BGP Hijacking Continues, Despite the Ability To Prevent It

An anonymous reader writes: BGPMon reports on a recent route hijacking event by Syria. These events continue, despite the ability to detect and prevent improper route origination: Resource Public Key Infrastructure. RPKI is technology that allows an operator to validate the proper relationship between an IP prefix and an Autonomous System. That is, assuming you can collect the certificates. ARIN requires operators accept something called the Relying Party Agreement. But the provider community seems unhappy with the agreement, and is choosing not to implement it, just to avoid the RPA, leaving the the Internet as a whole less secure.

Comments

BGP?

[danceswithtrees]

What if we agree to spell out obscure acronyms the first time? Yes, I can google/bing it to find likely candidates, but what if you make life easier for all involved and actually use Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)? Mmmmkay?

Re:Required -- Except When It Isn't

[suutar]

It's required if you want to use ARIN's data. Those who choose not to agree are simply not using that data, with the consequence that they are less effective at validating route origin identity.

Shoplifting occurs despite the ability to prevent

[mysidia]

These events continue, despite the ability to detect and prevent improper route origination

Locked cases with hardened glass are a technology that allow a store to protect products for sale from surreptitious pilfering. That is, assuming you can fit the products in the case. Lock manufacturers for the cases require stores to accept something called a "key security agreement", but the shop owner community seems unhappy with the inconvenience posed to customers, and is choosing not to implement it, just to avoid the KSA, leaving the goods on store shelves worldwide as a whole less secure.