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BGP Hijacking Continues, Despite the Ability To Prevent It
An anonymous reader writes: BGPMon reports on a recent route hijacking event by Syria. These events continue, despite the ability to detect and prevent improper route origination: Resource Public Key Infrastructure. RPKI is technology that allows an operator to validate the proper relationship between an IP prefix and an Autonomous System. That is, assuming you can collect the certificates. ARIN requires operators accept something called the Relying Party Agreement. But the provider community seems unhappy with the agreement, and is choosing not to implement it, just to avoid the RPA, leaving the the Internet as a whole less secure.
Why do we continue to allow peers that have proven to be problematic in the BGP backbone? simply do not share routes with these ASs any more and fuck their shit hole countries until they stop dicking with the core of the internet.
its not like any old admin can be like "Ok i'm going to broadcast bad routes that will be observed and respected by all the core routers of the internet"
no these people have special agreements with the neighbours they route with, its not like BGP packets just fly around the internet from some random workstation belonging to a hacker magically find their way onto the private vlans the cores use for bgp traffic.
even if it wasnt technically preventable it should simply be resolved by refusing peering after an incident.