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Submersible Photographs WW2 Japanese Sub's Long-Lost Airplane Hangar
Zothecula writes: Until the 1960s, Japan's three I-400-class subs were the largest submarines ever built. They were so large, in fact, that they could each carry and launch three Aichi M6A Seiran amphibious aircraft. The idea was that the submarines could stealthily bring the planes to within striking distance of US coastal cities, where they could then take off and conduct bombing runs. Now, for the first time since it was scuttled at the end of World War II, one of the sunken subs' aircraft hangars has been photographed. The M6A on display at the Air and Space Museum's Udvar-Hazy Center is worth seeing, if you get a chance.
it must suck to be you. I on the other hand use Firefox with Adblock, and reading the article right now with no ads bothering me.
If you do any significant amount of reading regard the Japanese in WW2, you notice that there was often an over reliance on trickery, subterfuge, and a focus on the means rather than the end goal. Part of it was desperation borne out of being completely outmatched technologically, but part of it was also a deeply entrenched belief that the fighting spirit of the Japanese soldier would allow him to overcome any hardship, any adversary. Examples such as Guadalcanal, where they landed the 900-man Ichiki Detachment with orders to destroy the 10,000-strong Marine landing force; the countless instances of forsaking strong, pre-prepared defensive positions for banzai charges that killed hundreds or thousands of Japanese at the cost of a handful of Americans; to untrained high school boys with just enough flight training to be able to take off and fly level piloting aircraft with nothing more than an airspeed indicator and a compass trying to sink aircraft carriers. Necessity really is the mother of inventions, but when it is combined with desperation it can spawn some of the craziest ideas, which more often as not result in disaster.
The only thing necessary for evil to triumph is for it to be pitted against a slightly greater evil
The germans had great engineering, but between this, the Bismarck, and the Tiger tanks (with engines/transmissions that broke down frequently and couldn't handle the load), they had major failings too in the economy department of bang for your buck [reichsmark]. Leadership was mostly to blame.
As the war dragged on, Hitler became increasingly convinced that technology would turn the tide for the Germans. The V-series rockets, the ME-262, the Tiger/King Tiger, all were intended to make up for the fact that they were increasingly sending young boys and old men onto the front lines. Numerous advisors and ranking members of teh military (at least claimed to have) attempted to persuade Hitler that these programs were a waste of resources but he was adamant in his support of them. I wonder if a lot of it was due to he increasingly deteriorated mental state as the combination of stress, drugs, and mental diseases (Parkinsons and possibly syphyllis if I am not mistaken ) took their toll.
The only thing necessary for evil to triumph is for it to be pitted against a slightly greater evil
The Japanese strategy of using their subs as highly ineffective aircraft carriers is one of the reasons they lost the war. While they were wasting their efforts on that, the American's were using their subs as commerce raiders, devastating the Japanese economy ... and the Japanese failed to stop that because they never developed effective anti-sub warfare. They should have consulted with their German allies, who could have told them a lot about the effective anti-sub tactics used against them in the Atlantic.
True, but one tactic that the Germans didn't realize was we were reading their codes and thus able to better intercept U-Boots and wolf packs. I'm not sure if Japan had developed sonar to the point it could detect submerged submarines; although radar could detect them while surfaced, which was their normal mode of operation, but then that also warns the submarine you are there before you detect them. Finally, the Allies pretty much controlled the seas in the Atlantic and thus could conduct ASW without much concern that they would get into surface battles; Japan did not have that luxury and was trying to fight naval battles that took ships that could be used for ASW away from that role. Not disagreeing with you but the two theaters were different enough that many of the things that work din one might not in the other.
I'm a consultant - I convert gibberish into cash-flow.
The germans had great engineering, but between this, the Bismarck, and the Tiger tanks (with engines/transmissions that broke down frequently and couldn't handle the load), they had major failings too in the economy department of bang for your buck [reichsmark]. Leadership was mostly to blame.
As the war dragged on, Hitler became increasingly convinced that technology would turn the tide for the Germans. The V-series rockets, the ME-262, the Tiger/King Tiger, all were intended to make up for the fact that they were increasingly sending young boys and old men onto the front lines. Numerous advisors and ranking members of teh military (at least claimed to have) attempted to persuade Hitler that these programs were a waste of resources but he was adamant in his support of them. I wonder if a lot of it was due to he increasingly deteriorated mental state as the combination of stress, drugs, and mental diseases (Parkinsons and possibly syphyllis if I am not mistaken ) took their toll.
I think part of it was that winning by tech was their only option: any rational analysis said they were outgunned and outproduced, so tech was their Hail Mary. They simply had to believe in it. Conveniently, it aligned with their sense of superiority.
Nostalgia's not what it used to be.
In the beginning, Barbarossa was launched with the assumption that the Soviet Union would collapse quickly. This did not happen, for various military, economic and political reasons. On this basis, the Germans attempted to convince the Japanese to strike at Great Britain at places like Singapore and Hong Kong late in 1941 and facilitate their war against Britain. They kept the Japanese in the dark about Barbarossa.
Amidst the signs of obvious failure just short of victory in Russia, the Germans tried to convince the Japanese in October and November of 1941 to attack the Soviets from Manchuria. This failed, as the Japanese already had plans to invade the Philippines, Singapore, Borneo, and all associated islands to secure oil supplies. Moreover, they had concluded a non-aggression pact with the Soviets they preferred to keep in place. So the Soviets ended up at war with just Germany and Italy. The Japanese ended up at war with just Britain and the US. The Germans, however, ended up at war with all three major Allied powers, by foolishly declaring war on the US just after Pearl Harbor.
The German DoW was predicated on a weak American response to Europe based on the Japanese threat. The agreement to focus on Germany between the Anglo-American powers confounded this idea. Even Mussolini believed that the focus would be on the Pacific after the Japanese attack, hence his declaration of war on the US, which seems insane considering the results just over a year later.
At that point, Hitler's (and Goebbels', judging by his diaries) only hope was for a cleavage between the Soviets and the Anglo-American powers. There was about zero chance of this happening with Roosevelt championing the alliance, but that was what he hoped for. When Roosevelt died and nothing changed, this is the point where he gave up hope and we can then segue to the events of "Downfall".
I don't think Hitler hoped for actual military victory post-Stalingrad. He hoped for delay in the war's end game to present a political situation he could take advantage of. His thoughts were rational, I believe, but unlikely from this vantage point to ever bear fruit.
HBI's Law: Frequency of calling others Nazis is directly correlated with the likelihood of the accuser being Communist.
In the beginning, Barbarossa was launched with the assumption that the Soviet Union would collapse quickly. This did not happen, for various military, economic and political reasons.
Its easy to tell why it happened: HItler got distracted. Hitler pulled resources from the drive on Moscow and diverted them to the attack in the Caucasus for the oil fields. Had he continued the drive on Moscow they would have more than likely made it before winter, Stalin would have had to abandon the city, and most Soviet resistance would have collapsed. HIs insistance on personally controlling the war cost him the war and eventually his life.
I always found it interesting that, in the waning months of the war, many in the German high command clung to the hope that they would ally with the Americans and fight the Russians. Reading histories with 1st hand accounts and personal war diaries of the Wehrmacht can really change how you look at the war and really humanizes them.
The only thing necessary for evil to triumph is for it to be pitted against a slightly greater evil
I always thought the most practical combination of aircraft and submarine was the FA 330, a rotary-wing kite used by Nazi submariners to get their lookout higher to see farther. It was tethered and unpowered, but it was quick to set up, simple to use, and provided a great benefit to the sub in the last few days before radar.