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Georgia Institute of Technology Researchers Bridge the Airgap
An anonymous reader writes Hacked has a piece about Georgia Institute of Technology researchers keylogging from a distance using the electromagnetic radiation of CPUs. They can reportedly do this from up to 6 meters away. In this video, using two Ubuntu laptops, they demonstrate that keystrokes are easily interpreted with the software they have developed. In their white paper they talk about the need for more research in this area so that hardware and software manufacturers will be able to develop more secure devices. For now, Faraday cages don't seem as crazy as they used to, or do they?
I was working at a defense contractor in the '80's when the whole "Tempest" program started.
Rather than shield equipment, we simply added a small amount of broadband noise.
The problem isn't to limit emission: The problem is to frustrate detection.