Google Is Working To Safeguard Chrome From Quantum Computers (theverge.com)
Quantum computing could potentially someday be used to retroactively break any communications that were encrypted with today's standard encryption algorithms. Google realizes this, and hence, is ensuring that it doesn't happen. Today, it announced that it has begun to deploy a new type of cryptography called the New Hope algorithm in its Chrome Canary browser that is designed to prevent such decryption attacks. From a report on The Verge: Although quantum computers of this variety are only small and experimental at this stage, Google is taking precautions for the worst case scenario. "While they will, no doubt, be of huge benefit in some areas of study, some of the problems that they [quantum computers] are effective at solving are the ones that we use to secure digital communications," writes Matt Braithwaite, a Google software engineer, in a blog post. "Specifically, if large quantum computers can be built then they may be able to break the asymmetric cryptographic primitives that are currently used in TLS, the security protocol behind HTTPS." In other words, quantum computers could undermine the security of the entire internet. Quantum computers promise computational power far exceeding today's standards by taking advantage of the underpinning physics discipline. So the presence of a hypothetical future quantum computer, Braithwaite adds, puts at risk any and all encrypted internet communication past or present. It's unclear how secure New Hope (PDF) will prove to be for Chrome, and Braithwaite admits it could be less secure than its existing encryption. But Google says New Hope -- developed by researchers Erdem Alkim, Leo Ducas, Thomas Poppelmann and Peter Schwabe -- was the most promising of all post-quantum key-exchange software it looked into last year.
I wouldn't buy Quantum Bigfoot hard drives back in the day. I'm sure as hell not buying a Quantum computer any time soon.
"security of the entire internet."
The author of this nugget doesn't know, apparently, that the Internet was never designed to be secure, and any attempt to make it so will inevitably fail. The Internet was designed to facilitate the OPEN exchange of information.
I don't respond to AC's.
Post-Quantum cryptography, but still can't give us an option to disable middle click scrolling on Windows.
somehow, I don't fully trust google to safeguard ANY privacy.
I know they have the financial ability to do major work like this, but their results are 100% untrustable, given WHO they are and WHAT they do.
damn. we could use a good ally on the freedom trail; but google will NEVER be it.
--
"It is now safe to switch off your computer."
[...] a new type of cryptography called the New Hope algorithm [...]
Maybe it's just me, but I have some reservations using an encryption technology with the word "Hope" in the name--as in, "We really hope this works." It's kind of like PGP, "Pretty Good Privacy." It's not great, but it's pretty good.
Granted, what's in a name? Take the same encryption and call it "Anti-Quantum Encryption" and I'd probably be on board.
Why do you feel the need to keep repeating this? Do you think doing so will suddenly make it true?
Ever hear of cryptography? Ever hear of IPSec, for example, not to mention the numerous protocols- TLS, PGP, SSH, the Signal protocol, etc. etc. etc.? What about the underlying nature of "the Internet" are you saying makes security layers on top of it "inevitably fail?"
It's not really fair to call what a quantum computer does "computational power", is it? If you factor N by trying all the integers greater than one and smaller than M= floor( square root ( N ) ), you will eventually find the answer, and the more computational power you have, the faster you can race from 2 to M. Using Shor's algorithm on a quantum machine, you don't actually end up doing all of the intervening computation, but you do get the answer. But that doesn't mean you can automatically take any set of problems and "solve them all at once", because that isn't really what is happening. It's not computational power in that sense, right?
The core problem with pushing "post quantum" crypto into production is you are essentially making choices in the blind based exclusively on fear and *baseless* speculation. There is no affirmative evidence of any kind Quantum computers with the capability to crack crypto are even possible let alone expected in the near to medium term.
I can't help but wonder if at least some of those pushing "post quantum" crypto are intentionally making a play to nerf security more than it already is.
There are a million practical things Google could elect to do to improve real world practical security starting with not reading everyone's email to applying TLS-SRP patches to enable secure password authentication to making Android less of a security joke. Time spent on post quantum crap is time not spent addressing actual threats we know for sure exist in the real world.
What US government did support regime changes that resulted in major bloodshed? Was there one?
I'm not anything approaching a cryptoanalyst; but my understanding is that TLS has been 'broken' at various times because of either implementation flaws or legacy-compatibility stuff not being dropped fast enough(and there's the minor problem of CAs being a total clusterfuck); but that these breaks were of the somewhat less scary kind that can be fixed by deprecating a specific cipher, or increasing a key length, or patching/replacing a specific flawed implementation.
A development of the 'hahaha, prime factorization is now trivial!' flavor would be the sort of ugly break where fundamental underlying assumptions are no longer correct and there no amount of incremental fixing will work.
According to Google's blog post:
Today we're announcing an experiment in Chrome where a small fraction of connections between desktop Chrome and Google's servers will use a post-quantum key-exchange algorithm in addition to the elliptic-curve key-exchange algorithm that would typically be used. By adding a post-quantum algorithm on top of the existing one, we are able to experiment without affecting user security. The post-quantum algorithm might turn out to be breakable even with today's computers, in which case the elliptic-curve algorithm will still provide the best security that today’s technology can offer. Alternatively, if the post-quantum algorithm turns out to be secure then it'll protect the connection even against a future, quantum computer.
If I read this correctly, they are using "New Hope" in combination with an existing algorithm.
That is actually slightly less scary than a fast factorization algorithm. If you could factor, then you could calculate the root CAs private keys from their certificates, but also you could retroactively decrypt any communication that was intercepted in the past and decrypt it. If the CA private keys were released alone, it would not allow you to retroactively decrypt anything because Diffie-Hellman key exchange provides perfect forward secrecy that ensures retroactive decryption is not possible even if you later learn the private key.