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Germanwings Plane Crash Was No Accident
hcs_$reboot writes The Germanwings plane crash takes a scary turn. After a couple of days investigation, it appears that the co-pilot requested control of the aircraft about 20 minutes into the flight. The pilot then left the cockpit, leaving the co-pilot in full control of the plane. Then, the co-pilot manually and "intentionally" set the plane on the descent that drove it into the mountainside in the southern French Alps. Co-pilot Andreas Lubitz, a 28-year-old German national, could be heard breathing throughout the plane's descent and was alive at the point of impact, according to the prosecutor.
http://pilots-airmen.findthedata.com/l/986395/Andreas-Guenter-Lubitz
The command was given by the captain before he left the cockpit (most likely to use the toilet).
Except that the co-pilot "manipulated the flight monitoring system" to allow the plane to descend at 1000 meters/minute.
Jeebus, that's terrible!
Very unlikely. It's been explained that the door lock has 3 positions: Not locked, Normal, Locked. The door is always in the "Normal" position: the normal position allows another pilot, outside the cockpit, to unlock and enter the door after entering a digital code. The "Locked" position is used only in extreme cases, and nobody but the people inside the cockpit may unlock the door. The door has been switched to "Locked".
Slashdot, fix the reply notifications... You won't get away with it...
And the co-pilot had to have blocked the door so that the pilot could not re-enter. From the article, there is a code that allows crew members to open the cabin door from the outside, but the pilot inside the cabin has the ultimate power to block access. So it seems the co-pilot deliberately overrode the ability of the pilot to access the cabin again.
Ot that they haven't slept. I know several airline pilots, they are told to fly even when they are very tired or when sick.
Do not look at laser with remaining good eye.
That is not entirely true; the procedure takes the following steps - The door is normally pre-locked and can only be opened from inside - Crew trying to enter from outside have first to contact the cockpit via intercom and then press a code on a pad. The cockpit gets a visual and aural signal and has a time period to confirm the entry. - When the crew finds that the cockpit is not responding to a request they (mostly the Purser) can enter a security code on the pad which will unlock the door after a time period - but the cockpit can still override the opening request within 20 seconds. So whenever a pilot or crew is not able to enter a cockpit for an extended period, then somebody in the cockpit is denying them the entry by an action (flipping a switch). That is why some airlines allow a cockpit member to leave the cockpit only while two crew members are in the cockpit for that time (4 eyes principle).
Here is the pic of the switch in question:
http://oi58.tinypic.com/qyhc0p...
In "normal" mode its set to allow the door to unlock when the external code is entered.
In "unlocked" mode, the door is completely unlocked.
In "locked" mode, the door is completely locked, the external code will not unlock it.
The action to move between the three states is a very deliberate one - you need to lift the switch up and move it, there is an infinitesimally small chance that it was engaged by accident.
Only on some airlines. Others allow one in the cockpit for the "minimum time necessary" (paraphrase of what I read on BBC News earlier).
systemd is Roko's Basilisk.
Producing the alarm sound when the autopilot is turned off, which would have been heard on the recording.
Seven puppies were harmed during the making of this post.
AFAIK, there is no such rule in Europe (yet).
But there are more would-be terrorists in the world than severely depressed pilots.
It is not that rare:
Mozambique Airlines flight 470 - 29 November 2013
Egypt Air flight 990 - 31 Oktober 1999
Silk Air flight 185 - 19 December 1997
Royal Air Maroc flight 630 - 21 Augustus 1994
Japan Airlines flight 350 - 9 Februari 1982
Regulations suck, but they're often effective:
http://cdn.static-economist.com/sites/default/files/imagecache/original-size/images/articles/20140315_gdc500_0.png
Looks like there's sufficient data to piece together what happened. As far as I know the flight data recorder is still missing in the wreckage. They found the case, but not the storage module.
This was a clear crash over mainland Europe.
In the middle of rugged mountains that can only be reached by helicopter + long hike.
Regarding overriding the autopilot system, not it is not - you do not "remove" the autopilot from "normal law", as that is the normal operating law and you cannot intentionally degrade to alternate law.
Flight laws have nothing to do with autopilot states or limits. They are flight system protections and limits.
The 15 degrees value you use is the protection that normal law gives the pilot when the pilot is in charge, it is not a limit on what inputs you can command using the side stick while the autopilot is on. 15 degrees is quite a steep nose down angle.
Lets not forget here that we are talking about the aircraft descending, which does not necessarily require it to have a nose down position. There are several ways in which to achieve a descent, most of them in a normal situation does not require side stick interaction.
Indeed. Here's a 5 minute Airbus-produced video showing how the reinforced door interlock system works, including the exact same switch you describe:
Airbus Reinforced Cockpit Door Description and Procedure
https://www.youtube.com/watch?...
I have no special gift, I am only passionately curious. --Albert Einstein
I can believe this. But what if, instead of falling against the switch, the copilot, recognizing that he was about to pass out (e.g. recognizing symptoms of an impending stroke), intentionally attempted to move the switch to the "unlocked" postion (to make it easier for the captain to get into the cockpit quickly)? Due to a combination of confusion, physical incapacitation, and infamiliarity with a probably rarely-used control, he could conceivably have turned the switch to the wrong position even while he was attempting to do what he thought would be the best possible action.
The switch is designed such that the middle ("norm") position is the only one that's stable and will be retained without the user pushing the switch. I.e. the switch will always move back to "normal" when not actively pushed to either "lock" or "unlock". And with the switch in stable position, the door can always be unlocked from the outside -- with a short delay that gives the person inside the cockpit time to actively suppress the unlock using the switch. If the person in the cockpit does nothing, the door unlocks. So without deliberate and repeated activity from the person inside the cockpit, there is no scenario that would indefinitely prevent people outside the cockpit from entering.