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Antineutrino Detectors Could Be Key To Monitoring Iran's Nuclear Program
agent elevator writes: Tech that analyzes antineutrinos might be the best way to keep tabs on Iran's nuclear program. The technology, which can tell how much of and what kind of plutonium and uranium are nearby, should be ready to serve as a nuclear safeguard in less than two years, according to IEEE Spectrum. In a simulation of the Arak nuclear plant, which the Iran deal requires be redesigned to make less plutonium, a detector parked outside in a shipping container could do the job.
Now that Iran is going to get nukes, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are going to try to get them, too.
And thanks to Obumble's fecklessness with Ukraine (provoke a regime change that you know will lead to war, then run away), there isn't any country on Earth that is going to be willing to give up nukes ever again.
This isn't the Hope and Change you expected, now is it?
- Massive surveillance state
- "Extrajudicial" killings of US citizens
- Regime change in Libya that led to one of the worst failed states ever (and you thought Iraq was bad? But we can't publicized The Won's FAILURE in Libya, now can we?)
- "The JV" in control of 3/4 of Syria and 1/3 of Iraq and inspiring if not actually conducting terrorist attacks inside the US.
- Iran nuclear deal where Iran gets out from under crippling sanctions for paper promises they're going to walk away from (aka taqiya)
I agree that a new gadget doesn't actually change anything about nuclear monitoring in Iran. Also, you may want to see what IAEA actually said about Iran before making such a strong statement. You're flat out wrong about the IAEA and Iran. The IAEA repeatedly complained about Iran's lack of cooperation and militarization of nuclear sites. I also think you're underestimating the leverage the Iran had here. The US didn't have a choice, we HAD to make a deal because we lost this fight.
You can't argue that Iran enriched to bombmaking levels and simultaneously claim they didn't pursue a weapon. Uranium for energy is 4% enriched. Uranium for a bomb practically starts at 20% enriched. Iran took material up to between 19% and 20%. Cute, because research reactors use that grade, but Iran was producing much more 19.75% LEU per month than their research reactors could use in a year. Using this material in an electricity generating reactor is needlessly expensive and wasteful. In sufficient quantities, this material can be made into a bomb, and Iran passed this "sufficient quantity" line a while ago. The purpose of IAEA inspections (and UN resolutions, sabotage, assassinations, sanctions, etc.) was to prevent this from happening. Crossing this line didn't send a message that they're just doing research or working on power systems. The message they sent to the international community is that they effectively had a bomb, and we couldn't stop them. That they then came to the negotiating table willing to throw that material out speaks to their willingness to be a civilized member of global society. Doubters will expect to see some of that material end up in the hands of terrorists, but whether that happens or not is a real test of Iranian intentions. If Iran simply wanted to nuke Israel, they could have done that already.
It's not likely that they simply want a civilian power industry. If that's so, they're going about this very differently than other countries have. The "normal" way to do power industry uranium enrichment is to run enrichment using a multinational corporate entity "owned" by multiple governments. In this way, regional and worldwide rivals can keep eachother in check while ensuring a domestic, cost-effective supply of uranium. Brazil, Argentina, Germany, the Netherlands and Japan all have civilian power industries without weapons programs and without nationalized uranium enrichment. Each of those countries went through this transition to regional nuclear (electricity) power without the drama and dangerous actions Iran has taken (kicking out the IAEA inspectors).
Now, it's completely absurd to argue that Iran will make money off of enriching uranium, the market is not there, and will not develop in the foreseeable future. The worldwide capacity for uranium enrichment is far in excess of what the power industry needs. After Fukushima, there is a huge surplus of power-grade uranium out there. Russia, in particular, runs it's enrichment factories well below capacity. Russia would love to supply uranium all over central Asia.
It is also absurd to argue that that Iran would be unable to create a domestic source of uranium for electricity using the international standard structures. Several other regional power level countries have done this. Early in negotiations, when everyone thought Iran simply wanted a power industry, Russia offered to partner with them in the normal way. It would make sense for Iran to partner with other regional powers getting into nuclear energy (Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan) as well. That we don't see the typical partnership out of this strongly implies that Iran wants more than a power industry. They want to be treated like part of the "nuclear weapon club" without triggering immediate war with Israel by actually testing a bomb.
None of this means that the deal with Iran is bad, but everyone needs to be realistic about what's really going on. Iran has effectively had a bo