Mozilla Breaks Its Own Promise, Allows Symantec To Issue Insecure Certificates (softpedia.com)
An anonymous reader writes: After researchers discovered that SHA-1 can be decrypted, Mozilla, together with Microsoft and Google, said they will no longer "trust" SHA-1-based certificates issued after January 1, 2016, and later stop supporting any type of SHA-1 certificates after June 30, 2016, or January 1, 2017. The foundation went back on its word this week, when Symantec begged Mozilla to allow it to issue nine new certificates for one of its clients, Worldpay PLC, which forgot to request these certificates before January 1. Symantec got what it wanted. Fortunately, other companies like Microsoft, Apple, or Google didn't cave under the pressure.
Hashes are not encryption. Plans are not promises.
NB: The message above might reflect my opinion right now, but not necessarily tomorrow or next year.
Mozilla "bowed to pressure" over making a version of Firefox without pocket, australis and hello.
Mozilla needs to be shut down and replaced by a competent browser making organization.
Once again we are reminded of the truly sad state of business security.
From TFA:
A company representative has informed Mozilla that one of its clients, Worldpay PLC, has asked for nine new SHA-1 certificates. Symantec explains that Worlpay has forgot to ask for nine new SHA-1 certificates for some of its servers that process SSL/TLS communications for over 10,000 payment terminals across the world. Worldpay blames this situation on a communications mishap. They say that someone forgot to ask for these certificates before the January 1 deadline.
The purpose of the January 1 deadline was supposed to be "Hey, your shit is not secure, you need to change to something else". It was NOT intended as "Hurry up and get all your shitty insecure SHA-1 certificates right away before we stop giving them out on Jan 1".
Well, at least Mozilla never promised that they wouldn't completely fuck up Firefox and render it irrelevant.
i guess it's time to switch to chrome?
I switched to firefox recently. It's great; the browser for android (chrome's out of the running as it doesn't support plugins,so you're stick with whatever ads or javascript the sites (and the ads running on the sites) feel like serving up) is the best out there, and the desktop one is great too. I hear people whining about firefox occasionally but i don't get it. Perhaps they're running hardware older than the 5 year old desktop i'm running.
I would have let you pay for that favour.
I hope, but I also detest that Mozilla did exactly that.
Couldn't Symantec simply set the certificate date to be valid from 31 December of 2015?
Also, why would I trust Worldpay PLC with any business if they can screw up something as simple as renewing certificates?
So I can make sure they go in the Untrusted Certs folder where they belong?
I like you, Stuart. You're not like everyone else, here, at Slashdot.
So this "blunder" means that user's payments aren't going through, and now the work around is to ensure the user's payments are no longer secure?
Sorry but I'd prefer my payment to not go through. I want no business with people who refuse to secure my financial transactions, I mean it's not like there wasn't a warning. Mozilla is again showing that they don't give a shit about users.
But the article gives rise to another interesting issue, it implies there may have been a rush on renewals for SHA-1 certs. This kicking the can down the road approach deserves naming and shaming.
I use uBlock and Disconnect and a handful of other extensions. I never have issues with ads or javascript.
Only the State obtains its revenue by coercion. - Murray Rothbard
Man, you managed to read that far into the article but not the next 2 paragraphs. I can't tell if you're being purposefully disenginous or if your attention span is that short... For the record, the next two paragraphs state:
The company says they are already in the midst of the process of updating their servers to SHA-2, but this blunder now puts some of its users in danger of not having their payments go through.
Internally, Mozilla has agreed to allow Symantec to issue these certificates under two conditions: the entire process should be transparent, and that the certificates should expire after only 90 days.
First, why are they only "in the midst of updating" after the deadline has already has passed? This should have been done already. This goes back to my original point -- their attitude was not "hey we need to upgrade before Jan1". It was "we just need to hurry up and get some new certs before Jan 1 and then we can fuck off and do nothing for another year".
Second, what do you think is REALLY going to happen in 90 days?
First, why are they only "in the midst of updating" after the deadline has already has passed? This should have been done already.
Payment systems upgrades can be year-long projects. Recertifying with your bank and other partners takes months. And with everyone having to do it at the same time, everyone is stretched thin getting it all done.
Nope, no sig
I use uBlock and Disconnect and a handful of other extensions. I never have issues with ads or javascript.
Don't worry, Mozilla are working hard to change that (via deprecation of the extension API).
Just use the Ghostery browser on you phone - no plugins needed.
"Transparent" is a shit show that trades on every stereotype going. A man in drag is NOT a transsexual.
ArgleBargle, thanks for the clarifications.
What you said is the opposite of Argle Bargle: "Copious but meaningless talk or writing; nonsense".
I should have added, on Chrome.
Only the State obtains its revenue by coercion. - Murray Rothbard
The danger in issuing a certificate with a weak signature (like SHA1 today) is that the entity requesting the certificate (WorldPay in this case) is planning to take the signature from that certificate and apply it to another certificate, effectively forging the signature of the CA to create another valid certificate without the CA's blessing. In order to pull this off, the requestor needs to first find a hash collision (leveraging the weakness of the signature algorithm) and then anticipate exactly what's going to be in the issued certificate from the CA, down to the byte, before submitting the request.
Thus, the date of actual certificate issuance is the important date for security, not the date that it expires, since each passing day makes SHA-1 more breakable. But once the certificate has been issued, your window for breaking it has closed. This is the justification for disallowing any SHA1 issuance after 1/1/16, but allowing up to 39 month durations on certificates issued on 12/31/15 (though it was recommended that they expire by 12/31/16.)
In order to compensate for allowing this more dangerous issuance after the cutoff date, Mozilla imposed a requirement on these certificates that the serial number contain at least 80 random bits. This requirement effectively eliminates the risk of the SHA1 signature because now the contents of the final certificate are totally unpredictable to WorldPay. So I don't see how these certificates themselves could pose any threat to security, for those using the payment terminals in question, or for the larger internet community.
The best argument against allowing them to be issued is the precedent it sets. Will Mozilla now find themselves swimming in other such requests for the rest of the year? Mozilla had to weigh that risk against the economic damage that would have been caused to the 10,000 merchants who would suddenly lose their ability to take payments, and I personally think they made the right call.
I am using Chrome with Adblock Plus on Android. As long as you can change the proxy settings for WiFi and mobile connections (and I can) it works fine. My phone (Sony Xperia Z3) is not even rooted. You have to download it from the Adblock site as Google have blocked it from the Play store.
Payment systems upgrades can be year-long projects. Recertifying with your bank and other partners takes months. And with everyone having to do it at the same time, everyone is stretched thin getting it all done.
Well, it's a good thing for them that NIST declared that "SHA-1 shall not be used for digital signature generation after December 31, 2013", back in January of 2011. They should be done with their year-long POS upgrade by sometime in 2012 at the latest.
Maybe businesses should follow actual security best practices instead of waiting for ultimatums.
If you want a vision of the future, imagine a youtube comments section scrolling - forever.
NIST isn't the standards body retailers care about. That would be PCI, the organization that determines who can take credit cards. And their deadline was not in 2013. http://www.businesswire.com/ne...
Nope, no sig
The last bastion turned out to be a house of cards after all.
And Microsoft and Google weren't the highest bidders this time.
firefox me.
WARNING: Smartphones have side effects--most of them undocumented.
How can anybody trust a "security" company that is literally crying to have people accept insecure certificates? Absolutely mindboggling.
It's really unfortunate, too... Symantec used to be top of the game.
No you haven't. (Note that I'm talking about Android.)