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The Case Against Ratifying the Trans Pacific Partnership (michaelgeist.ca)
An anonymous reader writes: For the past two and a half months, Canadian law professor Michael
Geist has been writing a daily series on the trouble with the
Trans Pacific Partnership. The 50 part series wrapped up today with
the
case against ratifying the TPP. While the focus is on
Canadian issues, the series hits on problems that all 12 countries
face: unbalanced intellectual property rules, privacy risks, dangers
to the Internet and technology, cultural and health regulation, and
investor-state settlement rules that could cost countries billions
of dollars.
Wage trends in China indicate the "race to the bottom" is actually a race to the middle.
the first truly global power
Only if we ignore the Chinese, Mongolians, and English. At various times in their history, they too were the dominate global powers of their day (with the Mongolians dominant to the point that they had two significant military defeats on the battlefield over a half century period). And the English both at their peak and currently have the ability to globally project military power.
What kept these powers from being being Brzezinski's first "truly global power"? The same sort of institutional and infrastructural limitations that will keep the US from being the first "truly global power" too.
For example, if the Mongolian empire could have kept its shit together for a couple of centuries, we'll all be speaking some derivative of Mongolian now. But they couldn't. They didn't have the infrastructure, technology, or culture to maintain such a vast empire for more than a human lifespan.
While the US is in a good position now, it's just not that powerful a position. It's relatively weak economically and militarily. The EU, China, and Japan are close enough economically that the US just can't throw its weight around in trade treaties. Similarly, Russia and China are close enough militarily that the US can't throw around its weight that way. Both the EU and Japan can build their militaries as well to be credible counters too.
Then there's the institutional obstacles. Even if we ignore the considerable public opposition to empire-building, we still have a rather corrupt and profoundly inefficient military procurement system. In a world where future global military adventures will be fought and frequently won with technology and where even small wars cost a lot for the US, this is a lethal flaw which I think will knock the US out of superpower status sooner or later.
There's also the incompetence of many of the political leaders of the US. For example, between Presidents G. W. Bush and Obama, the US almost lost Iraq to ISIS. If that had happened, I believe the US would have effectively lost superpower status since a lot of the hegemony that the US maintains is based on relationships and credibility.
Not to discount the bad aspects of the TPP (intellectual property BS, etc), but I'll attempt to make a Devil's Advocate pitch for the 'good' side from the US perspective.
The first is that most of the NAFTA comparisons aren't exactly accurate, in that a free trade agreement with a significantly less developed nation has more downsides than one with a similarly advanced nation. For instance, when people complain about NAFTA, they're complaining about Mexico, not Canada. The USA had a free trade agreement with Canada that predated NAFTA, and it's really never been an issue. TPP includes several nations that are similarly advanced, and with whom free trade will likely be entirely beneficial, such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore. (Canada is part of the TPP, but the USA already has a free trade agreement with them). Of the less developed nations, we already have a free trade agreement with the most impactful (Mexico).
Probably the biggest upside would be cementing an anti-China (or at least counterweight to China) trade bloc in the Asia Pacific region. A lot of people talk about China or outsourcing to China, but China's not a part of this deal, nor is it presently in consideration to do so, as it's not even on the list of potential second-wave candidates (South Korea, Indonesia, Colombia, Taiwan, Philippines, Thailand). It also includes a number of key U.S. allies in the region, and could ideally bolster those economies vis a vis China.
It also opens those countries' markets to more U.products, and reduces a lot of the trade barriers that contribute to the existing trade deficit, such as Japan's agricultural import restrictions, for one.