unfamiliar with desktops, stick them with a desktop of any OS flavor, and they will in both cases go to a browser and do things that put the system at risk. These days they implement similar levels of security. Many flavors of both prompt you to escalate an process to root/admin privilage, so each are vulnerable to users unwisely escalating software of questionable sources.
-Server: If there is a vulnerability in a server, regardless of OS, "a remote exploit is required to bring down a server system". This doesn't invalidate the parent's point.
Parent's point is that it is newsworthy because many naive individuals in the Linux community likes to purport that Linux is somehow invulnerable to such exploits. When I say "many naive" I don't mean to say all Linux users are naive, just that there are a fair share who don't understand that Linux and software running on Linux has the same potential to harbor undiscovered vulnerabilities as any other competing OS/software.
This means they make blanket statements about how this or that security problem effecting Windows isn't a concern for Linux. They don't know about clarifying criteria that Linux is more secure under the circumstances that you maintain updates and properly administer WAN facing interfaces.
The result is you have individuals running unmaintained Linux servers because they think they are more secure, but which require significantly more attention than similar Windows counterparts. So you have two factors working against the security of Linux, misinformation, and ease of maintenance.
Even in situation where you have a capable staff who understand the importance of maintaining updates. If you have updates that are fragile and require lots of testing, require alot of babysitting to apply, or are in other ways difficult to automate in a reliable way, then you are going to occasionally create situations for admins where their manpower isn't enough to get to those updates immediately. That's not to imply that Windows updates don't sometimes break things and require testing, but I would say they are easier to automate overall and more reliable. Probably due to the fact there are far fewer flavors of Windows, so updates which do have issues are quickly hotfixed. When I've had updates on Linux fail, sometimes there is a good bit of manual work to back them out, fix whatever went wrong, and re apply them.
I am not trying to say Windows is better than Linux, as I am not trying to do a compelte comparison of the two, but simply pointing out that this article highlights some of the factors that contribute to the formation of such an infection. Certainly Windows has some of these same issues as well and we've seen infections that targeted machines that weren't up to date. However, I think Windows has done a better job at least with the automatic updates to address this kind of problem. It certainly isn't always perfect, but its pretty good.
I don't run X on any "server" system I manage. Not for this reason, but for the general security concept that you don't run stuff you don't use. Good luck turning off the GUI on your windows box...
Didn't you say that you just finished off setting up a Windows Server 2008R2? And you do not know about Server Core? I sense much deceit here. (IOW: I don't believe you).
However, if you did have X running, it's only going to accept X client connections from the local machine (unless you've opened it up further). This means that any attack vector though X will have to be launched from the local box. Which means that the attacker will have to compromise the local box in some other way.
Goes to show your grasp of this security thingy. There's this security principle called isolation:
Windows has been dealing with so-called shatter attacks where rogue processes sent messages remotely controlling windows belonging to other processes. Up until Windows Vista, Windows only isolated processes belonging to different users. With Vista and MIC (Mandatory Integrity Control), processes were prohibited from sending such messages to windows of higher-integrity processes.
X based Linux distros have absolutely zero isolation. Do you have any idea how serious this is? If there is a memory corruption bug in Firefox and the process is taken over (FF does not have sandboxing), it can install a keyboard hook in X and read every single keystroke entered into any windows. That includes a terminal windows, and worse, even if you sudo to root user, the keyboard hook read every single keystroke including the sudo password.
If that's a superior security model than I have a tower in Paris you may want to invest in.
Reading slashdot one-liner: (irm http://rss.slashdot.org/Slashdot/slashdot).rdf.item | fl title,desc*
But we are talking ONE issue now which has long been known and easily avoided.
No, we are talking an issue that is the result of an inadequate security model that is incapable of securing anything but files.
Windows NT was designed with access control in place for files, devices, mailslots, pipes (named and anonymous), jobs, processes, threads, events, keyed events, event pairs, mutexes, semaphores, shared memory sections, I/O completion ports, LPC ports, waitable timers, access tokens, volumes, window stations, desktops, network shares, services, registry keys, printers, Active Directory objects, and so on. Yes Active Directory objects are in that list, because the model was designed to be extensible
We are talking you claiming that an operating system which cannot even pass the Orange Book requirements without severe redesign by NSA is more secure out of the box than an operating system which has met those requirements from day 1.
Ever wonder why they picked the [CTL][ALT][DEL] key sequence in Windows NT? Think about it... Windows has the same kinds of issues, you just don't want to think about it
The secure attention sequence is guaranteed to be non-hookable by software on the box. The reason for that is added security (that Linux lacks), not a remediation of lacking isolation. Yes, Windows has had similar (but far from as severe) problems with shatter attacks. And there's learning for you in how it was handled:
After UAC was introduced with Windows Vista it was made illegal for lower-integrity processes to send messages (or hook keyboard etc) of higher-integrity processes - even if they were running as the same user. Combined with the fact that IE ran as low-integrity it was made exceedingly difficult for an attacker to hook the kayboard or remote control other windows, even if he compromised the IE process.
However, trojan malware that users were tricked into installing as normal-integrity processes could still hook the keyboard. With Windows 7 Microsoft added to the protection: No longer can an equal-level (integrity level) process hook another process' window or keyboard. To accomodate accessibility tools which frequently need to do that, Microsoft allowed a slightly *higher* integrity level *if* and only if a certain manifest requires it and the files has been digitally signed.
The point of this is that both enhancements were achieved through the already extensible security model. Integrity levels were simply assigned SIDs. If the low-integrity SID is in your process token you are a low-integrity process.
You can *never* extend the simplistic Linux security model like this. It is forever limited to user identities. A process under Linux does not have a token - it has an effective user. It was designed with the faulty assumption that a process in all aspects could represent the user who started it. Proper tokens recognize that processes may have fewer rights, or even more rights than the user who launched it.
You have uttered unbased claims through this entire thread. Now it's time to tell the world how - specifically - the Linux mode is inherently more secure than the Windows model.
Reading slashdot one-liner: (irm http://rss.slashdot.org/Slashdot/slashdot).rdf.item | fl title,desc*
You do understand that it takes ROOT to set the SUID bit on a file right?
You do understand what the SUID bit does when the file is owned by ROOT, right? When you run such a file, you elevate to root just to change the password. That is *vastly* more power than you need, and it is a serious danger: Just a simple bug like a buffer overflow can cause total system compromise when it allows the attacker to execute as root.
This is why you will find all SUID programs set to read only and owned by an administrative user (such as root). It is why you instruct your sysadmin staff to NEVER SUID anything w/o good reason and permission and It is also why you scan systems for SUID binaries and scripts regularly so you can find and remove such nonsense as SUID security holes.
Yes, it is because the interent danger in SUID root utilities. Now imagine a security model that does not need anything like SUID.
And if you find any unexplained SUID stuff on your box, you pull the plug on everything and start looking for where the break in happened because you've been compromised and your whole network is suspect.
Yes, but how do you audit the "explained" SUID stuff? How do a security auditor really know what a user can do, which resources (files, etc) a specific user can access, when he is allowed execute access to SUID utilities like sudo, passwd and the likes? He may think he knows what the utility does by it's name, but how does he know *what else* it can do?
What do you think of a security model where you will have to compile all utilities from audited sources, with audited compilers to make sure that users cannot access resources they are not supposed to.
See, that's the difference between a security model that protects resources and one that tries to restrict access to utilities that can manipulate every resource on the system: You cannot effectively audit such a system.
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