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Security Company Tries To Hide Flaws By Threatening Infringement Suit
An anonymous reader writes: An RFID-based access control system called IClass is used across the globe to provide physical access controls. This system relies on cryptography to secure communications between a tag and a reader. Since 2010, several academic papers have been released which expose the cryptographic insecurity of the IClass system. Based on these papers, Martin Holst Swende implemented the IClass ciphers in a software library, which he released under the GNU General Public License.
The library is useful to experiment with and determine the security level of an access control system (that you own or have explicit consent to study). However, last Friday, Swende received an email from INSIDE Secure, which notified him of (potential) intellectual property infringement, warning him off distributing the library under threat of "infringement action." Interestingly, it seems this is not the first time HID Global has exerted legal pressure to suppress information.
The library is useful to experiment with and determine the security level of an access control system (that you own or have explicit consent to study). However, last Friday, Swende received an email from INSIDE Secure, which notified him of (potential) intellectual property infringement, warning him off distributing the library under threat of "infringement action." Interestingly, it seems this is not the first time HID Global has exerted legal pressure to suppress information.
Nothing worse than a person who always finds a way to blame someone else for their own mistakes, except perhaps cold coffee or warm beer.
Buy your next Linux PC at eightvirtues.com
IClass, meet Barbara.
You can't handle the truth.
All the bugs were reclassified as security features
Most of the world knows that security is fleeting, and those that deepend on the law to preserve obscurity is the fleetingness of all. Do they not even consider that citizens of nations that don't give a shit about legal protections are the very people their customers need to be protected against? These companies should be paying rewards to anyone who can defeat their protections, not punishing them.
Time is what keeps everything from happening all at once.
NoClass sounds more like it.
Below I will paste the specific patent's independent claims. I don't think this can actually cover generic software written for the PC, because of the 'secret memory' and the fact that they have patented the device implemented in hardware, not a software implementation of the algorithm (and how many computers actually have a pseudo-random shift register?)
1. Method of producing an authentication code (CA), comprising cycles for reading binary words (Mn) out of a secret memory (21) comprising a plurality of binary words, wherein, at each cycle, the address for reading a word out of the secret memory (21) is generated from an address generating binary word (GA) forming the result of a combination operation (Fc, ) of words (M1 to Mn) read out of the memory during previous cycles, characterised in that it comprises a transform operation of the address generating word (GA) consisting in logically combining at least one bit (g'0, g'1, g'2) of the address generating word (GA) with at least one bit (r1, r4, r6) of a pseudo-random shift register (26).
8. Logic machine (20, 20-1, 30) clocked by a clock signal (H), comprising a secret memory (21) in which a plurality of binary words read out at clock rate are stored, wherein the output of the memory (21) is applied to a first input (A) of a logic circuit (22) whose output (C) is fed back to the second input (B), the logic circuit (22) performing a combination (Fc, "+") of its two inputs (A, B) and producing an address generating binary word (GA) supplied to the address input (ADR) of the memory, characterised in that it comprises a pseudo-random shift register (26) and logic means (25-1, 27) for combining at least one bit (r1, r4, r6) of the shift register (26) with at least one bit (g'0, g'1, g'2) of the address generating word (GA).
"First they came for the slanderers and i said nothing."
Without inspecting the software, and knowing what the HID attorney is asserting, there is no way of forming a legal opinion... and this is in no way a legal opinion, just a recitation of the first patent claim and some questions. But it does look like the method requires using a "pseudo-random shift register" and a "secret memory" among other things. Do the people who are said to infringe actually use this method? Does the code require that such a register and memory be used, or are there ways the code could be used without infringing all of the elements in the claim? Is the target of the letter simply caving to avoid consulting a lawyer?
Join the IParty!
Some software projects like LAME, x264, and libav claim to skirt around patent issues by only distributing source code, not binaries. I've always wondered if this is a valid workaround, or just some clever devs getting their hopes up.
"Being a security company, we wanna keep our mistakes secure."
Table-ized A.I.
That suggestion does seem like it would make it hard for the HID attorney to continue to assert that Swende is trying "to incite third parties to infringe our intellectual property rights."
Join the IParty!
His implementation only uses non-secret memory and should therefor be safe from these patents. The patents described here rely on the contents of the memory of the contraptions to be "secret" to make the process "secure".
You could even say that the original implementation by INSIDE secure doesn't follow the patent since obviously, the memory content isn't that "secret" anymore.
I was promised a flying car. Where is my flying car?
Governments are trying similar shit, by silencing dissent with summary penalties for as-yet undefined "trolling".
What governments are you talking about here?
"First they came for the slanderers and i said nothing."
You must've missed yesterday's news. See the UK.
I can assure you the word "trolling" does not appear in legislation anywhere on the earth (except maybe in the misguided title of some legislation, perhaps). You'll find the law would be somewhat specific about what it defines as prohibited behavior, simply because the courts would shred the legislation if it isnt. At least the US, UK and Australian ones would.
Excuse the Unicode crap in my posts. That's an apostrophe, and slashdot is busted.
Because they need to because they can and if they don't make a success they are all screwed to the wall. Plenty of incentive to bend people's morality which is usually pretty non existent to begin with.
I've said that same thing before. I happen to BE competent professional in certain security matters, so that affects my point of view.
On the other hand, the most popular locks, Kwikset and Master lock, are obviously not designed to be secure against a knowledgeable or determined advesary. They are designed to discourage your neighbor from casually getting into your stuff, and that's pretty clear from looking at the product and feeling how lightweight it is. Maybe that's what people want most of the time - a lock sufficient to make it rather inconvenient for the average person to walk in, not something that's going to keep the locksmith out when you lose your key.
At the other end of the spectrum, for $10,000 you can buy a heavy duty safe made of steel and concrete. For $32, I can rent a demolition saw designed to cut through concrete and steel. Since physical security costs about 300 times as much as breaking it costs, perhaps the primary goal is to not be low-hanging fruit. I've watched a car burglar go from car to car, stealing stuff from the ones that were unlocked. He skipped the locked ones, which all had very breakable windows.*
* Redundant. Windows is always easily breakable.
under european law, they have no standing for requesting this sort of code to be removed, as the code was obviously created as a research tool and for interoperability.
screw those idiots... let's start git cloning the hell of it ;)
It's seriously difficult to understand the mindset of the organization and how they came into this. Did they even bother hiring a competent cryptographer when designing their product ? Were they duped by someone they hired and led to design a insecure product ? Or is encrypting an RFID communication a difficult and non-trivial task with no known vetted solution ?
I don't think that the problem is difficult in some fundamental way (the problem of verifying a remote host with asymmetric crypto has been reasonably well explored with SSL/TLS, and an access control system has the advantage of being able to trust only a CA it controls, and the advantage that you need to get physical access to an RFID reader pad to attempt attacks); but there are significant practical challenges.
RFID chips are pretty power constrained, since they only get whatever energy they can scavenge from the reader's RF output; and customers want them to be cheap. The industry also has fairly long product lifecycles (since, once you've put in a zillion card readers and integrated it with all your other building security stuff you don't want to rip it out and upgrade in 2 years).
It isn't so much a 'there is no known cryptographic solution to this problem' issue as a 'Why yes, we still have major customers using the 'security' provided by the lousy proprietary cryptosystem that our engineers were able to cram into a cheap, power-constrained, chip using the fab processes available in the mid to late 90s, and we really don't want to fix that' issue.
At the other end of the spectrum, for $10,000 you can buy a heavy duty safe made of steel and concrete. For $32, I can rent a demolition saw designed to cut through concrete and steel. Since physical security costs about 300 times as much as breaking it costs, perhaps the primary goal is to not be low-hanging fruit. I've watched a car burglar go from car to car, stealing stuff from the ones that were unlocked. He skipped the locked ones, which all had very breakable windows.
Exactly. The goal of any security measure is to make it easier for someone to break into someone else's property; thus securing yours. I have a dog, and most burgers will move on before confronting it even though a steak tossed into the porch would distract it long enough to lock it out. However, it's simpler to move on to the next house. If a determined criminal wants something you have they will find a way to get it.
I'm a consultant - I convert gibberish into cash-flow.
Can't say I've ever heard of [...] security by litigation.
Then you weren't around for the DeCSS cases.
The goal of any security measure is to make it easier for someone to break into someone else's property; thus securing yours.
It's like an implementation of the punchline, "I don't have to run faster than the bear. I just have to run faster than you."
Please stand clear of the doors, por favor mantenganse alejado de las puertas
I've said that same thing before. I happen to BE competent professional in certain security matters, so that affects my point of view.
On the other hand, the most popular locks, Kwikset and Master lock, are obviously not designed to be secure against a knowledgeable or determined advesary. They are designed to discourage your neighbor from casually getting into your stuff, and that's pretty clear from looking at the product and feeling how lightweight it is. Maybe that's what people want most of the time - a lock sufficient to make it rather inconvenient for the average person to walk in, not something that's going to keep the locksmith out when you lose your key.
My front door has a pretty decent kwikset lock that I can personally pick. But the door also has a window large enough to walk through in addition to a window on each side.
Unless you have a solid steel door the lock isn't relevant.
Do you have ESP?
Where did you get that interpretation? The way I read patent law, if you trip all the parts of one claim, you infringe the patent. If a claim is dependent ("The device of claim 1, where..."), you have to trip the claim it mentions as well. But you don't have to trip all of them.
You owe my hound dog an apology. He was crying, more than usual. I asked him what was wrong and he said you called him "a lawyer".
I only look human.
My mother is a halfling and my dad is an ogre, so that makes me an Ogreling
I'll have you know that Windows is far more secure nowadays than it ever used to be.
You're a temporary arrangement of matter sliding towards oblivion in a cold, uncaring universe
Depending on where you live, often the purpose of security is not to stop someone entering but to ensure that they're going to make a lot of noise doing so. If you're in a street with lots of neighbours, then a burglar is not going to want to be smashing windows or wooden doors.
This is also why dogs make good guard pets as some of them make lots of noise when they see someone they don't know. A lot of dogs would just go and excitedly greet a burglar, but the burglar wouldn't want to take the chance and will often pick a house without a dog.
You're a temporary arrangement of matter sliding towards oblivion in a cold, uncaring universe
* Redundant. Windows is always easily breakable.
I've got to disagree with that one, unless you refer to Microsoft Windows then sure I agree with that :)
I did say Windows IS, not Windows ARE. :) Lexan windows are pretty tough, and the front door windows of some cars are tough, with the ability to bend a bit rather than break. On YouTube there is a funny video of a reporter trying to break a car window with a hammer.
Indeed it has improved considerably. The basic security model went from "don't show other people's files unless you click the C: drive" to actually denying access to other people's files. Currently it has what has traditionally been considered a decent model, discretionary access control very similar to the classic Unix model.
On the other hand, Unix used that model in the 1970s. Linux moved to a more secure mandatory access control model ten years ago, around the same time that Windows was finally getting DAC. The weaker model is also the simpler and more convenient model, so this doesn't necessarily make Linux BETTER, it's more secure, but less simple and convenient. Choose your own priorities.
perhaps the primary goal is to not be low-hanging fruit
Exactly. The goal is to avoid being the easiest target around.
If bad guys wanted to work hard they'd just get a job. There are contexts in which the value of a target justifies expending a lot of effort, but they're the exception. In every case real security is all about correctly understanding the threat model and then applying adequate mitigation.
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The industry also has fairly long product lifecycles (since, once you've put in a zillion card readers and integrated it with all your other building security stuff you don't want to rip it out and upgrade in 2 years).
This is the core issue. When evaluating what should be done you have to consider available technology... and in this case your baseline is 10-20 years ago because old systems don't get replaced very often and for new systems backward compatibility is important, as is minimizing the number of distinct products you have to manage.
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If bad guys wanted to work hard they'd just get a job.
I like the way you put that. I'm going to steal that phrasing.
At least Lexmark v. Static Control Components, the case I assume you're referring to, was decided in favor of interoperability.
That subject line should say DAC, not FAX.
I imagine that it also helps (at least in terms of customer acceptance) that most of these RFID tags are probably replacing something that was as bad or worse. Keys are clonable, provide no record of use(much less timestamped logs of individual users) and if one gets into the wild re-keying the place is Not Fun. Magnetic stripe cards are trivially clonable; but on the same level as most RFID tags in terms of access logging and enabling/disabling access. Adequately rugged optical sensors have historically been pretty expensive, so bar codes, hand scanners, and any other biometric gimmicks are likely niche players.
I'd be pretty annoyed if some salesweasel lied to me about it; but it's unlikely that an RFID installation replaced something that was harder to clone, and it's still easier than keys, slightly more robust than mag stripe readers, and reasonably cheap per tag. In some ways that makes it even more obnoxious to harass the researchers, though.
+1
Excellent points.
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If they were on the up and up they'd be glad for the help finding their flaws I'd think...