The Problem With Using End-to-End Web Crypto as a Cure-All
fsterman writes: Since the Snowden revelations, end-to-end web encryption has become trendy. There are browser add-ons that bolt a PGP client onto webmail and both Yahoo and Google are planning to support PGP directly. They attempt to prevent UI spoofing with icons similar to the site-authentication banks use to combat phishing.
The problem is that a decade of research shows that users habituate to these icons and come to ignore them. An attacker can pull off UI spoofing with a 90%+ success rate.
The problem is that a decade of research shows that users habituate to these icons and come to ignore them. An attacker can pull off UI spoofing with a 90%+ success rate.
The funny thing is that the technical security of snail mail (a paper envelope) is amazingly poor, but it is generally quite secure due to law and custom. However, law and custom is absolutely no security or privacy on the Internet. There is the problem.