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Why Crypto Backdoors Wouldn't Work
An anonymous reader writes: Your devices should come with a government backdoor. That's according to the heads of the FBI, NSA, and DHS. There are many objections, especially that backdoors add massive security risks.
Would backdoors even be effective, though? In a new writeup, a prominent Stanford security researcher argues that crypto backdoors "will not work." Walking step-by-step through a hypothetical backdoored Android, he argues that "in order to make secure apps just slightly more difficult for criminals to obtain, and just slightly less worthwhile for developers, the government would have to go to extraordinary lengths. In an arms race between cryptographic backdoors and secure apps, the United States would inevitably lose."
Would backdoors even be effective, though? In a new writeup, a prominent Stanford security researcher argues that crypto backdoors "will not work." Walking step-by-step through a hypothetical backdoored Android, he argues that "in order to make secure apps just slightly more difficult for criminals to obtain, and just slightly less worthwhile for developers, the government would have to go to extraordinary lengths. In an arms race between cryptographic backdoors and secure apps, the United States would inevitably lose."
I seem to recall that we went through this in the mid to late 90s, where the government insisted any use of strong cryptography should as a matter of law, have a backdoor for the government. Then suddenly they dropped it, and all of us paying attention knew they got their way by some other means. Now post-Snowden, I guess we know what that was, and they're back to beating this horse all over again.
The answer should be no, with absolutely no further discussion.
Would it work for the government to have access to everyone's cars? Cars can be used for criminal activities. Ditto for keys; should we have to al give the government access to our homes?
"Maybe this world is another planet's hell"
Aldous Huxley
They can read your RAM
Intel Active Management Technology
(aka vpro, aka vt)
doesn't matter anyway. never done 'backdoor'. likely, never will.
Hardly a good example, Android is clearly *front*doored. It even comes with specific spyware apps for the purpose!
For one thing it communicates your location, even without GPS, even with location services turned off, (Google has a separate switch you have to turn it off twice). You'll never be able to stop their Play Location Service unless you root.
All those free messaging services that need all those permissions, you sign up and your contacts list is sent to them.
Then there's the 'cloud backup' that lets you 'backup' to their cloud.
Go see the list of apps installed on a typical android phone and you'll see they can take control of the phone USING ONLY THE VOICE CHANNEL, see all files, all SMSs, all passwords, record voice, video, fake calls, fake messages. There are quite a few of these, DSMLawMo + DSM Forwarding is one (of 3) that came installed on mine.
You think it went away with CarrierIQ?
Dice selling NSA propaganda again- use a commercial encryption solution from ANY commercial entity (especially Microsoft, Apple, Google etc) and it already has full NSA back-door functionality-- even the so-called end-point encryption solutions.
You are TOLD (in well placed lies across all the mainstream media outlets) the LIE that security services are unhappy about ordinary people suing commercial solutions. I trust you are all familiar with Br'er Rabbit and the briar patch- or what became widely known as REVERSE PSYCHOLOGY.
There are good solutions- Truecrypt is one- which is why the NSA ran a TEN MILLION dollar plus project to collapse confidence in Truecrypt, and paid off key people involved in the original development team.
Publicly disseminated LIES are a key tactic of NSA/GCHQ operations- and this place is just another willing outlet for NSA psy-ops.
Snowden insisted the journalists remove the battery from their phones and put the phones in the fridge.
That pretty much tells you how useful 'encryption' on Android would be against back doors. None, if you can't protect your speech near the phone you can't protect the password.
Reading the article, it's very intersting. His argument is that you CAN'T backdoor a platform. Summarizing:
1) Say Android rolls over and backdoors the encrypted filesystem.
2) 3rd party apps can use the cryptography library, so Google would also have to backdoor that.
3) Then apps could use a 3rd party crypto library, so gov't would have to compel google to monitor for at least respond to takedown requests for strong crypto 3rd party apps.
4) But apps can easily download and incorporate new code, so Google would have to audit running apps with static and dynamic analysis.
5) Even then, people could use other app stores or sideloads, so Google would have to have an app kill switch option. This would be HUGE INTRUSION and delete apps from people's phones (even innocent people).
6) But how to identify apps? Sideloaded apps could generate a new appID with each download, so Google would have to scan for app characteristics (think antivirus software here).
7) Even if the above worked, browser-based apps could be built that use secure data stores or end-to-end messaging. This would mean the gov't would have to block these web apps, i.e., Internet censorship.
It's just not technically feasible if there is any respect for liberty, not to mention the significant technical challenges involved.
Two words: key escrow. Google "secret sharing" for interesting details and concepts.
Learning HOW to think is more important than learning WHAT to think.
Blockquote... [Citation needed]
Just make encryption that isn't ridiculously easy to crack illegal, or subject to severe regulation and taxation. Get an expert devoid of care for privacy (say, Dorothy Denning) to endorse the law on the Sunday Morning talk shows. Cast anyone who cares about secure encryption as a bitter and deranged malcontent. Tell people it's for the Common Good.
Problem solved.
Finding God in a Dog
I just read the entire article and the author forgot one other solution: the British solution Instead of putting the burden on app developers to include backdoors, or on Google to block apps that don't, put the burden on end users to turn over their keys to police when asked. I'm not saying I like this solution, but it is a solution the author of the article didn't consider. If you make the sentence for non-cooperation long enough, it doesn't really matter if the police find what they're looking for: they can just lock you up for not handing over the keys.
If I can be modded down for being a troll, can I be modded up for being an orc, or a balrog?
Let me save the GP the trouble of responding:
blah blah Google it yourself, blah blah not doing your homework for you even though I know it's really my homework, blah blah I refuse to understand burden of proof, blah blah hypocritical accusation of laziness, blah blah u r sheeple.
...has the fact a program simply won't work deterred the Government from attempting it anyways?
Just because there may be open "app" warfare continuing on the devices, doesn't mean that sanctioned device access offers no value whatsoever.
There are plenty of use cases where access to the mundane contents of a device offer valuable information over and above whatever may be stored in "deep crypto". Especially in cases involving people that simply would no be using deep crypto.
Consider the phone of a murder victim, one that was killed for a mundane emotional reason rather than some nefarious terrorist plot.
The State already has access to pretty much everything but the contents of your head and other protected conversations. It can access your house, your safes, your safe deposit boxes, your bank records, phone records, medical records, etc. etc. The State is allowed to do irreparable damage to gain access to these things. It can burn your safe open, kick your door open, carve your mattress open with a knife, disassemble your car to it's component bits. All with no compensation for damages rendered. And all under guise of authority through lawful procedures (i.e. warrants).
Frankly, you phone should not be exempt from this process.
Have the factories key escrow the devices, require physical access, and a jtag connector causing destruction of the phone (well, the case), and I'd have no problem with it at all.
If you then put some deep crypto on top of that layer, then fine. The factory encryption keeps the phone "safe" from generic ne'er do wells. But the State, society has the access it needs in order to perform the criminal investigations we, the people, have charged them to do.
If I have a photo of my killer on my phone, I sure wouldn't mind them having that information. Anyone else can be offered to submit their pass code, or basically be told "Well, ok, we're going to destroy your phone then and get the information anyway." Just like everything else.
And yes, I'm wary of the state as much as anybody, but unless we're going to roll back all of the other things that the State has access too during criminal investigations, I don't see why a cell phone should be any different.
If you have something to hide, maybe you should stop being evil. I, for one, welcome our omnipotent crypto destroying overlords.
Seriously, no matter what this Stanford researcher's credentials, or reputation, or logic, or merits. The Three Letter Agencies have said they want a back door, does anyone doubt they will do everything in their power to get it? Does anyone think their political masters will say no? Does anyone believe the average citizen will understand what this is about or care?
Also, didn't the GHGQ ask for exactly the same thing? Which hints that every partner in the Five Eyes likely also wants this.
The default position of any spy agency is to ask for more information. All Your Base Are Belong To Us, that's how they think. And if questioned why, they blather on about how you don't need to know, they have the authority, and what business is it of yours anyway? "If you don't have anything to hide you won't mind being spied upon" is the BS rationale for it all.
When in reality, it's creepy, violates reasonable expectations of privacy, usurps due process, is certainly unconstitutional, and creates a mammoth opportunity for abuse of power for all the wrong reasons. Oh, and the Three Letter Agencies can never quite get their facts straight about how effective all this spying is. Not that this ultimately matters much. Be careful about arguing minor secondary issues of effectiveness, when the primary issues are unconstitutionality, followed by due process and privacy. It's just that the final insult in this farce is that an illegal spying program also cannot be proven effective.
Seems to me, everytime they talk about this kind of thing, it does exactly what I want. Raise crypto awareness. Keep trying guberment. The more you preach for backdoors, the more people you make aware of the usefulness of crypto. Streisand effect anyone?
to make ... apps just slightly more difficult ... and just slightly less worthwhile ... the government would have to go to extraordinary lengths.
Ahh, well there's your problem: you expect resource restrictions and common sense from government.
"the government would have to go to extraordinary lengths" Really!?! When has that ever stopped them from doing anything?
If the universe is someone's simulation -- does that mean the stars are just stuck pixels?
Encryption is often placebo; no cellular phone will ever be secure the way things are going... do the research- you'll find they already have their backdoor for most devices. uefi, efi- are suspect as well, but I've not come across anything nearly as condemning as what's trivially possible with cheap hardware and known baseband hacking. -the feds don't have to hack it- it's built in...
Because all you fucking morons, are still running windows and don't learn.
I love how this discussion can even happen, with hundreds of comments, and people still do not want to mention the common vector / denominator to all these attacks: WINDOWSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS
The answer is asbolutely fucking no! What fucking liberal asstard would even post this. We are guaranteened a 4th amendent right and protection. I will defend it with my life if nescesary because nobody has the man balls to do it anymore.
Surprised nobody posted this yet.
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Examine carefully the 'Trusted Computing' hardware and software components for new computers. Governmental agencies already have access to not only the escrowed keys, but to the master keys used to revoke and authorize other new keys. For personal security, it's quite troubling.
It already has access built into the CPU at a machine level, is my guess.
It's working; my insurance stocks have gone up magnificently, to the order of 6x the market.
suckers
Lots have been caught with plaintext browser history on their hard drives listing Google queries like "how to dispose of a body". That despite tools to clear or not record such history are easily available. To such end, having a half hearted, optional key escrow may do a lot of good. Let smartphones be encrypted by default, with a copy of the key encrypted with a public key of a cloud company that has an excellent security record. Then if someone forgets their password, and shows up at Apple or Verizon store with a valid ID, they can have their vacation photos back. So can law enforcement if they produce a valid and narrow scope search warrant.
At the same time, people can install custom ROMs that support encryption that is potentially impractical to crack. That's important for many reasons including personal freedom and keeping country's technological edge by encouraging people to develop and understand software. Whistleblowers will get to keep their privacy, and so will a few criminal masterminds. But chances are, the later will have dumb associates who will set their password to 12345. I think a bet that smart people are generally also well intentioned is a good one for our society to make. In the meantime, we don't have to make life of the next Scott Peterson too easy.
Leaks like this just tell people that that need to encrypt their shit using third party software. There will always be Third Party crypto software out there, and this will only encourage it to get stronger. You basically can't install a backdoor on much of the crypto software out there, because people of means can see the code (Open Source.) That's kind of the point. I'm in favor of the crypto concept...my phone is encrypted, and I don't even have anything to hide. It's more to piss the NSA off than anything, and because I can, and to make it so that if anyone stole my phone, it would be a brick. I'm not afraid of the NSA...I'm afraid of Industrial hackers, and even then, I don't put stuff on my phone that is sensitive. Joke's on them...all they'll find is porn. And, frankly, my taste in porn is questionable.
It only takes the courage to implement it: all crypto technology must be endorsed by the government, then it's only a matter of seeking out the black sheep. Using non-government approved cryptography? Automatic 20 years sentence. Possession of non-government approved crypto tools? Automatic 20 years sentence. Developing tools to circumvent surveillance? Automatic 40 years sentence. Discussing such tech? Minimum 50'000$ fine the first time, 5 years sentence after that. Make a couple of high-profile examples and the rest will behave. As for the rest of the world... Well, they seem so eager to trade sith us, I'm sure they will get the message. :)
"Your devices should come with a government backdoor"
is NOT equal to
"Walking step-by-step through a hypothetical backdoored Android"
Government backdoor means hardware has been laced with "funny" instructions, something like the Pentium bug, but less obvious. Who knows of the trick can interpret the skewed results to crack crypto with magnitudes less effort, but those left in the dark still think it is really 256 or 2048 bits strenght.
I would think this is already the situation. Most microchips are designed in Haifa and they put in HW backdoors for use by Mossad / Unit 8200, as well as american use (since they really depend on goodwill for the 10 billion dollars / year US military aid package, including F-35 JSF, Apache attack helicopters, AMRAAM missiles, ammunitions, parts for nukes, misc. supplies, etc.)
The asians are only doing the fab part, they don't really fully understand the logic design of microchips they make. I think only France has a truly US/IL-independent microelectronics design and manufacturing capability from the ground up, but they have huge cost problems and the produce only goes into military tech like the SPECTRE module in the Rafale.
I found three decomposed corpses buried under my old house the other day. I called up the local po-po, told them what I found, and they said “Well, bring ’em on in, & we’ll take a look at ‘em."
The neighbor has a camera, hack into his internet and lets see it.
First, you need his IP address, then is his router even port mapped to his camera to allow internet viewing and what port, what brand is his brand and model is the camera so you can get the right viewing software and what about the username and password he likely has to access the cameras ? Or does a CSI team have universal backdoor access to all devices.
Give me 5 seconds....Ok Im in, Im pulling up lastnight's video now....
Yesterday, there was a congressional subcommittee hearing regarding crypto backdoors. Congress members asked the witness panel a variety of questions related to unintentional vulnerabilities, identifying good/bad guys, economic impact, application development impact, global political impact, and whether it is even possible to design and create such a system. The "Clipper Chip" was cited. There was indirect mention of a former NSA employee. Long story short, it did not go particularly well for law enforcement or the government position in this round, but there will be others.
The witness panel, prepared written testimony, and video of that hearing can be found here: http://oversight.house.gov/hearing/encryption-technology-potential-u-s-policy-responses/