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Chris Roberts Is the Least Important Part of the Airplane Hacking Story

chicksdaddy writes: Now that the news media is in full freak-out mode about whether or not security researcher Chris Roberts did or did not hack into the engine of a plane, in flight and cause it to "fly sideways," security experts say its time to take a step back from the crazy and ask what is the real import of the plane hacking. The answer: definitely not Chris Roberts. The real story that media outlets should be chasing isn't what Roberts did or didn't do on board a United flight in April, but whether there is any truth to longtime assurances from airplane makers like Boeing and Airbus that critical avionics systems aboard their aircraft are unreachable from systems accessible to passengers, the Christian Science Monitor writes. And, on that issue, Roberts' statements and the FBI's actions raise as many questions as they answer. For one: why is the FBI suddenly focused on years-old research that has long been part of the public record.

"This has been a known issue for four or five years, where a bunch of us have been stood up and pounding our chest and saying, 'This has to be fixed,' " Roberts noted. "Is there a credible threat? Is something happening? If so, they're not going to tell us," he said. Roberts isn't the only one confused by the series of events surrounding his detention in April and the revelations about his interviews with federal agents. "I would like to see a transcript (of the interviews)," said one former federal computer crimes prosecutor, speaking on condition of anonymity. "If he did what he said he did, why is he not in jail? And if he didn't do it, why is the FBI saying he did?"

47 of 200 comments (clear)

  1. not the real question by ganjadude · · Score: 5, Insightful

    the real question to be asking is that if what the FBI is claiming is true, why has the FAA not grounded all planes of the same make yet? they have grounded planes for less in the past, the FAA doesnt really mess around

    --
    have you seen my sig? there are many others like it but none that are the same
    1. Re:not the real question by qeveren · · Score: 4, Interesting

      I doubt what the FBI is claiming is true, but you gotta market the fear somehow.

      --
      Don't just stand there, get that other dog!
    2. Re:not the real question by damicatz · · Score: 4, Informative

      The FBI isn't claiming anything. The affidavit simply states that Chris Roberts told the FBI agents he was able to hack the avionics of the plane.

      Frankly, it's complete bullshit. The systems are completely, physically separate. There is no way to hack the thrust from the in-flight entertainment system because they are not connected to each other. The most he'd be able to do is turn on the fasten seatbelt sign.

    3. Re:not the real question by Penguinisto · · Score: 3, Informative

      This, right here.

      Seriously - entertainment and flight controls on subnets that are reachable from each other? What the hell was the engineering team drinking/snorting/smoking/shooting that day?

      I'm thinking that due to the lack of an emergency TCTO* , and lack of any corroborating evidence (seriously, you'd think a pilot would notify *somebody* if his airplane did something way out of the ordinary like that, even if to report bad wind turbulence/shear/whatever as a warning to ATC and other pilots in the same path)?

      Yeah... not so sure the FBI's assertion holds that much water. Awaiting more evidence and/or corroboration on that one.

      * Time Compliance Technical Order - at least that's what the USAF used to call it. Dunno what they call it nowadays in the civilian world.

      --
      Quo usque tandem abutere, Nimbus, patientia nostra?
    4. Re:not the real question by Mr+D+from+63 · · Score: 3, Informative

      The FBI isn't claiming anything.

      Exactly. They are just saying what they are investigating based on claims from Roberts himself. Roberts meanwhile has been anything but clear on what he's done.

    5. Re:not the real question by mcrbids · · Score: 4, Insightful

      It's only bullshit if Chris Roberts was actually lying. And validating it is pretty straightforward: Did the plane yaw, as was claimed? Can Chris' software cause it to happen again?

      It's a pretty simple test. And as far as Chris' treatment, if he's been trying to tell people about this vulnerability and getting the cold shoulder, he's as innocent as they get and should be compensated for time served.

      --
      I have no problem with your religion until you decide it's reason to deprive others of the truth.
    6. Re:not the real question by nedlohs · · Score: 2, Insightful

      So if Roberts was telling the truth he should be charged for hacking the avionics. If he wasn't telling the truth then he should be charged with making false statements.

      Though of course the FBI will want to dig up evidence either way before doing anything. Even though it's obvious the second is the case. If a plane he had caused a plane to climb the pilots would have reported that the plane initiated a climb all by itself and the FAA would be investigating and probably grounding planes or having them disable the entertainment systems.

    7. Re:not the real question by AK+Marc · · Score: 4, Informative

      The affidavit simply states that Chris Roberts told the FBI agents he was able to hack the avionics of the plane.

      It's not illegal to be "able" to hack something. A crime is an illegal act, done at a specific time and place. You can't charge someone with having killed "someone" unless you name that someone. You can't even charge them if you have a name of the murdered, unless you have a time and place named.

      You can get a warrant for someone "able" to do it, and they did. If they arrested him, the charge should specify what he did that was illegal, and when and where it happened. I haven't seen a pic of the actual arrest paperwork, but the media stated it was for hacking a specific flight. This means that the media reports are that he was arrested for actually having caused a flight-path diversion mid-flight by controlling (at least part of) the flight control systems from his passenger seat.

    8. Re:not the real question by FlyHelicopters · · Score: 2

      * Time Compliance Technical Order - at least that's what the USAF used to call it. Dunno what they call it nowadays in the civilian world.

      The FAA calls them ADs, or Airworthiness Directives... You must comply with them for the aircraft's Airworthiness Certificate to remain valid.

      An Emergency AD can be issued that takes effect right away, which is how the FAA often will "ground planes until they are fixed".

    9. Re:not the real question by ganjadude · · Score: 5, Informative

      he made it clear that he did so in a simulator, not on a real plane in the sky. the FBI is taking it out of context to scare people and the media is complicit in this as well for not doing basic journalist research

      --
      have you seen my sig? there are many others like it but none that are the same
    10. Re:not the real question by wonkey_monkey · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Frankly, it's complete bullshit. The systems are completely, physically separate. There is no way to hack the thrust from the in-flight entertainment system because they are not connected to each other.

      What are your qualifications to be able to say so?

      The systems should be separate. There should be no way to hack into avionics. That doesn't necessarily make it so.

      If you really do know, then great, I am more informed than I was previously was.

      --
      systemd is Roko's Basilisk.
    11. Re:not the real question by john.r.strohm · · Score: 4, Informative

      The corresponding FAA term is "Airworthiness Directive" (AD). An AD is a very big deal.

      The in-flight entertainment (IFE) systems receive navigation data from the flight deck computers so they can display the moving maps and other stuff on the entertainment displays, for those passengers who want to know "where am I", "are we there yet", "is it time to reset my watch because we've crossed a time zone and I'm trying to adjust my body clock".

      I would be shocked to learn that Boeing allowed the IFE to put ANY kind of data into the flight deck computers. I'd actually expect Boeing to use a one-way interface, one that transmits but does not receive: think RS-232 with one of the pins removed. I'd be almost as shocked to learn that Airbus did something like that. However, Airbus's comment about "firewalls" does not exactly inspire me to confidence in their airplanes.

      There's something else. If Mr. Roberts did in fact do what the FBI claimed he said he did, I would have expected the air up in the cockpit to have turned very blue, as the pilots said (screamed, actually) something along the lines of what the Apollo 8 crew said (screamed, actually) when their CSM did an uncommanded thruster burn. I would further expected them to take manual control immediately, get on the radio immediately, declare an emergency because of the uncommanded engine power setting change, and land at the nearest airstrip that could handle the airplane. I would further expect maintenance crews to pull the flight data recorders to find out WTF just happened.

    12. Re:not the real question by grimmjeeper · · Score: 5, Interesting

      The systems are completely, physically separate.

      Considering that both the Avionics systems and the in flight entertainment systems are both able to reach the SATCOM radios, I'm not sure this assertion is true.

      I've spent a great deal of my career working on avionics systems and did work on early Ethernet implementations in the late 90's, well before ARINC came up with AFDX/664 standards. Back then we restricted Ethernet to single point to single point dedicated channels with no switching or routing of any kind. The first vague ideas of having an in-flight entertainment network were starting to form. But at the time, it was just high level R&D.

      From what I've been able to piece together is that Chris Roberts bought an under-seat device and hooked up something in his basement for proof-of-concept attacks into the avionics network. But without all of the rest of the equipment, he had to build up his system with commercial grade equipment. And that's where his "hacking the engine controls" story falls apart. Sure, he may have been able to get a specifically formatted packet through the IFE network and send it out the port that connects to the rest of the plane. And with his generic Ethernet switches, he may have been able to get that packet through to where he thought the engine control computer was. But his model is flawed.

      AFDX/ARINC 664 is an entire structure built on top of the physical layer of Ethernet. While it may use Ethernet frames to pass the data, there's a ton of bandwidth management and strict routing management built on top of it. Assuming for the sake of argument that the avionics network was indeed set up correctly, there's no way an engine control packet coming from the IFE network would be routed. The filters would see that the IFE port isn't authorized to send that data and it would be dropped, perhaps with an error log of some kind. The only thing the IFE network should be able to talk to is the SATCOM radio and only within very specific parameters. There's no way a properly set up avionics network is vulnerable to an attack like this.

      Of course, that begs the question. Did they set up their avionics network correctly? It's highly likely that they did, but I'm not going to say with 100% certainty that there are absolutely zero vulnerabilities. Suffice it to say, I'm extremely skeptical of Roberts' claims. But I will stop short of saying that he is, without question, full of it.

    13. Re:not the real question by g0bshiTe · · Score: 2

      Planes typically yaw in flight all the time, it's called dog tailing. There is a number of reasons why, the main is thrust typically every aircraft dog tails, the second is a change in wind direction, could cause the yaw to change. It's possible he is misinterpreting flight dynamics with something he was attempting to do.

      --
      I am Bennett Haselton! I am Bennett Haselton!
    14. Re:not the real question by R3d+M3rcury · · Score: 4, Insightful

      And I assume there are a couple of pilots on the flight who could easily verify if this was the case.

    15. Re:not the real question by SpankiMonki · · Score: 4, Interesting

      Name 1 reason an active port under an uncontrollable passengers seat needs to have access to avionics or any critical system?

      History. As was pointed our to me in an earlier discussion on this topic, bean counters might have played a role in consolidating ALL electronic systems in an aircraft, thus tying its avionics with its in-flight entertainment systems.

    16. Re:not the real question by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

      According to Bruce Schneier they're not physically separated: "Newer planes such as the Boeing 787 Dreamliner and the Airbus A350 and A380 have a single network that is used both by pilots to fly the plane and passengers for their Wi-Fi connections."

      See also Figure 4 of this GAO report: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669627.pdf. There's a firewall protecting the command-and-control avionics from the passenger's network. Both the avionics systems and the passenger network utilize the same egress to the ground. Per the report: "Firewalls protect avionics systems located in the cockpit from intrusion by cabin system users, such as passengers who use in-flight entertainment services onboard."

      Older planes had physically separate networks. Newer ones, not so much. Of course, maybe the security is bullet-proof. Doubtless there are access controls at the ethernet layer much more sophisticated than your standard network. And it'd be very surprised if Chris Roberts wasn't lying or grossly exaggerating. But regardless the systems are _not_ physically separate.

    17. Re:not the real question by phantomfive · · Score: 2

      All you need for that is a separate GPS unit.

      --
      "First they came for the slanderers and i said nothing."
    18. Re:not the real question by dcollins117 · · Score: 2

      Planes typically yaw in flight all the time, it's called dog tailing.

      You mean there is a plausible explanation that doesn't involve elite hackers controlling a plane fly-by-wire from the entertainment system? I wonder why the FBI never considered that.

    19. Re:not the real question by WaffleMonster · · Score: 2

      The FBI isn't claiming anything. The affidavit simply states that Chris Roberts told the FBI agents he was able to hack the avionics of the plane.

      This is the part I'm most interested in. Did Chris really say these things or did the FBI want to hear a specific narrative and perhaps twist or misunderstand his remarks about what he believes is possible into "something he did"?

      Chris isn't talking and I'm disinclined to accept FBI statements at face value. I will be very interested in hearing Chris's account of what he actually said to the FBI.

    20. Re:not the real question by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Informative

      I've been to Roberts' lectures. There is a piece of information that he talks about but is left out his slide deck and other documentation that is missing in the media reports. That piece is the actual vulnerability itself.

    21. Re:not the real question by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Great post.

      From the WIKI page on afdx, it appears that AFDX expects all systems are physically connected together, but logically separated by routing tables in the switches. The logical separation seems fairly simple, so maybe it is not hackable. But 'maybe' is not a good word to have to use for this sort of thing. Without more info, it seems impossible to say. This really makes Airbus saying 'naturally' we don't discuss this stuff counterproductive.

      The question is, from where he was able to connect, can he send packets to a box that in turn has the ability to send stuff to the flight control stuff (or the box controlling the routing)?

      Perhaps he setup a test system in his basement with normal Ethernet switches and was able to do something interesting that would not have worked in the air with real AFDX switches?

    22. Re:not the real question by grimmjeeper · · Score: 2

      Perhaps he setup a test system in his basement with normal Ethernet switches and was able to do something interesting that would not have worked in the air with real AFDX switches?

      That's where the uncertainty comes in. Near as I can tell, it's "very unlikely" that what he built could hack an actual plane. But I can't say with 100% certainty that he hasn't found a weakness that can be exploited. I doubt he has. But it is theoretically possible.

    23. Re:not the real question by bluescrn · · Score: 2

      That seems like a bad idea... Even if you can't communicate with critical systems, there could be the possibility of denial-of-service type attacks? And if the system can resist software-based attacks, what about a malicious user killing the network by somehow feeding a high voltage into a passenger-accessible network port?...

    24. Re:not the real question by blindseer · · Score: 2

      You can't charge someone with having killed "someone" unless you name that someone.

      Also, would not that someone have to be proven to be dead? The FBI claims that Roberts caused a plane to move in a manner that resulted from his actions. If someone can show the movement was in fact because of pilot action, or from wind, then there is no crime. Right?

      --
      I am armed because I am free. I am free because I am armed.
    25. Re:not the real question by AK+Marc · · Score: 2

      The article claims that the actual lice hack was done with default usernames and passwords. If that's true, the CEO of the airline should be in jail for 10M counts of criminal negligence.

    26. Re:not the real question by AK+Marc · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Yes. If you are charged with the murder of Bob, by shooting him, and you can prove that he was dead from a heart attack, the most they can charge you with is desecrating a corpse, which wouldn't stick if you could prove that he was alive when you shot, and dead when it hit.

      Hacking doesn't have to have an effect, though. It's not a crime to make a plane divert. It's illegal to try, whether or not you succeed. So that's different.

    27. Re:not the real question by JeffOwl · · Score: 4, Insightful

      If he did this on an actual aircraft in flight (he didn't, it's BS) then he put the lives of everyone on that plane in danger. They don't let flight control software on a plane without a well understood pedigree for a reason and he was mucking with that. If he did this on an actual plane in flight (he didn't) he belongs in jail. If he didn't do it (he didn't) then he is basically confessing to a crime that wasn't committed, and perhaps he should be committed himself, that or the FBI is full of shit and it wouldn't be the first time for that. If the entertainment system actually has a way to send data to the critical flight control systems then a bunch of engineers and executives belong in jail right beside him, and throw in some FAA folks for good measure.

    28. Re:not the real question by citizenr · · Score: 3, Insightful

      I doubt what the FBI is claiming is true

      of course its true, they found hair evidence and everything!

      --
      Who logs in to gdm? Not I, said the duck.
    29. Re:not the real question by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Informative

      Name 1 reason an active port under an uncontrollable passengers seat needs to have access to avionics or any critical system?

      History. As was pointed our to me in an earlier discussion on this topic, bean counters might have played a role in consolidating ALL electronic systems in an aircraft, thus tying its avionics with its in-flight entertainment systems.

      There's no way any designer would mix a Safety Critical System with a Non-Safety Critical System, no matter what the cost "benefits" might appear to be...

      DO-254 requires an astronomical (ha!) amount of verification and hence effort/cost. The physical segregation of Safety Critical Systems from Non-Safety Critical Systems is essential to reduce complexity, improve predictability and decrease verification costs. Keep in mind that the verification of these systems costs 100x what it does to design and implement them (if not more).

      In saying that, you can run a black channel (safety critical information mixed with non-safety critical information), but as per IEC-61784, these must be categorically protected against masquerade (as well as the usual sources of error). So even if our chump of a hacker could gain access to the network, they would be unable to influence any Safety Critical Systems.

      Bean counters don't sit at this table.

    30. Re:not the real question by Xiaran · · Score: 4, Funny

      No. It is because when the generic olive skinned hijackers take over the aircraft the hero can hack into the system with the assistance of the plucky, attractive flight attendant and save the presidents life. Duh.

    31. Re:not the real question by Jason+Levine · · Score: 2

      No. It's the hero's geeky friend who hacks into the system which buys time for the well muscled hero to overpower the generic olive skinned hijackers (who are armed with machine guns that they somehow smuggled on board) with his bare hands and whatever he finds lying around.

      --
      My sci-fi novel, Ghost Thief, is now available from Amazon.com.
    32. Re:not the real question by deadweight · · Score: 5, Informative

      I am a commercial pilot and the term "dog tailing" is a new one for me. Also I would *very much* notice an uncommanded change in engine power.

    33. Re:not the real question by cgfsd · · Score: 2

      At DefCon last year there was seminar on plane hacking given by what I consider a definite expert. He was a commercial airline pilot and certified mechanic and a computer hacker to boot.
      Other than the 777, the avionics of a plane do not use TCP/IP and therefore cannot communicate with a PC without a special adapter plugged directly into the avionics.
      Awesome seminar, but the speaker did bring up the potential in the future if airplane builders were not careful.

    34. Re:not the real question by grimmjeeper · · Score: 2

      If that's the case, I'd assert that it's even less likely he was able to hack in.

      I've written more than my share of ARINC 429 drivers and code that uses them. Hacking into a box at one end of a 429 connection so you can pass the data you want is significantly harder, especially in older aircraft which use more primitive operating systems (if they use an operating system at all). It's not like they're running off-the-shelf Linux with everything enabled. If they have a full operating system it will be something like VxWorks or Green Hills Integrity. Beyond that, you're not using the full RTOS, you're using the ARINC 653 compliant subset that has some pretty robust partitioning. And when you set them up for your system, you take out the parts you aren't planning on using so you have less to certify. There are no service ports left open on the IP stack. There are no terminals or file transfer services to hack into. Hell, many (most?) of those types of systems don't even have a file system at all. And if you're trying to hack a pre-RTOS era box, you have an IP stack that was customized specifically for the box to provide only the services required for that box and every other port will be closed. They were pretty adamant that the ports we were going to use were the only ones you could use when I had to run my IP stack through the testing gauntlet in the pre-RTOS days, not to mention that every single packet had to be screened for validity before it was accepted. They did quite a bit of testing to make sure we didn't have any "undefined behavior" resulting from corrupted or incorrectly formatted packets.

      If you manage to get hacked packets to the box, you still have to find your way through the very custom software to get anything specific out of the 429 port at the other side. Which in most cases is virtually impossible because it's specifically designed to pass only the data it expects to pass. Then you have to deal with how to get the data you want through the 429 network. That's a network which has very specific message handling built into it and each computer using it configures their software to route the 32 bit packets very specifically. Keep in mind that 8 bits out of those 32 bits is the routing label that determines what the packet is used for. If the receiver isn't expecting a specific label, it will drop the packet. Beyond that, 429 is a single point to single point connection. The protocol has no provision for routing packets past that. You have to specifically design a computer to forward the data between two connections. And when you do that, you only route just the very specific data you want to route. You don't design it to accept any data from anywhere and pass it on to everywhere else. That's a huge safety hazard. Engine control data coming from the GPS interface simply doesn't get passed through the data concentrator because that's not where it's designed to come from.

      If that weren't enough, you have to add in the fact that out of the 32 bit packet, you really only have 21 bits for payload, broken up in a couple of different ways depending on what you're sending. Every given routing label identifies what data is being sent. And for a lot of it, they only ever send one packet on a periodic basis for status update. It's a lot less common to send multi-word packet sequences. Even then, they're very specifically formatted and there's heavy range checking and so forth on expected vs received values for safety reasons. So it's not like there's a lot of room to pack in anything to hack with.

      The more I read about this the less I believe he could actually hack a real plane.

  2. Hmmm... by fuzzyfuzzyfungus · · Score: 4, Insightful

    It's almost as though the FBI is being hamfisted and incompetent again; but that couldn't be right...

  3. I wonder how this will affect SC? by chris200x9 · · Score: 4, Funny

    I wonder how this will affect the development of Star Citizen?

  4. Boeing Engineers... by mbone · · Score: 2, Informative

    I have talked to Boeing Engineers about this in the past. They say that (both with present systems and new all IP based systems) there is a total physical and logical separation between the three types of networks on a plane (basically, pilot command and control, airplane maintenance networking, and passenger facing networking). They were pretty firm on this separation being inviolable, due to the obvious safety aspects. Either Chris Roberts is blowing smoke, or some pretty smart people made some pretty basic mistakes.

    1. Re:Boeing Engineers... by grimmjeeper · · Score: 5, Informative

      Logical? Yes. Physical? No.

      Speaking as someone who worked for a Boeing subcontractor who designed their on board computers, I can tell you that there is a physical connection. There's only one set of SATCOM radios on board. The avionics systems use it for some of their communications and have for a long time. The airlines wanted to monetize the extra bandwidth by selling access to the passengers for a price. I am told they didn't add a second set of radios to provide bandwidth to the passengers.

      So at the very least, there is a switch that connects the avionics network, the in flight entertainment network, and the SATCOM radios. And while this is a physical connection, there is a fair amount of confidence that it's still a logical separation. The AFDX/ARINC 664 standard is pretty extensive and allows for very strict connection management. While Roberts may have been able to get a packet out of the IFE network and have it look like an engine control message, there's very little chance that packet would make it anywhere close to the engine control computer. Of course, that assumes that the avionics network was set up correctly. And that's a pretty good assumption given the safety requirements in place for avionics design. Still, there's that one in a million shot that there is an exploitable flaw. It's probably less chance than that, but it's not guaranteed to be zero.

    2. Re:Boeing Engineers... by PPH · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Except that Boeing asked the FAA for a Special Condition to allow just such an interconnection.

      --
      Have gnu, will travel.
    3. Re:Boeing Engineers... by I'm+not+god+any+more · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Except that Boeing asked the FAA for a Special Condition to allow just such an interconnection.

      Which was granted: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granu...

    4. Re:Boeing Engineers... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Informative

      Specifically, I suspect he set up his basement simulator with a regular commercial ethernet router standing in for a real ARINC 664 / AFDX router. An ethernet router will route AFDX packets just fine, since they look the same, but it will also pass malformed packets, packets that are not in the ICD, and packets that are sent at the wrong time. A real AFDX router has a table of every packet that's allowed on the network, along with the specific times when these packets are to be sent, and it drops any noncompliant packets. This is done to eliminate any chance of frame collisions, but it's also makes a lot of traditional attacks very difficult.

  5. Sounds like a bad translation by Ken_g6 · · Score: 4, Funny
    --
    (T>t && O(n)--) == sqrt(666)
  6. Re:Two radios? by grimmjeeper · · Score: 3, Informative

    Because that adds weight and power consumption for no good reason. When it comes to that, the airlines and the manufacturers are pretty religious about reducing both. Every extra ounce reduces fuel efficiency. Every milliwatt consumed reduces efficiency. If you don't have to have two separate GPS units, you're not going to have them on the plane. The networking standards for avionics systems are capable of having the two networks connected together to share the data without letting one impact the other. So they do it that way rather than have two receivers on board.

  7. Never underestimate... by Big_Oh · · Score: 2

    Never underestimate the ability of non-security programmers and hardware people to overestimate their own security prowess.

  8. Unforeseen consequences by WD · · Score: 2

    When doing security testing of any system, one must consider the possibility of unforeseen consequences. That is, while you think that your test may be harmless, you'll really never know this for sure until you perform the test. And even then, you might not know of all possible damage that was done to the system.

    Just as system architects and developers make certain assumptions that may introduce vulnerabilities, a security tester may make assumptions about the consequences of their actions. The problems happen when these assumptions don't map up to reality 100%.

    Yes, airplanes' computer systems should receive security testing. But to perform any sort of testing without authorization and when there are potential safety (human life) consequences is inconceivably irresponsible. Regardless of whether or not the tester suspects any damage will occur.

  9. Re:Anyone who knows avionics knows he's full of sh by cozytom · · Score: 2

    The Avionic box was probably designed in 1984, using hardened chips of the day. Chances are, it uses a 80186 or something of equal power, but no Linux, or Windows. Certainly there was never an IP stack in the OS, and there were never any ethernet connectors on the box. There is an ARINC-422 connection, which is mostly GPIO pins, not much serial.

    Yes, there could be updates to the box, but the certification process is very time consuming. There are paths for software updates, but the hardware has almost no changes over the last 30 years.

    Yes, Chris Roberts is full of Sh** and is causing peoples heads to explode for no good reason.